PRACTICAL INTEREST AND EPISTEMIC MODALS PETER VAN ELSWYK

THE PROBLEM

Hale (1987) Modal terms can be used in a distinctively epistemic way. Adverbs, adjectives, and auxiliaries can all be used to express a possibility that is relative to someones knowledge. Epistemic modals are thus said to quantify over someones knowledge. This much is standard. The difculty, however, is determining whose knowledge determines the truth-conditions for an epistemic modal. The two dominant views are contextualism and relativism. Contextualism claims that the truth of an epistemic modal claim depends on the knowledge of the salient group of knowers. Relativism more restrictively claims that the truth of an epistemic modal claim depends on the knowledge of a single assessor. The standard way to assess and compare both theories is to evaluate the verdicts they offer on a variety of cases. For each case there is an intuition that compels either a verdict on which utterances are true or false or a verdict on how an agent should or should not act with regards to their assertions. A successful theory of epistemic modals can accomodate the intuitions one has about modal assertions. Recently, Wright (2007) has advanced cases that he thinks problematize relativism. The aim of this paper is to defend relativism against Wrights objections by arguing that relativism can accomodate the intuitive verdict in each of the cases that Wright presents. My defense of relativism, however, will be atypical. In most of the literature on epistemic modals not much is assumed about knowledge beyond its factivity. In this paper I will assume that knowledge has a practical component; that is, I will assume that knowledge is pragmatically encroached. Whether an agent knows depends, partly, on practical facts. The paper will thus proceed in three steps. In section 2 I will explain how a pragmatically encroached conception of knowledge entails an interestdependent theory of epistemic possibility. In section 3 I demonstrate how an interestdependent theory is uniquely suited to explain cases that trouble interestindependent theories of epistemic possibility. In section 4 I put an interestdependent theory of epistemic possibility to work defending relativism against Wrights recent objections. I conclude in section 5.

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PRACTICAL INTEREST AND EPISTEMIC POSSIBILITY

The standard view of epistemic possibility holds that knowledge sets the goalposts for epistemic possibility. These two conditionals are taken to be logical truths: If an agent knows p, then p is not epistemically possible and if an agent knows p, then p is not epistemically possible. Consequently, when an agent learns, she shrinks the total number of epistemic possibilities and when an agent loses knowledge, she enlarge the total number of epistemic possibilities. We can thus dene epistemic possibility as follows: (EP) p is epistemically possible for S iff nothing S knows rules out p1 (EP) helps us crystallize what contextualists and relativists are disagreeing about over modals. Contextualists and relativists are disagreeing about the identity of S. The relativist says that S is a single assessor: the truth of a modal claim depends solely on the knowledge of the assessor. The contextualist, however, says that S is the set of assessors in a shared context and the truth of a modal claim depends on the collective knowledge of the set of assessors in the shared context. The debate between contextualists and relativists about modals is a debate about whose knowledge matters. So, it is worthwhile to say more about the nature of knowledge. It is now common to think that whether or not an agent S knows that p, in part, depends on practical facts. What we learned from DeRoses (1992) bank cases and the similar cases that followed was that our willingness to attribute knowledge depends on the practical stakes involved. If the costs of being wrong are high, then the standards for knowledge seem to be high. Conversely, when the costs of being wrong are low, then the standards for knowledge seem low. Knowledge thus appears to be sensitive to practical facts when such facts are made salient. Since practical facts are indexed to agents who have practical interests, there is an additional difculty similar to the contextualist/relativist dispute in determining whose practical interests determine the salient practical facts for knowledge attributions. Let us set aside this particular dispute and merely assume that knowledge depends on salient practical facts. If knowledge depends on practical facts, then knowledge comes and goes depending on the interests that come and go. To illustrate, suppose I am driving from Los Angeles to Las Vegas to visit a friend. I know that I will be in Vegas before nightfall because I regularly make this drive at this time of day during
A lot can be said about what ruling out amounts to in (EP). Let us set aside the recherch of chisholming out an adequate explanation because it is not necessary for the purposes of this paper. The roughandready notion that p is ruled out if an agent knows that p is false or if the agent knows that p is inconsistent with what they know will sufce. For a thorough analysis see Engel (manuscript) which considers over two dozen formulations.
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the week. However, suppose you, as my highly informative companion, point out halfway through our trip that the car is almost out of gas and express your worry that we might not reach a gas station in time. Having driven from Los Angeles to Las Vegas many times in my trusty Volvo, your worry does not threaten my knowledge because I know that the car has enough gas to get to the nearest gas station. However, suppose that I am driving to Las Vegas to catch a ight out of the country to avoid being arrested and suppose that there is good reason to think that there are police in pursuit an hour or so behind us. Given this stipulation, your worry undermines my knowledge because the practical costs for being wrong are very high. So, I lose knowledge based on my available evidence given the risk of being arrested that becomes salient when you express your worry about the cars gas. Since knowledge depends on practical facts and epistemic possibility depends on knowledge, epistemic possibility depends on practical facts. So, things will become epistemically possible and epistemically impossible when certain practical considerations become salient. When I lose my knowledge that I will be in Vegas before nightfall because you make salient a practical cost, missing my ight becomes an epistemic possibility when it was not before. Epistemic possibility thus comes and goes with knowledge. Call this an interestdependent theory of epistemic possibility. An interestdependent theory of epistemic possibility will predict that when the practical stakes increase the number of epistemic possibilities increase and when the stakes decrease the number of epistemic possibilities decrease. The likelihood that a mightclaim will be true thus goes up when the practical stakes go up because there is less knowledge to ruleout the possibility being expressed by the mightclaim.

WEAKENING EPISTEMIC COMMITMENTS

An interestdependent theory of epistemic possibility falls out of a commitment to knowledge possessing an interestdependent dimension. So, whatever reason one has to afrm the latter is a reason to afrm the former. Nevertheless, an interestdependent theory of epistemic possibility is uniquely equipped to explain a widespread tendency for speakers to weaken their epistemic commitments. We should therefore be committed to an interestdependent theory of epistemic possibility even if we are not committed to an interestdependent theory of knowledge. When a speaker retreats from a mustclaim to a might claim due to the salience of practical facts, an interestdependent theory of epistemic possibility can easily explain such a retreat.

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Consider the following case where a sargeant is reporting to his general on the potential location of snipers.
BATTLEFIELD
SARGEANT GENERAL SARGEANT

There must be enemy snipers in those woods. Are you sure? Those woods were checked just the other day. Yes, there are snipers in those woods.

It seems proper for the Sargeant to stick to his claim. If he condently knows that there are snipers in the woods then he should stand by what he thinks he knows. Assume, however, that the Sargeant is up for promotion and that he has been wrong in his reports to the General in the past. The Sargent is thus keenly aware that if he misreports he could miss out on an important promotion. Given this assumption, consider the modied dialogue:
BATTLEFIELD*
SARGEANT GENERAL SARGEANT

There must be enemy snipers in those woods. Are you sure? Those woods were checked just the other day. Well, there might be enemy snipers in those woods.

In BATTLEFIELD* the Sargeant retreats from a mustclaim to a mightclaim and this seems appropriate given the Generals challenge. A plausible explanation of this weakening of the Sargents commitments is that the Generals question makes salient the Sargeants interest in getting a promotion, which in turn raises the standards for knowing that there are snipers in the woods. Consequently, when the standards raise, the Sargeant should not stick to the strong modal must but retreat to the weaker might. Since nothing the Sargent knows rules out the possibility that there are snipers in the woods, it is still proper for him to assert the weaker mightclaim about snipers even though he is no longer in an epistemic position to assert the stronger mustclaim. The ability to explain cases like BATTLEFIELD* is unique to an interest dependent theory of epistemic possibility. A theory of epistemic possibility that is not interestdependent cannot as easily explain the difference between these cases. Since the only thing that has changed from BATTLEFIELD to BATTLEFIELD* is the salience of the Sargeants practical interests, a standard theory of epistemic possibility will not predict that the Sargeant retreats to a weaker claim in light of the Generals challenge because the salience of practical interests does not impact what is epistemically possible or necessary. In sum, cases like BATTLEFIELD* show the broad explanatory power of an interestdependent theory of epistemic possibility.

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PRACTICAL INTEREST AND RETRACTIONS

Now that the interestdependent theory has been laid out and put to work generally, let us put it to work specically defending relativism. A common type of case used to defend relativism involves a retrospective retraction. Cases of this type take a common form: rst, agent1 makes a modal claim; second, agent2 corrects the modal claim made by agent1 in light of knowledge she possesses that agent1 does not possess; third, agent1 retracts her modal claim. Consider the following:
BOSTON
SALLY GEORGE SALLY

Joe might be in Boston. No, he cant be in Boston. I saw him an hour ago in Berkeley. Okay, then, I was wrong.

In BOSTON it seems natural and proper for Sally to retract her initial modal claim. Indeed, it would be strange for her to stand by her initial explanation given Georges testimony that he just saw Joe in Berkeley. The propriety of Sallys retraction needs to be explained. The relativist has a simple and elegant explanation. Sallys rst assertion was made relative to her set of knowledge which did not contain knowledge transmitted by Georges testimony that Joe was in Berkeley. Sallys retraction, however, was made relative to a later and different set of knowledge which did contain Georges testimoniallytransmitted knowledge about Joe. Sally gains knowledge and the number of epistemic possibilities shrink. So, Sally retracts her initial claim because she knows now that it is false. At rst blush it seems like the contextualist has an easy explanation too. If the context of assessment is expanded to include George, then Georges knowledge is a part of the knowledge base that determines the propriety of modal assertions. So, Sally retracts her modal claim once she becomes aware of the other contextually salient knowledge. So far so good, but there is a bigger problem lurking nearby. As MacFarlane (forthcoming) notes, once we expand the contextually relevant group to include more than just the speaker, there is no principled way to stop the expansion of context. Every thirdparty who assesses the claim will become relevant. MacFarlane thinks that only the relativist can stop this exploding expansion by claiming that Georges knowledge is relevant only if it transmittable to Sally by testimony. If Sally does not have an opportunity to update her set of knowledge given Georges testimony, then Sallys retraction would seem improper even though her retraction would be consistent with the

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shared set of knowledge for that context. So, it makes the most sense to say that expressed modals quantify over the knowledge over the expressor. It would be strange to say that modals expressed by Sally quantify over knowledge of which she is unaware. Retraction cases like BOSTON are thus considered evidence for relativism because they involve a prior mightclaim changing its truthvalue solely on the basis of the speakers knowledge being updated. Recently, however, there has been clamor that relativism overpredicts retractions. Although relativism can explain cases like BOSTON, there are other similar cases where a retraction seems out of place. Before considering these cases, we should clarify what exactly the relativist will predict: (RR) If S is a maximabiding speaker who utters a mightclaim at t and S gains knowledge that rulesout the possibility initially expressed at t+1 , then S will retract her initial mightclaim at t+1 because the mightclaims truthvalue has changed. (RR) has two important antecedent conditions that are worth elaborating. The rst condition requires that S abide by conversational maxims. If S were to out, say, the maxim of quality, then S might not retract her initial mightclaim when she should. So, relativisms predictions assume that agents are abiding by the accepted purpose of their conversations. The second condition requires that an agent possess knowledge that rulesout the expressed possibility. Since the relativists claim is that the truthvalue of modals depends on the knowledge of the assessor, the knowledge that an agent gains must entail the falsity of the initial claim for it to compel a retraction. If S gains knowledge that does not ruleout the expressed possibility but, say, merely calls into question its probability, then this new knowledge will not be sufcient enough to motivate a retraction. Other types of knowledge that do not rule out previous claims might motivate hedging or a weakening of the strength of the initial modal claim, but such knowledge should not be expected to motivate a retraction. Now that it is clear what relativism will predict, let us consider obejections. Wright (2007) thinks there are cases where agents do not retract, but relativism would predict that they should. The cases Wright presents take the following form: rst, agent1 makes a mightclaim about an improbable event; second, agent2 challenges the truth of agent1 s mightclaim; third, time passes and the improbable event does not occur; fourth, agent2 points out the events nonoccurence as evidence for her previous denial of agent1 s mightclaim; fth, agent1 does not retract her initial mightclaim. Wrights presentation of a case that instantiates this form is ambiguous between epistemic possibility and metaphysical possibility. To disambiguate, I have altered the case:

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CHAINSAW
JEN

I am going to go cut down a tree with a chainsaw while wearing shorts and ipops. Dont be ridiculous. Nothing rules out you getting hurt. Ill be ne. [Later] See! Im not hurt at all. You are a damn fool. You might have been hurt!

MARTY JEN JEN MARTY

In CHAINSAW it seems right that Marty sticks to his original claim. It would be strange for him to instead say, Oh, then, I guess I was wrong. Wright thinks that relativism cannot accomodate this intuitive verdict because relativism predicts that Marty will retract his claim insofar as CHAINSAW does not differ from BOSTON in that Martys set of knowledge gets updated. Assuming an interestdependent theory of epistemic possibility, I do not think that relativism predict a retraction in CHAINSAW. (RR) predicts that an agent will retract only if the updated knowledge rulesout the previously expressed possibility. But, in CHAINSAW, the knowledge that Marty gains does not disconrm his initial modal claim. Martys initial claim is modest. Given what he and Jen knew, Jen might have been hurt. Whats more, since the practical stakes for both Marty and Jen were very high, neither of them knew that Jen would be safe. Even if the likelihood of Jen getting hurt was small, both Jen and Marty had a vested interest in Jens safety. So, when Jen returned unscathed, although Marty knows that Jen did not get hurt on this particular occasion, knowledge of her safety does not falsify his initial claim. In the prose of possible worlds: Jen going unscathed in the actual world does not entail that she does not get hurt in some possible world, and since it is with regards to the latter that Marty made his initial claim, Martys knowledge does not get updated in the appropriate way for (RR) to predict a retraction. To further demonstrate the explanatory power offered by interestdependent considerations, let us consider a second case. Wright offers a second case that differs only from CHAINSAW in that it contains a lottery assertion.
LOTTERY
TED SUE SUE

I might win the lottery. Dont be ridiculous. Youll lose. [Later] See! I told you so!

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TED

Thats just hindsight. It is still true that, for all I knew, I might have won.

In this case, it seems right for Ted to stick to his claim that, for all he knew, he could have won the lottery. Wright again claims that relativism cannot accomodate the intuitive verdict that the nonretraction is proper. I think (RR) does not predict a retraction here too. Although Ted learns that his ticket is not a winner, such knowledge does not ruleout his initial might claim because it was still possible that he could have won. Indeed, Ted is a good candidate for having counterfactual knowlege. Assuming it is a fair lottery, it is true that it is possible that Ted might have won. So, like the knowledge Marty gains in CHAINSAW, the type of knowledge that Ted gains is not the proper kind of knowledge needed to motivate a retraction according to (RR). LOTTERY can also be given a pragmatic explanation that is consistent with (RR). Since Sues assertion is a lottery assertion and lottery assertions are notorioulsy improper, Sues assertion is improper. She has asserted something she does not know and outed the maxim of quantity. As such, even though Sues assertion ends up being correct, Ted should not retract his initial claim because it would falsely implicate that Sues initial claim was correct. Since Sues claim was not correct, and since Teds initial claim does appear to be correct because his knowledge has not been updated in a way to render his initial claim incorrect, Ted should not retract.

CONCLUSION

Let us retrace our steps Yablo (2000). Epistemic possibility can be given a practical rendering when we assume that knowledge has a practical dimension. When epistemic possibility is rendered interestdependently, we can now easily explain cases where an agent weakens the strength of her epistemic commitments. So, pragmatic encroachment is vindicated with respect to its implications for epistemic modals and we are also left with an independent reason for thinking that modals are interestdependent even if knowledge is not interestdependent. Finally, when we apply the interestdependent account to Wrights (2007) cases, relativism can be defended against Wrights claim that it overpredicts retrospective retractions. I thus conclude that the interestdependent theory of epistemic possibility offered in this paper dissolves some of the worries about relativism overpredicting retractions.

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REFERENCES
Hale, B. 1987. Abstract Objects. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Yablo, S. 2000. A paradox of existence. In Empty Names, Fiction and the Puzzles of Non-Existence, eds. A. Everett and T. Hofweber, 275312. Stanford: CSLI Press.