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WWI 2nd Infantry Division
WWI 2nd Infantry Division
JC-33
, 1918
Sub5 ttod by
A* D. Bruos
Captain, Infantry, DOL
Fort Lavnivorth f Kanam, 25 February, MEMORANDUM FOHi SUBJECTS The Director Second Yetir C l a s s , The Command and General S t a f f School, Fort Leavenworbh, Kansas. A C r i t i c a l Analysis of the Ilaohine Oun Support of the 2d D i v i s i o n i n the M*uae-Argonn* f 1 Novairibar, 1918
I . FAggtS ACCOMPAHYINGi
First Amy*
(2) 7-PO < >V Corps near 8t# Georges and Landres-et-St# Georges* X# 1-PO U , 2 DiT l-Tent*P}an#2 Div assigned i t shown in Plato X*
1-0-3 M#ao,2 DiT
Tf
sive system is best brought out under the study of the terrain*
o-Terraln (1) The terrain nas favorable for defexise by
the enemy* (See Plate II) In the iisnediate front the ^nxay hold
the high ground just south, of St.Georges and Landres~et-3tGeorgea9
This iias covered by partially oompleted trenohes, machine gun em placements, and some *ire of the portion of the Krienhilde Stellung
that had not yet been captured The Bois des Hazois and Bois l'Epasse
ivere good positions for strong points* The southern edges had been
organised by connecting a line of sholl holes North of L&ndres-et-
St. Georges, Cote 253, covered here and there with woods, offered
exoellent observation points for watching the ground over which the
2d Division had to advance* Beyond was a repetition of ridges,
(5) 7-0p RptfV Corps
spurs, valleys and woods favorable for a stubborn defense. (5) 30p Rpt# 2 Div
is evident that careful preparations and skillful attacks were
necessary in order to make an advance*
(2) Within the lines of the 2d Division, the Bois do
Romagne, Chatillon, and Gesnes with numerous small patches of woods
here and there afforded oover for the concentration of troops anrl the
(1) 1-FO I|U# 2 Divs Sinoe the pages of the sources are not numbered
the system usedw is as followst "1" refers to paragraph 1 of
Bibliography* F0 i|U, 2 D 1 T " refers to Field Orders tyi9 2d
Division as listed in paragraph I*of Bibliography*
-2
It
maters from the line formerly held by the l|2d Division. (7) Th
line of departure, xone of aotion, direotion of attaok# objectives,
and formations are shown in Plate II
(2) Sinoe a great doal of the oorps and army artillery
were assigned targets in the xone of aotion of the 2d Division, it
may be said about 320 guns of all calibers were to furnish artillery
(8) 7~0p Rpt,V Corps
support during the initial stages of the attaok* (8) The plan oon 8-FAJ, Vol 9#
templated a two hour preparation prior to the attaok, to be partioi pp li4B182
(9) 7-FO 101,V Corps
pated in by all available guns* (9) At H-hour, in addition to inter 1-FO h9, 2 D I T
diotion and oounterbattery fires, a deep rolling barrage, organised
Into lines, uas to be furnished as shown on Plate VI*
9 MACHINE GUN PLANS AND PREPARATIONS* a -Preliminary plans and
preparations(1) On 25 October, having received vex*bally the tentative
plans of the division for the attaok, the Division Maohlne Gun Offi oer and the Commanding Officer of the l|th Machine Gun Battalion pro oeeded from Herpont by motor about 6J4 kilometers towards the front
of the I|2d Division for a reoonnaissanoo* This not only inoluded a
general reooimaissanoe of the ground, but a visit to the maohine gun
units of the i|2d Division, and a study of available map*, intelli gence summaries, and aerial photographs Details considered in oluded suoh items as positions, routes and movements thereto, extra
(10) l-TentPlan,
2 Dlv
9~Maj Waller
10-Uaj Bruce
materiel needed, coordination with the artillery, and the like* (10)
This reoonnaissanoe was not intended to be final* For instance, uhe
general position for the ljth Maohine Gun Battalion was pioked after
-3
5-0p Rpts*
6 KG B m
9-Uaj Waller
10-Maj Bruce
(o) The machine gun barrage was to be delivered in oon (20) 7-0p Rpt,V Corps juxwtion with the artillery* (20) Since an arerage of 500 meters
9-Maj Waller
10-Maj Bruce from the advancing friendly infantry to the maohina gun barrage
was required to olear Hera safely, the greater portion of the bar-,
would fall beyond th* line of 75n& shrapnel and near or among
(21) 5-0p Hpt f U MG Bn the series of concentrations of the 155-DB. and 8-inoh howitsers. (21)
9-Maj Waller
This would thioken the artillery barrage materially* (See Plate VI)
Slnoe such a mass of machine guns and artillery were to be employed,
no attempt was made to assign separate targets to reapeotire weapons#
(22) 9-Maj Waller 10-Maj Bruoe
but, instead, to use the machine guns to ino?ease fire superiority
generally on important targets. (22)
(d) After the first objeotive had been taken, the maohine
(23) 7-F0 101 f 7 Corps gun battalions of the l|2d Division were to rejoin their division. (23
1-F0 h9> 2 Div
-5
(2k) 1-FO 2*0p 3 2-PO h%* D1V Uerao 2|5, Bri* 3k9k Brig
(27) 10-Maj
9-Capta Farna used in the attaok was such that good positions for all of the
worth &
weapons could not be found* Several of the machine guns of the
Weatover
more advanced organisations were knocked out before a shot was fired,
or soon after the ba&rage started* In some oases, this was due to
improper detailed reconnaissance end to improper coordination with
other weapons in the selection of positions* Despite general pre cautions, some smaller units coming in would find their positions
-6
(35) ?~0p Rpt#V Ooqs barrage was terrifio* (33) "The whole sky abort thi division
3-0? Rpt,2 Diy
seemed to be lit up with ghastly yellowish flashes of high escplo*
slve thills mixed in with blood r#d burat of thermite*" The roar
was tar splitting* Yet* in toot parts of the lint, hard used tanks
oould be heard cooing up* In other parts * ths waspish swish and
or*>oking of Maohine gun bullets overhead oould be heard* The morals
(3k) 9-Capts Harvey, of our troops ros higher aiad higher* (3k) At 5t3O AM# the diri-
Callahan, &
FarnsTiorth
sion jumped off" closely following the artillery first line barrage
(35) 3-0p Hpt t 2 Dir
and made rapid progress*
3-0p Rptf3 Brig
3-0p Rptfl; Brig
o* - Completion of maohine gun barrage - Upon the com p let ion of the tasks assigned in the barrage scheme, having fired
from 30,000 to 95*000 rounds per company, the machine gun organisa tions joined their units in accordance nith the plan* Some companies
had to march quite a distance and did not join their battalions on
scheduled time This as partially due to having to carry their
equipment by hand; but in most instances, it nas caused by these
(36) i|-0p Rpt8#MG Co
companies not being located in positions uhioh lay in line -with
9 Inf
5-Co C,5 MG Bn; their subsequent some of advance* (36)
U,5,6 MG fins
9-Capt Hirsch 11* RESULTS* a*-^dvance of the 2d Division* - On 1 November,
felder
""
9-Lt Strout
1918# the 8d Division drove a flying wedge of 9 kilometers in and
through the enemy1 s position and "opened the way for the rapid ad (37) 6-Letter CG
vanoe of the army"* (37) (See Plate I) Losses in casualties were
First Array
7-0p Rpt,V Corps usually less than those inflicbed upon t*he enemy, due, in a great
measure, to the fire support rendered* (38)
(38) 3-**tter CG
V Corps
3-0p Rots,2 Div
b-Results of the maohine gun barrage* - Since the barrage
3-3 & k Brig
"*
4-9 & 23 Inf
was a combined one of several types of weapons* particularly strong
near the bottom and clay peppered with holes where the guns had
been on the targets* Questioning of prisoners resulted in various
-7
reports* 8oae stated they had not notioed the machine gun barrage*
The guns in these areas **re evidently off* In a great many oases
the prisoners stated they could not move on aooount of the machine
gun fire* Enemy dead materially strengthened the evidenoe as to
(1*0) 10-Maj Bruce
9-Capts Calla han &
Westover
the general effectiveness of the barrage* (1{O)
11, ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM* - - Neither the plan nor the
exeoution of the aaohine gun barrage can be said to have been per feot* Are not perfeot action* rare under the trying conditions
of actual battle? The coordination of the aaohine gun units with
other weapons in the selection and assignment of positions could
well have been improved* The lack of detailed reconnaissance, in
late in its position and masked the fire of the machine guns was
at fault*
b^ - On the other hand, the targets selected, the coordi nation of the waohino gun fire with that of the artillery, and the
fire delivered can be said generally to have been good* One machine
gun can normally cover from 25 to 50 meters in a barrage* With
this in mind, the aotual use of 255 Sa:nB Or about 1 gun to every
15 meters certainly contributed to gaining and maintaining fire
superiority* The resultsf as far as they could be determined,
show that these guns were useful in assisting the advance*
-8
-9
I It I L JL I I
with
RKRRBNCB ABBREVIATION
(KEYs On left margin)
3-Letter CO V Corps
Report of Operations , 3d Brigade from October 17, 1918 to Norenber 2d, 1918*
Operations Report-Jjth Brigade, Marines - Covering period ?Jk Oot#-ll N O T * j.918* k* RECORDS OF THE SECOND DIVISION-(Regular)-Operations Reports, War Diaries, Patrol Reports, 9th-23d Infantry, 5th-6th Marines, 2d Engineers, I9I8 - Yolmne ?
-Op Rpt, MG Co # 9 If
Rptf 9 Inf
Report of Operations of ihe 9th Infantry, US # A* f from Noreitt ber 1st to 11th* 1918*
Report of Operation from 2L|th October to 13th Korenbert 1918 Sixth Regiment, Marine Corps*
5. RECORDS OF THE SECOND DIVISION-(Regular) - Operations Reports,
War Diaries, 12th-15th-l?th Field Artillery, l*th-5th-6th
Maohine (ton Battalions, 1st Field Signal Battalion,
Second Trains, 1918 Volume 8
5-0p Rpt, h MG Bn
50p Rpt, Co C, 5 MG Bn
6-8 of I, 2 DiT
Letter - Cottnttnding General First Army to Comaander-ln-Chief, G*H*Q, A.B*F*, January 16, 1919
Field Orders No 101, FIFTH ARJIT CORPS, 28 October, 1918, lOtOO o'clock*
Operations Report V Corps, Novel*er 1, 1918 8* Shepherd, Lt*-Col* *~ The Employment of the Artillery, Fifth
pp
Army Corps, Ueuse-Argonrie Operations (Field Artillery Journal, 1919 Volume 9t pages llj8-182#) 9* The following of floors, at different times, have been inter viewed either by letter or by personal conversation*
9-Capt Callahan
9-Capt Farnsworth
Captain John J* Harrey, 23d Infantry* Captain Chester J Hirschfelder, 5*h Machine Gun Battalion* First Lieutonant E*P# Strout, 5th Maohine Gun Battalion* Major L*W*T* Waller, Jr, TJ*8*M*C*, Division Machine Gun Officer, 2d Division*
9-Capt Ifestover
Captain Wendell Westover, ipth Machine Gun Battalion* 10* The author, formerly Major, Comnanding Officer, Ijth Machine Gun
10-Major Bruoe
Battalion, realising that ^TTOVM vdll oreep in ^ien revieir ing past actions of over II4 year^ ago, has carefully oon sulted maps and personal data before using himself to verify other sources or before asking any personal statements*
NOTES*
1* Source* Kos* 1-8, inclusive, are to bo found in the Command
and General Staff Sohool Library*
2* Souroe* for Plateo are showi either on the Plate, or V.lie page
opposite the Plate*
z
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ltt0k M .
PLATE I
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MNNI
nun in
ATUU1LI MiGHUE OOTS.M JU 4 t t DI118I0W, 1 lOTMNBt, ! !
tfcit
9 4 I I 9 10 11
14
Maohls* On 0a*99tfc Xafntxy laeMM (Koi Oo*,tU Mhia* On Ot,, etk I M U M On Ot., ttfc 4tk itohlB* On MttsUcs Bh I W U M On Battalim *logiamtal BMhlao On Ooo. 149ta HMhlao On Battalion 150th kohiM On Battalion
56(t)
total of Ooln
* 13
28
64
tfovroos for orfanlsatioas araila>loilD 101T Oorjs * 10 499 t BIT, * Bwo orgaBlaatloBf vtro not araila>lo la 10 10l t T Oorp tut not kMn os f i n t reooniialstanso of V Offioort* OrgaaiiatloMtl data oo^iloi Igr mtbov trim porMsal