UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE OF LEGAL STUDIES

PANJAB UNIVERSITY, CHANDIGARH

INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES AND

PRINCIPLES OF LEGISLATION

HARMONIOUS CONSTRUCTION

THE STATUTE SHOULD BE READ AS A WHOLE

PROJECT TOPIC - IDENTICAL EXPRESSIONS TO HAVE SAME MEANING

M. S. M. SHARMA v. SHRI SRI KRISHNA SINHA AND OTHERS

MAYA MATHEW v. STATE OF KERALA

SUBMITTED TO: - SUBMITTED BY: -

MR. AGAMPREET SINGH INDERPREET KAUR
B.A. LL.B.
(HONS.) 6TH
SEMESTER
SECTION:-B
ROLL NO.: -
1
77/19

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 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to express gratitude to my teacher Mr. Agampreet Singh who gave me this
opportunity to work on this project. I got to learn a lot about various general principles of
interpretation of statutes while working on this project. I would also like to thank our Director
Prof. (Dr.) Rajinder Kaur wholeheartedly. At last, I would like to extend my heartfelt gratitude to
my parents and friends who have been with me all the time and helped in the completion of this
project.

INDERPREET KAUR

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. HARMONIOUS CONSTRUCTION.......................................................................................5

1.1 APPLICATION OF THE RULE OF HARMONIOUS CONSTRUCTION.........................6

2. THE STATUTE SHOULD BE READ AS A WHOLE...........................................................8

2.1 APPLICATION OF THE CONSTRUCTION EX VISCERIBUS ACTUS..........................8

3. IDENTICAL EXPRESSIONS TO HAVE SAME MEANING.............................................10

4. M. S. M. SHARMA v. SHRI SRI KRISHNA SINHA AND OTHERS................................11

5. MAYA MATHEW v. STATE OF KERALA........................................................................15

BIBLIOGRAPHY..........................................................................................................................19

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 TABLE OF CASES
Attar Sigh v. Inder Kumar..............................................................................................................9

Bengal Immunity Company v. State of Bihar................................................................................6

CIT v. Hindustan Bulk Carriers.....................................................................................................6

D.D. Rego V. Rajiv Gandhi University of Health Sciences.........................................................10

Gurmej Singh v. Pratap Singh.......................................................................................................9

Jagdish Singh v. Lt. Governor, Delhi..........................................................................................10

M.S.M. Sharma v. Krishna Sinha.............................................................................................7,11

Maya Mathew v. State Of Kerala.................................................................................................15

Poppatlal Shah v. State of Madras.................................................................................................9

Raj Krishna v. Binod......................................................................................................................6

Ram Narain v. State of Uttar Pradesh...........................................................................................8

S. Gopal Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh................................................................................10

Wason v. Walter............................................................................................................................13

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 1. HARMONIOUS CONSTRUCTION
Where two provisions of a statute are repugnant, they should be so interpreted that, if possible,
the effect should be given to both by harmonising them with each other. This is what is known as
rule of harmonious construction. When the words of a statutory provision are ambiguous, then
such meaning should be attributed to them by which the words best harmonize with the subject
and the object of the enactment.
The essence of the rule of harmonious construction is that where alternative constructions are
possible, that construction should be accepted by which consistency is achieved between
apparently inconsistent provisions and both the provisions survive in harmony with each other.
This rule is based on the presumption that Legislature does not want to contradict itself and
therefore is not expected to enact such provisions in a statute which are in conflict with each
other. All the provisions of a statute are therefore considered to be well composed and consistent
with each other Hence, even if an inconsistency is found, the same is taken to be unintentional
and is required to be cured by way of harmonious construction.
But where it is not possible to give effect to both the conflicting provisions harmoniously, then
head on collision should be avoided by holding that:
(i) apparently conflicting provisions deal with separate situations, or
(ii) one conflicting provision merely provides for an exception of general rule contained in the
other provision.
There are two latin maxims on this point –
1. Generalia specialibus non derogant - This maxim means that general things do not derogate
from special things. If a special provision exists on certain matter, that matter shall be governed
by such special provision only and cannot be dealt with under general provision.1
2. Generalibus specialia derogant - This maxim means that special things derogate from general
things. General provisions have no application in the matters that are governed by special
provisions.2
The Apex Court has laid down five principles of rule of Harmonious Construction in the landmark

1
D.N. Mathur, Interpretation of Statutes 214 (Central Law Publications, Allahabad, 2018).
2
D.N. Mathur, Interpretation of Statutes 215 (Central Law Publications, Allahabad, 2018).

6
case of CIT v. Hindustan Bulk Carriers3:
 The courts must avoid a head on clash of seemingly contradicting provisions and they
must construe the contradictory provisions so as to harmonize them.
 The provision of one section cannot be used to defeat the provision contained in another
unless the court, despite all its effort, is unable to find a way to reconcile their
differences.
 When it is impossible to completely reconcile the differences in contradictory provisions,
the courts must interpret them in such as way so that effect is given to both the provisions
as much as possible.
 Courts must also keep in mind that interpretation that reduces one provision to a useless
number or dead is not harmonious construction.
 To harmonize is not to destroy any statutory provision or to render it fruitless.

1.1 APPLICATION OF THE RULE OF HARMONIOUS CONSTRUCTION

In Raj Krishna v. Binod4, the question before the court was the conflict between Sections 33(2)
and 123(8) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. Section 33(2) empowers a government
servant to nominate or second a candidate seeking election whereas Section 123(8) provides that
a government servant is not entitled to assist a candidate in an election in any manner except by
casting his vote. Observing that a government servant was entitled to nominate or second a
candidate seeking election to the State Legislative Assembly, the Supreme Court held that both
these provisions should be harmoniously interpreted. Harmony was possible only if Section
123(8) of the Act is interpreted as conferring power on a government servant of voting as well as
of proposing and seconding a candidature and forbidding him from assisting a candidate in any
other manner.
In Bengal Immunity Company v. State of Bihar5, the question before court was regarding the
conflict between Article 286(1), explanation (as it then stood) to Article 286(1)(a), and Article
286(2) was before the Court.
 Article 286(1) states ‘no law of a State shall impose a tax on the sale of goods where such

3
(2003) 3 SCC 57
5 AIR 1955 SC
6
4
AIR 1954 SC 202

6 AIR 1955 SC
6
 sale takes place (a) outside the State.’
 The explanation to Article 286(1)(a) stated ‘for the purposes of sub-clause (a) a sale shall
be deemed to have taken place in the State in which the goods have actually been
delivered as a direct result of such sale for the purpose of consumption in that State.’
 Article 286(2) provides ‘Except in so far as Parliament may by law otherwise provide, no
law of a State shall impose a tax on the sale of any goods where such sale took place in
the course of inter-State trade or commerce’.
The respondent argued that they were entitled to tax the sales made by the appellant, a registered
dealer under the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, in the course of inter-State trade or commerce
because the goods had been delivered in the respondent State for consumption in that State.
Applying the principle of harmonious construction, the Supreme Court held that the conflict
between the said provisions could be solved if the explanation to Article 286(1)(a) was
interpreted as limited only to the Article 286(1)(a) because the only purpose of the explanation
was to explain the meaning of the phrase ‘outside sale’ used in Article 286(1)(a). The
explanation, therefore, could not be extended to Article 286(2) either as an exception or as a
proviso.
In M.S.M. Sharma v. Krishna Sinha6, the petitioner, an editor of a newspaper, was asked to
show cause as to why he should not be punished for a breach of privilege of the House
guaranteed by Article 194(3) of the Constitution for publishing a speech made in the State
Legislative Assembly without expunging certain remarks as directed by the Speaker. In a petition
under Article 32 of the Constitution, he argued that the proposed action against him would be
contrary to the freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a) of the
Constitution. The Supreme Court held that Articles 19(1)(a) and 194(3) had to be harmoniously
interpreted. To give effect to both these provisions, it was necessary to hold that fundamental
right of freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) was subject to the privileges of
Houses guaranteed by Article 194(3). The petition was, therefore, dismissed.

6
AIR 1959 SC
7
 2. THE STATUTE SHOULD BE READ AS A WHOLE
A statute cannot be interpreted in isolation. The statue should be read as a whole and all parts
of it taken together while construing a provision. This is one of the important general
principles of interpretation. This principle is also known as construction ex visceribus actus,
which means within the four corners of act. Sometimes, the meaning of words may be
determined by other words used in the same section while in some cases a section may be
interpreted in the light of some other sections in the same statute.
There is a presumption that the legislature has intended to give effect to every part of a
section without any prejudice, and to reach the desired effect, a harmonious construction has
to be adopted. Maxwell has said that it is an elementary rule that construction is to be made
of all the parts and not of one part only by itself.7
However, this rule should not be used when the meaning of a provision is clear. The rule is
applicable only when there comes the question of interpreting obscurely written statutes. Use
of words like “if not consistent with the context or subject-matter”, “unless the context
otherwise requires” and “unless a contrary intention appears” in acts are indications of
application of this principle.

2.1 APPLICATION OF THE CONSTRUCTION EX VISCERIBUS ACTUS

In Ram Narain v. State of Uttar Pradesh 8, the appellant’s circumstances and property were
taxed under Section 14(1)(f) of the U.P. Town Areas Act. Challenging the imposition, he
argued that even though he was carrying on business in town area, he was not living there
and therefore, could not be taxed. The Supreme Court while rejecting this contention, held
that while interpreting a particular enactment, it is essential to keep the whole scheme of the
statute in mind, and therefore on interpreting, it becomes clear that residence within the town
area is not an essential condition for imposition of tax on circumstances and property because
circumstances mean one’s status and financial position which includes income from trade.

7
M.P. Tandon, Interpretation of Statutes and Legislation 65 (Allahabad Law Agency, Faridabad, 11th edn., 2005).
6
AIR 1959 SC
8
 In Poppatlal Shah v. State of Madras 9, the Supreme Court observed that it is a settled rule of
construction that to ascertain the legislative intent, all the constituent parts of a statute are to
be taken together and each word, phrase, or sentence is to be considered in the light of the
general purpose and object of the Act itself.
In Gurmej Singh v. Pratap Singh10, the respondent’s election was challenged by the
appellant under Section 123(7) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 on the ground
of use of corrupt practices by him because village headmen or lambardars were appointed by
him as his polling and counting agents. The law at that time was that revenue officers
including village accountants were not entitled to assist in the election process even though
other village officers could. The Supreme Court held that while interpreting one enactment of
a statute, all parts of the statute had to be kept in mind. So construed, it is clear that the
legislature had distinguished between two kinds of officers, i.e., the revenue officers which
included village accountants also, and other officers. Since village headmen or lambardars
were neither revenue officers nor village accountants, they fell in the category of other
village officers who were not barred from assisting in the election in such a capacity.
In Attar Sigh v. Inder Kumar 11 , interpretation of Section 13(a)(ii) of the Punjab Rent
Restriction Act, 1949 was in question. Under this provision a landlord could obtain
possession of rented lands if (a) he requires it for his own use; (b) he is not occupying in the
urban area for the purpose of his business any other such rented land; and (c) he has not
vacated such rented land without sufficient cause after the commencement of the Act in the
urban area concerned. The Punjab High Court held that the words 'for his own use' in clause
(a) of the section means that a landlord could evict whatever may be the nature of his use of
the land. The Supreme Court applied the principle that the statute should be read as a whole
and observed that all the three clauses (a), (b) and (c) should be read together, and held that
the words 'for his own use' have been used in a restricted sense and would mean that his own
use could be only of or business purposes which is inferred when clause (a) is read together
with

9
AIR 1953 SC
274
10
AIR 1960 SC

9
clauses (b) and (c).
In S. Gopal Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh 12, the Supreme Court while holding that the
Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 prohibits not only actual receiving of dowry but also the very
demand for dowry made even before the marriage, observed that the text and context of the
entire Act must be looked into while interpreting any of the expressions used in a statute. The
Courts must look to the object which the statute seeks to achieve while interpreting any of the
provisions of the Act.
In Jagdish Singh v. Lt. Governor, Delhi 13, it was held by the Supreme Court that in case of
conflict between various provisions of the rule, harmonious construction should be made and
statute or rule made thereunder should be read as a whole. One provision should be construed
with reference to another provision so as to make the rule consistent. One rule cannot be used
to defeat another rule.

3. IDENTICAL EXPRESSIONS TO HAVE SAME MEANING

This principle means that a word which occurs more than once in the same act should be
given the same meaning throughout the act, unless the context shows that the legislature has
used the word in a different sense. Words such as 'unless the context otherwise requires’
indicate the instances when the similar expression is intended by the legislature to have a
different meaning in different contexts. The commonest illustrations where the principle
identical expressions to have same meaning has not been followed are found in the
interpretations of the expressions may and shall where frequently either of these words has
been interpreted sometimes as mandatory and sometimes discretionary upon the context in
which it has been used.
In D.D. Rego V. Rajiv Gandhi University of Health Sciences 14, the Karnataka High Court
held that it is settled law that in matters relating to educational institutions if two
interpretations are possible, the courts would be reluctant to accept that which would upset
and reverse the decision of the educational authorities and would accept the interpretation
made by such

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12
AIR 1996 SC 2184
13
AIR 1997 SC 2239
14
AIR 1999 Kar 203

1
 institutions. Thus, when examination regulations for the purpose of declaration of results
were notified by the University and the candidates knew about the procedure to be adopted
by the University fully well, they cannot turn around to say that the University regulations
are contrary to regulations framed by the Medical Council of India.

4. M. S. M. SHARMA v. SHRI SRI KRISHNA SINHA AND OTHERS15

In this case, the rule of harmonious construction was applied to resolve conflict between Article
19 (1) (a) and Article 194 (3) of the Constitution of India. It was held that the right of freedom of
speech guaranteed under Article 19 (1) is to be read subject to powers, privileges and immunities
of House of Legislative as provided by Article 194 (3).
FACTS:
M.S.M. Sharma, the petitioner, was a renowned journalist and editor of the English newspaper
'Searchlight' which is published and circulated in the State of Bihar. Shri Krishna Sinha, the
respondent was holding the post of 'Chief Minister' of the State and the Chairman of the
Privileges Committee of the Bihar Legislative Assembly.
In his speech made in the Bihar legislative Assembly on 30th May 1957, Shri Maheshwar Prasad
Narayan Sinha, a member of that Assembly, delivered what has been described as "one of the
bitterest attacks against the way the Chief Minister was conducting the administration of the
State". According to him, the Chief Minister was being guided in the matters like the selection of
Ministers, transfer of a district judge etc. by the advice of a gentleman named Shri Mahesh
Prasad Sinha, who was a former minister of Bihar and had been defeated at the last general
elections. He also strongly criticised the appointment of Shri Mahesh Prasad Sinha as the
Chairman of the Bihar State Khadi Board as having been made only to enable him to stay in
Patna where residential accommodation at Bailey Road had been procured for him. Following
the speech, the speaker ruled that whatever has been said about Mahesh Prasad Sinha would be
expunged from the proceedings but that whatever may be said with reference to the
Chairmanship of the State Khadi Board will remain in the proceedings.

15
AIR 1959 SC 395

1
Though the references to Mr. Mahesh Prasad Sinha was directed to be expunged by the Speaker
of the Legislative Assembly, on 31st May, 1957, the English daily, 'Searchlight', published an
article reporting the entire speech of Mr. Maheshwar Prasad Narayan Sinha, including the
expunged parts as well.
On August 18, 1958 the petitioner was served with a notice dated issued by the Secretary to the
Bihar Legislative Assembly, calling upon the petitioner to show cause why appropriate action
should not be taken against him for breach of privilege of the Speaker and the Assembly in
respect of the offending publication. Apprehending an adverse outcome of the enquiry to be held
by the Committee of Privilege, the petitioner moved the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the
Constitution for the enforcement of his fundamental rights provided by Art. 19(1)(a) and Art. 21.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the Constitution of India, under Article 194(3), empowers a State Legislative
Assembly to restrict any publication of a proceeding that has been witnessed by its
members or to prohibit the publication of the parts that has been directed to be expunged?
2. Does the privilege of the House under Art. 194 (3) prevail over the fundamental right of
the petitioner under Art. 19 (1) (a)?
ARGUMENTS OF PETITIONER:
 The petitioner contended that the show cause notice and the proposed action by the
Committee of Privileges are in violation of the petitioner’s fundamental rights to freedom
of speech and expression under Art.19(1)(a) and to the protection of his personal liberty
under Art. 21.
 Learned advocate for the petitioner relied upon Art. 19(1)(a) and argued that the
petitioner, as a citizen of India, has the right to freedom of speech and expression and
that, as an editor of a newspaper, he is entitled to all the benefits of freedom of the Press.
 The petitioner claims that as a citizen and an editor of a newspaper he has the absolute
right, subject, of course, to any law that may be protected by cl. (2) of Art. 19, to publish
a true and faithful report of the publicly heard and seen proceedings of Parliament or any
State Legislature including portions of speeches directed to be expunged along with a
note that that portion had been directed to be so expunged.

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  They also contended that the decision in Wason v. Walter16, establishes that the Press had
the absolute privilege of publishing a report of the proceedings that take place in
Parliament, just as it is entitled to publish a faithful and correct report of the proceedings
of the Courts of justice, though the character of individuals may incidentally suffer and
that the publication of such accurate reports is privileged and entails neither criminal nor
civil responsibility.
 The petitioner argued that the proceedings before the Committee of Privileges threaten to
deprive him of personal liberty otherwise than in accordance with procedure established
by law.
 The next argument urged by learned advocate for the petitioner is that, after the House
had referred the matter to the committee of privileges, nothing was done for about one
year, and after such a lapse of time the committee has suddenly woke up and resuscitated
the matter only with a view to penalise the petitioner.
ARGUMENTS OF RESPONDENT:
 The respondents argued that the report contained in the offending publication was not in
accordance with the authorised report of the proceedings in the House. It contained even
those remarks which were directed by the Speaker to be expunged.
 It is claimed that generally speaking proceedings in the House are not in the ordinary
course of business meant to be published at all and that under no circumstances is it
permissible to publish the parts of speeches which had been directed to be expunged.
Such publication is said to be a clear breach of the privilege of the Legislative Assembly
which is entitled to protect itself by calling the offender to book and, if necessary, by
meting out suitable punishment to him under Art. 194.
 They urge that under Art. 194 (3), Parliament and the State Legislatures have the powers,
privileges and immunities enjoyed by the House of Commons of British Parliament and
those powers, privileges and immunities prevail over the freedom of speech and
expression conferred on citizens under Art. 19 (1) (a).

16
(1868) 4 Q. B. 73

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  It is claimed that legislative assembly like the House of Commons has the power and
privilege to prohibit the publication in any newspaper of even a true and faithful report of
its proceedings and certainly the publication of any portion of speeches or proceedings
directed to be expunged from the official record.
DECISION:
 Dealing with the first issue, the court opined that there was no statute existent in the
Legislature of Bihar under - Entry 39, List II, Seventh Schedule, of the Constitution of
India, related to the powers, privileges and immunities of the House. Hence, all the
Houses of the Legislative Assembly of Bihar reserves the said powers, privileges and
immunities as that of House of Commons at the onset of the Constitution of India. The
court concluded that at the time of the onset of the Constitution of India i.e., 26th
January, 1950, the House of Commons reserved a right to impose the restriction on
publication of its proceedings. As per this observation, the court opined that the
Legislative Assembly of Bihar also had the same powers as that of the House of
Commons i.e., the State Legislative Assembly is empowered to restrict any publication of
its proceedings.
 Regarding the second question whether the privilege of the House under Art. 194 (3)
prevail over the fundamental right of the petitioner under Art. 19 (1) (a), the court
observed that Art. 19 (1) (a) and Art. 194 (3) have to be reconciled and the only way of
reconciling the same is to read Art. 19 (1) (a) as subject to the latter part of Art. 194(3).
The court was of the view that principle of HARMONIOUS CONSTRUCTION must be
adopted, and so construed, the provisions of Art.19 (1) (a), which are general, must yield
to Art.194 (1) and Art. 194 (3) which are special.
 The court also held that the Legislative Assembly has the powers, privileges and
immunities of the House of Commons and if the petitioner is eventually deprived of his
personal liberty as a result of the proceedings before the Committee of Privileges, such
deprivation will be in accordance with procedure established by law and the petitioner
cannot complain of the breach of his Fundamental Right under Art. 21.
 Therefore, the petition was dismissed.

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 5. MAYA MATHEW v. STATE OF KERALA17
In this case, the Apex Court laid down some well settled rules of interpretation of a subject
which is governed by two sets of rules and applied the principle of Generalibus specialia
derogant.
FACTS:
The appellant was a Pharmacist in the Homeopathy Department of State of Kerala. The Kerala
State Homeopathy Services are governed by the Special Rules for the Kerala State Homeopathy
Services, 1989. All sub-ordinate services in the State of Kerala including the State Homeopathy
Services are also governed by the Kerala State and Sub-ordinate Services Rules, 1958. The
Homoeopathy Department reported 55 vacancies in the post of Medical Officers (Homoeopathy)
to the Kerala Public Service Commission, for purposes of recruitment. The Commission, by
Notification, invited applications for filling up the said 55 posts of Medical Officers
(Homoeopathy) by dividing them in the ratio of 5:1:1:1 for direct recruitment (32 posts), transfer
from nurses (7 posts), transfer from pharmacists (7 posts), and transfer from clerks (7 posts)
respectively as per rule 3 of the special rules.
The appellant filed a writ petition before the High Court seeking a direction to the State
Government to report to the Public Service Commission, 32 vacancies of Medical Officers
(Homoeopathy) to be filled by appointment by transfer of Pharmacists. They contended that the
cadre strength of Medical Officers (Homoeopathy) was 442. Having regard to the ratio of 5:1:1:1
for making appointments provided in the Special Rules, out of the said 442 posts, 277 posts
could be filled by direct recruitment and the balance of 165 posts had to be filled by the
transferees from the posts of nurses, pharmacists and clerks in the Homoeopathy Department at
the rate of 55 each. Due to non-availability of qualified persons in the categories from which
appointments were to be made by transfer, only 23 from the category of pharmacists, one each
from the categories of nurses and clerks were holding the post of Medical Officers, and all
other Medical Officers

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17
AIR 2010 SC 1932

1
(Homoeopathy) were direct recruits.

DIRECT RECRUITMENT THESE AND REST OF THE POSTS

WERE FILLED BY DIRECT
(277) RECRUITS

TRANSFER FROM NURSES

STRENGTH
OFFICERS
MEDICAL

ONLY 1 HELD THE POST

CADRE

(55)

TRANSFER FROM PHARMACIST

ONLY 23 HELD THE POST
(55)

TRANSFER FROM CLERKS

ONLY 1 HELD THE POST
(55)

Now as the direct recruits were occupying posts in excess of their quota, when making further
recruitments, the vacancies to be filled have to be determined by applying the fixed ratio to the
cadre strength and not the vacancies then existing. The allocation of 55 vacancies to different
categories had to be reworked and all 55 vacancies ought to be distributed among pharmacists,
nurses and clerks without providing for any direct recruitment.
A learned Single Judge held that the writ petitioners can claim the quota for Pharmacists only in
respect of the vacancies that existed (as on 12.4.1999) and vacancies that arose subsequently. He
therefore disposed of the writ petition with a direction to the respondents to fill up the available
vacancies by applying the quota mentioned in the Special Rules with reference to the existing
vacancies of Medical Officers (Homeopathy), that is vacancies available as on 12.4.1999 and
vacancies which arose thereafter. He further directed that if there was any dearth of qualified
Pharmacists, Nurses, Clerks within the quota intended for them, those vacancies should be filled
by direct recruitment and the backlog shall not be required to be restored in any future
recruitment. The appellant challenged the said order by filing a writ appeal. A Division Bench of
the High Court, dismissed the writ appeal holding that the recruitment will be governed by the
Special Rules. The said order is challenged in this appeal by special leave before the Supreme
Court.

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ISSUES:
The question for consideration before the court is whether the respondents were justified in
determining the number of posts to be filled by direct recruitment, and posts to be filled by
transfer from the three transfer categories, by applying the prescribed ratio of 5:1:1:1 to the
existing vacancies instead of the cadre strength.
ARGUMENTS OF PETITIONER:
The writ petitioners relied upon Note (3) to Rule 5 of the General Rules which requires that the
ratio should be with reference to the cadre strength and not the actual vacancies existing at the
time of recruitment. The appellant contends that Note (3) to Rule 5 of the General Rules will
prevail over Note (2) to entry 5 of the Table under Rule 3 of the Special Rules.
ARGUMENTS OF RESPONDENT:
The respondents resisted the petition. They contended that according to Note (2) to Entry 5 of the
Special Rules, when in a recruitment, transfer quota posts have to be filled by direct recruits, due
to non-availability of candidates from transfer categories, the backlog in regard to such transfer
categories cannot be restored in future recruitments. As a result, the number of vacancies to be
filled under each category i.e., direct recruitment and by transfers at any subsequent recruitment
can be only by applying the ratio for appointment to the number of vacancies existing at the time
of such subsequent recruitment and not with reference to the cadre strength. They submitted that
the provisions of the Special Rules will prevail over the provisions of the General Rules.
DECISION:
The court laid down the rules of interpretation when a subject is governed by two sets of Rules
are well settled. They are:
(i) When a provision of law regulates a particular subject and a subsequent law contains a
provision regulating the same subject, there is no presumption that the later law repeals the
earlier law. The rule making authority while making the later rule is deemed to know the existing
law on the subject. If the subsequent law does not repeal the earlier rule, there can be no
presumption of an intention to repeal the earlier rule.
(ii) When two provisions of law - one being a general law and the other being special law govern
a matter, the court should endeavour to apply a harmonious construction to the said provisions.
But where the intention of the rule making authority is made clear either expressly or impliedly,

1
as to which law should prevail, the same shall be given effect.
(iii) If the repugnancy or inconsistency subsists in spite of an effort to read them harmoniously,
the prior special law is not presumed to be repealed by the later general law. The prior special
law will continue to apply and prevail in spite of the subsequent general law. But where a clear
intention to make a rule of universal application by superseding the earlier special law is evident
from the later general law, then the later general law, will prevail over the prior special law.
(iv) Where a later special law is repugnant to or inconsistent with an earlier general law, the later
special law will prevail over the earlier general law.
It was therefore held that the ratio of 5:1:1:1 has to be applied with reference to vacancies which
were notified and not with reference to the cadre strength. There was no ground to interfere with
the decision of the High Court. Hence, the appeal was dismissed.

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 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bhattacharyya, T. The Interpretation of Statutes. Allahabad: Central Law Agency, 2020.

Mathur, DN. Interpretation of Statutes. Allahabad: Central Law Publications, 2018.

Sarathi, VP. Interpretation of Statutes. Lucknow: Eastern Book Company, 2003.

Tandon, MP. Interpretation of Statutes and Legislation. Faridabad: Allahabad Law Agency, 2005.