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Letter From Oceanside Collegiate Academy To Charter Institute at Erskine
Letter From Oceanside Collegiate Academy To Charter Institute at Erskine
VIA E-MAIL
Charter Institute at Erskine Board of Directors
1201 Main Street, Suite 300
Columbia, SC 29201
We are in receipt of a letter from the Superintendent of the Charter Institute at Erskine
sent by email at 6:16 p.m. on May 2, 2024. The letter states that on May 2, 2024, the Charter Institute at
Erskine Board of Directors voted to issue a Notice of Revocation of Oceanside Collegiate Academy’s
charter effective June 30, 2024, subject to a hearing and final action.
OCA has an “Excellent” rating on its State Report Card, a 100% graduation rate, and
many consecutive years of clean audits from independent CPA audit firms pre-approved by the State
Auditor to conduct charter school audits, as recognized by the State Department of Education:
https://ed.sc.gov/finance/auditing/information-memos-and-forms/audit-firm-approval-for-school-
districts/. OCA serves approximately 650 students, is at full capacity, and has hundreds of students on
the waitlist. The State Department of Education recently recognized OCA as a Palmetto Gold Award
winner. In November 2023, the Institute recognized OCA as a Diamond School of Excellence and a
Platinum School of Distinction.
Neither the Institute’s recommendation, vote, nor written notification to revoke OCA’s
charter complied with the requirements of the South Carolina Charter Schools Act (the “Act”), the South
Carolina Ethics Reform Act (the “Ethics Reform Act”), or other applicable law.
I. The Institute’s Vote and Written Notification Failed to Comply with the Act
[a]t least sixty days before not renewing or terminating a charter school, the
sponsor shall notify in writing the charter school’s governing body of the
proposed action. The notification shall state the grounds for the proposed
action in reasonable detail. Termination must follow the procedure provided
for in this section.
S.C. Code Ann. § 59-40-110(F). The South Carolina Administrative Law Court, which
has jurisdiction to hear appeals of revocation proceedings pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 59-40-110(J),
has repeatedly applied the sixty-day notice requirement to begin at the time the sponsor board sends
written notification to the charter school’s governing board. See S.C. Calvert Academy v. The South
Carolina Public Charter School District, 2017 WL 2685359 (June 13, 2017); Quest Leadership
Academy v. South Carolina Public Charter School District Board of Trustees, 2019 WL 3713745 (July
25, 2019). With respect to exhaustion of the sixty-day requirement, the South Carolina Administrative
Law Court has held that “it is clear that the sixty-day notice refers to the date revocation becomes
effective, i.e. the date of closure of the school.” See S.C. Calvert Academy v. The South Carolina Public
Charter School District, 2017 WL 2685359 (June 13, 2017).
In this instance, the Institute sent OCA 58 days, five hours, and 44 minutes’ written notice
of the proposed termination of OCA’s charter effective June 30, 2024. Therefore, the Institute’s vote and
written notification were legally invalid because they failed to comply with the Act’s mandated timeline
for revocation.
On May 2, 2024, in a public board meeting, the Institute’s Superintendent, Mr. Cameron
Runyan, presented his recommendation to revoke OCA’s charter effective June 30, 2024, to the Institute
Board. Immediately after receiving Mr. Runyan’s recommendation, the Institute Board voted to revoke
OCA’s charter effective June 30, 2024. Mr. Runyan’s recommendation and the Institute Board’s vote
occurred only days after the South Carolina Senate and House of Representatives each included in their
respective 2024-2025 proposed budgets a proviso (1.105) that would allow OCA to assign its charter
and contract to a different sponsor effective July 1, 2024, given that Erskine College is on warning for
significant noncompliance with its accrediting authority, the Southern Association of Colleges and
Schools (SACS). Exhibit A.
OCA has pending legal claims against Mr. Runyan in his individual capacity, along with
the Institute and Erskine College. Mr. Runyan previously filed a motion in court to dismiss OCA’s claims
against him in his individual capacity. The South Carolina Circuit Court denied Mr. Runyan’s motion to
dismiss claims against him in his individual capacity. Exhibit B. The Circuit Court found that the
Plaintiffs “have alleged facts that Defendant Runyan acted with actual malice or intent to harm OCA.”
Exhibit B, p. 10. The Court noted that such actions would not be protected by the South Carolina Tort
Claims Act, and the Court declined to dismiss the claims against Mr. Runyan in his individual capacity.
OCA is seeking monetary damages from Mr. Runyan, the Institute, and Erskine College in the lawsuit.
Mr. Runyan has a personal monetary interest in preventing OCA from prosecuting legal
claims against him in his individual capacity. If OCA’s charter was revoked and OCA dissolved before
OCA could assign its charter and contract to a different sponsor on July 1, 2024, all of OCA’s assets
would become property of its existing sponsor pursuant to the Act. S.C. Code Ann. § 59-40-120. The
loss of all assets would not only eliminate OCA’s ability to serve 650 families in its community, but it
would also impair OCA’s ability to prosecute its lawsuit against and seek monetary damages from Mr.
Runyan in his individual capacity.
The Ethics Reform Act governs conflicts of interest of public employees. S.C. Code Ann.
§ 8-13-700 et seq. The Ethics Reform Act prohibits a public employee from making, participating in
making, or in any way attempting to use his employment to influence a governmental decision in which
he has an economic interest. S.C. Code Ann. § 8-13-700(B). Mr. Runyan has an economic interest in
May 13, 2024
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revoking OCA’s charter and impairing OCA’s ability to prosecute its lawsuit against him in his
individual capacity. Mr. Runyan used his employment as Superintendent of the Institute to recommend
to the Institute Board that it revoke OCA’s charter effective June 30, 2024, one day before OCA could
move to a different sponsor pursuant to 2024-2025 Budget Proviso 1.105. Mr. Runyan did so even
though his recommendation violated the mandatory timeline for revocation under the Act. S.C. Code
Ann. § 59-40-110(F). In summary, Mr. Runyan acted to influence a governmental decision in which he
has an economic interest. Rather than Mr. Runyan disclosing his conflict of interest and recusing himself
from the meeting as required under the Ethics Reform Act, Mr. Runyan violated the Ethics Reform Act.
The Institute Board not only allowed the violation to occur, but also took a vote to revoke OCA’s charter
based on Mr. Runyan’s illegal recommendation.
III. Conclusion
The Institute is restricted from spending funds in a manner that is inconsistent with the
Act. Fiscal Year 2024-2025 General Appropriations Act, H. 5100, 125th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.,
Proviso 1.106 (S.C. 2024) (“If the Superintendent of Education discovers a violation of this provision,
she may declare that the authorizer no longer has the authority to charter or authorize schools and all
schools may apply to transfer to a different authorizer.”). On January 17, 2024, the Institute Board passed
a Resolution stating that the Institute will expend funds in alignment with state and federal law.
However, the Institute utilized public funds and resources to call a special meeting on May 2, 2024,
during which Mr. Runyan recommended and the Institute Board voted to revoke OCA’s charter effective
June 30, 2024, in contravention of the Act’s mandated timeline for revocation and in violation of the
Ethics Reform Act. Accordingly, we respectfully request that the Institute Board rescind and withdraw
its illegal vote on May 2, 2024, to revoke OCA’s charter effective June 30, 2024.
If the Institute Board refuses to rescind and withdraw its illegal vote on May 2, 2024,
OCA hereby requests a hearing. 1 OCA’s appearance at any hearing shall not be construed as OCA’s
acquiescence to the Institute’s noncompliance with applicable law, a waiver of OCA’s rights under
applicable law, or OCA’s voluntary participation in legal revocation procedures.
Sincerely,
1
A hearing based on the illegal recommendation, vote, and notification on May 2, 2024, would involve the Institute expending
additional public funds and resources in violation of the Act and would provide the State Superintendent of Education further
justification to declare that Erskine College and the Institute no longer have the authority to serve as a charter school
authorizer. 2024-2025 General Appropriations Act, H. 5100, 125th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., Proviso 1.106 (S.C. 2024)
Exhibit A
Southern Association of Colleges and Schools
Commission on Colleges (SACSCOC)
http://www.sacscoc.org
The following publicly available information is provided by the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools Commission on Colleges
(SACSCOC) concerning the accreditation of Erskine College. Information presented below is in accord with SACSCOC’s disclosure
policy; SACSCOC staff cannot comment further on questions specifically related to Erskine College. The institution has reviewed this
statement prior to public posting and was invited to submit official comments regarding SACSCOC Board of Trustees action.
Action by SACSCOC Board of Trustees took place on December 4, 2022, and the institution’s next review is December 2023.
What is the accreditation status of Erskine College? Erskine College is accredited by the Southern Association of Colleges and
Schools Commission on Colleges; however, the institution was denied reaffirmation, continued in accreditation, and placed on
Warning for twelve (12) months following SACSCOC Board action on its comprehensive decennial review. SACSCOC accreditation
includes all components of the institution—all programs, branch campuses, off-campus sites, and distance education programs as
reported to SACSCOC; thus, the Warning status applies to the entire institution.
What does it mean to be denied reaffirmation, continued in accreditation, and placed on Warning? A Warning imposed by the
SACSCOC Board of Trustees at the time of an institution’s comprehensive decennial review follows a determination of significant non-
compliance with the Core Requirements or Standards of the Principles of Accreditation—the accreditation standards of SACSCOC—
failure to make timely and significant progress toward correcting the deficiencies that led to the findings of non-compliance; or failure to
comply with SACSCOC policies and procedures. The maximum total time during a monitoring period that an institution may be on
sanction is two years. In December 2023, Erskine College will have been on Warning for one (1) year. For additional information
about sanctions, see SACSCOC’s policy entitled “Sanctions, Denial of Reaffirmation and Removal from Membership.”
Why was Erskine College denied reaffirmation, continued in accreditation, and placed on Warning? Erskine College was
denied reaffirmation, continued in accreditation, and placed on Warning because the SACSCOC Board of Trustees determined that it
had failed to demonstrate compliance with the Principles of Accreditation, namely, Core Requirement 4.1 (Governing board
characteristics), Core Requirement 13.1 (Financial resources), and Standard 13.3 (Financial responsibility). These standards expect
an institution to (1) to have a governing board that (b) exercises fiduciary oversight of the institution; (2) to have sound financial
resources and a demonstrated, stable financial base to support the mission of the institution and the scope of its programs and
services; and (3) to manage its financial resources in a responsible manner. (To read the full statements for the standards cited
above, access the Principles of Accreditation: Foundation for Quality Enhancement.)
What will happen in December 2023? The SACSCOC Board of Trustees will consider the accreditation status of Erskine College
following a review of a Monitoring Report submitted by the institution addressing the standards cited above for non-compliance. The
Board will have the following options: (1) reaffirm accreditation and remove the institution from Warning without an additional report;
(2) reaffirm accreditation, remove the institution from Warning, and request a Follow-Up Report submitted at the same time as the
Fifth-Year Interim Report; (3) deny reaffirmation, continue accreditation, continue Warning, request a Monitoring Report, with or
without authorizing a Special Committee; (4) deny reaffirmation, continue accreditation, place the institution on Probation, request a
Monitoring Report, and authorize a Special Committee; and (5) remove the institution from membership for failure to comply with the
Principles of Accreditation. SACSCOC staff will not speculate on what decision might be made by the Board of Trustees in December
2023.
For additional information regarding SACSCOC’s accreditation process, access the Principles of Accreditation: Foundation for Quality
Enhancement
Southern Association of Colleges and Schools
Commission on Colleges (SACSCOC)
http://www.sacscoc.org
The following publicly available information is provided by the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools Commission on Colleges
(SACSCOC) concerning the accreditation of Erskine College. Information presented below is in accord with SACSCOC’s disclosure
policy; SACSCOC staff cannot comment further on questions specifically related to Erskine College. The institution has reviewed this
statement prior to public posting and was invited to submit official comments regarding SACSCOC Board of Trustees action.
Action by SACSCOC Board of Trustees took place on December 5, 2023, and the institution’s next review is December 2024.
What is the accreditation status of Erskine College? Erskine College is accredited by the Southern Association of Colleges and
Schools Commission on Colleges; however, the institution was denied reaffirmation, continued in accreditation, and continued on
Warning for twelve (12) months following SACSCOC Board action on its comprehensive decennial review. SACSCOC accreditation
includes all components of the institution—all programs, branch campuses, off-campus sites, and distance education programs as
reported to SACSCOC; thus, the Warning status applies to the entire institution.
What does it mean to be denied reaffirmation, continued in accreditation, and continued on Warning? A Warning imposed by
the SACSCOC Board of Trustees at the time of an institution’s comprehensive decennial review follows a determination of significant
non-compliance with the Core Requirements or Standards of the Principles of Accreditation—the accreditation standards of
SACSCOC—for failure to make timely and significant progress toward correcting the deficiencies that led to the findings of non-
compliance; or failure to comply with SACSCOC policies and procedures. The maximum total time during a monitoring period that an
institution may be on sanction is two years. In December 2024, Erskine College will have been on Warning for two (2) years. For
additional information about sanctions, see SACSCOC’s policy entitled “Sanctions, Denial of Reaffirmation and Removal from
Membership.”
Why was Erskine College denied reaffirmation, continued in accreditation, and continued on Warning? Erskine College was
denied reaffirmation, continued in accreditation, and continued on Warning because the SACSCOC Board of Trustees determined that
the institution failed to demonstrate compliance with the Principles of Accreditation, namely, Core Requirement 4.1 (Governing board
characteristics), Core Requirement 13.1 (Financial resources), and Standard 13.3 (Financial responsibility). These standards expect
an institution to (1) to have a governing board that (b) exercises fiduciary oversight of the institution; (2) to have sound financial
resources and a demonstrated, stable financial base to support the mission of the institution and the scope of its programs and
services; and (3) to manage its financial resources in a responsible manner. (To read the full statements for the standards cited
above, access the Principles of Accreditation: Foundation for Quality Enhancement.)
What will happen in December 2024? The SACSCOC Board of Trustees will consider the accreditation status of Erskine College
following a review of a Monitoring Report submitted by the institution addressing the standards cited above for non-compliance. The
Board will have the following options: (1) reaffirm accreditation and remove the institution from Warning without an additional report;
(2) reaffirm accreditation, remove the institution from Warning, and request a Follow-Up Report submitted at the same time as the
Fifth-Year Interim Report; (3) deny reaffirmation, recommend continued accreditation for Good Cause, place the institution on
Probation, request a Monitoring Report, and authorize a Special Committee visit; or (4) remove the institution from membership for
failure to comply with the Principles of Accreditation. SACSCOC staff will not speculate on what decision might be made by the Board
of Trustees in December 2024.
For additional information regarding SACSCOC’s accreditation process, access the Principles of Accreditation: Foundation for Quality
Enhancement.
Exhibit B
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STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA )
) IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
COUNTY OF RICHLAND ) FIFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon Motion by Defendants Erskine
College, The Charter Institute at Erskine (the “Institute”), and Cameron Runyan (collectively, the
“Erskine Defendants”), by and through their attorneys, seeking dismissal of all claims against them
pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1), 12(b)(2)1, and 12(b)(6) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.
Defendants also moved to strike all requests for punitive damages from the Complaint pursuant to
Rule 12(f), SCRCP. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and Strike Complaint is DENIED.
public charter school located in Mount Pleasant, South Carolina, serving students in grades nine
through twelve who choose to attend the school. Plaintiff Oceanside Collegiate Academy has been
serving students since 2016. Pursuant to the South Carolina Nonprofit Corporation Act (the
“Nonprofit Act”) and the South Carolina Charter Schools Act (the “Act”), Oceanside Collegiate
1
Although Defendants initially cited Rule 12(b)(2), SCRCP, lack of personal jurisdiction, in their Motion to Dismiss
as a basis for dismissal, Defendants abandoned this argument. To the extent this argument needs to be addressed, the
Court finds it has personal jurisdiction over each of the Defendants because each defendant is at home within South
Carolina.
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Academy is governed by a group of volunteer board members, the Board of Directors, who oversee
Oceanside Collegiate Academy’s governance, operations, and fiscal affairs (Plaintiffs Oceanside
Collegiate Academy and its Board of Directors are collectively referred to herein as “OCA”). OCA
Group (“Pinnacle”), to provide management services to OCA in exchange for a fee. Oceanside
duties to the Institute. Oceanside Collegiate Academy sought to transfer its charter from the South
Carolina Public Charter School District to Erskine College and the Institute effective July 1, 2018,
and OCA’s charter application was approved by the Institute Board on behalf of Erskine College
on November 3, 2017.
allegations to the OCA Board about Pinnacle’s handling of Oceanside Collegiate Academy’s
finances. OCA and representatives of the Institute agreed to engage an independent, qualified
auditor to conduct a review of the school’s finances under certain terms and conditions. However,
OCA and the Institute were subsequently unable to agree on the terms and conditions of the
proposed engagement.
In August 2020, the Institute sent OCA a communication through its legal counsel
threatening to enact the Institute’s Fraud Prevention Policy and stating that it had received an
“anonymous report” of “suspected corrupt or fraudulent conduct” by Pinnacle. The Institute and
Defendant Runyan also accused the OCA Board of failing to fulfill its statutory and fiduciary
duties. Thereafter, written communications were sent between OCA, Erskine College, the
Institute, and Defendant Runyan related to the allegations presented by the Institute and Defendant
Runyan against Pinnacle and OCA and the subsequent investigations into these allegations by both
On June 14, 2021, Defendant Runyan sent an email to public officials making
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allegations of wrongdoing against OCA. On June 26, 2021, the Institute provided the OCA Board
with the results of its investigation into the allegations and issued findings and sanctions based on
an alleged “forensic audit” report. The OCA Board disputed the results and responded to the
Institute in writing. On July 13, 2021, Defendant Runyan sent another email to public officials
making allegations of wrongdoing against OCA. The parties exchanged additional written
communications, which led to OCA filing an appeal with the Institute Board related to the
allegations.
In August 2021, a newspaper article ran in The Post & Courier in which Defendant
Runyan publicly threatened to revoke OCA’s charter. Around the same time, Defendant Michael
Smith created an OCA Parents page on the social media site, Facebook. Defendant Runyan joined
Defendant Smith’s OCA Parents Facebook page. After creating the OCA Parents Facebook page,
Smith encouraged the other initial members of the page to “build up this group with as many
parents as possible so that we can effect the plan when ready.” Soon thereafter, Defendant Smith,
the Institute, and Defendant Runyan communicated privately regarding OCA and then used the
OCA Parents Facebook page to organize a meeting between the Institute, Defendant Runyan, and
OCA parents. The meeting between the Institute, Defendant Runyan, and OCA parents took place
on August 23, 2021. During the meeting, the Institute and Defendant Runyan made allegations of
wrongdoing by OCA to OCA parents and encouraged OCA parents to take action against the OCA
Board of Directors.
In November 2021, the OCA Board informed the Institute that it was requesting to
transfer its charter to another sponsor of charter schools. Subsequently, the Institute published on
its publicly accessible website several prior communications from the Institute to OCA, which
included allegations of wrongdoing made by the Institute against OCA. The Institute Board
thereafter voted to deny OCA’s request to transfer its charter to another sponsor.
Plaintiffs initiated this action on July 13, 2022, asserting claims of civil conspiracy,
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defamation, negligent supervision, negligence, violation of due process, and breach of contract
against the Erskine Defendants as well as one claim against Defendant Smith for civil conspiracy.
The Erskine Defendants filed a motion to dismiss and strike Plaintiff’s complaint with the Court
and subsequently filed a supporting memorandum of law on February 27, 2023. Plaintiffs
submitted a memorandum in opposition to the motion on March 1, 2023. Following notice to the
parties, a hearing on the Erskine Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and Strike was held on March 6,
20232, via WebEx, during which counsel for the parties presented oral arguments. After
considering the written submissions of the parties and the oral arguments made by counsel during
the hearing, the Erskine Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and Strike Plaintiffs’ Complaint is
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“Subject matter jurisdiction is the power of a court to hear and determine cases of
the general class to which the proceedings in question belong.” Sabb v. S.C. State Univ., 350 S.C.
416, 422, 567 S.E.2d 231, 234 (2002) (citing Dove v. Gold Kist, Inc., 314 S.C. 235, 442 S.E.2d
598 (1994)). “The question of subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law for the court.” Capital
City Ins. Co. v. BP Staff, Inc., 382 S.C. 92, 99, 674 S.E.2d 524, 528 (Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Chew
v. Newsome Chevrolet, Inc., 315 S.C. 102, 104, 431 S.E.2d 631, 631 (Ct. App. 1993)).
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), SCRCP, must be denied if the facts and
inferences drawn from the facts alleged in the complaint, viewed in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, would entitle the plaintiff to relief on any theory. Brazell v. Windsor, 384 S.C. 512, 515,
682 S.E.2d 824, 826 (2009). In considering a motion to dismiss a complaint based on a failure to
2
Several other motions in this case were also heard by the Court on March 6, 2023. The Court’s decisions on the other
motions are addressed in separate Orders.
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state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, the trial court must view all facts and inferences
alleged in the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and base its ruling “solely upon
the allegations set forth on the face of the complaint.” FOC Lawshe Ltd. P’ship v. Int’l Paper Co.,
352 S.C. 408, 412-413, 574 S.E.2d 228, 230 (Ct. App. 2002) (quoting Brown v. Leverette, 291
C. Motion To Strike.
Johnson, 253 S.C. 430, 432, 171 S.E.2d 597, 598 (1969); Robinson v. Code, 384 S.C. 582, 585,
682 S.E.2d 495, 496 (Ct. App. 2009). “A motion to strike, challenging a theory of recovery in the
complaint, is comparable to a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), SCRCP.” Robinson, 384
S.C. at 585, 682 S.E.2d at 496 (Ct. App. 2009) (citing McCormick v. England, 328 S.C. 627, 632,
494 S.E.2d 431, 433 (Ct. App. 1997)). “In ruling on such a motion, a Court decides whether a
party should be allowed to plead a defense or other matter, not whether there are facts supporting
what has been pleaded.” Id. at 587, 682 S.E.2d at 497 (quoting Alladin Plastics, Inc. v. Wintenna,
Inc., 301 S.C. 90, 93, 390 S.E.2d 370, 372 (Ct. App. 1990)).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs assert six causes of action in the Complaint: (1) Civil Conspiracy against
Defendants Runyan and Smith; (2) Defamation against the Erskine Defendants; (3) Negligent,
Grossly Negligent, and Reckless Supervision against Erskine College and the Institute; (4)
Negligence, Gross Negligence, Willful, Wanton, and Reckless Conduct against Erskine College
and the Institute; (5) Violation of Due Process under South Carolina law against Erskine College
and the Institute; and (6) Breach of Contract against Erskine College and the Institute.
The Erskine Defendants assert the following bases for dismissing this action: (1)
this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims; (2) the Act grants the
Erskine Defendants immunity from any civil liability stemming from their acts or omissions as a
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charter school sponsor; (3) the Plaintiffs lack standing; (4) Plaintiffs fail to state facts sufficient to
constitute causes of action for breach of contract and due process; (5) the Erskine Defendants are
further granted immunity by the South Carolina Tort Claims Act; (6) Erskine College should be
dismissed from the action because it delegated administrative duties as a charter school sponsor to
the Institute, and Plaintiffs have failed to state facts sufficient to constitute any of its claims against
Erskine College; (7) Plaintiffs cannot state a cause of action for defamation as a governmental
entity, have not stated facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for defamation, and have
improperly named Defendant Runyan in the defamation cause of action; (8) Plaintiffs fail to allege
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for civil conspiracy; and (9) Plaintiffs’ causes of
action for negligent supervision, negligence, and breach of contract were not brought within the
statute of limitations for those claims. Additionally, the Erskine Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’
requests for punitive damages should be stricken from the Complaint because the South Carolina
Tort Claims Act prevents recovery of punitive damages against governmental entities.
As an initial matter, the Erskine Defendants assert that Plaintiffs’ Complaint should
be dismissed for this Court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In their Motion, the Erskine
Defendants rely on Sections 59-40-90 and 59-40-40 of the Act as bases for dismissing Plaintiffs’
claims due to this Court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Section 59-40-90 of the Act permits
a party to appeal a final decision of a charter school sponsor to the Administrative Law Court and
definitional statute, is silent as to any specific jurisdictional requirements for civil cases brought
by charter schools. The Court finds that these statutes do not support dismissing Plaintiffs’
Complaint.
In South Carolina, the circuit courts “are vested with original jurisdiction in civil
and criminal cases, except those cases in which exclusive jurisdiction shall be given to inferior
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courts.” Fullbright v. Spinnaker Resorts, Inc., 420 S.C. 265, 274–75, 802 S.E.2d 794, 799 (2017)
(quoting Dema v. Tenet Physician Servs.-Hilton Head, Inc., 383 S.C. 115, 120, 678 S.E.2d 430,
433 (2009)). Plaintiffs have asserted various civil claims against the Erskine Defendants. Section
59-40-90, then, is inapplicable to Plaintiffs’ claims because Plaintiffs are not appealing a final
decision issued by the Erskine Defendants. Moreover, the Administrative Law Court is not the
appropriate forum for Plaintiffs’ civil causes of action. Town of Arcadia Lakes v. S.C. DHEC, 433
S.C. 47, 54, 855 S.E.2d 325, 329 (Ct. App. 2021) (quoting S.C. Dep’t Consumer Affairs v.
Foreclosure Specialists, Inc., 390 S.C. 182, 187, 700 S.E.2d 468, 470 (Ct. App. 2010)) (“[T]he
ALC [does] not have the ‘authority to decide civil matters or to award monetary damages in
cases.’”). Neither Section 59-40-90 nor Section 59-40-40 of the Act divest this Court of
jurisdiction to hear Plaintiffs’ civil claims. For these reasons, the Court finds that it has subject
matter jurisdiction over the claims asserted by Plaintiffs, and the Erskine Defendants’ motion to
The Erskine Defendants next assert that all of Plaintiffs’ claims against them must
be dismissed because Section 59-40-190(C) of the Act grants the Erskine Defendants immunity
from any civil or criminal liability. The Erskine Defendants misconstrue the intent of this statute.
Section 59-40-190(C) of the Act states that “[a] . . . sponsor . . . acting in their official capacity [is]
immune from civil or criminal liability with respect to all activities related to a charter school they
sponsor. The governing body of a charter school shall obtain at least the amount of and types of
insurance required for this purpose.” S.C. Code Ann. § 59-40-190(C). The Erskine Defendants
argue that this statute grants them immunity from any and all civil actions based upon their alleged
interpreted as granting the Erskine Defendants immunity for their own civil and criminal acts or
omissions. Such an interpretation would be an absurd conclusion. See State v. Johnson, 396 S.C.
182, 189, 720 S.E.2d 516, 520 (Ct. App. 2011) (“[C]ourts will reject a statutory interpretation that
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would lead to an absurd result not intended by the legislature or that would defeat plain legislative
charter school sponsors from third parties for legal liability stemming from the actions and
omissions of a charter school. Accordingly, the Court finds that Section 59-40-190(C) does not
grant the Erskine Defendants immunity from Plaintiffs’ claims, which stem from the Erskine
Defendants’ alleged conduct, and the Erskine Defendants’ motion to dismiss based on such
immunity is denied.
The Court finds the Erskine Defendants’ remaining arguments for dismissing
Plaintiffs’ Complaint unpersuasive. Regarding the Erskine Defendants’ argument that Plaintiffs’
lack standing to bring tort actions against a governmental subdivision under the Act, the Court
notes that the Erskine Defendants have not cited any South Carolina law in support of their
argument. Consequently, the Court is not persuaded by this argument and denies the Erskine
The Erskine Defendants next argue that Plaintiffs’ causes of action for breach of
contract and violation of due process should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and failure to
state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. As discussed, supra, this Court properly has
subject matter jurisdiction over the claims asserted by Plaintiffs. Further, when the facts and
inferences in Plaintiffs’ Complaint are drawn in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, the
Plaintiffs have alleged facts sufficient to constitute causes of action for breach of contract and
violations of due process. Specifically, Plaintiffs asserted that OCA has a valid charter contract,
that the Institute and Erskine College breached the charter contract through various actions and
omissions as OCA’s sponsor, and OCA suffered damages as a result. Likewise, OCA has plead
facts illustrating that the OCA Board requested several hearings before the Institute Board
regarding the Institute administration’s actions against it, which affected the Plaintiffs’ liberty and
property interests in operating a charter school. The Institute Board did not grant Plaintiffs’
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requests to be heard regarding these matters, and instead, made decisions regarding OCA based
solely on the Institute administration’s recommendations. As such, Plaintiffs have plead facts
sufficient to constitute a violation of due process. Therefore, the Court denies the Erskine
Defendants’ motion to dismiss the breach of contract and due process causes of action.
The Erskine Defendants also argue that the South Carolina Tort Claims Act
provides each of them immunity from all of Plaintiffs’ causes of action. As discussed more
thoroughly in the Court’s decision on the Erskine Defendants’ Motion to Strike, infra, questions
remain regarding the applicability of the South Carolina Tort Claims Act to each of the Erskine
Defendants. Accordingly, the Court declines to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims on this basis.
delegated charter school sponsor duties to the Institute, the Court declines to dismiss Erskine
College as a party to this action. Under the Act, a “sponsor” is defined as “the South Carolina
Public Charter School District Board of Trustees, the local school board of trustees in which the
charter school is to be located, as provided by law, a public institution of higher learning as defined
50.” S.C. Code Ann. § 59-40-40(4). When the facts and inferences in Plaintiffs’ Complaint are
drawn in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, Erskine College appears to meet the statutory
definition of a sponsor under the Act, and the Plaintiffs have alleged facts to constitute causes of
action against Erskine College. Accordingly, Erskine College’s motion to dismiss all Plaintiffs’
The Erskine Defendants next argue that Plaintiffs have not stated sufficient facts to
constitute a cause of action for defamation. As an initial argument, the Erskine Defendants assert
that Plaintiffs cannot state a claim for defamation because it is a governmental entity. Plaintiffs
plead in their Complaint that Oceanside Collegiate Academy is a nonprofit corporation and a
charter school, and that a group of volunteer board members serves as the governing body, its
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Board of Directors. The Court notes that the Erskine Defendants cited no South Carolina law in
support of its position that the Plaintiffs in this case cannot state a cause of action for defamation.
The Court denies the Erskine Defendants’ motion to dismiss on this basis.
Additionally, the Erskine Defendants assert that Plaintiffs have not identified a
specific third party to whom the Erskine Defendants allegedly published false statements.
Unprivileged publication of a false and defamatory statement to a third party is a necessary element
of a claim for defamation under South Carolina law. See Fleming v. Rose, 350 S.C. 488, 494, 567
S.E.2d 857, 860 (2002). Publication may be intentional or negligent so long as the defamatory
statement is reasonably expected to reach a third party. Pierce v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
444 F. Supp. 1098, 1101 (D.S.C. 1978) (citing Riley v. Askin & Marine Co., 134 S.C. 198, 132
S.E. 584 (1926)). When the facts and inferences in Plaintiffs’ Complaint are drawn in the light
most favorable to the Plaintiffs, the Plaintiffs have alleged facts regarding publication of
statements to third parties sufficient to state a cause of action for defamation. The Erskine
named in Plaintiffs’ defamation cause of action under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act. When
the facts and inferences in Plaintiffs’ Complaint are drawn in the light most favorable to the
Plaintiffs, the Plaintiffs have alleged facts that Defendant Runyan acted with actual malice or intent
to harm OCA. Such actions by employees of governmental entities are not protected by the South
Carolina Tort Claims Act; therefore, the Erskine Defendants’ motion to dismiss Defendant Runyan
Similarly, the Erskine Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ cause of action for civil
conspiracy against Defendant Runyan should be dismissed for failure to state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action. To succeed in a claim for civil conspiracy, a plaintiff must prove “(1)
the combination or agreement or two or more persons, (2) to commit an unlawful act or a lawful
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act by unlawful means, (3) together with the commission of an overt act in furtherance of the
agreement, and (4) damages proximately resulting to the plaintiff.” Paradis v. Charleston Cty. Sch.
Dist., 433 S.C. 562, 574, 861 S.E.2d 774, 780 (2021). When the facts and inferences in Plaintiffs’
Complaint are drawn in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, the Plaintiffs have alleged facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action for civil conspiracy against Defendant Runyan under
South Carolina law. The Erskine Defendants’ motion to dismiss the civil conspiracy cause of
action is denied.
Finally, the Erskine Defendants assert that Plaintiffs’ claims for negligent
supervision, negligence, and breach of contract are barred by the statute of limitations. South
Carolina law establishes a three-year statute of limitations for breach of contract claims, S.C. Code
Ann. § 15-3-530(1), and a two-year statute of limitations for negligence and negligent supervision
claims, S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-110. Causes of action for both breach of contract claims and
negligence claims are subject to the discovery rule, meaning that the cause of action arises on the
date the plaintiff either discovers or reasonably should have discovered the breach or negligent act.
See Kagan v. Simchon, 429 S.C. 516, 527–28, 839 S.E.2d 106, 112 (Ct. App. 2020) (quoting Maher
v. Tietex Corp., 331 S.C. 371, 377, 500 S.E.2d 204, 207 (Ct. App. 1998)); Allwin v. Russ Cooper
Assocs., Inc., 426 S.C. 1, 15, 825 S.E.2d 707, 714 (Ct. App. 2019) (statute of limitations for
plaintiff’s negligent construction cause of action began to run upon plaintiff receiving notice of
the construction defects). Plaintiffs filed their Complaint on July 13, 2022. Plaintiffs have alleged
facts in their Complaint for causes of action for negligent supervision, negligence, and breach of
contract that occurred within the statute of limitations for each of these claims. Accordingly, the
Court denies the Erskine Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ negligent supervision,
The Erskine Defendants moved to strike several paragraphs of the Complaint that
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requested an award of punitive damages and relied on Section 15-78-120(b) of the South Carolina
Tort Claims Act as the basis for its motion. Section 15-78-120(b) prohibits the award of punitive
or exemplary damages or interest prior to judgment against entities that are entitled to protection
under the Tort Claims Act. The Erskine Defendants argue that each of them is entitled to protection
under the Tort Claims Act as either a political subdivision of the State or an employee of a political
The Tort Claims Act provides certain protections for tort liability to the State and
its political subdivisions. See S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-20(a). A “political subdivision” is defined
in the Tort Claims Act as “the counties, municipalities, school districts, . . . and special purpose
districts of the State and any agency, governmental health care facility, department, or subdivision
thereof.” S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-30(h). Although Defendants Erskine College and the Institute
assert that because they are charter school sponsors they are “necessarily” political subdivisions
of the State, the Court is not convinced at this time that this assertion is accurate. Plaintiffs
Complaint alleges that Defendant Erskine College is a nonprofit corporation and independent
institution of higher learning, that Defendant Institute is a separate nonprofit corporation that does
not meet the definition of a “sponsor” under the Act, and that Defendant Runyan is the Chief
Executive Officer of the Institute. Questions remain regarding the applicability of the Tort Claims
Act to each of the Erskine Defendants that cannot be resolved from the face of the pleadings. Given
these questions, the Court finds Plaintiffs are allowed to request punitive awards in their Complaint
and declines to strike entire paragraphs of the Complaint. Accordingly, the Erskine Defendants’
IT IS SO ORDERED.
____________________________________
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The Honorable Ralph F. Cothran, Jr.
Fifth Judicial Circuit
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Richland Common Pleas
Type: Order/Dismissal
So Ordered