Journal of Rational-Emotive & Cognitive-Behavior Therapy

Volume 19, Number 3, Fall 2001

UNCONDITIONAL SELF-
ACCEPTANCE AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL HEALTH
John M. Chamberlain
David A. F. Haaga
American University

ABSTRACT: Low self-esteem is usually considered unhealthy, but according

to rational-emotive behavior therapy, any level of self-esteem reflects a dys-
functional habit of globally evaluating one’s worth; it would be preferable to
accept oneself unconditionally. This hypothesis was tested by examining sev-
eral correlates of scores on a novel questionnaire measure of unconditional
self-acceptance (USA). In a nonclinical adult sample, statistically controlling
for self-esteem, USA was inversely correlated with anxiety symptoms and
with narcissism, positively correlated with state mood after imaginal expo-
sure to negative events. Other predicted associations of USA (with depres-
sion, happiness, and self-deception) either were not evident or became non-
significant when self-esteem was taken into account. Discussion centered on
the conceptual and operational distinctions between self-esteem and self-
acceptance.

KEY WORDS: self-acceptance; self-esteem; psychological well-being.

Low self-esteem is typically considered dysfunctional. It is associ-

ated with, among other difficulties, experiencing depressive symptoms
(e.g., Beck, Steer, Epstein, & Brown, 1990; Tarlow & Haaga, 1996).
Such findings underlie the development of programs to enhance self-

This paper was based on the first author’s doctoral dissertation at American University, chaired
by the second author. The research was supported by an internal grant from American Univer-
sity. We are grateful to dissertation committee members Tony Ahrens, Jim Gray, and Susan
Walen for their comments on earlier versions of this report.
Address correspondence, including requests for reprints, to David A. F. Haaga, Department of
Psychology, Asbury Building, American University, Washington, DC 20016-8062, USA; e-mail:
dhaaga噝american.edu.

163 䉷 2001 Human Sciences Press, Inc.

164 Journal of Rational-Emotive & Cognitive-Behavior Therapy

esteem (e.g., the California Task Force to Promote Self-esteem and

Personal and Social Responsibility; Mecca, Smelser, & Vasconcellos,
1989). Nevertheless, attempts to increase self-esteem may have draw-
backs as well. Individuals with extremely high self-esteem, for in-
stance, may be more prone to acts of violence (Baumeister, Smart, &
Boden, 1996). Those with high self-esteem may also be less open to
unfavorable feedback (Shrauger & Lund, 1975) and more emotionally
vulnerable to criticism (Schlenker, Soraci, & McCarthy, 1976).
Rational-emotive behavior therapy (REBT; Ellis, 1962, 1995) pro-
vides one possible explanation of the seeming paradox that either low
self-esteem or high self-esteem can be unhealthy. In particular, REBT
holds that the very presence of any level of self-esteem reflects occur-
rence of a dysfunctional self-rating process, an evaluation of one’s
global worth as a person. REBT depicts self-rating as irrational inas-
much as there is no objective basis for determining the worth of a
human being. Self-ratings, then, have an “intrinsic illegitimacy about
them, in that accurate or true self-ratings or global ratings seem vir-
tually impossible to make” (Ellis, 1976, p. 347).
Besides being illogical, self-rating is dysfunctional according to REBT,
predisposing people to feel depressed (if the rating is low) or anxious
(even if one’s rating is currently high, the mindset of self-evaluation
foretells a fall in self-esteem in response to various failures, criticisms,
rejections, mistakes, or inabilities). Furthermore, self-rating (espe-
cially comparing of one’s worth with others’) tends to become a preoc-
cupying pastime, distracting from the more rational goals of trying to
achieve happiness and to discover and pursue what one really wants
in life.
Ellis’s solution to the problem of self-rating is that people abandon
the quest for self-esteem and the self-rating process that accompanies
it and instead work toward unconditional self-acceptance (USA),
meaning that “the individual fully and unconditionally accepts himself
whether or not he behaves intelligently, correctly, or competently and
whether or not other people approve, respect, or love him” (Ellis, 1977,
p. 101). The hypothesis that USA is associated with mental health has
been part of REBT theory for decades, and related (though not identi-
cal) views have long been espoused by, among others, Carl Rogers
(1951), yet this idea has rarely been tested. Many outcome studies of
the efficacy of REBT as a treatment have been conducted (Engels, Gar-
nefski, & Diekstra, 1993), but they have not tested whether increased
self-acceptance mediates any favorable impact of REBT (Haaga &
Davison, 1989).
John M. Chamberlain and David A. F. Haaga 165

In the study reported in this article we developed a measure of USA

and recruited a nonclinical adult sample to evaluate in multiple ways
the REBT hypothesis that USA reflects a mentally healthy philosophy.
Several predictions were explored via cross-sectional correlation of
USA with other psychological variables. First, we expected USA to cor-
relate negatively with depressive symptoms. REBT sees depression as
a natural consequence of self-rating, given that self-rating fosters low
self-rating and feelings of inadequacy in response to failure and rejec-
tion (Ellis, 1973). Second, USA should correlate negatively with anxi-
ety because the self-rating process contributes to worry about losing
one’s perceived level of self-worth even if one is currently having suc-
cess and receiving approval. Third, USA should correlate negatively
with self-deception. USA is incompatible with self-deception because
the self-accepting individual is aware of his or her strengths and
weaknesses (Ellis, 1976) and is not invested in inflating the sense of
self-worth (Ellis, 1977). Fourth, USA should correlate negatively with
narcissism. According to REBT, narcissism stems from an insistence
on the approval of others in order to maintain one’s self-worth (Ellis &
Tafrate, 1997). Avoiding evaluation of self-worth entirely, therefore,
should result in diminished grandiosity. Fifth, USA should correlate
positively with happiness and general well-being. Striving for enjoy-
ment of life is a fundamental goal of REBT and of USA (Ellis & Har-
per, 1997) and an expected outcome of embracing the USA belief sys-
tem. Finally, USA should correlate positively with mood subsequent to
negative events, relative to baseline mood. REBT does not suggest that
self-accepting people have no negative emotional reactions to negative
events but that these reactions are muted (e.g., mild disappointment
vs. severe despair) because the sense of self-worth is not threatened
(Ellis & Harper, 1997).
We also retested the six predictions just described, controlling statis-
tically for self-esteem level, in order to evaluate the incremental utility
of USA relative to the better-established construct of self-esteem.

METHOD

Participants

Adult volunteers (N ⳱ 107; 61 women and 46 men) were recruited

from a newspaper advertisement requesting participation in person-
166 Journal of Rational-Emotive & Cognitive-Behavior Therapy

ality research. Ages ranged from 19 to 81, with a mean age of 48.9.
Participants were each paid ten dollars for their participation.

Measures

A novel measure of unconditional self-acceptance was created. The

Unconditional Self-Acceptance Questionnaire (USAQ) consisted of 20
statements intended to reflect the various aspects of USA philosophy
and practice as distilled from REBT literature on the subject (see Ap-
pendix). Participants responded to each on a scale ranging from 1 (Al-
most Always Untrue) to 7 (Almost Always True) depending on their
perceptions of how characteristic the statement was of them. Nine
items were worded such that higher scores represented greater USA
(e.g., “I avoid comparing myself to others to decide if I am a worth-
while person”), while 11 items were reverse-scored because they were
worded such that lower self-reported frequencies represented greater
USA (e.g., “I set goals for myself that I hope will prove my worth”).
Internal consistency of the USAQ was moderate (alpha ⳱ .72), which
seems acceptable for a multifaceted construct such as self-acceptance.
Self-esteem was measured with the Rosenberg Self-Esteem scale
(RSE; Rosenberg, 1965). The RSE is a widely used 10-item 4-point
Likert-type scale with high internal consistency, 2-week retest re-
liability, and convergent and discriminant validity (Robinson &
Shaver, 1973).
Depressive symptoms were measured with the Beck Depression In-
ventory (BDI; Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979), a 21-item, 4-point
Likert-type scale with demonstrated high internal consistency and
high convergent validity with interview ratings of depression severity
(Beck, Steer, & Garbin, 1988).
Anxiety symptoms were measured with the Beck Anxiety Inventory
(BAI; Beck, Epstein, Brown, & Steer, 1988). The BAI is a 21-item,
4-point Likert-type scale which has shown high internal consistency
and 1-week test-retest reliability as well as convergent and discrimi-
nant validity (Beck, Epstein et al., 1988).
Self-deception was measured with the Marlowe-Crowne scale, a 33-
item true-false inventory showing good internal consistency and
1-month retest reliability (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960). The Marlowe-
Crowne was originally intended as a measure of social desirability.
However, research suggests that it measures a tendency toward self-
deception rather than an inclination to look good to others (Wein-
berger, 1990).
John M. Chamberlain and David A. F. Haaga 167

Narcissism was measured with the Narcissistic Personality Inven-

tory (NPI; Raskin & Hall, 1979), a 29-item forced-choice measure de-
signed to measure individual differences in narcissism in nonclinical
populations. The NPI has shown high internal consistency and alter-
nate-form reliability (Raskin & Hall, 1981) and moderate convergence
with observer-ratings of narcissism (Raskin & Terry, 1988).
Happiness and general well-being were measured with the Satisfac-
tion with Life Scale (Pavot & Diener, 1993), a 5-item, 7-point Likert-
type scale which has been shown to have good internal consistency and
2-month test-retest reliability (Pavot & Diener, 1993), and by the Hap-
piness Measures (Fordyce, 1988), which ask respondents for a 10-point
Likert-type rating of their usual happiness and unhappiness and a
breakdown of the percentage of time they feel happy, unhappy, and
neutral. Despite the latter test’s brevity (two items, essentially), its
combination score has shown good retest reliability, ranging from 0.62
over 4 months to .81 for 1 month to .98 for 2 days (Fordyce, 1988).
Mood reactivity to setbacks was measured via the Articulated
Thoughts during Simulated Situations (ATSS) paradigm (Davison,
Robins, & Johnson, 1983; Davison, Vogel, & Coffman, 1997). In the
ATSS paradigm participants are asked to imagine themselves in a sit-
uation as it is described to them on audiotape. The tape is interrupted
periodically to allow the participants to think aloud. These verbaliza-
tions are typically themselves audiotaped and later subjected to con-
tent analysis. In this study, we used ATSS primarily as a mechanism
for creating imaginal stress. We attempted to code for self-accepting
thoughts evident in participants’ responses but found that the vast
majority of this material did not clearly suggest high vs. low self-ac-
ceptance, an issue we return to in the Discussion section.
In our use of the ATSS paradigm, three scenarios were depicted: a
scenario involving the demise of a relationship with a romantic part-
ner (7 segments), a stressful job application process (6 segments), and
a positive job-seeking outcome (2 segments). The romantic breakup
scenario was a modified version of one used by Solomon, Haaga,
Brody, Kirk, and Friedman (1998), while the job-seeking scenario and
positive job outcome scenario were written for this study.
State mood was measured four times, after an ATSS instructions
tape was played and after each of the three scenario tapes. Mood was
measured on a visual analog scale requiring the participant to mark a
line indicating how he or she felt “at this very moment” (Cowdry, Gar-
dner, O’Leary, Leibenluft, & Rubinow, 1991). Our indicator of mood in
response to negative events was a sum of two change scores: (mood
168 Journal of Rational-Emotive & Cognitive-Behavior Therapy

after the breakup ⳮ mood before breakup) and (mood after job
stress ⳮ mood before job stress). Positive scores would indicate that
participants’ mood tended to improve after imagining negative experi-
ences, while negative scores would indicate mood decline.

Procedure

Participants completed the BDI first, as it was being administered

also as part of an unrelated study conducted conjointly. Following the
BDI, the USAQ, Beck Anxiety Inventory, Marlowe-Crowne, Narcissis-
tic Personality Inventory, Happiness Measures, Satisfaction with Life
Scale, Rosenberg Self-Esteem, and ATSS procedure (accompanied by
the mood measures) were completed in random order.

RESULTS

Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1, intercorrelations of

the dispositional measures in Table 2.
As predicted, scores on the Unconditional Self-Acceptance Question-
naire were negatively correlated with depressive symptoms, r (104)
⳱ ⳮ.39, p ⬍ .001. Likewise, the USAQ measure of self-acceptance

Table 1

Descriptive Statistics
Measure N Mean SD
Unconditional Self-Acceptance
Questionnaire 106 88.15 13.78
Rosenberg Self-Esteem scale 105 33.04 5.39
Beck Depression Inventory 107 7.83 7.00
Beck Anxiety Inventory 106 7.12 7.10
Marlowe-Crowne 106 16.56 6.32
Narcissistic Personality Inventory 106 14.50 7.35
Happiness Measures 104 63.64 20.11
Satisfaction with Life Scale 106 22.36 7.62
Mood change (post - pre) in ATSS 81 ⳮ13.86 27.13
John M. Chamberlain and David A. F. Haaga 169

Table 2

Intercorrelations of Measures
Variable 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. USAQ 56 ⳮ39 ⳮ50 19 ⳮ02 36 29
2. Rosenberg Self-es-
teem ⳮ62 ⳮ56 25 35 63 57
3. Beck Depression In-
ventory 62 ⳮ17 ⳮ16 ⳮ61 ⳮ48
4. Beck Anxiety Inven-
tory ⳮ19 ⳮ02 ⳮ43 ⳮ36
5. Marlowe-Crowne ⳮ17 13 21
6. Narcissistic Person-
ality 16 20
7. Happiness Measures 61
8. Satisfaction with
Life Scale
Note. All decimal points are omitted. USAQ ⳱ Unconditional Self-Acceptance Questionnaire. All
correlations of absolute value .20 or greater are significant at .05 level.

was strongly inversely related to anxiety symptoms, r (103) ⳱ ⳮ.50,

p ⬍ .001, consistent with the REBT premise that high self-acceptance
buffers people against anxiety.
Contrary to predictions, USAQ was not significantly correlated with
either self-deception, r (104) ⳱ .19 or narcissism, r (103) ⳱ ⳮ.02.
However, the USAQ was, as expected, significantly positively corre-
lated with the Happiness Measures, r (102) ⳱ .36, p ⬍ .001, and the
Satisfaction with Life Scale, r (104) ⳱ .29, p ⬍ .01, and with state
mood after the negative ATSS scenarios relative to before them, r
(79) ⳱ .31, p ⬍ .01.

Controlling for Self-Esteem

As discussed in the Introduction, according to REBT theory self-ac-

ceptance is a distinct construct from self-esteem level. Nonetheless, we
obtained a high correlation between the USAQ and the Rosenberg
Self-Esteem scale, r (103) ⳱ .56, p ⬍ .001. To evaluate the unique as-
sociation of self-acceptance with indicators of psychological health, we
170 Journal of Rational-Emotive & Cognitive-Behavior Therapy

repeated the analyses described earlier with statistical control of RSE

scores. In particular, each of the predictions was retested with a multi-
ple regression analysis in which RSE scores were partialled out.1
This approach eliminated several of the predicted associations. The
associations of USAQ fell to ⳮ.08 (ns) with depressive symptoms, to
.05 (ns) with the Happiness Measures (residuals from this equation
failed to pass the test for normality but passed when 3 outlier cases
were dropped (with similar results regarding the partial correlation)
and to ⳮ.02 (ns) with the Satisfaction with Life Scale. The association
of USAQ scores with self-deception remained nonsignificant.
Some significant predicted relations were obtained even when con-
trolling for self-esteem, however. The association of USAQ scores with
anxiety symptoms remained significant, pr (101) ⳱ ⳮ.27, p ⬍ .01.
Similarly, participants high in self-acceptance, controlling for self-es-
teem, reported more favorable state mood after imagining themselves
in negative ATSS scenarios (again, relative to pre-scenario mood), pr
(77) ⳱ .26, p ⬍ .05. This state mood result requires cautious inter-
pretation inasmuch as the residuals for this regression failed to pass
the Lilliefors test of normality, and this was not remedied by attempts
to transform the mood change variable.
Finally, partialling out RSE scores produced one interesting result
that strengthened support for predictions. The near-zero correlation
found between the USAQ and the Narcissistic Personality Inventory
(NPI) became negative once RSE was partialled out, pr (101) ⳱ ⳮ.29,
p ⬍ .01, suggesting that the portion of USA that was not reflected in
high self-rating was quite distinct from narcissism.

1
For the multiple regressions, several steps were taken to attempt to meet the assumptions of
normality and to examine the effects of outliers and large leverage cases. First, for each equation
tested, an initial regression was conducted and the studentized residuals saved and submitted to
a Lilliefors test for normality. Second, outliers with studentized residuals ⬎ 2 or ⬍ ⳮ2 and cases
with leverage ⬎ .3 were deleted and the analyses performed again (and the resulting residuals
tested for normality). Third, if the residuals failed the Lilliefors test in both regressions, the
independent and dependent variables were themselves submitted to Lilliefors tests, and the vari-
ables that failed were transformed via a variety of exponential functions in order to bring each
into a normal distribution. When this succeeded with any variables in the equation, the regres-
sion was performed again using the transformed variable(s). Unless otherwise noted, results
reported here are those from the initial regression equation, the residuals from that regression
passed a test for normal distribution, and the findings were consistent with those from the re-
gression in which the outlier and large leverage cases were dropped. Finally, tolerances for each
term entered into each equation were inspected as an indicator of multicollinearity (Norusis,
1990). No terms produced tolerances smaller than .5, and the vast majority were .6 or higher,
indicating an absence of serious multicollinearity problems.
John M. Chamberlain and David A. F. Haaga 171

DISCUSSION

Several predictions were tested regarding the association of uncon-

ditional self-acceptance with several aspects of mental health. Consis-
tent with predictions derived from rational-emotive behavior therapy,
people who were more unconditionally self-accepting tended to be
lower in depression and anxiety and higher in happiness or general
well-being. They also showed less mood decline in response to imag-
ined emotionally provocative scenarios. Contrary to predictions, those
scoring higher in USA did not show less self-deception or narcissism.
As noted in the Method section, content analysis of articulated
thoughts proved difficult. The vast majority of segments of partici-
pants’ thoughts were rated 4 (inconclusive) on a 1 (non-self-accepting)
to 7 (self-accepting) scale. Perhaps self-acceptors do not manage their
negative affective response to rejection or failure by way of engaging in
conscious self-accepting internal dialogue. Their self-accepting beliefs/
philosophies may be sufficiently internalized as to be taken for
granted rather than emerging in specific verbalizable self-referent
thinking at the time of a negative event.
A methodological limitation of the study is the lack of prior validity
evidence regarding the USAQ as a measure of self-acceptance.
Whereas the USAQ showed reasonable internal consistency reliability,
its test-retest reliability and convergent and discriminant validity
have not been tested directly.
Perhaps the most interesting question raised by this study is the
high correlation between the Unconditional Self-Acceptance Question-
naire and the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale. Given that USA as a phi-
losophy is cast as diametrically opposed to the philosophy of “self-es-
teeming,” and given that the refusal to esteem oneself may be
considered the hallmark of USA, the positive correlation of .56 be-
tween the USAQ and the RSE is surprisingly high.
Poor validity of the novel USAQ is one possible explanation of the
overlap with self-esteem. The correlation between the USAQ and the
RSE could suggest that the USAQ may largely be measuring self-es-
teem rather than self-acceptance. Under this interpretation, the re-
gression analyses in which self-esteem scores were partialled out pro-
vide better tests of the predictions than do the direct correlations
between USA and other variables. Conversely, one could argue that
our self-esteem indicator (RSE) includes some self-acceptance content.
Several of its items (e.g., “all in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a
172 Journal of Rational-Emotive & Cognitive-Behavior Therapy

failure” [reverse-keyed]) could very plausibly be included in a scale

intended to measure USA. Other items (e.g., reverse-keyed items “I
certainly feel useless at times,” “At times I feel no good at all”) imply
that one’s overall worth as a person is unstable and/or conditional and
thus may reflect self-acceptance as much as self-esteem. Under this
interpretation, the partialling out of self-esteem scores in an attempt
to purge the USA variable of self-esteem content is too conservative a
procedure and results in underestimates of substantive associations of
USA with psychological health measures.
An alternative interpretation of the relation between the USAQ and
the RSE is that it accurately reflects a relationship between USA and
self-esteem as they exist in the real world. As USA is considered a
habit that can never be perfectly acquired (Ellis & Dryden, 1997), it
seems reasonable to think that people who generally strive to accept
themselves will, in moments when they lapse into self-rating, more
often view themselves positively than negatively (and may even have
self-rating lapses more often when faced with success than when faced
with failure). Those who are low in USA are somewhat harder to pre-
dict, but as long as at least a sizable minority of low-USA scorers tend
to rate themselves toward the negative pole on a self-esteem scale and
the preponderance of high-USA scorers rate themselves toward the
positive pole, we would expect to find a substantial correlation be-
tween valid measures of self-acceptance and self-esteem.
Finally, the constructs of USA and self-esteem are not entirely dis-
tinct. People who score high on both the USAQ and the RSE strongly
share an avoidance of negative self-rating, both philosophically and in
practice. What may be the key distinction between the two constructs
is USA’s avoidance of and philosophical opposition to positive self-rat-
ing. In this regard it is interesting to note that self-esteem was pos-
itively correlated with narcissism, while the USAQ and narcissism
were uncorrelated (and negatively correlated once the RSE was par-
tialled out).
An important measure of USA’s usefulness in mental health would
come from research on its role as a process variable in therapy out-
comes. Finding that enhanced USA precedes or accompanies reduction
in symptoms of anxious or depressed patients (and that declining or
unchanged low USA is associated with poor treatment outcomes)
would go far in bolstering the status of USA as an important clinical
goal. As USA is thought by REBT proponents to have mental health
benefits for the general public, nonclinical samples could also play an
important role in future studies. Programs to enhance self-esteem in
John M. Chamberlain and David A. F. Haaga 173

schoolchildren provide a natural comparison group for similar pro-

grams that could be developed to promote USA.
The present study was intended as an initial foray into examination
of an important but heretofore untested principle of rational-emotive
behavior therapy, that unconditional self-acceptance, with its rejection
of the pursuit of high self-esteem, is an important ingredient of good
mental health. The present study did not find across-the-board sup-
port for REBT’s theory regarding the benefits and tendencies associ-
ated with unconditional self-acceptance. However, several central pre-
dictions were supported, notably the inverse relations of USA with
narcissism and anxiety when self-esteem was controlled statistically,
as well as the positive correlation (again, even with self-esteem con-
trolled) of USA with mood in the wake of simulated negative events.
These findings suggest that additional investigation of the association
of USA with psychological health and of the mechanisms linking the
two is warranted.

REFERENCES

Baumeister, R. F., Smart, L., & Boden J.M. (1996). Relation of threatened
egotism to violence and aggression: The dark side of high self-esteem.
Psychological Review, 103, 5–33.
Beck, A. T., Epstein, N., Brown, G., & Steer, R. A. (1988). An inventory for
measuring clinical anxiety: Psychometric properties. Journal of Consult-
ing and Clinical Psychology, 56, 893–897.
Beck, A. T., Rush, A. J., Shaw, B. F., & Emery, G. (1979). Cognitive therapy of
depression. New York: Guilford.
Beck, A. T., Steer, R. A., Epstein, N., & Brown, G. (1990). Beck Self-Concept
Test. Psychological Assessment, 2, 191–197.
Beck, A. T., Steer, R. A., & Garbin, M. G. (1988). Psychometric properties of
the Beck Depression Inventory: Twenty-five years of evaluation. Clinical
Psychology Review, 8, 77–100.
Cowdry, R. W., Gardner, D. L., O’Leary, K. M., Leibenluft, E., & Rubinow, D.
R. (1991). Mood variability: A study of four groups. American Journal of
Psychiatry, 148, 1505–1511.
Crowne, D. P., & Marlowe, D. (1960). A new scale of social desirability inde-
pendent of psychopathology. Journal of Consulting Psychology, 24, 349–
354.
Davison, G. C., Robins, C., & Johnson, M. K. (1983). Articulated thoughts
during simulated situations: A paradigm for studying cognition in emo-
tion and behavior. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 7, 17–40.
Davison, G. C., Vogel, R. S., & Coffman, S. G. (1997). Think-aloud approaches to
cognitive assessment and the articulated thoughts in simulated situations
paradigm. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 65, 950–958.
174 Journal of Rational-Emotive & Cognitive-Behavior Therapy

Eisenberg, N., & Okun, M. A. (1996). The relations of dispositional regulation

and emotionality to elders’ empathy-related responding and affect while
volunteering. Journal of Personality, 64, 157–183.
Ellis, A. (1962). Reason and emotion in psychotherapy. New York: Lyle Stuart.
Ellis, A. (1973). Humanistic psychotherapy: The rational-emotive approach.
New York: Julian.
Ellis, A. (1976). RET abolishes most of the human ego. Psychotherapy: The-
ory, Research, and Practice, 13, 343–348.
Ellis, A. (1977). Psychotherapy and the value of a human being. In A. Ellis &
R. Grieger (Eds.), Handbook of rational-emotive therapy (pp. 99–112).
New York: Springer.
Ellis, A. (1995). Changing rational-emotive therapy (RET) to rational emotive
behavior therapy (REBT). Journal of Rational-Emotive and Cognitive-
Behavior Therapy, 13, 85–89.
Ellis, A., & Dryden, W. (1997). The practice of rational emotive behavior ther-
apy (2nd edn.). New York: Springer.
Ellis, A., & Harper, R. A. (1997). A guide to rational living (3rd Ed.). North
Hollywood, CA: Wilshire.
Ellis, A., & Tafrate, R. C. (1997). How to control your anger before it controls
you. Secaucus, NJ: Carol.
Engels, G. I., Garnefski, N., & Diekstra, R. F. W. (1993). Efficacy of rational-
emotive therapy: A quantitative analysis. Journal of Consulting and
Clinical Psychology, 61, 1083–1090.
Fordyce, M. W. (1988). A review of research on the Happiness Measures: A
sixty second index of happiness and mental health. Social Indicators Re-
search, 20, 355–381.
Haaga, D. A. F., & Davison, G. C. (1989). Outcome studies of rational-emotive
therapy. In M. E. Bernard & R. DiGiuseppe (Eds.), Inside rational-emo-
tive therapy: A critical appraisal of the theory and therapy of Albert Ellis
(pp. 155–197). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
Mecca, A. M., Smelser, N. J., & Vasconcellos, J. (Eds.) (1989). The social im-
portance of self-esteem. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Meston, C. M., Heiman, J. R., Trapnell, P. D., & Paulhus, D. L. (1998). So-
cially desirable responding and sexuality self-reports. The Journal of Sex
Research, 35, 148–157.
Norusis, M. J. (1990). SPSS introductory statistics student guide. Chicago, IL:
SPSS Inc.
Pavot, W., & Diener, E. (1993). Review of the Satisfaction with Life Scale.
Psychological Assessment, 5, 164–172.
Raskin, R., & Hall, C. S. (1979). A narcissistic personality inventory. Psycho-
logical Reports, 45, 590.
Raskin, R., & Hall, C. S. (1981). The Narcissistic Personality Inventory: Al-
ternate form reliability and further evidence of construct validity. Jour-
nal of Personality Assessment, 45, 159–162.
Raskin, R., & Terry, H. (1988). A principal-components analysis of the Narcis-
sistic Personality Inventory and further evidence of its construct validity.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 54, 890–902.
John M. Chamberlain and David A. F. Haaga 175

Robinson, J. P., & Shaver, P. R. (1973). Measures of social psychological atti-

tudes. Ann Arbor, MI: Institute for Social Research.
Rogers, C. R. (1951). Client-centered therapy: Its current practice, implica-
tions, and theory. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Rosenberg, M. (1965). Society and the adolescent self-image. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
Schlenker, B. R., Soraci, S., & McCarthy, B. (1976). Self-esteem and group
performance as determinants of egocentric perceptions in cooperative
groups. Human Relations, 29, 1163–1176.
Shrauger, J. S., & Lund, A. K. (1975). Self-evaluation and reactions to evalua-
tions from others. Journal of Personality, 43, 94–108.
Solomon, A., Haaga, D. A. F., Brody, C., Kirk, L., & Friedman, D. G. (1998).
Priming irrational beliefs in recovered-depressed people. Journal of Ab-
normal Psychology, 107, 440–449.
Tarlow, E. M., & Haaga, D. A. F. (1996). Negative self-concept: Specificity to
depressive symptoms and relation to positive and negative affectivity.
Journal of Research in Personality, 30, 120–127.
Weinberger, D. A. (1990). The construct validity of the repressive coping style.
In J. L. Singer (Ed.), Repression and dissociation: Implications for per-
sonality theory, psychopathology, and health (pp. 337–385). Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press.

APPENDIX A

UNCONDITIONAL SELF-ACCEPTANCE QUESTIONNAIRE

INSTRUCTIONS: Please indicate how often you feel each statement

below is true or untrue of you. For each item, write the appropriate
number (1 to 7) on the line to the left of the statement, using the
following key:

More Equally More

Often Often Often
Almost Untrue True True Almost
Always Usually Than And Than Usually Always
Untrue Untrue True Untrue Untrue True True
1 2 3 4 5 6 7

1. Being praised makes me feel more valuable as a person.

2. I feel worthwhile even if I am not successful in meeting cer-
tain goals that are important to me.
3. When I receive negative feedback, I take it as an opportunity
to improve my behavior or performance.
176 Journal of Rational-Emotive & Cognitive-Behavior Therapy

4. I feel that some people have more value than others.

5. Making a big mistake may be disappointing, but it doesn’t
change how I feel about myself overall.
6. Sometimes I find myself thinking about whether I am a good
or bad person.
7. To feel like a worthwhile person, I must be loved by the peo-
ple who are important to me.
8. I set goals for myself with the hope that they will make me
happy (or happier).
9. I think that being good at many things makes someone a
good person overall.
10. My sense of self-worth depends a lot on how I compare with
other people.
11. I believe that I am worthwhile simply because I am a human
being.
12. When I receive negative feedback, I often find it hard to be
open to what the person is saying about me.
13. I set goals for myself that I hope will prove my worth.
14. Being bad at certain things makes me value myself less.
15. I think that people who are successful in what they do are
especially worthwhile people.
16. I feel that the best part about being praised is that it helps
me to know what my strengths are.
17. I feel I am a valuable person even when other people disap-
prove of me.
18. I avoid comparing myself to others to decide if I am a worth-
while person.
19. When I am criticized or when I fail at something, I feel worse
about myself as a person.
20. I don’t think it’s a good idea to judge my worth as a person.