OF. DC - 7 3 OP. M S .

JC-33

ORODP RESEARCH 8TUDT

THE UACHIIB GUN SUPPORT OP THE 2d DIVISIOI
IN THE

, 1918

Sub»5 ttod by

A* D. Bruos
Captain, Infantry, DOL

Th» Coomad aaA Otmral Staff 8ohool
Port L«aT«tworth, Kanaac.

Fort L«av«nivorth f Kanam, 25 February, MEMORANDUM FOHi SUBJECTS The Director Second Yetir C l a s s , The Command and General S t a f f School, Fort Leavenworbh, Kansas. A C r i t i c a l Analysis of the Ilaohine Oun Support of the 2d D i v i s i o n i n the M*uae-Argonn* f 1 Novairibar, 1918«

I . FAggtS ACCOMPAHYINGi

1. A Bibliography for this study.
2, Plate It Genoral Situation, First Army, 1 November, 1918*
3v Plate H i Extract of Operations Map, 2d Division, 1 Nov­ ember, 1918.
J4. Plate IIIi Available Machine Guns, 2d and l&d Divisions,
1 November, 1918,
5. Plate IV: Machine Gun Barrage Positions and Targets, 2d
Division, 1 November, 1918.
6. Plato Vx Machine Gun Barrage Positions and Targets, t|2d
Division, 1 Noveiriber, 1918,.
7. Plate VIi Diagram of Results of Machine Gun and Artillery
Coordination^ 1 November, 1918*
II. THE STUDY PRESENTED,, — A brief study is made of the en*xny
situation, the terrain, and of the 2d Division plan for the attack
of 1 November, 1918 in order to1 see -.why and how the machine guns
dovetailed in the general scham6 of the unit supported. In present­ ing a critical analysis of the mohine gun support of the 2d Division
in the Meuse-Argonne on 1 November, 1918, several dcrlfcila of machine
gun technique are brought out in the historical facts relating to
the subject and in the analysis and criticism. Some of these facts

are not in historical documents, and, although they may appear
extraneous to the conclusion reached, are presented as a matter of
record.
III. HISTORICAL FACTS RELATING TO THE SUBJECT, ~
8. GENERAL, a.. - Location of the 2d Division,-- The 2d Division,
-1­

whioh had recently fought with the Prenoh Fourth A n y In th#

#

was ordered, on 21 Ootobtr, 1918, to join the Aatt loan
(1) It was assigned subsequently to the 7 Corp* to

(1) 1-FO Ui# 2 DiT
1-FO 1|59 2 DiT
Rpt, 2 Dir

First Amy«*

tidce pcurt in an attaok on D-day at H-hourf (1 Noreaber, 1918)»

(2) The son* of aotion

(2) 7-PO < >V Corps near 8t# Georges and Landres-et-St# Georges* X# 1-PO U , 2 DiT l-Tent*P}an#2 Div» assigned i t shown in Plato X*
1-0-3 M#ao,2 DiT

b»-Bnony situation* - Only slight gains had boon aado
against the onmay for saToral days prior to tho attaok on 1 Nor«a­ (5) 7*0p Rpt,V Corps
bar* (3) The German l£st Dirlsion hold tho ground near Landre»-et~
3-0p Rptf 2 DiT
8t« Goorgos» This division nas in the proooss of being relieved by
the German 52d Division on the night 31 October-1 Novenber* Tho Ba­ varian 15th Division held the ground around St* Georges and reports
(k) 7-0p Rpt# Corps
indicated it had orders to hold at all costs* (J±) The enemy1 s defen­ 6-S of 1, 2 DiT

Tf

sive system is best brought out under the study of the terrain*
o»-Terraln« (1) The terrain nas favorable for defexise by
the enemy* (See Plate II) In the iisnediate front the ^nxay hold
the high ground just south, of St.Georges and Landres~et-3t«Georgea9
This iias covered by partially oompleted trenohes, machine gun em­ placements, and some *ire of the portion of the Krienhilde Stellung
that had not yet been captured• The Bois des Hazois and Bois l'Epasse
ivere good positions for strong points* The southern edges had been
organised by connecting a line of sholl holes« North of L&ndres-et-
St. Georges, Cote 253, covered here and there with woods, offered
exoellent observation points for watching the ground over which the
2d Division had to advance* Beyond was a repetition of ridges,
(5) 7-0p RptfV Corps
spurs, valleys and woods favorable for a stubborn defense. (5) 3«0p Rpt# 2 Div
is evident that careful preparations and skillful attacks were
necessary in order to make an advance*
(2) Within the lines of the 2d Division, the Bois do
Romagne, Chatillon, and Gesnes with numerous small patches of woods
here and there afforded oover for the concentration of troops anrl the
• (1) 1-FO I|U# 2 Divs Sinoe the pages of the sources are not numbered
the system usedw is as followst "1" refers to paragraph 1 of
Bibliography* F0 i|U, 2 D 1 T " refers to Field Orders tyi9 2d
Division as listed in paragraph I*of Bibliography*

-2­

It

oonoealaent of a normal amount of artillery, Maohine guns, tn& other
weapons* The high ground •*•* °* 8owaeranoe afforded good forward
and retar<i6 slop* tuitions from whioh to deliver overhead fire of
machine guns* To the north of this high ground, maohine gun posi­ tions litre so:;*ewhat exposed to direot observed eneny firej and the
lint of departure on low ground required the troops to advanoe up
(6) Study of Plate
II
10-MaJ Pruoe
hill at the outset, (6) (8ee Plate II)

d•-Outline of 2d Division plan* - (1) After relieving the
i*2d Division, the 2d Division was to attaok on a front of I4OOO

(7) 1-FO Ij8# 2 DiT
1-FO 1*9, 2 Div
1-FO 50 f 2 Div

maters from the line formerly held by the l|2d Division. (7) Th©
line of departure, xone of aotion, direotion of attaok# objectives,
and formations are shown in Plate II•
(2) Sinoe a great doal of the oorps and army artillery
were assigned targets in the xone of aotion of the 2d Division, it

may be said about 320 guns of all calibers were to furnish artillery
(8) 7~0p Rpt,V Corps
support during the initial stages of the attaok* (8) The plan oon­ 8-FAJ, Vol 9#
templated a two hour preparation prior to the attaok, to be partioi­ pp li4B«182
(9) 7-FO 101,V Corps
pated in by all available guns* (9) At H-hour, in addition to inter­ 1-FO h9, 2 D I T
diotion and oounterbattery fires, a deep rolling barrage, organised
Into lines, uas to be furnished as shown on Plate VI*
9» MACHINE GUN PLANS AND PREPARATIONS* a •-Preliminary plans and
preparations»(1) On 25 October, having received vex*bally the tentative
plans of the division for the attaok, the Division Maohlne Gun Offi­ oer and the Commanding Officer of the l|th Machine Gun Battalion pro­ oeeded from Herpont by motor about 6J4 kilometers towards the front
of the I|2d Division for a reoonnaissanoo* This not only inoluded a
general reooimaissanoe of the ground, but a visit to the maohine gun
units of the i|2d Division, and a study of available map*, intelli­ gence summaries, and aerial photographs• Details considered in­ oluded suoh items as positions, routes and movements thereto, extra
(10) l-Tent«Plan,
2 Dlv
9~Maj Waller
10-Uaj Bruce
materiel needed, coordination with the artillery, and the like* (10)
This reoonnaissanoe was not intended to be final* For instance, uhe
general position for the ljth Maohine Gun Battalion was pioked after

-3­

an examination through field glacses of the ground 1500 meters
awayj but a more detailed reoonnaiesanoe was made subsequently by
that unit* ( U ) 10-Maj Bruce
9-Capt Westover
(11)
(2) An estimate was made* also, of the number of maohine

guns available# The 'Corps Commander desired the maximum amount of
(12) 7-FO 90, V Corps
fire support. (12) If all of the maohine guns of the 2d Division
1-Tent Plan,
and of the Ij2d Division whioh was to be relieved oould have been
2 D I T
employed in an organised barrage* the total would have amounted
to 336 active guns. (See Plate III) In this situation, extreme
forward positions for maohine gun companies with assault rifle
battalions were somewhat exposed* Positions in rear were too far
away to allow these companies to rejoin their respective battalions
at the proper time, because the initial advance was expected to be
rapid* It was decided tentatively, therefore, that the four com­ panies necessary for the four assault battalion* of the 2d Division
would not be used in the barrage* This idea likewise applied to
the four ooapanies of the battalions of the l£d. Division being re­ lieved or passed through on the night, Jl October- 1 November*
Thase guns were to be used for liaiuon groups and for any targets
of opportunity that might be presented* They were not to be in
the organised and coordinated barrage* This tentative decision re­ duced the number to 2l\D active guns* By counting in the reserve
guns of the 10 remaining companies of the 2d Division, which hai
had an opportunity to replace lost equipment since last engaged
in battle$ the tentative number reached 260 on a front of I4OOO
(13) 1-Memo l.Tent
Plan, 2 Dir
9-Maj Waller
10-Uaj Bruce
9-Maj Waller
10-Maj Bruce
meters* or 1 gun per ll; otters* (13)

b•-Further preparations and the final plan* - (l) The
plan for the use of the maohine guns was not written up at once, but
was gradually built up and modified* (lit) Where possible, organic

cations were moved up to intermediate positions out of range of

(15) 1-FO ltf, 2

5-0p Rpts*
6 KG B m
9-Uaj Waller
10-Maj Bruce

light artillery and convenient for preparing their positions* (15)
In some organisations* suoh labor Sjivolved wnall details going for­ ward during the day for the detailed selection of positions* and
for obtaining data for firing calculations* At night* large details

i«r« sent up to prepare enpl&oments, to bring up ammunition fro*
dump* n u r a road, and for other miscellaneous work* In the mean­ time, data nets calculated and oh*oked> oonferenoes were hold tdth
the staff and with organisation*! and adjustments wort wide result*
(16) U-Op Rpts, MO
Co 9 Inf ing in a final plant (16)
5-Co 0,5 no 6nf
ll,5f6,NO Bnt (2) (a) The aaohine guns initially were to support the
9-Maj Waller,Capt
Westover attack by harassing fir* during the art ill try preparation from
10-Maj Bruoe
H-2 hours to H hour, and those that oould olear friendly troops by
(17) 7-FO 101f V Corps barrage fire fro* H hour to their limit of range» (17)
1-FO k9$ 2 Dir
5-0p Rpt#if. Ma
(b) The Machine Gun Conpany* 9th Infantry, l|th, <?th, and
Bn
6th Uaohine Gun Battalions (less Company A, 5th Machine Gun Bat­ talion with the 3d Battalion, 23d Infantry) of the 2d Division, and
the H#th, 150th, and 151st Machine Gun Battalions of the l£d Divi­ (18) 1-F0 ]#, 2 Div
2-FO 5k$ h Brig
2-0p Memo 25,
3 Brig.
(This memo plaoed
MG Co, 23 Inf under CO 5 UG Bn,
but it was not pfttoaed to be used
to ay knowledge nor is there a
record of its use. - The euthor)
(19) 9-*fej Waller lO-Maj Bruoe
si on were to be used for this initial fire# (18) After delivering

harassing fire during the preparation on k&om or suspeoted enemy
points, a series of standing barrages were to be plaoed cm important
targets* (See Plates IV and 7) A rolling barrage for these Machine
guns was not contemplated. Instead, for instance, a battery m s to
be assigned approximately three or more standing barrages, lifting
from the first to suooeeding assigned areas just before friendly
troops oam© under the required safety clearance. (19)

(o) The machine gun barrage was to be delivered in oon­ (20) 7-0p Rpt,V Corps juxwtion with the artillery* (20) Since an arerage of 500 meters
9-Maj Waller
10-Maj Bruce from the advancing friendly infantry to the maohina gun barrage
was required to olear Hera safely, the greater portion of the bar-,
would fall beyond th* line of 75n«& shrapnel and near or among
(21) 5-0p Hpt f U MG Bn the series of concentrations of the 155-DB. and 8-inoh howitsers. (21)
9-Maj Waller
This would thioken the artillery barrage materially* (See Plate VI)
Slnoe such a mass of machine guns and artillery were to be employed,
no attempt was made to assign separate targets to reapeotire weapons#
(22) 9-Maj Waller 10-Maj Bruoe
but, instead, to use the machine guns to ino?ease fire superiority
generally on important targets. (22)
(d) After the first objeotive had been taken, the maohine
(23) 7-F0 101 f 7 Corps gun battalions of the l|2d Division were to rejoin their division. (23
1-F0 h9> 2 Div

-5­

The mohine gen -nit* of th« 2d Dirltion# exoept the ijth Kaohine
Oun Battalion, *ert to r^irert to the eontrol of the rifle battaliom
to which they w*re ordinarily attached• The exoepted battalion was

(2k) 1-FO 2*0p 3 2-PO h%* D1V Uerao 2|5, Bri* 3k9k Brig

to form a part of the divinion reserre* (2k)
(e) The control of the machine gun barrage was to be by
tla^d firing* based on a tine-table of the infantry adiunoe at
speolfied rates* (2?)
10. TH2 EXBCUTIOH OP THE MACHINE GUN PLAN,, a« - Coring intc
position* - On the night of 31 Ootober-1 November, the neoessary

(25) 7-FO 101fV Cflqps 9-Maj VTaller 10-Uaj Bruoe

(£6) 3-0p Rpt#2 Div
3-0p Rpt,3 Brig
3-0p BptfU Brig

into final positions were nadft* (26) Hot suppers were
served whore it was possible to do so* (27) The mass of materiel

(27) 10-Maj
9-Capta Farna­ used in the attaok was such that good positions for all of the
worth &
weapons could not be found* Several of the machine guns of the
Weatover
more advanced organisations were knocked out before a shot was fired,
or soon after the ba&rage started* In some oases, this was due to
improper detailed reconnaissance end to improper coordination with
other weapons in the selection of positions* Despite general pre­ cautions, some smaller units coming in would find their positions

(28) 9-Uaj Waller 9-Capt Harvey 9-Lt Strout

occupied by other weapons* (26) In one organisation, guards had
"b&en plaoed over their positions prior to the actual occupation to
see that no one attempted to take them or to disturb the camouflage*
Even with this precaution in that organization, four guns were not
able to fire due to rifle organisations not being ia place at the

(29) UMtaj Bruce
9-Capt TTestover

specified time, therebylmsking their fire, (29) Many machine gun
platoons had trouble in laying their guns* This was due to the faot
that several officers and men who did not know anything about naohine
guns had been sent to these organisations reoently to replace cas­

(30) 9-MaJ Waller &
ualties* (30) The result of these happenings coupled with neoessary
Capt#HTestover
last minute changes, was that approximately 235 maohine guns, out of
10-Maj Bruce
(31) 3-0p Rpt,2 DiT
9-Uaj Waller
(32) 10-Maj Bruce
9-Capts Farns­ worth &
Westover
the 280 tentatively planned, participated in the organised fire* (31)
Looking at synchronised watches, the last seoond passed, the orders,
"Let »er go1* or •Give f em hell11 was heard, and the guns opened up* (32]
b* - The preparation and barrage* - At 3$3O AM, 1 November,
1918, the preparation began* This preparation and the subsequent

-6­

(35) ?~0p Rpt#V Ooqs barrage was terrifio* (33) "The whole sky abort thi division
3-0? Rpt,2 Diy
seemed to be lit up with ghastly yellowish flashes of high escplo*
slve thills mixed in with blood r#d burat• of thermite*" The roar
was tar splitting* Yet* in toot parts of the lint, hard used tanks
oould be heard cooing up* In other parts * ths waspish swish and
or*>oking of Maohine gun bullets overhead oould be heard* The morals
(3k) 9-Capts Harvey, of our troops ros® higher aiad higher* (3k) At 5t3O AM# the diri-
Callahan, &
FarnsTiorth
sion •jumped off" closely following the artillery first line barrage
(35) 3-0p Hpt t 2 Dir
and made rapid progress*
3-0p Rptf3 Brig
3-0p Rptfl; Brig
o* - Completion of maohine gun barrage• - Upon the com­ p let ion of the tasks assigned in the barrage scheme, having fired
from 30,000 to 95*000 rounds per company, the machine gun organisa­ tions joined their units in accordance nith the plan* Some companies
had to march quite a distance and did not join their battalions on
scheduled time« This «as partially due to having to carry their
equipment by hand; but in most instances, it nas caused by these
(36) i|-0p Rpt8#MG Co
companies not being located in positions uhioh lay in line -with
9 Inf
5-Co C,5 MG Bn; their subsequent some of advance* (36)
U,5,6 MG fins
9-Capt Hirsch­ 11* RESULTS* a*-^dvance of the 2d Division* - On 1 November,
felder
""
9-Lt Strout
1918# the 8d Division drove a flying wedge of 9 kilometers in and
through the enemy1 s position and "opened the way for the rapid ad­ (37) 6-Letter CG
vanoe of the army"* (37) (See Plate I) Losses in casualties were
First Array
7-0p Rpt,V Corps usually less than those inflicbed upon t*he enemy, due, in a great
measure, to the fire support rendered* (38)
(38) 3-**tter CG
V Corps
3-0p Rots,2 Div
b»-Results of the maohine gun barrage* - Since the barrage
3-3 & k Brig
"*
4-9 & 23 Inf
was a combined one of several types of weapons* particularly strong

l|-5 & 6 Mar*

in artillery, it was difficult to determine exactly the results of
the maohine gun fire* As a whole, the execution of the firing was
(39) 9-tfaj Waller
10-UaJ Bruce
good* (39) Enemy positions examined afterwards showed trees struck

near the bottom and clay peppered with holes where the guns had
been on the targets* Questioning of prisoners resulted in various

-7­

reports* 8oae stated they had not notioed the machine gun barrage*
The guns in these areas **re evidently off* In a great many oases
the prisoners stated they could not move on aooount of the machine
gun fire* Enemy dead materially strengthened the evidenoe as to
(1*0) 10-Maj Bruce
9-Capts Calla­ han &
Westover
the general effectiveness of the barrage* (1{O)
11, ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM* - £• - Neither the plan nor the
exeoution of the aaohine gun barrage can be said to have been per­ feot* Are not perfeot action* rare under the trying conditions
of actual battle? The coordination of the aaohine gun units with
other weapons in the selection and assignment of positions could
well have been improved* The lack of detailed reconnaissance, in

certain instances, resulting in finding positions untenable was
unjustifiable* The machine gun units placed outside of their sub­ sequent sone of advance -which resulted in unnecessary narohixjg ic
rejoining the rifle organizations can not be generally oondoned*
The basic reasons for errors in the detailed preparation and ex­ ecution of the barrage was the reoeipt of untrained aaohine gun
replacements* It is self-evident that the rifle unit whioh arrived

late in its position and masked the fire of the machine guns was
at fault*
b^ - On the other hand, the targets selected, the coordi­ nation of the waohino gun fire with that of the artillery, and the
fire delivered can be said generally to have been good* One machine
gun can normally cover from 25 to 50 meters in a barrage* With
this in mind, the aotual use of 255 Sa:nB Or about 1 gun to every
15 meters certainly contributed to gaining and maintaining fire
superiority* The resultsf as far as they could be determined,
show that these guns were useful in assisting the advance*

17* CONCLUSIONS OP THE AUTHOR*
In the light of modern developments in teohnique that
permit the more rapid employment of machine guns in indireot lay­

-8­

Ing, It is tT«n more true now than them
THE ORGANIZED AND COORDINATED FIRE POTTER OF MACHINE
GUN UNITS OF RESERVES, BOTH FROM DIRECT AND INDIRECT LAYING
POSITIONS, SHOULD BE EMPLOYED IN THE INITIAL PHASES OF AN ATTACK*
V* RECOMMENDATIONS * -- None required*
VI* CONCURRENCES* •- None required*

-9­

£ I £ It I £ £ £ L JL I I

with
RKRRBNCB ABBREVIATION
(KEYs • On left margin)

1* RBCQRD8 OP THE SECOND DIVISION-Field Orders, 1918-1919. Volm- !•
1-FO lfo$ 2 Div
1-FO k5$ 2 *>!•
1-FO \£$ 2 Div
1-Tent* Plan, 2 Dir
1-Memo 1 9 Tent* Plan,
2 Div
Field Orders No* Ifo, 2d Division, 22 October, 1918, lit00 A)T*
Field Orders No* 1*5* 2d Division, 22 Ootober, 1918, lit55 **•
Field Orders No* h$$ 2d Division, 2k Oetobert 1918#
Field Orders , Tentative Plan for 2d Division, 25 October,

Memo No* 1 (To accompany Tentative Plan for 2d Division, 25
October, 1918) 26 October, 1918, 20 hours*

1-K) itf, 2 Div
1-FO I48, 2 Div
1-FO k9$ 2 Div
1-FO 50, 2 Div
1-0-3 Memo, 2 Div

Field Orders No* kl, 2d Division, 26 Ootober, 1918, 10t30 hours.
Field Orders No* I48, 2d Division, 30 Ootober, 1918, I61OO hours*
Field Orders No* JL#, 2d Division, 31 Ootober, I9I8, 7i00 hour*.
Field Orders No* 50, 2d Division, 31 October, 1918, l6cOO hours*
A*C* of S*, G-3 Mer^randum No* 9, 2d Division, 31 October, 1918*
2. RECORDS OF THE SECOND DIVISION-Field Orders Third and Fourth
Brigades (191% 9^9)$ Volume 2*

2-0p Memo, 3 Brig

Operations Memorandum, No* 25, 3d Brigade, 2d Division,
October 27, 1918*

2-FO 3h$ h Brig

Field Orders No* 3J4, Fourth Brigade, 2d Division, 31 October,
1918, 2t00 PM*
3* RECORDS OF THE SECOND DIVISION-(Regular)-Operations Reports,
War Diaries, Journal of 0perations-2d Division, 2d Field
Artillery Brigade, 2d Trench Uortar Battexy, 3d Brigade,
l^th Brigade-1918 - Volume 6*

3-Op Rpt, 2 Div

Special Operations Report of the 2d Division, West of the
Ueuse, November 1-November 11, 1918, inclusive*
(l) 1-FO U ^ 2 Divt Sinoe the pages of the souroes are not num­ bered the eystta used is as followst "1" refers to paragraph
1 of Bibliography* *F0 W4, 2 Div11 refers to Field Orders I4U,
2d Division as listed in pir*£raph 1 of Bibliography*

3-Letter CO V Corps

Letter-Cownanding General FIFTH ARMY CORPS to Ceauanding
General 2d Division, November 2, 1916 (Bctraot found In Op Rpt, 2 Dir)

3-Op Rpt, 3 Brig

Report of Operations , 3d Brigade from October 17, 1918 to Norenber 2d, 1918*

3-0p Rpt, U Brig

Operations Report-Jjth Brigade, Marines - Covering period ?Jk Oot#-ll N O T * j.918* k* RECORDS OF THE SECOND DIVISION-(Regular)-Operations Reports, War Diaries, Patrol Reports, 9th-23d Infantry, 5th-6th Marines, 2d Engineers, I9I8 - Yolmne ?•

-Op Rpt, MG Co # 9 I»f

Operations Report, Machine Gim Compaiyp 9th Inl*anbry# H/l/18­ 11/11/18.

Rptf 9 Inf

Report of Operations of ihe 9th Infantry, U«S # A* f from Noreitt­ ber 1st to 11th* 1918*

il-Op Rpt, 23 Inf• ll~Op Rpt, 5 Mar

Report of Operations November lst-7th# 1918 - 23d Infantry.
Report of Operations October 17-Novraber 16, 1918 (inolusivt)
United States Karines, 5th Regi»ent«

il«Op Rpt, 6 Mar

Report of Operation from 2L|th October to 13th Korenbert 1918­ Sixth Regiment, Marine Corps*
5. RECORDS OF THE SECOND DIVISION-(Regular) - Operations Reports,
War Diaries, 12th-15th-l?th Field Artillery, l*th-5th-6th
Maohine (ton Battalions, 1st Field Signal Battalion,
Second Trains, 1918« Volume 8»

5-0p Rpt, h MG Bn

Operations Report, FOURTH MACHINE GUN BATTALION, Ootober 31st,
1918-November 11th, 1918#

5«0p Rpt, Co C, 5 MG Bn

Operations Report, Company C, 5th Machine Gun Battalion,
Ueuse-Argonne Offensive, November 1-11, 1918*

5-0p Rpt, 5 Mg .n 5«0p Rpt, 6 MG Bn

Operations Report, 5th Maohine Gun Battalion, Nora-11, 1918 #
Report of Operations, 6th Maohine Gun Battalion, Marine Corps,
November 1-11, 19U3.
« RECORDS OF THE 8&'JND DIVISION-(^gular) - Gteieral Orders,
telligenoe Reports, Field Artillery Data, I9I8, Volume 9»
-11­

6-8 of I, 2 DiT

No* 108 - Sumuafy of Intelligence, 2d Division, October 31 >
1918 to Noveafeer 1 # 1918 - Noon t o Noon*

6-Letter C First Amy G

Letter - Cottnttnding General First Army to Comaander-ln-Chief, G*H*Q«, A.B*F*, January 16, 1919«

7 # Narratire of the Y Corps$ tram Norenbei ltt, 1918 #
7-FO 90, V Corps

Field Orders Ho 90 f FIFTH ARMT C0RP8, 2k October, 81OO o1 clock•

7-FO 101, V Corps

Field Orders No 101, FIFTH ARJIT CORPS, 28 October, 1918, lOtOO o'clock*

7-0p Rptf V Corps

Operations Report V Corps, Novel*er 1, 1918• 8* Shepherd, Lt*-Col* *~ The Employment of the Artillery, Fifth

8-FAJ Vol 1148-182

pp

Army Corps, Ueuse-Argonrie Operations (Field Artillery Journal, 1919 ­ Volume 9t pages llj8-182#) 9* The following of floors, at different times, have been inter­ viewed either by letter or by personal conversation*

9-Capt Callahan

Captain Sbgene C* Callahan, 6th Division, att v^sd to Ijth
Brigade*

9-Capt Farnsworth

Captain John F. Farnsvrorth, i^Sd Division, attaohed t o 23d Infantry*

9-Capt Harvoy 9-Capt Hirsohf elder 9-Lt Strout 9-Major Tfaller

Captain John J* Harrey, 23d Infantry* Captain Chester J» Hirschfelder, 5*h Machine Gun Battalion* First Lieutonant E*P# Strout, 5th Maohine Gun Battalion* Major L*W*T* Waller, Jr«, TJ*8*M*C*, Division Machine Gun Officer, 2d Division*

9-Capt Ifestover

Captain Wendell Westover, ipth Machine Gun Battalion* 10* The author, formerly Major, Comnanding Officer, Ijth Machine Gun

10-Major Bruoe

Battalion, realising that ^TTOVM vdll oreep in ^ien revieir­ ing past actions of over II4 year^ ago, has carefully oon­ sulted maps and personal data before using himself to verify other sources or before asking any personal statements*

NOTES*
1* Source* Kos* 1-8, inclusive, are to bo found in the Command
and General Staff Sohool Library*
2* Souroe* for Plateo are showi either on the Plate, or V.lie page
opposite the Plate*

z
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PLATE I

nan xxz
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MNNI • • •

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9 4 I I 9 10 11
14

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1

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56(t)

total of Ooln—»

H

* 13

28

64

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