Case Study: Public Communication Failure for Japanese Nuclear Power Plant Event

Posted: April 21, 2011 in Uncategorized

0 This chapter has focused on the mechanism for successfully communicating risk. In many ongoing events, the basic set of guidelines established here, do not always work perfectly because of the suddenness, depth and breadth of the event. A case in point is the recent cascade of major events in Japan including an earthquake, tsunami, and a severely damaged nuclear power plant. On a backdrop of significant infrastructure damage, personal loss and tragedy, and chaos in many, if not all aspects of communication, the risks to the local community and the world from a nuclear power plant failure had to be communicated. Throughout the world, there are well researched and well-trained communications procedures for keeping communities abreast of the current, as well as the potential, threat from a static or dynamic event at a nuclear power plant. How did these communications procedures work following the one-two punch of the earthquake and tsunami in Japan? There are three major parties providing either formal or informal risk communications relating to plant conditions, the immediate threat to residents and workers near the plant, and the threat to people out of country who face radioactive contamination from material carried by the wind. The first is the company, Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO). The second is the government, and finally the international media. The 24/7 nature of the media, especially cable television increased the breadth and depth of the coverage but may also have contributed to the deluge of poorly vetted information and contradictory protective actions and conveyance of risk. Since Chernobyl there has been a great deal of debate about are the real threats posed by damaged nuclear power plants. Crafting a fully acceptable message during blue skies is complicated while the same message during a major event is oftentimes impossible. The need for credible public and company officials to present the message is complicated by media use of experts who may not have any firsthand knowledge of plant conditions or protective actions. During the recent events in Japan, both the civilian and company officials were painted by the media as less than credible due to incompetence or collusion. Incompetence was inferred from the slowness of communications and the significant changes and restatement of previous pronouncements. Collusion was alleged because the company and civilian officials coordinated messages. Although the company and civilian officials made their messages on the science and on generally accepted practices in the nuclear power generation business, their focus was on the people with direct risk around the plant possibly not understanding their audience and critics were worldwide. In this situation, the immediate risk population was educated prior to the event of the risks as well as the proper protective actions that would be ordered following an event. As expected, the protective action recommendations expanded as the risk increased during the weeks following the earthquake. Sheltering in place recommendations evolved into to evacuations

downwind then 360 degrees around the plant when the potential for controlled and possibly uncontrolled releases were increased. When developing a strategy for providing risk communication we tend to think linearly with a continuous and objective feedback mechanism. What we found in Japan following the recent disaster is that in some events there are many obstacles to successful communications including; damaged communications infrastructure, inaccurate and unvetted communications, as well as the different messages needed for local versus worldwide audiences.