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The Illusion of Conscious Will
The Illusion of Conscious Will
New Edition
Daniel M. Wegner
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any
electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information
storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from the publisher.
This book was set in Stone Sans and Stone Serif by Toppan Best-set Premedia Limited.
Printed and bound in the United States of America.
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
A leaf was riven from a tree,
“I mean to fall to earth,” said he.
The west wind, rising, made him veer.
“Eastward,” said he, “I now shall steer.”
The east wind rose with greater force.
Said he: “’Twere wise to change my course.”
With equal power they contend.
He said: “My judgment I suspend.”
Down died the winds; the leaf, elate,
Cried: “I’ve decided to fall straight.”
Ambrose Bierce, The Devil’s Dictionary (1911)
Contents
Foreword ix
Daniel Gilbert
Preface xvii
Daniel Wegner
1 The Illusion 1
It usually seems that we consciously will our voluntary actions, but this is an
illusion.
2 Brain and Body 27
Conscious will arises from processes that are psychologically and
anatomically distinct from the processes whereby mind creates action.
3 The Experience of Will 59
The experience of conscious will arises when we infer that our conscious
intention has caused our voluntary action, although both intention and
action are themselves caused by mental processes that do not feel willed.
4 An Analysis of Automatism 93
The experience of will can be reduced to very low levels under certain
conditions, even for actions that are voluntary, purposive, and complex—
and what remains is automatism.
5 Protecting the Illusion 137
The illusion of will is so compelling that it can prompt the belief that acts
were intended when they could not have been. It is as though people aspire
to be ideal agents who know all their actions in advance.
viii Contents
Notes 327
References 341
Author Index 391
Subject Index 405
Foreword
Daniel Gilbert
one of the century’s most creative and insightful explorers of the human
mind.
Of course, some of Dan’s most wonderful inventions reside not in the
pages of scientific journals, but in the memories of those who happened
to be standing nearby when he created them. Those were the ideas and
insights he generated in the course of daily conversation, in which he
would riff and roll and improvise on just about any topic with such effort-
less originality that it would make your jaw drop, your head spin, and sev-
eral other anatomically improbable metaphors. A conversation with Dan
was like a rollercoaster ride: It started out slow and a bit uphill because
Dan was rather shy, but then, just when you began to wonder why you’d
bothered to fasten your seatbelt, he would say this thing and suddenly you
were in free fall, spinning in a direction so strange and new that it bent the
needle on your compass.
The things Dan said were smart, but not just smart. They were also hilari-
ous. He never told stories or jokes but rather he remarked. Those remarks
were like great licks in jazz—ordinary phrases spontaneously rearranged in
ways so unexpected that they produced a visceral thrill. For Dan, remarking
was high art. He once told me that a good remark often contains “the sec-
ond most remote associate,” which is the word that is precisely two words
away from the word the listener was expecting. He noted that on a surpris-
ing number of occasions, that word is shrubbery. Dan thought about things
like this—and he thought about them a lot, which is why he so often tipped
me over using nothing but his mind.
In life, Dan attained professional heights that few of us will achieve. And
in death, he set a personal example that few of us will follow. In 2010, Dan
was diagnosed with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), and over the next
two-and-a-half years he gradually lost his ability to stand, then to sit, then
to move, then to speak, and then finally, to breathe. But until his last weeks,
Dan remained fully engaged in his life’s work. He continued to mentor his
students, helping them become the best versions of themselves rather than
pale copies of him. He continued to work on a new book (The Mind Club,
with his student and coauthor Kurt Gray), and to publish new scientific
papers. He was delighted by the steady stream of visitors to his home, refer-
ring to his waning days as “the world’s longest wrap party,” and he accepted
each new physical challenge and inevitable defeat with unusual grace and
good humor. In 2011, Harvard University held a final conference in his
Foreword xi
honor, which his friends affectionately dubbed Wegstock, and Dan made
the closing remarks. He expressed gratitude for “the deeply satisfying life
I’ve found using science to explore the nature of human connectedness,”
and then bid farewell to colleagues, students, friends, and admirers whom
he knew he would not see again: “I’d rather be here right now with you
people, the people in this room, than with some of the finest people in the
world.” For Dan, dying was no excuse for being serious.
Dan is gone and I miss him. You hold in your hand what I believe was
his magnum opus. In it you will find ideas that sparkle, whir, and fly. They
will be grounded in facts that only Dan could have discovered and adorned
with remarks that only Dan could have made. As you read, you will be
amazed, perplexed, aghast, and delighted—and when you are finished, you
will never see the world in the same way again. Lucky, lucky you.
Preface to the New Edition
Thalia Wheatley
If you picked up this book, you probably have an opinion on whether con-
scious will is—as Dan Wegner put it—an illusion. Perhaps you find the claim
absurd. After all, didn’t it feel like you consciously decided to read this
page? The “whodunit” of action seems obvious—so obvious, in fact, that
the possibility of it being illusory tickled one of the greatest minds in sci-
ence. Here, Dan Wegner delights in unmasking what he called “the most
compelling illusion”—the feeling that we consciously will what we do.
Wegner’s main thesis is that if the feeling of will drives action, then
manipulating the feeling should have consequences on action. In case after
case, he reveals that the feeling can be pushed around with little effect on
the actual doing. He takes us on an intellectual road trip from Victorian
parlors to modern laboratories where we see Ouija boards spell and alien
hands misbehave. At every stop, the feeling of will seems to rise and fall
quite independently of the action it purports to cause. The illusion fas-
cinated Dan. Like a grown adult watching expert sleight of hand, he was
delighted by being taken in despite knowing the trick. And the strength of
the illusion meant that he could play with it again and again, in the labo-
ratory and in the writing of this book, to understand how and when the
magic happens.
When I met Dan in the mid-1990s, the ideas in this book were a twinkle
in his eye. Back then, he was most famous for his ironic process model
of thought suppression. His lab buzzed with people trying, unsuccessfully,
to suppress thoughts and keep secrets. Many of his participants would be
asked not to think of a white bear, thereby ensuring that white bears came
to mind with frustrating regularity. Others played clandestine footsie with
strangers; each study revealing why trying to submerge thoughts made
them increasingly likely to bob into view. At that time, I was working with
xiv Thalia Wheatley
his close friends, Tim Wilson and Dan Gilbert, researching why people
make errors when predicting their future happiness. It was not until I was
in my third year that Dan Wegner and I realized a keen mutual interest in
agency.
Dan was ready to do something new and I was an eager apprentice. We
decided to test whether the feeling of agency could be evoked merely by
mimicking its natural conditions. We reasoned that most intentional acts
are preceded by a related thought. Given this, we wondered whether the
feeling of will could be conjured in people simply by giving them a thought
and then making them appear to act in kind—all without them actually
thinking or doing either. It was an arduous study to design and run but the
results were striking. If a thought seemed to come to mind just prior to see-
ing oneself appear to do a related action, people would claim authorship for
actions they did not do. As soon as I saw the results, I hurried to Dan’s office
and sketched out the simple four-point data plot that appears as figure 3.1
in chapter 3. His eyebrows arched, his eyes grew wide, and he told me that
he was all in. The feeling of will would be the next chapter of his scientific
career. As was Dan’s custom, he set about immediately to write a book to
crystallize his ideas in one place.
To have worked with Dan at the very beginning of these discoveries is a
gift I will never be able to repay. Most scientists spend their careers in a rela-
tively constrained theoretical space, making incremental progress toward
collective understanding. Dan’s mind worked differently and, as his gradu-
ate student, I had a front row seat. As Dan liked to put it, he was a bumbler.
His theory of scientific bumbling was actually his very first theory. He
came up with it at the tender age of eleven, though he didn’t write it down
for thirty years (Wegner 1992). As a child, Wegner saw a world containing
two types of people: “bumblers” and “pointers.” Bumblers are the kind of
people who go through life trying all sorts of things. They bumble from one
thing to the next, sometimes figuring things out and other times not. The
role of pointers, in contrast, is to point out the bumbler’s bumbles. Weg-
ner was moved to write down this theory in 1992 because he saw that the
bumbler-to-pointer ratio in the field of psychology was getting dangerously
low. Psychological journals were moving to a longer, multistudy format.
The reasons were sound in principle—more studies yield more confidence
in a particular finding. But science is a delicate ecosystem, and Wegner wor-
ried that too many people saying “run another study”—too much pointing,
Preface to the New Edition xv
as Wegner put it—risked curbing creativity. It could lead to fewer and fewer
of the inspiring, wild hypotheses that push the field forward. To be sure,
many of those wild hypotheses will be dead ends and the pointers play a
critical role in pointing them out. But every now and then, the bumblers
stumble onto an insight so provocative as to evoke intense debate and a
leap in scientific understanding. Wegner was one of science’s most eminent
bumblers. Over his career, he generated five major scientific theories, each
of which spawned its own thriving subdiscipline in psychology. The Illusion
of Conscious Will was his most controversial.
Fellow scientists still remain divided on whether they accept the theory.
While many find it compelling and persuasive, other have called it “an
affront to common sense” (Velmans 2004) and an “unwarranted imperti-
nence” (Kihlstrom 2004). Wegner’s wit and good writing belies the book’s
challenging tenets. It is an easy read that nonetheless risks making the
reader feel unmoored. If we cannot trust our own experience of how our
mind works, then what else is up for grabs? And therein lies the book’s
greatest promise. Whatever conclusion you reach by the end, reading it
will have meant grappling with the deepest questions of what it means to
be human.
Several years after the first edition was published, Dan had the oppor-
tunity—if that is the proper word—to experience life without the feeling
of will. In an episode that Dan would later characterize as having all the
elements of “bad fiction,” brain surgery would rob him of the feeling of
authorship. Later, he would write about the irony: “Here I was nattering
on about this interesting syndrome when a few years later I’d find it right
there at the end of my arm” (Wegner 2008). This state of affairs occurred
after a successful operation to remove a tumor from his left parietal ven-
tricle. As the tumor was resected, so too went the feeling of knowing what
the right side of his body was going to do next. This had interesting conse-
quences. He would notice that the sun was shining brightly just as his right
hand began moving toward his face, sunglasses in hand. More than once
he had to stop himself from saying “thank you” to his hand as if it were
some mysteriously prescient caregiver. Actions unfolded just fine without
him. “Those few blank spaces in my consciousness of my movement were
enough to render me fully appreciative that the conscious willing I had
long perceived as integral to the kinds of actions my hands usually do was,
in fact, expendable … My hand didn’t require the feeling of doing to keep
The Illusion 7
Figure 1.2
A table-turning seance. From L’ Illustration (1853).
those assembled that there was a devil inhabiting the table and causing it
to move.
The table-turning curiosity was sufficiently celebrated and controversial
to attract the attention of the chemist and physicist Michael Faraday, who
proceeded to test the source of the table movement. He placed force mea-
surement devices between participants‘ hands and the table, and found
that the source of the movement was their hands and not the table (Faraday
1853). All one needs to do, actually, is to use a dusty table and observe the
direction of the streaks left by participants’ slipping hands. The streaks run
away from their hands in the direction opposite the table movement (as
one would expect if people’s fingers slipped a bit as they pushed the table)
rather than toward the movement (as one would expect if the table were
pulling them along and their fingers were slipping as they fell behind).
Apparently, in attributing the table movement to the spirit, the participants
did not have sufficient experience of will to recognize the source of their
own voluntary actions. Indeed, the Reverend Godfrey disputed Faraday’s
findings vehemently: “[We] imparted the motion, he tells us, which we did
not.”
Such examples of the separation of action from the experience of
will suggest that it is useful to draw a distinction between them. Figure
1.3 shows what might be considered four basic conditions of human
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So fare they all that haue no vertue[1798] cand.
19.
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27.
28.
29.
30.
And when hee is once entred to[1805] rule the [beastly]
rout,
Although hee would, he can no way get out:
Hee may bee sure none will to him resorte,
But such as are the vile and rascall sorte:
All honest men, as well the most as lest,
To tast of treason will vtterly detest.
31.
Then let him way how long hee can bee sure,
Where fayth nor frendship may no while endure:
Hee whom hee trusteth most, to gayne a grote
Will fall him from, and assay[1806] to cut his throate:
Among the knaues and slaues where vice is rooted,
There is no other frendship to bee looked.
32.
33.
They lose their lands and goods, their childe and wife
With sorrowe and shame shall leade a wofull lyfe:
If hee bee slayne in fielde hee dyeth accurst,
Which of all wrecks wee should accompt the worst:
And hee that dyeth defending his liege lord
Is blist, and blist agayne by God’s owne worde.
35.
36.
37.
38.
Therefore the rebell is accurst and mad,
That hopeth[1811] for that which rebell neuer had:
Who trusting still to tales doth hang in hope,
Tyll at the last hee hang fast by the rope,
For though that tales bee tolde that hope might feede,
Such foolishe hope hath still vnhappy speede.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
And when wee had prepared euery thing,
Wee went to Tawnton with all our prouision,
And there we slewe the prouost of Penryn,
For that on the subsedy hee sate in commission:[1833]
Hee was not wise, nor yet of great discretion,
That durst approche his enmies in their rage,
When wit nor reason coulde their yre asswage.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
[This] my lorde and wee the captaynes of the west,
Tooke [our] inne at Newgate, fast in fetters tide,
Where after tryall[1845] wee had but litle rest:
My lorde through London was drawne on a slide,
To Tower hill, where with an[1846] axe hee dyde,
Clad in his [coate] armour painted all in paper,
Torne[1847] and reuersed[1848] in spite of his behauer.
[1849]
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
Wherefore, good Baldwine, do[1859] thou record my
name,
To bee ensample to[1860] such as credit lyes,
Or thrist to sucke the sugred cup of fame,
Or doe attempt agaynst their prince to ryse:
And charge them all to keepe within their syse:
Who doth assay to wrest beyond his strength,
Let him be sure hee shall repent at length.
68.
Maister Cauyll.[1864]
[“It is pity,” quoth[1865] one, “that the meeter is no better, seeing
the matter is so good: you may do very well to helpe it, and a lytle
filing would make it formal.” “The author him selfe,” quoth[1866] I,
“could haue done that, but hee would not, and hath desired me that it
may passe in such rude sort as you haue heard it: for hee obserueth
therein a double decorum both of the Smith, and of himselfe: for hee
thinketh it not meete for the Smith to speake, nor for himselfe to write
in any exact kinde of meeter.” “Well,” sayd another, “the matter is
notable to teach al people, as well officers as subiects, to consider
their estates, and to liue in loue and obedience to the highest
powers, whatsoeuer they bee, whome God either by birth, law,
succession, or vniuersall election, doth or shall aucthorise in his
owne roume to execute his lawes and iustice among any people or
nation. For by all these meanes God placeth his deputies. And in my
iudgement there is no meane so good eyther for the common quiet
of the people, or for God’s free choise, as the naturall order of
enheritaunce by lineall discent: for so it is left in God’s handes, to
creat in the wombe what prince hee thinketh meetest for his
purposes: the people also knowe their princes, and therefore the
more gladly and willingly receiue and obay them. And although some
realmes, more carefull then wise, haue entailed theire crowne to the
heire male, thinking it not meete for the feminine sexe to beare the
royall office: yet if they consider all circumstaunces, and the chiefest
vses of a prince in a realme, they shall see how they are deceiued.
For princes are God’s lieutenauntes or deputies, to see God’s lawes
executed among theire subiects, not to rule according to their owne
lustes or deuises, but by the prescript of God’s lawes: so that the
chiefest poynt of a prince’s office consisteth in obedience to God and
to his ordinaunces, and what shoulde let but that a woman may bee
as obedient vnto God, as a man? The second poynt of a prince’s
office is to prouide for the impotent, nedy, and helples, as widowes,
orphanes, lame, and decrepite persons: and seing women are by
nature tender harted, milde and pitifull, who may better then they
discharge this duty? Yea but a woman lacketh courage, boldnesse,
and stomacke, to withstand the aduersarie, and so are her subiects
an open spoyle to their enemies. Debora, Iaell, Iudith, Thomeris, and
other doe proue the contrary. But graunt it were so: what harme were
that, seing victory consisteth not in witte or force, but in God’s
pleasure.[1867] I am sure that whatsoeuer prince doth his duty in
obaying God, and causing iustice to bee ministred according to
God’s lawes, shall not only lacke warre (bee hee man, woman, or
childe) but also bee a terroure to all other princes. And if God suffer
any at any time to be assayled, it is for the destruction of the
assayler, whether he bee rebell or forayne foe, and to the honour
and profit of the vertuous prince, in whose behalfe, rather then hee
shall miscary, God himselfe will fight with enfections and
earthquakes from the lande and waters, and with stormes and
lightenings from the ayre and skies. Moe warres haue bene sought
through the wilfull and hauty courages of kings, and greater
destructions happened to realmes therby, then by any other meanes.
And as for wisdome and pollicy, seing it consisteth in following the
counsayle of many godly, learned, and long experienced heades, it
were better to haue a woman, who considering her owne weaknes
and inability, should be ruled thereby, then a man which presuming
vpon his owne fond brayne, will heare no aduise saue his owne. You
muse peraduenture wherefore I say this. The franticke heades which
disable our queene, because shee is a woman, and our king
because hee is a straunger, to bee our princes and cheife
gouernours, hath caused mee to say thus mutch. For whatsoeuer
man, woman, or childe, is by the consent of the whole realme
established in the royall seate, so it haue not bene iniuriously
procured by rygour of sworde and open force, but quietly by tytle,
either of enheritaunce, succession, lawfull bequest, common consent
or election, is vndoubtedly chosen by God to bee his deputye: and
whosoeuer resisteth any suche, resisteth agaynste God himselfe,
and is a ranke traytour and rebell, and shalbe sure to prosper as well
as the blacke Smith and other suche haue done. All resist that
wilfully breake any lawe, not being agaynst God’s lawe, made by
common consent for the wealthe of the realme, and commaunded to
be kept by the authority of the prince: or that deny to pay such
duties, as by consent of the high court of parliament, are appointed
to the prince, for the defence and preseruation of the realme.” “You
haue saide very truly herein,” quoth[1868] I, “and I trust this terrible
example of the blacke Smith, will put all men in minde of their duties,
and teach them to bee obedient to all good lawes, and lawfull
contributions. The scriptures do forbyd vs to rebell, or forcibly to
withstand princes, though they commaund vniust things: yet in any
case wee may not doe them: but receiue quietly at the prince’s hand
whatsoeuer punishment God shall suffer to bee layd vpon vs for our
refusall. God will suffer none of his to bee tempted aboue their
strength.”[1869] This talke thus being ended: “I was willed my
maisters,” quoth I, “by maister Holinshed, to bring sir Nicholas Burdet
vnto you.” “Were you?” quoth they: “on his word we will heare what
he sayes.” “Read it, I pray you,” quod one. “You must thinke then,”
quoth I, “that you see him all wounded as he was slaine at Pontoise,
to say as foloweth.”]
How the Valiant Knight Sir Nicholas
Burdet, Chiefe Butler of Normandy,
was slayne at Pontoise, Anno 1441.
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