Rick Siegel

1 22971 Darien Street

Woodland Hills CA 91364
2 323.864.7474
Acting Pro Per as Non-Party Amicus
3
4
5 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
6 COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, STANLEY MOSK COURTHOUSE
7
)
8 STARSTRUCK MANAGEMENT GROUP, )
)
9 LLC, a Tennessee limited liability company, ) Case No.: 20STCV37081
) Related Case No: 23STCP04379
10 Plaintiff, ) [Assigned to Hon. Wendy Chang, Dept. 36]
) Unlimited Civil Case
11 vs. )
) Amount in excess of $25,000
12
KELLY CLARKSON, an individual; FACE )) REQUEST FOR ACCEPTANCE OF
13 FACE PRODUCTION, INC., a Nevada ) AMICUS BRIEF AND AMICUS BRIEF
corporation; SHPANTS, INC., a Nevada )
14 ) Action Filed September 29, 2020
corporation; and DOES 1 through 20, Related Case Filed December 1, 2023
inclusive, ) Hearing Date June 4, 2024 at 8:30AM
15 )
Defendants )
16 )
.________________________________ )
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18
Dear Honorable Wendy Chang,
19
I am requesting the Court accept and consider this amicus brief which speaks to the
20 potential that the enforcement of unlicensed procurement may be unconstitutional as the
21 Talent Agencies Act, irrespective of how it has been enforced, has neither a statute
22 expressly prohibiting unlicensed persons from procuring employment for an artist nor a
23 statutory remedy should litigants be found to have procured without a license.
24 Here are the reasons I believe my perspective is worthy of consideration. I am an
25 expert witness utilized by artists and unlicensed representatives on the enforcement and

26 mis-enforcement of the Talent Agencies Act (“TAA”). I regularly give presentations on the

27 subject to the Entertainment Law students at Southwestern Law School, and attorneys can
receive 1.5 CLE credits for hearing the information I offer (the State Bar certification is
28
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______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

REQUEST FOR ACCEPTANCE OF AMICUS BRIEF AND AMICUS BRIEF

 attached). I am the Marathon of Marathon Entertainment v. Blasi, 42 Cal.4th 974 (2008)
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that is cited fourteen times in the Respondent’s petition package.
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I am not an attorney; I obtained this knowledge after being compromised by artists
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using the Act not as a shield but as a sword to avoid their legal obligations. I now devote
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much of my life to ensure others, like the Petitioners, are not similarly compromised.
5
While amici submissions of amici curiae are rare in trial courts, this is a de novo
6
review/appeal of a CLC Order and ‘Friend of the Court’ submissions are appropriate for
7 appeals.
8 Marathon not only answered a question for me, in stating three times that the Act has
9 no penalty provision for unlicensed procurement but not speaking to the implications of
10 that issue, it created one as well, one I am hoping this Court will now answer.
11 As you will read, the TAA neither expressly reserves procuring employment for artists
12 to those with licenses, nor has a remedy for those found to have procured without a license,

13 the question is whether the Commissioner’s enforcement is legally supportable, or as it

14 appears, extrajudicial and unconstitutional.

15 Respectfully submitted on May 15, 2024

16
17
Rick Siegel
18 Marathon Entertainment
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______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

REQUEST FOR ACCEPTANCE OF AMICUS BRIEF AND AMICUS BRIEF

 OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL COMPETENCE

180 Howard Street, San Francisco, CA 94105 Providers@calbar.ca.gov

415-538-2100

June 15, 2022

RICK SIEGEL
Provider #: 20176
RICK SIEGEL
22971 Darien Street
Woodland Hills, CA 91364

Dear RICK SIEGEL:

The below referenced educational activity has been approved. You do not need to seek approval for
repeats of this approved activity during the approval period noted above, provided that the repeated
activity is identical to the approved activity (e.g., same name, same topics, same time for each topic, etc.).
Annual events, such as conferences, retreats, and forums, are not considered a repeat activity and require
a new and separate approval each year.
1. Educational Activity Approved: The Proper Way To Interpret the CA Talent Agencies Act
2. Approval Period: May 31, 2022 to May 30, 2024
3. Total Credit Hours Approved = 1.50, including the following subfield credits
a. .00 = Legal Ethics Hours
b. .00 = Competence Issues Hours
c. .00 = Recognition and Elimination of Bias Hours

All Minimum Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Providers are expected to conform to the State Bar of
California’s MCLE rules which can be found here.

Please be sure that you are using the State Bar’s most current forms including the Record of Attendance,
Evaluation Form, and Certificate of Attendance found here.

If, upon review of the above information, you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me at
either via email at jonita.rose@calbar.ca.gov or via phone at 415-538-2137.

Regards,

Jonita Rose
Program Coordinator
TABLE OF CONTENTS Pg. 2
FEDERAL CASES Pg. 4
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS Pg. 4
CALIFORNIA STATE CASES Pg. 4
CALIFORNIA STATE STATUTES Pg. 5
LEGAL PUBLICATIONS/LEGISLATIVE REPORT Pg. 5
LEGAL PUBLICATIONS Pg. 5
LEGISLATIVE REPORT Pg. 5
I. INTRODUCTION Pg. 6
II. LEGAL ARGUMENT Pg. 7
A. History Of The Legislation Pg. 8
B. Case Law Is Irrelevant When Ascertaining Legislative Intent Pg. 13
C. The Commissioner’s Interpretation And Enforcement Of
The TAA Conflicts With At Least 14 Of The United States
Supreme Court’s 23 Published Rules Of Statutory Construction Pg. 13
1. The Interpretation Conflicts With Rules 1, 2, 3, and 22 Pgs. 13-17
2. The Interpretation Conflicts With Rule 4 Pgs. 17-18
3. The Interpretation Conflicts With Rule 5 Pg. 18
4. The Interpretation Conflicts With Rule 6 Pgs. 18-19
5. The Interpretation Conflicts With Rule 8 Pgs. 19-22
6. The Interpretation Conflicts With Rule 10 Pgs. 22-25
7. The Interpretation Conflicts With Rule 12 Pgs. 25-28
8. The Interpretation Conflicts With Rule 14 Pgs. 28-29
9. The Interpretation Conflicts With Rule 15 Pg. 29
10. The Interpretation Conflicts With Rule 17 Pgs. 29-30
11. The Interpretation Conflicts With Rule 21 Pgs. 30-31
III. CONCLUSION Pg. 32
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS

14th Amendment/Substantive Due Process Clause Pgs. 6. 7, 25

14th Amendment/Equal Protection Clause Pgs. 7, 8, 25
FEDERAL CASES

BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996) Pgs. 24, 28

Chevron USA v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) Pg. 8
City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999) Pg. 19
Desertrain v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.3d 1147 Pgs. 23-25
Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167 (2001) Pg. 14
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307 (2012) Pg. 23
Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) Pg. 23, 25
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 35 (1983) Pg. 19
Lambert v. California 355 U.S. 225 (1957) Pgs. 19-20
Smith v. Gougen, 415 U.S. 566 (1972) Pg. 19
United States v. Evans, 333 U.S. 483 (1948) Pgs. 20-21, 28
STATE CASES
Consumer Advocacy Group Inc. v. Kintetsu Enterprises
of America, 150 Cal.App.4th 953 Pgs. 19-20
De Anza Santa Cruise Mobil Estates Homeowners Assn. v.
De Anza Santa Cruz Mobile Estates, 94 Cal.App.4th 890 Pg. 20
Dyna-Med v. Fair Emp & Hous. Comm., 43 Cal. 3d 1385 (1987) Pgs. 14-15, 20, 22, 28
Marathon v. Blasi, 42 Cal. 4th 974 (2008) Pgs. 8, 10, 12, 14, 18, 19, 23, 28, 30
Marathon v. Blasi, 140 Cal.App. 4th 1001 (2006) Pg. 15
N.J. v. Fair Lawn Service Center, Inc., 120 A.2d 233 (NJ 1956) Pg. 8
Nome State Bank v. Brendmoen, 295 N.W. 82 (N.D. 1940) Pg. 14
Peralta v. Fair Empl. & Housing Comm., 52 Cal. 3d 40 (1990) Pgs. 15, 20, 22, 28
Radin v Laurie, 120 Cal. App. 2d 778 (1953) Pgs. 26-27
Sierra Club v Superior Ct. of Orange Cty., 57 Cal.4th 157 (2013) Pg. 7
Smith v. Bach, 183 Cal. 259 (1920) Pgs. 18, 27
Wachs v. Curry, 13 Cal.App.4th 616 (1993) Pg. 24
Wood v. Krepps, 168 Cal. 382 (1914) Pgs. 14, 28

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TALENT AGENCIES ACT DECISIONS
Pardoe v. Salazar, TAC-52864 (2008) Pg. 13, 27-28
Wesley Snipes v. Robinson Management, TAC 36-96 31
CALIFORNIA STATE STATUTES
CA Civil Code
§ 1598 Pgs. 29-30
§ 1599 Pgs. 29-30
§ 3530 Pg. 15
CA Labor Code
§ 1700 Pgs.11, 19, 30
§ 1700.4 (a) Pgs. 10, 12, 16, 18, 28, 31
§ 1700.4 (b) Pgs. 10
§ 1700.5 Pgs. 16
§ 1700.29 Pg. 29
§ 1700.30 Pg. 11
§ 1700.44 (c) Pg. 21
§ 1700.44 (d) Pg. 24
§ 1700.46 Pgs. 12-13
CA Business & Professions Code (BPC)
§ 1203 Pg. 15
§ 1270 Pg. 15
§ 1280 Pg. 20
§ 1281 Pg. 15
§ 1287 Pg. 20
§ 1700 Pg. 15
§ 2052 Pg. 15
§ 2521 Pg. 20
§ 2790 Pg. 20
§ 2799 Pg. 21
§ 2903 (a) Pg. 16
§ 2903 (c) Pg. 16
§ 2861 Pg. 17
§ 3760 (a), (b) Pg. 15
§ 4051 Pg. 15
§ 4825 Pg. 15
§ 4935 Pg. 15
§ 5120 Pg. 21
§ 5615 Pg. 17
§ 5640 Pg. 21
§ 6730 Pg. 15

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 § 6980 Pg. 15
§ 7027.1 Pg. 21
§ 7031 Pg. 20
§ 7402 Pg. 21
§ 7523 Pg. 21
§§ 7802-7803 Pg. 18
§ 7830 Pg. 16
§ 8550 Pg. 16-17
§ 10139 Pg. 22
Artists’ Managers Act Pgs. 10-12, 25-27
§ 1650 - 1661 Pgs. 10-12
§ 1650 Pg. 10
§ 1651 Pg. 11, 26
General Employment Agencies Act Pgs. 9-10
§ 1581 Pg. 26
Private Employment Agencies Act Pg. 8-9
Theatrical Employment Agencies Act Pg. 26
§ 1643 Pg. 26
§ 1648 Pg. 26

LAW REVIEW ARTICLES

“Due Process Limitations on Occupational Licensing”,
VA Law Review (Vol. 59, No. 6) Pg. 31
Substantive Criminal Law § 1.2(d) (1st ed. 1986) Pg. 8
“The Talent Agencies Act: A Personal Manager’s Nightmare”
Ed McPherson, Los Angeles Lawyer (May, 1994) Pg. 6
“The Talent Agencies Act: Time For A Change, ” Ed McPherson,
Hastings Comm. and Ent. Law Journal, Vol. 14, No. 4 (1997) Pg. 6
LEGISLATIVE REPORTS
1986 Report of the CA Entertainment Commission Pgs. 30-31
U.S. Supreme Court’s Published Rules Of Statutory Construction Pgs. 13-31

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 BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE

I. INTRODUCTION

Quoting Respondent’s counsel Ed McPherson from his law review article, “The
Talent Agencies Act: A Personal Manager’s Nightmare”, Los Angeles Lawyer (May,
1994), artists “will be ecstatic when the manager books the band in club after club
(particularly when the band is unsigned and/or does not have enough of a following to get
an agent) or when the manager gets the actor reading after reading and part after part that
is, until the artist or actor decides he does not want the manager around anymore. Perhaps
the artist has become so big (often due to the manager’s efforts) that he needs more of a
“heavy hitter” to manage him, or perhaps the actress just plain does not want to pay that
15% anymore or, for that matter, does not want to pay the commissions long past due.”
The TAA has been the subject a litany of articles and academic papers like that of
Respondent’s counsel, speaking to the draconian penalty, and, as Mr. McPherson wrote in
“The Talent Agencies Act: Time For A Change” (Hastings Communication and
Entertainment Law Journal, Vol. 14, Number 4, Pg. 905), “the ambiguities, intangibles and
imprecisions” of the Labor Commissioner’s inconsistent line of when an unlicensed
person’s actions morph from lawful to unlawful.
This brief asks the Court to consider whether entwining unlicensed persons in such
controversies is justified or a violation of the unlicensed person’s civil rights. The Amicus
asks the Court to, along with the arguments presented by the parties to consider if the TAA:
(1) Provides clear notice anyone procuring employment for artists,
and specifically personal managers, are subject to regulation,
and if not, is the Act is unconstitutionally vague, violating the
substantive due process clause of the 14th Amendment of the
United States?
(2) Without a provision expressly barring unlicensed persons or
one reserving procurement for licensees, is there clear notice
that procuring employment is a regulated activity, and if not, is
the Act unconstitutional on its face, violating the substantive
due process clause of the 14th Amendment?

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 (3) Without the Act having a statute expressly barring such
activities, is there clear notice that persons procuring without a
license are acting unlawfully, and if not, is the Act is
unconstitutional as applied, violating the 14th Amendment’s
substantive due process and equal protection clauses?
(4) Does meting out never-codified remedies violate the due
process clause and equal protection clauses of the 14th
Amendment?
(5) Is voiding the contractual rights of unlicensed persons without
statutory authority violates, among others, the basic civil right
of ensuring all persons receive the benefit of their labors
unconstitutional as applied by the Commissioner?
If, as this brief shows, the Act is unconstitutional on its face and as applied, then the
worldwide attention has wrongly labeled Narvel and Brandon Blackstock as lawbreakers
and a generation of personal managers have been similarly wronged, and it is in this Court’s
power to declare it so and end seventy years of extrajudicial enforcement.

II. LEGAL ARGUMENT

The idea of examining the statutory construction of a law is “to determine the
Legislature's intent so as to effectuate the law's purpose.” Sierra Club v Superior Court of
Orange County, 57 Cal.4th 157, 166 (2013)
To that end, courts are to, “first examine the statutory language, giving it a plain and
commonsense meaning. We do not examine that language in isolation, but in the context
of the statutory framework as a whole in order to determine its scope and purpose and to
harmonize the various parts of the enactment.
“If the language is clear, courts must generally follow its plain meaning unless a literal
interpretation would result in absurd consequences the Legislature did not intend. If the
statutory language permits more than one reasonable interpretation, courts may consider
other aids, such as the statute's purpose, legislative history, and public policy.” Id.
If Respondent was the first artist ever wishing to use the Talent Agencies Act to void
her personal manager’s contractual rights, the statutory language, or lack thereof, would be
a roadblock.

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 “The Act is silent – completely silent – on the subject of the proper remedy for illegal
procurement.” Marathon v. Blasi, 42 Cal.4th 974, 991 (2008).
Violations of law are “made up of two parts, forbidden conduct and a prescribed
penalty. The former without the latter is no [violation].” Wayne R. LaFave, “Substantive
Criminal Law”, § 1.2(d) (1st ed. 1986).
“Where a statute fails to provide a penalty it has been uniformly held that it is beyond
the power of the court to prescribe a penalty.” New Jersey v. Fair Lawn Service Center,
Inc., 120 A.2d 233, 236 (NJ 1956).
However, the Labor Commissioner interprets the Act, and courts have followed, as the
Commissioner’s interpretations are “entitled to substantial weight if not clearly erroneous”
(Marathon supra at p. 988). The construction “should be “disturb[ed]” when it “appears
from the statute or its legislative history is not one that Congress would have sanctioned.”
Chevron USA v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984).
As the statute’s missing verbiage seems conclusive that unlicensed procurement is not
an unlawful act, only if the Court thinks that because of the existing precedents there can
be another reasonable interpretation, the next step is to examine the legislative history.

A. History of the Legislation

Exhibit 1 is the codified history of the TAA and its antecedents, all authenticated by
LRI History LLC, a legislative history service, beginning with The 1913 Private
Employment Agencies Act (PEAA):
“An act regulating private employment agencies, providing
for a license for the operation thereof and a fee therefor,
providing forms of receipts and registers to be used and kept,
prohibiting any charge for registering or filing application for
help or employment, prohibiting the dividing of fees, providing
for the refunding of fees and expenses in the event of failure to
procure employment, and granting the commissioner of the
bureau of labor the power to prescribe rules and regulations to
carry out the purpose and intent of this act.” Id., Pg. 4.

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 Section 1.2 of the PEAA memorialized how the Act regulated and all agencies that
helped people find work in any occupation:
“The term ‘employment agency’ means and includes the
business of conducting, as owner, agent, manager, contractor,
subcontractor, or in any other capacity an intelligence office,
domestic and commercial employment agency, theatrical
employment agency, teachers’ employment agency, general
employment bureau, shipping agency, nurses’ registry, or any
other agency or office for the purposed of procuring or
attempting to procure help or employment or engagements for
persons seeking such help, employment or engagement.” Id.
Per Section 2 of the PEAA:
“A person shall not open, keep, maintain or carry on any
employment agency, as defined in the preceding section, unless
he shall have first procured a license therefor as provided in this
article from the commissioner of labor. ... Any person who shall
open or conduct such an employment agency without first
procuring said license shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall
be punished as hereinafter provided.” Id., p. 5.

The phrase “as defined in the previous section” reserved the defining activities of
Section 1.2 for licensees, and Section 1.8...
“violating or omitting to comply with any of the provisions of this
act shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof
shall be punished by a fine of not less than fifty dollars or more
than two hundred and fifty dollars or by imprisonment for a
period of not more than sixty days or by both fine and
imprisonment. Id. p. 10.
... gave notice of the consequences should the prohibition be ignored.
The prohibition and remedies for procuring without a license remained in place when
the PEAA became the General Employment Agencies Act in 1925, but notably, they were
removed from the licensing scheme the Legislature created specifically for artists’
managers: Chapter 329, the 1943 Artists’ Managers Act (“AMA”), where...

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 ...“Sections 1650, 1651 1652, 1653, 1654, 1655, 1656, 1657,
1658, 1659, 1660, and 1661 to Article 3 of Chapter 1 of Part 6 of
Division 2 of the Labor Code, relating to artists’ managers.”
It has long been assumed the 1978 enactment of the Talent Agencies Act only made
“minor changes in the statutory regime” past renaming it from the Artists’ Managers Act
to align its title with the modern term for talent agents and that talent agents were previously
referred to as ‘artists managers’. (See Marathon supra at 985 (2008).
The legislative history reveals the change was instead hugely significant.
Whereas the defining activities of today’s Labor Code 1700.4 (a) aligns with talent
agents, with procurement the primary activity of talent agents, the eliminated
responsibilities of an artist’s manager, prioritizing the advising, counseling and directing
artists while noting procurement is an unavoidable element, aligns with personal managers:
Per CA Labor Code § 1650: An artists’ manager is hereby
defined as a person, firm or corporation who engages in the
occupation of advising, counseling or directing artists in the
development or advancement of their professional careers; and
who, as an element of such occupation, endeavors to find
opportunities for the artists to whom the services above described
are rendered.”
The 1943 legislation carved the occupation of personal managers, then and still at time
referred to as artists’ managers, out of the General Employment Agencies Act because of
the emphasis on directing, counseling and advising, despite procurement being an element
of their job, and leaving talent agenting inside the GEAA.
The AMA also aligns to the reality of personal management, that to fulfill their
responsibilities, managers must procure. It is an element of their realities: managers hires
and supervise the sales team/talent agents, the procurers; they create and choose the sales
materials (demo tapes, pictures, resumes); and they oversee the efforts of the agents,
publicists and negotiator/lawyers; all of whom are involved in creating revenue, procuring.
The Respondent is an actress, an artist as defined in CA Labor Code 1700.4 (b). In the
entertainment industry, the artist is the chairman of the board their business and the product
being sold, synonymous to being both Steve Jobs and the iPhone. Publicists are the vice-

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presidents of public relations, attorneys the vp’s of business affairs. Talent agents are the
vice presidents of sales. And each report to the artist’s CEO: the personal manager.
In a letter to then-Gov. Earl Warren, the Artists’ Managers Guild’s attorney explains
how an artist’s manager’s “work is distinct and different” than an employment agency,
“which merely seeks employment for those who patronize it. The seeking of employment
is a small part of the services rendered by artists’ managers.” (Id., pg. 43),
While the language of CA Labor Code § 1651 of the AMA (Id. p. 39) mirrors its
predecessor GEAA: “No person, firm or corporation shall engage in or carry on the
occupation of an artists’ manager without procuring a license therefor from the Labor
Commissioner,” relevantly, the AMA does not include the phrase “as defined in the
preceding section.”
With the 1943/AMA removal of “as defined in the preceding section”, along with not
codifying statutes either barring unlicensed persons from procuring or levying a
consequence to procuring without a license, the Legislature memorialized their choice that
artists’ managers – now known as personal managers -- do not need a license to procure.
Among those in favor of this new law: the Labor Commissioner. Quoting from a
memorandum from the Commissioner to the governor during discussion of this bill: “Due
to the peculiar nature of the services rendered by artists’ manager, the business should be
subject to different regulations than those prescribed for employment agencies generally.
This bill contains proper regulations and I recommend its approval.” Exhibit 1, Pg. 37.
The State attorney general also approved enacting a licensing scheme for those “who
conduct a business similar to that of a theatrical agency,” yet different; who direct, advise,
and counsel; with procurement “an element” of their responsibilities. Id. at 38.
With Assembly Bill 885: the 1959 Amendments to the Artists’ Managers Act, the
defining activities of an artists’ manager still mirrored the responsibilities of a manager,
only renumbered to Labor Code § 1700.4, as the Act was changed to begin at § 1700.
Bill 885 had put two remedy statutes into the AMA. § 1700.30 made it a misdemeanor
should a licensee “sell, transfer or give away interest or participate in the profit of the
artists’ manager without the written consent of the Labor Commissioner” (Id. p. 107), and

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§ 1700.46: “Any person, or agent or officer thereof, who violates any provision of this
chapter is guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine ... or imprisonment ... or both.”
(Id., p. 110).
However, the AMA still had no verbiage reserving directing, counseling, or the
element of procurement, the defining activities of an artists’ manager, for licensees; nor
did it have the PEAA phrase prohibiting unlicensed procurement, “as defined in section
1700.4 (a),” nor any other verbiage barring unlicensed procurement.
A reading of the Governor’s Chaptered Bill File of Assembly Bill 885 (Id., pgs. 101-
104) offers context to the Legislature did not regulate procurement for artists’ managers .
In an “inter-departmental communication” from the Director of the Department of
Industrial Relations (at p. 102) to the Legislative Secretary in the Governor’s office,
speaking about the amendments to the AMA, wrote, “there is no substantive change,
merely giving artists’ managers a chapter of their own as a separate category rather than
including them in the chapter dealing with employment agencies and labor contractors
generally as is the case now.
“The changes were introduced at the request of the artists’ managers.” It would be
absurd to think managers would request enacting criminal sanctions that would interfere in
their ability to properly serve their clients’ needs and objectives.
Chapter 1382, The Talent Agencies Act of 1978, is “An act to amend the heading of
Chapter 4” and to amend multiple sections “relating to talent agencies.” Id., p. 122.
As stated above, Marathon thought ‘talent agent’ was synonymous with artists’
manager, that until then the Legislature had only had a licensing scheme to license talent
agents, and in 1978 it was considering “establishing a separate licensing scheme for
personal managers.”
In changing the emphasis on procurement over directing and counseling, it is clear the
legislature is talking about a different occupation.
Thirty-six sections of law were amended with the 1978 passage of the TAA (Id., p
122), but the § 1700.46 penalty provision remained intact; it remained without verbiage
that would incorporate procurement into the chapter, leaving procurement unregulated.

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 Chapter 682 of 1982 morphed the TAA, “[a]n act to amend, repeal and add Sections
1700.4 and 1700.44 of, to repeal Section 1700.46... .” Id., p. 120. The repealed § 1700.46
was the Act’s penalty provision, leaving the TAA from that time until today without
remedies irrespective of the violation.

B. Case Law Is Irrelevant When Ascertaining Legislative Intent

In Pardoe v Salazar, TAC-52864 (2008) (Exh. 2) in sloughing aside much of what is

being presented herein, the CLC wrote, “[The personal manager’s] principal argument is
that because the Talent Agencies Act lacks an explicit remedy for unlicensed procurement
by a manager, the Labor Commissioner cannot void or sever the contract. Correspondingly,
they argue, the Labor Commissioner must uphold the contract.
“Binding precedent clearly rejects this interpretation.” Id. at P. 5, lns. 14-18.
The Commissioner is wrong.
The U.S. Supreme Court has a published list of 23 rules of statutory construction
(“U.S.S.C. Rules”).1 None of those 23 rules speak to any import of a previous holding.
The reason for a statutory construction challenge is to examine whether a law and any
related precedents are legally and constitutionally supportable; as such they are immaterial
to an analysis of statutory interpretation.

C. The Commissioner’s Interpretation and Enforcement Of The TAA Violates At

Least 14 Of The U.S. Supreme Court’s 23 Rules Of Statutory Construction

1. The Interpretation Conflicts With Rules 1, 2, 3, and 22

Rule 1: “The law should be given its plain meaning wherever possible.” Id.
Rule 2: Statutes must be “entirely harmonious with all laws as a whole.” Id.
Rule 3: “Every word within a statute is there for a purpose and should be given its due
significance.” Id.

1
https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/18/18-9575/102239/20190611092122150_00000055.pdf

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Rule 22: All of the words used in legislative acts are to be given force and meaning,
otherwise they would be superfluous having been enough to have written the act without
the words.” A statute ought “to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause,
sentence or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.” Id. quoting Duncan v.
Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001)
As the Act is void of verbiage either expressly barring unlicensed persons
from procuring or assigns a penalty for unlicensed procurement, the CLC
should follow the maxim of CA Civil Code 3530: “That which does not appear
to exist is to be regarded as if it did not exist.”
Or it should follow the relevant case law delineating the implications of a
lack of a remedy provision: in Wood v. Krepps, 168 Cal. 382 (1914), “the court
had before it a statute that required personal property brokers to give to
borrowers a notice of the contents of notes and chattel mortgages taken to
secure loans and imposed a penalty for failure to comply with the statute.”
Nome State Bank v. Brendmoen, 295 N.W. 82 (N.D. 1940).
Marathon v. Blasi, 140 Cal.App. 4th 1001, 1010 (2006) noted how Wood
“enforced a promissory note despite the plaintiff pawnbroker's violation of a
municipal business licensing statute that, like the [Talent Agencies] Act, did
not expressly prohibit the enforcement of contracts made in violation of the
statute ... The ordinance does not declare that a contract made by any one in
the conduct of the various businesses for which licenses are provided to be
procured under the ordinances, shall, if a license is not obtained, be invalid;
nor is there any provision therein indicating in the slightest that this failure was
intended to affect in any degree the right of contract. (Wood at p. 387.)"
“An administrative agency cannot by its own regulations create a remedy
which the Legislature has withheld. 'Administrative regulations that alter or
amend the statute or enlarge or impair its scope are void and courts not only
may, but it is their obligation to strike down such regulations.” Dyna-Med Inc.
v. Fair Empl. & Housing Comm., 43 Cal. 3d 1385,1388 (1987).

13
 Dyna-Med limited its review and prohibition to creating a remedy to
punitive damages. Peralta v. Fair Empl. & Housing Comm., 52 Cal. 3d 40,
60 (1990) similarly held that without statutory authority, administrative
agencies are barred from creating compensatory remedies as well.
The CLC’s enforcement of the TAA is anomalous to how all other
licensing schemes are interpreted. If the CLC interpretation is correct and
procurement is reserved for licensees because it is a defining activity of a
talent agent, every clause, sentence and word of every CA statute expressly
reserving a defining activity is rendered superfluous. Conversely, if those
terms and phrases are necessary, than axiomatically the decision of the
legislature not to put these terms into the TAA must be given their due
significance.
BPC § 1203 gives clear notice that only licensed clinical bioanalysts
“may perform” the specific activities detailed in §§ 1203 (a-c).
BPC § 1270 (a) plainly states that only licensed cytotechnologists can
lawfully examine cytological slides
BPC § 1281 makes it, “unlawful for any person to own, operate, maintain,
direct, or engage in the business of operating a clinical laboratory, as defined
in this chapter, unless he or she possesses a valid clinical laboratory license
issued by the department.”
BPC § 2052 plainly states how only licensed doctors can prescribe drugs.
BPC § 6980 makes it clear that only those with valid locksmith licenses
can engage in the defined activities of a locksmith.
Similarly, the occupational licensing schemes for dentists (BPC § 1700),
respiratory therapists, (BPC 3760 (a) and (b)), pharmacists (BPC § 4051 (a)),
veterinarians (BPC § 4825), acupuncturists (BPC § 4935), professional
engineers (BPC § 6730), geologists (BPC § 7830), and among others, pest
control specialists (BPC § 8550 (a)) all create clear demarcation lines between
activities anyone can engage in and those requiring licensure.

14
 Per Labor Code § 1700.4 (a): “’talent agency’ means a person or
corporation who engages in the occupation of offering, promising, or
attempting to procure employment or engagements for an artist or artists ...
Talent Agencies may, in addition, counsel or direct artists in the development
of their professional careers.” Neither 1700.4 (a) nor any other statute in the
TAA has any express language reserving any of its three defining activities –
procuring, counseling or directing – to licensees.
If Labor Code § 1700.5 had, as the above licensing schemes do, and as the
Private Employment and General Employment Agencies Act had, verbiage
matching or mirroring “It is unlawful to engage in the business of a talent agent
as defined in this chapter without a license” (emphasis added), then procuring,
directing and counseling artists would be reserved for licensees.
But neither § 1700.5 nor any other statute in the TAA has like language.
Not all CA licensing schemes regulate their defining activities. BPC §
2903 (a) of the Psychologists Act defines the practice of psychology as,
“rendering or offering to render … any psychological service involving the
application of psychological principles, methods, and procedures of
understanding, predicting, and influencing behavior, such as principles
pertaining to learning, perception, motivation, emotions, and interpersonal
relationships…”
BPC § 2903 (c) defines psychotherapy as using “psychological methods
in a professional relationship to assist a person or persons to acquire greater
human effectiveness or to modify feelings, conditions, attitudes, and behaviors
that are emotionally, intellectually, or socially ineffectual or maladaptive.”
The Psychologists Act has no statute expressly reserving those activities
to those with a psychologist’s license, and accordingly, there are no examples
of Scientologists, who regularly engage in constructing, administering and
interpreting tests of mental abilities, aptitudes, interests, etc. to affect others’
behavior being found in violation of § 2903.

15
 Nor has any court found a pastor, rabbi, salesperson, life coach, teacher,
trainer, doctor, physical or drug rehabilitation counselor, advertising
executive, nurse or any others that use psychological principles to understand
and influence the behavior of others in violation of law without the violator
falsely claiming to be a psychologist.
Among the other licensing schemes without statutes expressly barring
non-licensees from engaging in the defined activities of the regulated
profession: the Landscape Architects Act (BPC § 5615/maintaining and
beautifying outdoor areas) and the Geologists Act (BPC §§ 7802.1/7803,
examining the Earth’s materials). No California Court has ever found anyone
engaging in any of the defining activities of those professions, unless the
accused has also held themselves out as a licensee, in violation of law.
As stated in the CA Vocational Nursing Act, non-licensees can engage in
all the activities as a licensee, “provided that such person shall not in any way
assume to practice as a licensed vocational nurse.” BPC 2861.If the TAA is
correctly interpreted where just being a defined activity reserves it for
licensees, all the above statutes are unnecessary, superfluous; which per the
U.S.S.C. rules of statutory construction, is incorrect. There is an exception:
even if the licensing scheme has no express prohibition, “where a statute
contains a penalty, that penalty is equivalent to an express prohibition.” Smith
v. Bach, 183 Cal. 259, 262 (1920).

2. The Interpretation Conflicts With Rule 4

Rule 4: Courts should “construe laws in harmony with the legislative

intent and seek to carry out legislative purpose.” U.S.S.C Rules supra.
As delineated in Section IV.A, the legislative history of the TAA makes
it inarguably clear the legislature never had an interest in requiring managers
to have a license to procure. First, it created the AMA, where the express
purpose was to let them procure without a license, and during further

16
revisions, never restored the “as defined in this chapter” phrase which would
have made licensure a requirement.

3. The Interpretation Conflicts With Rule 5

Rule 5: “Presumption may not be used in determining a statute.” Id.

Marathon (at 986) found managers are subject to TAA regulation based
on (1): Labor Code § 1700, as "any individual, company, society, firm,
partnership, association, corporation, limited liability company, manager, or
their agents or employees", and (2): procurement is reserved for licensees
because a ‘talent agent’ is defined in § 1700.4 (a) as “a person or corporation
who engages in the occupation of procuring, offering, promising, or
attempting to procure employment or engagements for an artist or artists. ...
Talent agencies may, in addition, counsel or direct artists in the development
of their professional careers."
Both conclusions were presumptions; not determined by statutory edict
and without any corresponding words in the Act to the conclusions reached.

4. The Interpretation Conflicts With Rule 6

Rule 6: “Laws are void for vagueness if the persons subject to the law
cannot deduce its meaning; “we insist laws give the person of ordinary
intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited so that he
may act accordingly.” U.S.S.C Rules supra.
§ 1700.4 (a) lists three defining activities of talent agents, but neither it
nor any statute expressly states one or more of those activities is reserved for
licensees, nor conversely, bans unlicensed persons from engaging in
directing, procuring.
All persons have a constitutional right to know what is required and what
is prohibited. No law should be drafted or interpreted to encourage or
facilitate arbitrary and potentially discriminatory enforcement. See City of

17
Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 52, 58-59 (1999); Kolender v. Lawson, 461
U.S. 352, 357 (1983); Smith v. Gougen, 415 U.S. 566, 575 (1972).

5. The Interpretation Conflicts With Rule 8

Rule 8: “A term’s definition is not to be implied.” Id.

“Engrained in our concept of due process is the requirement of notice.
Notice is sometimes essential so that the citizen has the chance to defend
charges. Notice is required before property interests are disturbed, before
assessments are made, before penalties are assessed.” Lambert v. CA. 355
U.S. 225, 228 (1957) See Consumer Advocacy Group Inc. v. Kintetsu
Enterprises of America, 150 Cal.App.4th 953, 960 (2007).
The Talent Agencies Act “is silent – completely silent – on the subject
of the proper remedy for illegal procurement.” Marathon supra at 991.
“The Act provides no remedy for its violation.” Id.
“The Legislature has not seen fit to specify the remedy for violations of
the Act.” Id. at 996.
Marathon was asked to decide whether a violator’s contractual rights
should always be voided or can severance be appropriate. It was not asked,
and did not opine, if the Legislature’s silence affected the right to contract.
It does.
“Elementary notions of fairness enshrined in this Court’s constitutional
jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice not only of the conduct
that will subject him to punishment but also of the severity of the penalty that
a State may impose.” De Anza Santa Cruise Mobil Estates Assn. v. De Anza
Santa Cruz Mobile Estates, 94 Cal.App.4th 890, 904.
Even if there were legislative history showing the State wanted to punish
unlicensed procurers, The U.S.S.C. holds without notice of remedy, the
procurer cannot be penalized. See U.S. v Evans, 333. U.S. 483 (1948).

18
 Evans was convicted for harboring an illegal alien, violating a federal
statute prohibiting both smuggling and harboring undocumented persons.
However, as Congress had only enacted a remedy for smuggling – five
years in prison – the Court ruled itself without authority to assign and mete
out a remedy for harboring, holding that assigning penalties is a legislature
responsibility; “a task outside the bounds of judicial interpretation.” Id. at
495. And as there is no remedy for unlicensed procurement, it is not unlawful.
As held in Dyna-Med and Peralta, California expressly bars
administrative agencies from assigning and enforcing uncodified remedies.
As enforced, unlicensed procurement is a civil infraction. Per CA Labor
Code 1700.44 (c), the failure to procure a license “shall not be considered a
criminal act under any law of this state.
However, extinguishing the rights to the benefits of a found violator’s
labor without an allegations or finding of fraud or nonperformance, the
lawful rationales for forfeiting otherwise-owed compensation for a civil
infraction, makes the forfeiture a criminal remedy, an unconstitutional
response – even if unlicensed procurement was a civil wrong.
The CA Contractors Act gives notice unlicensed persons cannot “bring
or maintain any action, or recover in law or equity in any action, in any court
in this state for the collection of compensation for the performance of any act
or contract where a license is required … regardless of the merits of the cause
of action.” See BPC § 7031. The TAA provides no such or similar notice.
Per BPC § 1280 of the Clinical Laboratory Act, it is illegal for unlicensed
persons to represent themselves or “act as a licensed individual, and, per BPC
§ 1287, such violations are misdemeanors punishable with imprisonment of
up to six months and/or a fine of up to $1,000.
Per BPC § 1700, it is a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment of ten
days to one year and/or a fine between $100 and $1,500 to assume the degree

19
of a dental hygienist, to represent oneself as a dental hygienist, or engage in
the practice of dental hygiene without the proper certifications.
Per BPC § 2521, “Any person who violates this article [which regulates
licensed midwives] is guilty of a misdemeanor.”
Per BPC § 2790, it is a misdemeanor “punishable by imprisonment” for
up to six months, and/or “a fine not exceeding” $2,000, for an unlicensed
person to claim to be a psychologist.
Per BPC § 2799, “any person who violates the provision of this chapter
[regulating nurses] is guilty of a misdemeanor” and can be imprisoned for up
to a year and/or fined up to $1,000.
Per BPC § 5120, non-licensees engaging in the activities reserved only
for those with public accountancy licenses are “guilty of a misdemeanor,
punishable for not more than six months,” and/or a fine up to $1,000.
Per BPC § 5640, it is a criminal misdemeanor punishable by a fine of
$100 to $500 and/or imprisonment not exceeding six months, for an
unlicensed person to engage in the practice of landscape architecture, use that
title or other that implies having a license, use the stamp of a licensee, or
advertise in ways imply having a license.
Per BPC § 7027.1, it is a criminal misdemeanor punishable by a fine
between $700 and $1000 to advertise to do construction work or engage in
any of the defining activities of a contractor without a valid contractor’s
license.
Per BPC 7402, it is a criminal misdemeanor punishable by fines up to
$2500 and imprisonment of up to six months for an unlicensed person to
represent themselves to be a cosmetologist or barber.
Per BPC § 7523, it is a misdemeanor punishable by a $10,000 fine and/or
a year in prison for an unlicensed person to act as or represent oneself to be a
private investigator or in any way have identification, business card,

20
letterhead or electronic messaging that indicate being a licensed private
investigator.
Per BPC § 10139, it is “a public offense punishable by a fine” up to
$20,000, and/or “by imprisonment” of up to six months to act “as a real estate
broker, real estate salesperson, or mortgage loan originator … or who
advertises using words indicating” an unlicensed person has a license.
Every state licensing scheme reserving defining activities for licensees
also gives notice that engaging in those actions without a license is a criminal
offense, and thus, any contract made by an unlicensed person to engage in
those activities is invalid. Except for the TAA, which provides no such
notice, and thus, following all rules of statutory construction, should not be
enforced as if it does.
As the TAA has no prohibitionary statute or penalty provision, and as
Peralta and Dyna-Med bar the Labor Commissioner and all administrative
agencies from creating remedies that the Legislature has withheld, it is clear
the Act as it has been enforced against Appellants and others is extrajudicial
and unconstitutional.

6. The Interpretation Conflicts With Rule 10

Rule 10: “It is a violation of due process of law to employ a ‘statutory

presumption,’ needing to guess about the definition of a word.” U.S.S.C.
Rules supra.
“It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for
vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined. … we insist that laws
give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know
what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly.” Grayned v. Rockford,
408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
The U.S. Supreme Court has established specific guidelines for
constitutional clarity: "Living under a rule of law entails various

21
suppositions, one of which is that ‘[all persons] are entitled to be informed
as to what the State commands or forbids.’” FCC v. Fox Television Stations,
Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2317 (2012).
In 2014, a 9th Circuit Court invalidated a Los Angeles ordinance
banning people from sleeping in their cars, finding it unconstitutionally
vague for failing, “to draw a clear line between innocent and criminal
conduct.” Desertrain v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.3d 1147.
The Desertrain opinion pointed to multiple questions the statute left
unanswered, leaving what was and was not permissible by law ambiguous:
“Is it impermissible to eat food in a vehicle? Is it illegal to keep a
sleeping bag? Canned food? Books? What about speaking on a cell phone?
Or staying in the car to get out of the rain?” Those unanswered questions
leave the statute, “impossible for citizens to know how to keep their conduct
within the pale.” Id. at 1156.
Clarity is essential whether an imposed sanction is civil or criminal. Civil
matters must receive the “same basic protections against ‘judgments without
notice’ as criminal matters.” BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 (1996)
Does the TAA offer the essential clarity for unlawful procurement?
Wachs v. Curry, 13 Cal.App.4th 616, 629 (1993) found the term
‘procurement’ constitutional, but noted its likeliness to be unconstitutional
as applied; and Marathon (at 990) explained why that is: “The act contains
no definition, and the Labor Commissioner has struggled over time to better
delineate which actions involve mere general assistance to an artist's career
and which stray across the line to illicit procurement.”
The most basic accepted responsibility personal managers engage in is
working with neophyte clients and working with them until appropriate talent
agents are willing to join in with the representation. See Marathon at 983-984.
Per Labor Code § 1700.44 (d), managers can work in conjunction with,
and at the request of, a licensed talent agency, but can managers solicit agents

22
to come aboard? Is it lawful for manager to put the artist’s sales team together,
as that is clearly part of the procurement process?
The Act, as written, leaves this unanswered.
It is universally accepted that personal managers work with their clients
to choose the photos, refine the resume, and edit the videos that first are used
to garner an agent’s interest and then used by the agents to pitch buyers. But
can a personal manager lawfully create the sales materials, an essential part
of the procuring process?
The Act, as written, leaves this unanswered.
Is it lawful for personal managers to forward sales materials to buyers?
In a reply brief to a legal challenge brought in Federal Court by the National
Conference of Personal Managers, the Labor Commissioner wrote that it
was inside the legal line to, “send out resumes, photographs, videotapes, or
written materials for an artist.” (Exh. 3.) But this is a supposition; the Act as
written leaves the question unanswered.
If one accepts that managers can lawfully send out a client’s marketing
materials, is it unlawful to follow up that submission with a call or email?
The Act, as written, leaves this unanswered.
Is it unlawful if the recipient of the marketing materials proactively calls
the unlicensed representative about the artist?
The Act, as written, leaves this unanswered.
Is it unlawful if an unlicensed representative receives a call from a buyer
late at night who cannot reach the client’s agent and wants to hire the actor
to report to work at 6AM the next morning? And if receiving the call is legal,
if the manager tells the artist about the opportunity, has the legal line been
crossed? What if the artist takes the job; has that made the manager’s actions
unlawful, even if the manager just received an offer and passed it on and did
not engage in procurement past sharing information with the client?
The Act, as written, leaves all of these questions unanswered.

23
 Assuming that it is lawful for an unlicensed representative to receive a
call and can inform their client about a job starting hours away, if, in that
situation, the manager asks the buyer for more money than originally offered
by the buyer; are these actions unlawful?
The Act, as written, leaves this and all the above questions unanswered.
“It is a basic principle of due process an enactment is void for vagueness if
its prohibitions are not clearly defined” (Grayned supra at p. 108 (1972)).
Without clarity as to what procurement activities may be unlawful, along
with violating the U.S.S.C. rules of statutory construction, the statutory
scheme is unconstitutional as applied, violating the substantive due process
clause and equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment.

7. The Interpretation Conflicts With Rule 12

Rule 12: Expressum Facit Cessare Tacitum: “What is expressed makes

what is silent cease: where we find an express declaration, we should not
resort to implication.” U.S.S.C. Rules supra.
As shown above, when the Legislature wants to regulate and assign
remedies to when the regulation is violated, it expresses declares its intention
with prohibition and penalty statutes. The Commissioner’s interpretation is
not just unsupportable, its beginnings is unconscionable.
One might expect to learn how legally unsupportable enforcement was
the result of an unintentional assumption the Legislature had codified statutes
inside the Talent Agencies Act that barred unlicensed persons from procuring
and attached a remedy to that activity. To the contrary, it is the result of
intentional, discriminatory actions by the Commissioner.
1953 was the height of McCarthyism and the Hollywood Blacklist, a
period in our history as much about anti-Semitism as anti-Communism.2

2
See “Why The Blacklist is a Jewish Story,” https://forward.com/culture/film-tv/413485/why-the-hollywood-
blacklist-is-a-jewish-story-and-also-a-milwaukee-story/

24
 “[A]nti-Semitism, and the systematic recruitment and display of Jewish
collaborators, were very much on HUAC’s (House Un-American Activities
Committee) only half-hidden agenda.” 3
After a teenaged actress left her manager and her mother withheld
commissions, the resultant breach of contract lawsuit reached a Court of
Appeals: Radin v. Laurie, 120 Cal. App.2d 778 (1953). Along with the
Parties’ briefs, the Commissioner submitted an amicus curiae (Exh. 4).
Quoting the Commissioner’s brief:
“The laws of this state [] require the licensing of
employment agents (Sec. 1581), theatrical employment agents
(Sec. 1643), 4 and artists managers (Sec. 1651); call for prior
submission and approval of their contract forms (Secs. 1644,
1955) and in numerous other and allied provisions establish a
clear intent on the part of the legislature to regulate closely
activities of such agents and managers.
“Violation of the provisions of the above legislation
constitutes a misdemeanor punishable by fine or imprisonment.
(Sec. 1648).” Smith v. Bach, 183 Cal. 259.”
The brief clearly leads readers to think the Artists’ Managers Act
statutorily prohibits and penalizes unlicensed procurers. Only a close
examination of the brief’s verbiage reveals how only the scheme regulating
booking agents/theatrical employment agents, includes a statute where, per
§ 1648, “a violation of the provisions constitutes a misdemeanor punishable
by fine or imprisonment.”
In a declaration subject to perjury, Legislative Intent Service (“LIS”)
attorney Jenny S. Lillge memorialized how the LIS had been asked:

3
https://books.google.com/books?id=qaowDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA126&lpg=PA126&dq=%22systematic+recruitment
+and+display+of+Jewish+collaborators%22&source=bl&ots=1jC9-
S4uwa&sig=ACfU3U0w4cBzsfvu7N46nuGiWgKkWlu7dQ&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjQ_4ub4YaEAxWnOk
QIHYgMAtAQ6AF6BAgIEAM#v=onepage&q=%22systematic%20recruitment%20and%20display%20of%20Jewi
sh%20collaborators%22&f=false
4
In 1953, what is now called ‘booking agents’, those who procure live engagements for artists, were referred to as
theatrical employment agents.

25
 “ to find the statutes that were the historical derivation of the
Artists’ Managers Act” that were in effect in 1953. ... Upon
review, we noted there was no penalty provision with regard to
unlicensed procurement in 1953. ... We have provided you with
a true and correct copy of this chaptered law attached to this
declaration.” See Exh. 5.
The most benign interpretation of the Commissioner’s actions would be
to label it as the wrongful resorting to implication, a violation of the U.S.S.C.
Rule 12. Moreover, the amicus was so carefully written so readers would
conclude the AMA barred and penalized unlicensed procurers by authors
who knew the licensing scheme did no such thing, it appears to be intentional
subterfuge.
It is inconceivable to think the Commissioner would have intentionally,
nefariously deceived the Court of Appeal had he a family member, an old
classmate, a friend from his country club or church who was an artists’
(personal) manager. Such actions are only done to those thought of as ‘lesser
than,’ which in 1953 included those with semitic names like Mr. Radin’s,
working in an occupation that was at the time almost exclusively Jewish.
As unfortunate the Radin chicanery would have been as a one-off, that
interpretation, that the licensing scheme should be enforced as if the Act had
prohibition and penalty statutes despite it not having either, remains CLC
policy 71 years later.
Per CA Labor Code § 1700.29, the Commissioner is to “adopt, amend,
and repeal such rules and regulations as are reasonably necessary for the
purpose of enforcing and administering this chapter and as are not inconsistent
with this chapter.” The CLC’s refusal to accept any of the above arguments in
Pardoe v. Salazar shows the administrative agency has abdicated its
responsibility, or any sense of fairness.
They are allowing instead, for example, propagated Brandon Blackstock’s
being painted as a lawbreaker in media from Indiana to India, despite knowing
he has done no such thing. The only thing he is guilty of is being good enough

26
 at his job to help his wife become one of the most successful show business
personalities in the history of show business.
It is the Amicus’s hope this court follows Dyna-Med, Peralta, U.S. v
Evans, Wood v. Krepps, BMW v. Gore and the many others, so the legally
unsupportable, unconstitutional and extrajudicial enforcement does not get
to year 72, and to instead help Mr. Blackstock get his good name back.

8. The Interpretation Conflicts With Rule 14

Rule 14: There must be fair notice: “laws must provide persons of
ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited.”
U.S.S.C. Rules supra.
No person of ordinary intelligence would read Labor Code §§ 1700.4 (a)
and 1700.5 and be able to ascertain that one must have a talent agency license
to help change the professional plateau of their artist clients.
But the Commissioner’s interpretation is now more blatantly prejudicial
and discriminatory against the occupation of personal managers.
There are over two hundred published TAA opinions.5
Pardoe was the first and only time the CLC cited CA Civil Code § 1598
and §1599 to void an unlicensed person’s contractual rights. See Salazar
supra (at p.6, fn. 1).
Those Civil Code sections are the statutory manifestation of the doctrine
of severability. They are not penalty, but mitigation statutes. After one found
someone had procured without a license, instead of just using severability
arbitrarily, as the CLC had done for decades, (see Marathon, pgs. 991-993),
Marathon (at p. 981) holds adjudicators “have the discretion to apply the
doctrine of severability to partially enforce these contract’ versus voiding

5
See https://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/DLSE-TACs.htm

27
 “manager-talent contracts ab initio for unlicensed procurement.” See also Id.
at p. 995.
If the severability statutes could possibly serve as penalty rather than
mitigation statutes – which they cannot – and had it wanted the severability
statutes to stand as the penalty provision of the TAA, the Legislature would
have cross-referenced the Civil Code statutes inside the Labor Code licensing
scheme. They know how to do that: see the list of 306 Civil Code cross-
references inside of the Labor Code, compiled by the Legislative Intent
Service.6
Further, were the Civil Code statutes standing as the penalty provision
for a Labor Code infraction, with nothing in the TAA directing one to those
other set of laws, it would be the epitome of unconstitutionally vague.
Conversely, if the severability statutes serve as sufficient notice, the
penalty provisions in every other scheme where the penalty of voidance are
expressed is surplusage; § 1598 and § 1599 would suffice for every chapter.

9. The Interpretation Conflicts With Rule 15

Rule 15: “Judges may not extend the meaning of word used within a
statute but must rely only on the things clearly included in the statute itself,
and nothing more.”
Again, no prohibition or remedy is included in the statute.

10. The Interpretation Conflicts With Rule 17

Rule 17: Noscitur a sociis: “words grouped in a list should be given

related meaning.”
The list of terms in CA Labor Code § 1700 – “individual, company,
society, firm, partnership, association, corporation, limited liability

6
https://www.scribd.com/document/731324747/Westlaw-List-of-306-Results-for-Adv-Civil-Code

28
company, manager, or their agents or employees" – define one’s place in an
organization, not an occupation.
For a reader to assume that one of these eleven terms is not about one’s
organizational status, but their occupation, conflicts with noscitur a sociis,
the ‘whole-text canon’, the ‘presumption of consistent usage canon’, the
harmonious reading canon, the fixed meaning canon (words must be given
the meaning they had when the text was adopted), and the associated words
contextual canon of statutory construction.

11. The Interpretation Conflicts With Rule 21

Rule 21: “Laws are void if they are vague.” Id.

Quoting Marathon supra at 990: “The Act contains no definition, and
the Labor Commissioner has struggled over time to better delineate which
actions involve mere general assistance to an artist's career and which stray
across the line to illicit procurement.”
Along with the High Court justices, among those who recognize the
statute fails to give sufficient notice: the Commissioner, the very person who
metes out these draconian penalties. ln 1984, the Legislature created the CA
Entertainment Commission (CEC) and appointed the Labor Commissioner
to serve as its chair, “to recommend to the Legislature a model bill regarding
this licensing.” Exhibit 6: “1986 Report of the California Entertainment
Commission.” Pg. 1 (Pg. 3 of exhibit).
After studying the Act for over two years; the Commission submitted the
Report, authored by the Commissioner, distilling the CECs conclusions and
recommendations on how to improve the TAA.
In the Report, the Commissioner warns of the vagueness of § 1700.4 (a):
“There is, however, an inherent inequity – and some
question of constitutional due process – in subjecting one
to criminal sanctions in violation of a law which is so
unclear and ambiguous as to leave reasonable persons in

29
 doubt about the meaning of the language or whether a
violation has occurred.
‘Procure employment’ is just such a phrase … [and
it] has left the personal manager uncertain and highly
apprehensive about the permissible parameters of their
daily activity.” Id., Pgs. 24-25 (Pgs. 4-5 of exhibit)
What greater admission of the inequities of this enforcement can there
be: the very person who metes out these penalties admitting to being unable
to ascertain a bright line between lawful and illicit activities.
Another admission: this very case. Here, the Commissioner ruled that,
“the agent must advise the manager or request the manager’s activity for each
and every submission. At the very minimum an agent must be aware of the
manager’s procurement activity.”
But notably in Wesley Snipes v. Robinson Management, TAC 36-96,
among other cases, the CLC held just the opposite: “The requirements of the
statute cannot be construed to call for a game of ‘Mother May I?’ every time
an artist manager7 takes some action during a long-term relationship.”
For a law to be constitutional, there must be clear notice of: (1) who is subject to the
enacted regulation; (2) what conduct is being regulated; and (3), what consequences do
found violators of the statute face. (See “Due Process Limitations on Occupational
Licensing,” VA Law Review (Vol. 59, No. 6, p. 1108.)
As has been made clear by the above, there is no clear notice as to whether personal
managers are subject to TAA regulation, what if any conduct is reserved for licensees, and
if any conduct is so reserved, what consequence does the violator face? As such, the Act is
unconstitutionally vague, these truths should be considered when this Court decides how
to decide this matter.

7
It is important to note that as recently as 1996, the Labor Commissioner was referring to a personal manager as an
artist’s manager, further cementing that that the Artists’ Managers Act was created to specifically regulate personal
managers, who were then removed from regulation with the passage of the Talent Agencies Act in 1978.

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 IV. CONCLUSION

As the foregoing arguments are arguably inarguable, the Amicus respectfully urges
this Court to consider that the CLC has no authority to mete out any penalty, no less impair
or void an unlicensed person’s contract, and that the Commissioner’s enforcement is
unlawful, unconstitutional, and extrajudicial when deciding whether Petitioners violated
the Act.

Dated May 13, 2024 Respectfully Submitted by:

Rick Siegel
Marathon Entertainment

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 PROOF OF SERVICE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age
of 18 and a party to the action entitled DIANE PARDOE and SARAH PARDOE
v. LOS ANGELES COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT, JUDE SALAZAR. My
address is 22971 Darien Street, Woodland Hills CA 91364.

On MAY 13, 2024, I facilitated service of the documents described as:

AMICUS BRIEF

on the interested parties in this action as stated on the below service list by
electronically transmitting a true copy of the foregoing document(s) to:
emcpherson@mcpherson-llp.com
ppine@mcpherson-llp.com
bfreedman@ftllp.com
jkaplan@ftllp.com

I declare under the penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that
the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on May 13, 2024, at Los Angeles, California.

Name (printed): Jennie Nigrosh

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