NATIONAL LAND TITLES AND DEEDS REGISTRATION ADMINISTRATION, petitioner,

vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and VIOLETA L. GARCIA, respondents.
The Solicitor General Ior petitioner.
Raul R. Estrella Ior private respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 649; REORGANIZED LAND
REGISTRATION COMMISSION TO NALTDRA; EXPRESSLY PROVIDED THE
ABOLITION OF EXISTING POSITIONS. Executive Order No. 649 authorized the
reorganization oI the Land Registration Commission (LRC) into the National Land Titles and
Deeds Registration Administration (NALTDRA). It abolished all the positions in the now
deIunct LRC and required new appointments to be issued to all employees oI the NALTDRA.
The question oI whether or not a law abolishes an oIIice is one oI legislative intent about which
there can be no controversy whatsoever iI there is an explicit declaration in the law itselI. A
closer examination oI Executive Order No. 649 which authorized the reorganization oI the Land
Registration Commission (LRC) into the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration
Administration (NALTDRA), reveals that said law in express terms, provided Ior the abolition oI
existing positions. Thus, without need oI any interpretation, the law mandates that Irom the
moment an implementing order is issued, all positions in the Land Registration Commission are
deemed non-existent. This, however, does not mean removal. Abolition oI a position does not
involve or mean removal Ior the reason that removal implies that the post subsists and that one is
merely separated thereIrom. (Arao vs. Luspo, 20 SCRA 722 |1967|) AIter abolition, there is in
law no occupant. Thus, there can be no tenure to speak oI. It is in this sense that Irom the
standpoint oI strict law, the question oI any impairment oI security oI tenure does not arise. (De
la Llana vs. Alba, 112 SCRA 294 |1982|)
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; REORGANIZATION, VALID WHEN PURSUED IN GOOD FAITH; CASE
AT BAR. Nothing is better settled in our law than that the abolition oI an oIIice within the
competence oI a legitimate body iI done in good Iaith suIIers Irom no inIirmity. Two questions
thereIore arise: (1) was the abolition carried out by a legitimate body?; and (2) was it done in
good Iaith? There is no dispute over the authority to carry out a valid reorganization in any
branch or agency oI the Government. Under Section 9, Article XVII oI the 1973 Constitution.
The power to reorganize is, however; not absolute. We have held in Dario vs. Mison that
reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded as valid provided they are pursued in good
Iaith. This court has pronounced that iI the newly created oIIice has substantially new, diIIerent
or additional Iunctions, duties or powers, so that it may be said in Iact to create an oIIice
diIIerent Irom the one abolished, even though it embraces all or some oI the duties oI the old
oIIice it will be considered as an abolition oI one oIIice and the creation oI a new or diIIerent
one. The same is true iI one oIIice is abolished and its duties, Ior reasons oI economy are given
to an existing oIIicer or oIIice. Executive Order No. 649 was enacted to improve the services and
better systematize the operation oI the Land Registration Commission. A reorganization is
carried out in good Iaith iI it is Ior the purpose oI economy or to make bureaucracy more
eIIicient. To this end, the requirement oI Bar membership to qualiIy Ior key positions in the
NALTDRA was imposed to meet the changing circumstances and new development oI the times.
Private respondent Garcia who Iormerly held the position oI Deputy Register oI Deeds II did not
have such qualiIication. It is thus clear that she cannot hold any key position in the NALTDRA,
The additional qualiIication was not intended to remove her Irom oIIice. Rather, it was a
criterion imposed concomitant with a valid reorganization measure.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; THERE IS NO VESTED PROPERTY RIGHT TO BE RE-EMPLOYED IN A
REORGANIZED OFFICE; CASE AT BAR. There is no such thing as a vested interest or an
estate in an oIIice, or even an absolute right to hold it. Except constitutional oIIices which
provide Ior special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested
right in an oIIice or its salary. None oI the exceptions to this rule are obtaining in this case. To
reiterate, the position which private respondent Garcia would like to occupy anew was abolished
pursuant to Executive Order No. 649, a valid reorganization measure. There is no vested
property right to be re employed in a reorganized oIIice. Not being a member oI the Bar, the
minimum requirement to qualiIy under the reorganization law Ior permanent appointment as
Deputy Register oI Deeds II, she cannot be reinstated to her Iormer position without violating the
express mandate oI the law.
D E C I S I O N
CAMPOS, JR., J p:
The sole issue Ior our consideration in this case is whether or not membership in the bar, which
is the qualiIication requirement prescribed Ior appointment to the position oI Deputy Register oI
Deeds under Section 4 oI Executive Order No. 649 (Reorganizing the Land Registration
Commission (LRC) into the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration or
NALTDRA) should be required oI and/or applied only to new applicants and not to those who
were already in the service oI the LRC as deputy register oI deeds at the time oI the issuance and
implementation oI the abovesaid Executive Order.
The Iacts, as succinctly stated in the Resolution ** oI the Civil Service Commission, are as
Iollows:
"The records show that in 1977, petitioner Garcia, a Bachelor oI Laws graduate and a Iirst grade
civil service eligible was appointed Deputy Register oI Deeds VII under permanent status. Said
position was later reclassiIied to Deputy Register oI Deeds III pursuant to PD 1529, to which
position, petitioner was also appointed under permanent status up to September 1984. She was
Ior two years, more or less, designated as Acting Branch Register oI Deeds oI Meycauayan,
Bulacan. By virtue oI Executive Order No. 649 (which took eIIect on February 9, 1981) which
authorized the restructuring oI the Land Registration Commission to National Land Titles and
Deeds Registration Administration and regionalizing the OIIices oI the Registers therein,
petitioner Garcia was issued an appointment as Deputy Register oI Deeds II on October 1, 1984,
under temporary status, Ior not being a member oI the Philippine Bar. She appealed to the
Secretary oI Justice but her request was denied. Petitioner Garcia moved Ior reconsideration but
her motion remained unacted. On October 23, 1984, petitioner Garcia was administratively
charged with Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest oI the Service. While said case was
pending decision, her temporary appointment as such was renewed in 1985. In a Memorandum
dated October 30, 1986, the then Minister, now Secretary, oI Justice notiIied petitioner Garcia oI
the termination oI her services as Deputy Register oI Deeds II on the ground that she was
"receiving bribe money". Said Memorandum oI Termination which took eIIect on February 9,
1987, was the subject oI an appeal to the Inter-Agency Review Committee which in turn reIerred
the appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB).
In its Order dated July 6, 1987, the MSPB dropped the appeal oI petitioner Garcia on the ground
that since the termination oI her services was due to the expiration oI her temporary appointment,
her separation is in order. Her motion Ior reconsideration was denied on similar ground." 1
However, in its Resolution 2 dated June 30, 1988, the Civil Service Commission directed that
private respondent Garcia be restored to her position as Deputy Register oI Deeds II or its
equivalent in the NALTDRA. It held that "under the vested right theory the new requirement oI
BAR membership to qualiIy Ior permanent appointment as Deputy Register oI Deeds II or higher
as mandated under said Executive Order, would not apply to her (private respondent Garcia) but
only to the Iilling up oI vacant lawyer positions on or aIter February 9, 1981, the date said
Executive Order took eIIect." 3 A Iortiori, since private respondent Garcia had been holding the
position oI Deputy Register oI Deeds II Irom 1977 to September 1984, she should not be
aIIected by the operation on February 1, 1981 oI Executive Order No. 649.
Petitioner NALTDRA Iiled the present petition to assail the validity oI the above Resolution oI
the Civil Service Commission. It contends that Sections 8 and 10 oI Executive Order No. 649
abolished all existing positions in the LRC and transIerred their Iunctions to the appropriate new
oIIices created by said Executive Order, which newly created oIIices required the issuance oI
new appointments to qualiIied oIIice holders. Verily, Executive Order No. 649 applies to private
respondent Garcia, and not being a member oI the Bar, she cannot be reinstated to her Iormer
position as Deputy Register oI Deeds II.
We Iind merit in the petition.
Executive Order No. 649 authorized the reorganization oI the Land Registration Commission
(LRC) into the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration (NALTDRA). It
abolished all the positions in the now deIunct LRC and required new appointments to be issued
to all employees oI the NALTDRA.
The question oI whether or not a law abolishes an oIIice is one oI legislative intent about which
there can be no controversy whatsoever iI there is an explicit declaration in the law itselI. 4 A
closer examination oI Executive Order No. 649 which authorized the reorganization oI the Land
Registration Commission (LRC) into the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration
Administration (NALTDRA), reveals that said law in express terms, provided Ior the abolition oI
existing positions, to wit:
Sec. 8. Abolition oI Existing Positions in the Land Registration Commission . . .
All structural units in the Land Registration Commission and in the registries oI deeds, and all
Positions therein shall cease to exist Irom the date speciIied in the implementing order to be
issued by the President pursuant to the preceding paragraph. Their pertinent Iunctions, applicable
appropriations, records, equipment and property shall be transIerred to the appropriate staII or
oIIices therein created. (Emphasis Supplied.)
Thus, without need oI any interpretation, the law mandates that Irom the moment an
implementing order is issued, all positions in the Land Registration Commission are deemed
non-existent. This, however, does not mean removal. Abolition oI a position does not involve or
mean removal Ior the reason that removal implies that the post subsists and that one is merely
separated thereIrom. 5 AIter abolition, there is in law no occupant. Thus, there can be no tenure
to speak oI. It is in this sense that Irom the standpoint oI strict law, the question oI any
impairment oI security oI tenure does not arise. 6
Nothing is better settled in our law than that the abolition oI an oIIice within the competence oI a
legitimate body iI done in good Iaith suIIers Irom no inIirmity. Two questions thereIore arise: (1)
was the abolition carried out by a legitimate body?; and (2) was it done in good Iaith?
There is no dispute over the authority to carry out a valid reorganization in any branch or agency
oI the Government. Under Section 9, Article XVII oI the 1973 Constitution, the applicable law at
that time:
Sec. 9. All oIIicials and employees in the existing Government oI the Republic oI the Philippines
shall continue in oIIice until otherwise provided by law or decreed by the incumbent President oI
the Philippines, but all oIIicials whose appointments are by this Constitution vested in the Prime
Minister shall vacate their respective oIIices upon the appointment and qualiIications oI their
successors.
The power to reorganize is, however; not absolute. We have held in Dario vs. Mison 7 that
reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded as valid provided they are pursued in good
Iaith. This court has pronounced 8 that iI the newly created oIIice has substantially new, diIIerent
or additional Iunctions, duties or powers, so that it may be said in Iact to create an oIIice
diIIerent Irom the one abolished, even though it embraces all or some oI the duties oI the old
oIIice it will be considered as an abolition oI one oIIice and the creation oI a new or diIIerent
one. The same is true iI one oIIice is abolished and its duties, Ior reasons oI economy are given
to an existing oIIicer or oIIice.
Executive Order No. 649 was enacted to improve the services and better systematize the
operation oI the Land Registration Commission. 9 A reorganization is carried out in good Iaith iI
it is Ior the purpose oI economy or to make bureaucracy more eIIicient. 10 To this end, the
requirement oI Bar membership to qualiIy Ior key positions in the NALTDRA was imposed to
meet the changing circumstances and new development oI the times. 11 Private respondent
Garcia who Iormerly held the position oI Deputy Register oI Deeds II did not have such
qualiIication. It is thus clear that she cannot hold any key position in the NALTDRA, The
additional qualiIication was not intended to remove her Irom oIIice. Rather, it was a criterion
imposed concomitant with a valid reorganization measure.
A Iinal word, on the "vested right theory" advanced by respondent Civil Service Commission.
There is no such thing as a vested interest or an estate in an oIIice, or even an absolute right to
hold it. Except constitutional oIIices which provide Ior special immunity as regards salary and
tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an oIIice or its salary. 12 None oI the
exceptions to this rule are obtaining in this case.
To reiterate, the position which private respondent Garcia would like to occupy anew was
abolished pursuant to Executive Order No. 649, a valid reorganization measure. There is no
vested property right to be re employed in a reorganized oIIice. Not being a member oI the Bar,
the minimum requirement to qualiIy under the reorganization law Ior permanent appointment as
Deputy Register oI Deeds II, she cannot be reinstated to her Iormer position without violating the
express mandate oI the law.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, We hereby GRANT the petition and SET ASIDE the
questioned Resolution oI the Civil Service Commission reinstating private respondent to her
Iormer position as Deputy Register oI Deeds II or its equivalent in the National Land Titles and
Deeds Registration Administration.


CAMARNES NORTE ELECTRC COOPERATVE, NC. (CANORE-CO); RUBEN N.
BARRAMEDA; ELVS L. ESPRTU; MERARDO G. ENERO, JR.; MARCELTO B.
ABAS; and REYNALDO V. ABUNDO, petitioners, vs. HON. RUBEN D. TORRES, in his
capacity as Executive Secretary; REX TANTONGCO; HONESTO DE JESUS;
ANDRES BASCO; TEODULO M. MEA; and VCENTE LUKBAN, respondent.
D E C S O N
DAVDE, JR., .:
May the Office of the President validly constitute an ,d hoc committee to take over and
manage the affairs of an electric cooperative?
This is the key issue in this original action for certior,ri and prohibition under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court wherein the petitioners seek to (a) annul and set aside Memorandum
Order No. 409 of the Office of the President dated 3 December 1996 constituting an Ad
Hoc Committee to take over and manage the affairs of the Camarines Norte Electric
Cooperative, nc., (hereafter CANORECO) "until such time as a general membership
meeting can be called to decide the serious issues affecting the said cooperative and
normalcy in operations is restored"; and (b) prohibit the respondents from performing
acts or continuing proceedings pursuant to the Memorandum Order.
The factual backdrop of this case is not complicated.
Petitioner CANORECO is an electric cooperative organized under the provisions of P.D.
No. 269, otherwise known as the National Electrification Administration Decree, as
amended by P.D. No. 1645.
On 10 March 1990, then President Corazon C. Aquino signed into law R.A. No. 6938
and R.A. No. 6939. The former is the Cooperative Code of the Philippines, while the
latter created the Cooperative Development Authority (CDA) and vested solely upon the
CDA the power to register cooperatives.
Article 122 of the Cooperative Code expressly provides that electric cooperatives shall
be covered by the Code. Article 128 of the said Code and Section 17 of R.A. No. 6939
similarly provide that cooperatives created under P.D. No. 269, as amended by P.D. No.
1645, shall have three years within which to qualify and register with the CDA and that
after they shall have so qualified and registered, the provisions of Sections 3 and 5 of
P.D. No. 1645 shall no longer be applicable to them. These Sections 3 and 5 read as
follows:
SEC. 3. Section 5(a), Chapter of Presidential Decree No. 269 is hereby amended by
adding sub-paragraph (6) to read as follows:
"(6) To authorize the NEA Administrator to designate, subject to the confirmation of the
Board Administrators, an Acting General Manager and/or Project Supervisor for a
Cooperative where vacancies in the said positions occur and/or when the interest of the
Cooperative and the program so requires, and to prescribe the functions of said Acting
General Manager and/or Project Supervisor, which powers shall not be nullified, altered
or diminished by any policy or resolution of the Board of Directors of the Cooperative
concerned.
. . .
SEC. 5. Section 10, Chapter of Presidential Decree No. 269 is hereby amended to
read as follows:
"Section 10. nforcement Powers ,nd Remedies. -- n the exercise of its power of
supervision and control over electric cooperatives and other borrower, supervised or
controlled entities, the NEA is empowered to issue orders, rules and regulations and
motu proprio or upon petition of third parties, to conduct investigations, referenda and
other similar actions in all matters affecting said electric cooperatives and other
borrower, or supervised or controlled entities.
. . .
Finally, the repealing clause (Article 127) of the Cooperative Code provides:
Provided, however, That nothing in this Code shall be interpreted to mean the
amendment or repeal of any provision of Presidential Decree No. 269: Provided,
further, That the electric cooperatives which qualify as such under this Code shall fall
under the coverage thereof.
CANORECO registered with the CDA pursuant to R.A. No. 6938 and R.A. No. 6939.
On 8 March 1993, the CDA issued a Certificate of Provisional Registration (T-003-93) to
CANORECO effective for two years. On 1 March 1995, the CDA extended this
provisional registration until 4 May 1997. However, on 10 July 1996, CANORECO filed
with the CDA its approved amendments to its Articles of Cooperation converting itself
from a non-stock to a stock cooper,tive pursuant to the provisions of R.A. No. 6938 and
the Omnibus mplementing Rules and Regulations on Electric Cooperatives. On the
same date the CDA issued a Certificate of Registration of the amendments to
CANORECO Articles of Cooperation certifying that CANORECO is "registered as a full-
[f]ledged cooperative under and by virtue of R.A. 6938.
Previously, on 11 March 1995, the Board of Directors of CANORECO approved
Resolution No. 22 appointing petitioner Reynaldo V. Abundo as permanent General
Manager. The Board was composed of
Ruben N. Barrameda -- President
Elvis L. Espiritu -- Vice president
Merardo G. Enero, Jr. -- Secretary
Marcelito B. Abas -- Treasurer
Antonio R. Obias -- Director
Luis A. Pascua -- Director
Norberto Z. Ochoa -- Director
Leonida Z. Manalo -- OC GM/fficio
On 28 May 1995, Antonio Obias, Norberto Ochoa, Luis Pascua, and Felicito lan held a
special meeting of the Board of Directors of CANORECO. The minutes of the meeting
showed that President Ruben Barrameda, Vice-President Elvis Espiritu, and Treasurer
Marcelito Abas were absent; that Obias acted as temporary chairman; that the latter
informed those present that it was the responsibility of the Board after the annual
meeting to meet and elect the new set of officers, but that despite the fact that he had
called the attention of President Barrameda and Directors Abas and Espiritu for the
holding thereof, the three chose not to appear; and that those present in the special
meeting declared all positions in the board vacant and thereafter proceeded to hold
elections by secret balloting with all the directors present considered candidates for the
positions. The following won and were declared as the newly elected officers of the
CANORECO:
President . . . . . . . . Norberto Ochoa
Vice President . . . . Antonio Obias
Secretary . . . . . . . . Felicito lan
Treasurer. . . . . . . . Luis Pascua
Thereupon, these newly elected officers approved the following resolutions:
1) Resolution No. 27, c.s. -- confirming the election of the new set of officers of the
Board of Directors of CANORECO
2) Resolution No. 28, c.s. -- recalling Resolution No. 22, c.s. appointing Mr.
Reynaldo V. Abundo as permanent General Manager in view of the fact that such
appointment was in violation of the provisions of R.A. 6713; declaring the position
of General Manager as vacant; and designating Mr. Oscar Acobera as Officer-in-
Charge
3) Resolution No. 29, c.s. -- authorizing the Board President, or in his absence, the
Vice-President, countersigned by the Treasurer, or in his absence, the
Secretary, to be the only officers who can transfer funds from savings to current
accounts; and authorizing the Officer-in-Charge, Mr. Acobera, to issue checks
without countersignature in an amount not to exceed P3,000.00 and in excess
thereof, to be countersigned by the President and/or the Treasurer
4) Resolution No. 30, c.s. -- hiring the services of Atty. Juanito Subia as retainer-
lawyer for CANORECO.
The petitioners challenged the above resolutions and the election of officers by filing
with the CDA a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Board Resolutions and Election of
Officers with Prayer for ssuance of njunction/Temporary Restraining Order, which the
CDA docketed as CDA-CO Case No. 95-010.
n its Resolution of 15 February 1996, the CDA resolved the petition in favor of the
petitioners and decreed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Board Meeting of May 28, 1995, participated
by the respondents, and all the Resolutions issued on such occasion, are hereby
declared NULL AND VOD AB INITI.
Likewise, the election of respondents Norberto Ochoa, Antonio Obias, Felicito lan, and
Luis Pascua, as President, Vice-President, Secretary, and Treasurer, respectively, of
CANORECO is hereby declared NULL AND VOD AB INITI.
Hence, respondents Norberto Ochoa, Antonio Obias, Felicito lan, and Luis Pascua are
hereby ordered to refrain from representing themselves as President, Vice-President,
Secretary, and Treasurer, respectively, of CANORECO. The same respondents are
further ordered to refrain from acting as authorized signatories to the bank accounts of
CANORECO.
Further respondent Felicito lan is hereby ordered to refrain from exercising the duties
and functions of a member of the Board of CANORECO until the election protest is
resolved with finality by the proper forum. n the meantime, the incumbency of
petitioner Merardo Enero, Jr. as Director of the CANORECO Board is hereby
recognized.
A st,tus quo is hereby ordered as regards the position of General Manager, being held
by Mr. Reynaldo Abundo, considering that the recall of his appointment was done under
a void Resolution, and that the designation of Mr. Oscar Acodera as Officer-in-Charge,
under the same void Resolution, has no force and effect.
Finally, respondents Antonio Obias, Norberto Ochoa, Luisito Pascua, and petitioners
Ruben Barrameda, Elvis Espiritu, Marcelito Abas and Merardo Enero, Jr. are hereby
ordered to work together, as Board of Directors, for the common good of CANORECO
and its consumer-members, and to maintain an atmosphere of sincere cooperation
among the officers and members of CANORECO.
On 28 June 1996, in defiance of the abovementioned Resolution of the CDA and with
the active participation of some officials of the National Electrification Administration
(NEA), the group of Norberto Ochoa, Antonio Obias, Felicito lan, and Luis Pascua
forcibly took possession of the offices of CANORECO and assumed the duties as
officers thereof.
On 26 September 1996, pursuant to the writ of execution and order to vacate issued by
the CDA, the petitioners were able to reassume control of the CANORECO and to
perform their respective functions.
On 3 December 1996, the President of the Philippines issued Memorandum Order No.
409 onstituting an Ad Hoc Committee to temporarily take over and manage the affairs of
CANORECO. t reads as follows:
To efficiently and effectively address the worsening problem of the Camarines Norte
Electric Cooperative, nc. (CANORECO) and in order not to prejudice and endanger the
interest of the people who rely on the said cooperative for their supply of electricity, an
AD HOC Committee is hereby constituted to take over and manage the affairs of
CANORECO until such time as a general membership meeting can be called to decide
the serious issues affecting the said cooperative and normalcy in operations is
restored. Further, if and when warranted, the present Board of Directors may be called
upon by the Committee for advisory services without prejudice to the receipt of their per
diems as may be authorized by existing rules and regulations.
The AD HOC Committee shall be composed of the following:
REX TANTONGCO -- Chairman
Presidential Assistant on Energy Affairs
HONESTO DE JESUS -- Member
Cooperative Development Authority Nominee
ANDRES BASCO -- Member
Cooperative Development Authority Nominee
TEODULO M. MEA -- Member
National Electrification Administration Nominee
VCENTE LUKBAN -- Member
National Electrification Administration Nominee
The said Committee shall have the following functions:
1. Designate the following upon the recommendation of the Chairman:
1.1 an Acting General Manager who shall handle the day-to-day operations
of the Cooperative. n the meantime, the General Manager shall be
deemed to be on leave without prejudice to the payment of his salaries
legally due him; and
1.2 a Comptroller who shall handle the financial affairs of the Cooperative.
2. Ensure that:
.
The AD HOC Committee shall submit a written report to the President, through the
Office of the Executive Secretary, every two (2) weeks from the effectivity of this Order.
A General Membership Meeting shall be called by the AD HOC Committee to determine
whether or not there is a need to change the composition of the membership of the
Cooperative's Board of Directors. f the need exists, the AD HOC Committee shall call
for elections. Once the composition of the Board of Directors is finally settled, it shall
decide on the appointment of a General Manager in accordance with prescribed laws,
rules and regulations. Upon the appointment of a General Manager, the Committee
shall become functus officio.
This Memorandum Order shall take effect immediately.
On 11 December 1996, the petitioners filed this petition wherein they claim that
. THE PRESDENT HAS NO POWER TO TAKE OVER AND MANAGE OR TO
ORDER THE TAKE-OVER OR MANAGEMENT OF CANORECO.
. [THE] TAKE-OVER OF CANORECO BY THE AD HOC COMMTTEE S
UNLAWFUL DESPTE DESGNATON OF CANORECO CONSUMERS AS MEMBERS
OF AD HOC COMMTTEE.
. [THE] RELEGATON OF PETTONERS AS MERE ADVSERS TO THE AD HOC
COMMTTEE AMOUNTS TO REMOVAL FROM OFFCE WHCH THE PRESDENT
HAS NO POWER TO DO. MOREOVER, PETTONERS' REMOVAL VOLATES
PETTONERS' RGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
V. THE PRESDENT S LKEWSE WTHOUT POWER TO DESGNATE OR ORDER
THE DESGNATON OF AN ACTNG GENERAL MANAGER FOR CANORECO AND
TO CONSDER THE NCUMBENT REYNALDO V. ABUNDO TO BE ON LEAVE.
The petitioners assert that there is no provision in the Constitution or in a statute
expressly, or even impliedly, authorizing the President or his representatives to take
over or order the take-over of electric cooperatives. Although conceding that while the
State, through its police power, has the right to interfere with private business or
commerce, they maintain that the exercise thereof is generally limited to the regulation
of the business or commerce and that the power to regulate does not include the power
to take over, control, manage, or direct the operation of the business. Accordingly, the
creation of the Ad Hoc Committee for the purpose of take-over was illegal and void.
The petitioners further claim that Memorandum Order No. 409 removed them from their
positions as members of the Board of Directors of CANORECO. The President does
not have the authority to appoint, much less to remove, members of the board of
directors of a private enterprise including electric cooperatives. He cannot rely on his
power of supervision over the NEA to justify the designation of an acting general
manager for CANORECO under P.D. No. 269 as amended by P.D. No. 1645, for
CANORECO had already registered with the CDA pursuant to R.A. No. 6938 and R.A.
No. 6939; hence, the latter laws now govern the internal affairs of CANORECO.
On 3 January 1997, the petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for ssuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order.
On 9 January 1997, the petitioners filed a Manifestation and Motion informing the Court
that on 8 January 1997 respondent Rex Tantiongco notified the petitioners that the Ad
Hoc Committee was taking over the affairs and management of CANORECO effective
as of that date. They reiterated their plea for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order because the Ad Hoc Committee has taken control of CANORECO and usurped
the functions of the individual petitioners.
n the Resolution dated 13 January 1997, we required respondents to comment on the
petition.
Despite four extensions granted it, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) failed to file
its Comment. Hence, in the resolution of 16 July 1997 we deemed the OSG to have
waived the filing of its Comment and declared this case submitted for decision. The
OSG's motion to admit its Comment, as well as the attached Comment, belatedly filed
on 24 July 1997 was merely noted without action in the resolution of 13 August 1997.
We also subsequently denied for lack of merit its motion for reconsideration.
We find the instant petition impressed with merit.
Having registered itself with the CDA pursuant to Section 128 of R.A. No. 6938 and
Section 17 of R.A. No. 6939, CANORECO was brought under the coverage of said
laws. Article 38 of R.A. No. 6938 vests upon the board of directors the conduct and
management of the affairs of cooperatives, and Article 39 provides for the powers of the
board of directors. These sections read:
Article 38. omposition of the Bo,rd of Directors. -- The conduct and
management of the affairs of a cooperative shall be vested in a board of directors which
shall be composed of not less than five (5) nor more than fifteen (15) members elected
by the general assembly for a term fixed in the by-laws but not exceeding a term of two
(2) years and shall hold office until their successors are duly elected and qualified, or
until duly removed. However, no director shall serve for more than three (3)
consecutive terms.
Article 39. Powers of the Bo,rd of Directors. -- The board of directors shall direct and
supervise the business, manage the property of the cooperative and may, by resolution,
exercise all such powers of the cooperative as are not reserved for the general
assembly under this Code and the by-laws.
As to the officers of cooperatives, Article 43 of the Code provides:
ART. 43. fficers of the ooper,tives. The board of directors shall elect from among
themselves only the chairman and vice-chairman, and elect or appoint other officers of
the cooperative from outside of the board in accordance with their by-laws. All officers
shall serve during good behavior and shall not be removed except for cause and after
due hearing. Loss of confidence shall not be a valid ground for removal unless
evidenced by acts or omissions causing loss of confidence in the honesty and integrity
of such officer. No two (2) or more persons with relationship up to the third degree of
consanguinity or affinity shall serve as elective or appointive officers in the same board.
Under Article 34 of the Code, the general assembly of cooperatives has the exclusive
power, which cannot be delegated, to elect or appoint the members of the board of
directors and to remove them for cause. Article 51 thereof provides for removal of
directors and officers as follows:
ART. 51. Remov,. -- An elective officer, director, or committee member may be
removed by a vote of two-thirds (2/3) of the voting members present and constituting a
quorum, in a regular or special general assembly meeting called for the purpose. The
person involved shall be given an opportunity to be heard at said assembly.
Memorandum Order No. 409 clearly removed from the Board of Directors of
CANORECO the power to manage the affairs of CANORECO and transferred such
power to the Ad Hoc Committee, albeit temporarily. Considering that (1) the take-over
will be "until such time that a general membership meeting can be called to decide the
serious issues affecting the said cooperative and normalcy in operations is restored,
and (2) the date such meeting shall be called and the determination of whether there is
a need to change the composition of the membership of CANORECO's Board of
Directors are exclusively left to the Ad Hoc Committee, it necessarily follows that the
incumbent directors were, for all intents and purposes, suspended at the least, and
removed, at the most, from their office. The said Memorandum did no less to the
lawfully appointed General Manager by directing that upon the settlement of the issue
concerning the composition of the board of directors the Committee shall decide on the
appointment of a general manager. n the meantime, it authorized the Committee to
designate upon the recommendation of the Chairman an Acting Manager, with the
lawfully appointed Manager considered on leave, but who is, however, entitled to the
payment of his salaries.
Nothing in law supported the take-over of the management of the affairs of
CANORECO, and the "suspension, if not "removal, of the Board of Directors and the
officers thereof.
t must be pointed out that the controversy which resulted in the issuance of the
Memorandum Order stemmed from a struggle between two groups vying for control of
the management of CANORECO. One faction was led by the group of Norberto Ochoa,
while the other was petitioners' group whose members were, at that time, the incumbent
directors and officers. t was the action of Ochoa and his cohorts in holding a special
meeting on 28 May 1995 and then declaring vacant the positions of cooperative officers
and thereafter electing themselves to the positions of president, vice-president,
treasurer, and secretary of CANORECO which compelled the petitioners to file a
petition with the CDA. The CDA thereafter came out with a decision favorable to the
petitioners.
Obviously there was a clear case of intra-cooperative dispute. Article 121 of the
Cooperative Code is explicit on how the dispute should be resolved; thus:
ART. 121. $ettement of Disputes. -- Disputes among members, officers, directors,
and committee members, and intra-cooperative disputes shall, as far as practicable, be
settled amicably in accordance with the conciliation or mediation mechanisms embodied
in the by-laws of the cooperative, and in applicable laws.
Should such a conciliation/mediation proceeding fail, the matter shall be settled in a
court of competent jurisdiction.
Complementing this Article is Section 8 of R.A. No. 6939, which provides:
SEC. 8. edi,tion ,nd oncii,tion. Upon request of either or both or both parties,
the [CDA] shall mediate and conciliate disputes with the cooperative or between
cooperatives: Provided, That if no mediation or conciliation succeeds within three (3)
months from request thereof, a certificate of non-resolution shall be issued by the
commission prior to the filing of appropriate action before the proper courts.
Even granting for the sake of argument that the party aggrieved by a decision of the
CDA could pursue an administrative appeal to the Office of the President on the theory
that the CDA is an agency under its direct supervision and control, still the Office of the
President could not in this case, motu proprio or upon request of a party, supplant or
overturn the decision of the CDA. The record does not disclose that the group of
Norberto Ochoa appealed from the decision of the CDA in CDA-CO Case No. 95-010 to
the Office of the President as the head of the Executive Department exercising
supervision and control over said agency. n fact the CDA had already issued a Cease
and Desist Order dated 14 August 1996 ordering Antonio Obias, Norberto Ochoa, Luis
Pascua, Felicito lan and their followers "to cease and desist from acting as the Board of
Directors and Officers of Camarines Norte Electric Cooperative (CANORECO) and to
refrain from implementing their Resolution calling for the District V Election on August
17 and 24, 1996. Consequently, the said decision of the CDA had long become final
and executory when Memorandum Order No. 409 was issued on 3 December 1996.
That Memorandum cannot then be considered as one reversing the decision of the CDA
which had attained finality.
Under Section 15, Chapter of Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive
Order No. 292), decisions of administrative agencies become final and executory fifteen
days after receipt of a copy thereof by the party adversely affected unless within that
period an administrative appeal or judicial review, if proper, has been perfected. One
motion for reconsideration is allowed. A final resolution or decision of an administrative
agency also binds the Office of the President even if such agency is under the
administrative supervision and control of the latter.
We have stated before, and reiterate it now, that administrative decisions must end
sometime, as fully as public policy demands that finality be written on judicial
controversies. Public interest requires that proceedings already terminated should not
be altered at every step, for the rule of non quiet, movere prescribes that what had
already been terminated should not be disturbed. A disregard of this principle does not
commend itself to sound public policy.
Neither can police power be invoked to clothe with validity the assailed Memorandum
Order No. 409. Police power is the power inherent in a government to enact laws,
within constitutional limits, to promote the order, safety, health, morals, and general
welfare of society. t is lodged primarily in the legislature. By virtue of a valid delegation
of legislative power, it may also be exercised by the President and administrative
boards, as well as the lawmaking bodies on all municipal levels, including the -,r,ng,.
Delegation of legislative powers to the President is permitted in Sections 23(2) and
28(2) of Article V of the Constitution. The pertinent laws on cooperatives, namely, R.A.
No. 6938, R.A. No. 6939, and P.D. No. 269 as amended by P.D. No. 1645 do not
provide for the President or any other administrative body to take over the internal
management of a cooperative. Article 98 of R.A. 6938 instead provides:
ART. 98. Regu,tion of Pu-ic $ervice ooper,tives. -- (1) The internal affairs of
public service cooperatives such as the rights and privileges of members, the rules and
procedures for meetings of the general assembly, board of directors and committees;
for the election and qualification of officers, directors, and committee members;
allocation and distribution of surpluses, and all other matters relating to their internal
affairs shall be governed by this Code.
.
We do not then hesitate to rule that Memorandum Order No. 409 has no constitutional
and statutory basis. t violates the basic underlying principle enshrined in Article 4(2) of
R.A. No. 6938 that cooperatives are democratic organizations and that their affairs shall
be administered by persons elected or appointed in a manner agreed upon by the
members. Likewise, it runs counter to the policy set forth in Section 1 of R.A. No. 6939
that the State shall, except as provided in said Act, maintain a policy of non-interference
in the management and operation of cooperatives.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and Memorandum Order No. 409 of
the President is hereby declared NVALD.
SO ORDERED.


HEIRS OF SANTIAGO PASTORAL and AGUSTIN BATO, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS and COMMUNICATIONS, THE CITY
ENGINEER OF DAGUPAN CITY and LEONARDO ESPANOL, respondents-appellees.
P,uino $. ,-ug,o for petitioners,ppe,nts.

GUTIERREZ, JR.,
This case was certified to us by the Court of Appeals pursuant to Sections 17 and 21 of
the Judiciary Act, as amended in relation to Section 3, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court on
the ground that the issues raised are pure questions of law. The main issue centers on
the authority of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications under Republic Act
2056 to declare the construction of dikes encroaching into public navigable waters as a
public nuisance and to order their removal.
Sometime in October 1958, residents of Bacayao Norte, Caranglaan, and Mayombo
Districts of Dagupan City led by Leonardo Espanol filed complaints with the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications (hereinafter referred to as Secretary) denouncing
the heirs of Santiago Pastoral and Agustin Bato for "alleged encroachments into the
Tulao River ... to the prejudice of public interest." The complaints were docketed as
Cases Nos. RA-2056-26 and RA-2056-37 respectively.
The Secretary designated the City Engineer of Dagupan City to conduct hearings in the
two cases. All the parties were notified of the hearings set for both cases.
Based on the evidence submitted by the parties, the Secretary rendered two separate
decisions ordering the removal of the encroachments complained of within thirty (30)
days from receipt of notice. Thus, in Case No. RA-2056-26, the heirs of Santiago
Pastoral were ordered to remove the fishpond dikes indicated as Encroachments Nos.
1, 2, 3 and 4 in Exhibit "A" while in Case No. RA-2056-37, Agustin Bato was ordered to
remove the fishpond dikes indicated as Encroachment No. 5 in Exhibit "A." The
Secretary ruled that encroachments Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 in Exhibit "A" had been
illegally constructed within the channel of Tulao River. The Secretary declared the
encouragement croachments as public nuisances under Republic Act 2056.
Their motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Secretary, the respondents
filed in the Court of First nstance of Pangasinan a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against the Secretary, the City Engineer
of Dagupan City and Leonardo Espanol. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. D-
833.
The petitioners (respondents in the administrative cases) alleged "... that respondent
City Engineer informed petitioners that the 30-day period given them to remove the
fishpond dikes has expired and that his office will proceed to demolish the dikes on
orders from the Secretary of Public Works and Communications; that they have title
over the alleged encroachments and a fishpond permit issued by the Department of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, through the Bureau of Fisheries, authorizing them to
construct a fishpond on an adjoining parcel of their property not covered by title." The
petitioners sought the annulment of the decision of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and the issuance of a writ of
prohibition commanding the respondents to desist absolutely and perpetually from
further molesting in any manner the petitioners and interfering with the exercise of their
rights over the lands in question.
n his answer, the Secretary invoked his authority to remove the encroachments under
Republic Act No. 2056 and stated that he had acted lawfully and justly and within the
sound limits of his authority and jurisdiction thereunder.
The parties agreed to submit the case for judgment on the pleadings and were allowed
by the lower court to submit their respective memoranda.
The trial court then rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners-appellants prompting
the Secretary to interpose an appeal to the Court of Appeals.
The Secretary assigned a single assignment of error, to wit:
THE TRAL COURT COMMTTED ERROR N HAVNG ANNULLED THE DECSONS
RENDERED BY THE SECRETARY OF PUBLC WORKS AND COMMUNCATONS, N
CASES JURSDCTON, AND N PERMANENTLY ENJONNG SAD SECRETARY
FROM MPLEMENTNG THE ORDER TO REMOVE THE ENCROACMENTS PLACED
BY THE APPEALLEES ON THE TULAO RVER. (At p. 17, Rollo)
n support of this lone assignment of error, the petitioner raised the following arguments:
1) The Secretary was duly vested with jurisdiction both over the parties and subject
matter of the controversy.
2) The Secretary duly conformed to the requirements of due process in the exercise of
his authority under Republic Act No. 2056.
3) The Secretary did not, as concluded by the court a quo, rule on the validity of
appellees' titles over the lots in question.
4) The issuance of fishpond permits by the Bureau of Fisheries did not preclude the
Secretary from conducting due investigation and in ruling upon the same.
5) The Secretary's findings of fact are entitled to respect from the courts. (At pp. 17-18,
Rollo)
As stated earlier, the main issue hinges on the authority of the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications under Republic Act 2056 to declare that the construction or
building of dams, dikes or any other works which encroach into any public navigable
river, stream, coastal waters and any other navigable public waters or waterways as
well as the construction or building of dams, dikes or any other works in areas declared
as communal fishing grounds is prohibited and to order their removal as "public
nuisances or as prohibited constructions."
The lower court concluded that the Secretary abused his authority under Republic Act
No. 2056 on the following points: (1) The Secretary passed judgment on the validity of
the titles of the petitioners over Encroachments 3, 4 and 5 when he declared such titles
as null and void; and (2) the dikes denominated as Encroachments Nos. 1 and 2 were
constructed by virtue of a permit legally issued in favor of the late Santiago Pastoral by
the Bureau of Fisheries on July 19, 1948 because the area was deemed fit by said
Office of fishpond purposes, and the construction of such dikes would not impede the
flow of the river. The lower court opined that in constructing the dikes, the petitioners
were only exercising a right legally granted to them and that "they shall remain to enjoy
the privilege until such time that their permit shall have been cancelled."
The petition is impressed with merit.
The records belie the lower court's finding that the Secretary passed judgment on the
titles of the lots in question.
n connection with Encroachments Nos. 3 and 4, the Heirs of Santiago Pastoral
presented a certified true copy of Original Certificate of Title No. 9 issued by the
Register of Deeds of Dagupan City to show that the encroachments are within their
titled lands. The Secretary, however, stated in his decision:
As regards the last two encroachments, the evidence shows that the southern boundary
thereof is the original bank of the Tulao River. The properties in question, titled as they
are, are clearly within the bed of the river. Even the testimony of Aniceto Luis, a
representative of the Bureau of Lands in the investigation, shows without doubt, that the
encroachments are within the river bed as may be gleaned from the following:
Q As it appears in the record, title was granted to Santiago Pastoral on this alleged encroachment
No. 3 and 4 which falls squarely on the Tulao River and during the ocular inspection by the
undersigned, the fact became evident that the river is highly navigable. Now, what explanation
can you make as to why title was issued over a portion of a river, public river at that, which is
highly navigable?
A So far, our record does not show that it is a navigable river, but it is just stated that "the area
applied for is a part of the Tulao River and therefore it is covered by water." (From the report of
the Deputy Public Land nspector E. Ventura dated March, 1954 in connection with the Sales
application of Santiago Pastoral.)
Q So in the report, it was stated that the land applied for by Santiago Pastoral is entirely covered
by water and part of the river?
A Yes, sir,
The propriety of the title over the last two encroachments is beyond the jurisdiction of this
Office to inquire into, much less question, although it seems worth looking into by the
proper authorities. Be that as it may, the fact remains that the dikes and other works
therein are encroachments into the Tulao River and, as such, are public nuisances within
the contemplation of Republic Act No. 2056. (pp. 1-2, Decision in RA-2056-26)
Petitioner Agustin Bato also submitted a verified copy of the Original Certificate of Title
No. 2 to show that encroachment No. 5 was privately owned.
Anent this argument, the Secretary said:
xxx xxx xxx
... t has been found, however, that the land in question, although titled, is within the bed
of the Tulao River. Even the representative of the Bureau of Lands bolstered such finding
as may be gleaned from the following portion of his testimony:
Q But you stated that the technical description falls squarely to the Tulao River. What am after is
the condition of the land when the application was made. Do you have that in your records? "
A Yes sir.
Q Now, if show the certificate of title that covered the portion of this land, will you agree with me
that the technical description is the same as that appearing in your record?
A Yes, they are the same.
Q Mr. Luis, we have the technical description appearing in the certificate of title which you
admitted to be the same as appearing in your record plotted, and it appears that the same land
covered by the description falls squarely on the river? s it still on the side of the river or in the
river itself? am referring to the encroachment No. 5 by Agustin Bato.
A No, if this encroachment made by Agustin Bato is the same land as described in the technical
description from the title, then it is within the river."
Moreover, Section 39 of Act No. 496, in defining the scope and efficacy of a certificate of
title under the Torrens System, established some exceptions which the force of said title
does not reach or affect. Among them are properties of the public domain. Since the
portion appropriated is of public dominion, registration under Act No. 496 did not make
the possessor a true owner thereof. (Celso Ledesma v. The Municipality of loilo,
Concepcion Lopez, Maximo M. Kalaw and wife, and Julia Ledesma, defendants, 49 Phil.
769). (pp. 1-2, Decision in RA-2056-37)
n effect, the Secretary passed judgment only to the extent that, although the
encroachments were inside titled properties, they are within the bed of a river. With this
factual finding, he declared the encroachments, converted into fishponds within the
Tulao River, as prohibited and ordered their removal pursuant to his authority under
Republic Act 2056. He never declared that the titles of the petitioners over the lots in
question were null and void.
The Secretary's authority to determine questions of fact such as the existence of a river
even inside titled properties was recognized in the cases of ovin, v. oreno, (9 SCRA
557) and T,eon vs. $ecret,r of Pu-ic Works ,nd ommunic,tions (20 SCRA 69). We
stated that the fact-finding power of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications
is merely "incidental to his duty to clear all navigable streams of unauthorized
constructions and, hence its grant did not constitute an unlawful delegation of judicial
power. ... that although the titles were silent as to the existence of any stream inside the
property, that did not confer a right to the stream, it being of a public nature and not
subject to private appropriation, even by prescription." n the instant cases, the residents
along the Tulao River complained about obstructions on the river. From a width of 70 to
105 meters, the river had been reduced to a width of only 10 to 15 meters. The river
was navigable and even at low-tide was two to three meters deep.
As regards the lower court's finding that the dikes designated as Encroachments Nos. 1
and 2 were constructed under the petitioners' Fishpond Permit issued by the Bureau of
Fisheries in 1948 and, therefore, must be respected, the Secretary counters that such
issuance of fishpond permit did not preclude him from conducting due investigation
pursuant to his authority under Republic Act 2056.
We agree.
Section 1 of Republic Act 2056 is explicit in that An provision or provisions of l,w to
the contr,r notwithst,nding, the construction or building of dams, dikes ... which
encroaches into any public navigable river, stream, coastal waters and any other
navigable public waters or waterways ... shall be ordered removed as public nuisance or
as prohibited construction as herein provided ... The record shows that the petitioners'
fishpond permit was issued in 1948 while the Act took effect on June 3, 1958.
Therefore, the Secretary's more specific authority to remove dikes constructed in
fishponds whenever they obstruct or impede the free passage of any navigable river or
stream or would cause inundation of agricultural areas (Section 2, Republic Act 2056)
takes precedence. Moreover, the power of the Secretary of Public Works to investigate
and clear public streams from unauthorized encroachments and obstructions was
granted as early as Act 3708 of the old Philippine Legislature and has been upheld by
this Court in the cases of P,,nc, v. ommonwe,th (69 Phil. 449) and eneses v.
ommonwe,th (69 Phil. 647). The same rule was applied in Lovina v. Moreno, (supr,)
Santos etc., et al. v. Secretary of Public Works and Communications (19 SCRA 637).
All in all, we find no grave abuse of discretion or an illegal exercise of authority on the
part of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications in ordering the removal of
the encroachments designated as Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of Exhibit "A".
The rules of due process were observed in the conduct of investigation in the two
cases. The parties concerned were all notified and hearings of the two cases were
conducted by the Secretary through the City Engineer of Dagupan City. All parties were
given opportunity to present evidence to prove their claims after which the Secretary
rendered separate decisions pursuant to Republic Act 2056.
The factual findings of the Secretary are substantiated by evidence in the administrative
records. n the absence of any illegality, error of law, fraud or imposition, none of which
were proved by the petitioners in the instant case, said findings should be respected.
(Lovina v. Moreno, supra; Santos, etc., et al. v. Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, supra; See also Borja v. Moreno, 11 SCRA 568; Taleon v. Secretary
of Public Works and Communications, 20 SCRA 69).
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The questioned decision of the Court
of First nstance of Pangasinan is REVERSED and SET ASDE. The decisions of the
then Secretary of Public Works and Communications in Cases No. RA 2056-26 and No.
RA-2056-37 are RENSTATED.
SO ORDERED.


C8 no L26334
AN1CNIC I VILLLGAS |n h|s capac|ty as Mayor of the C|ty of Man||a CA1S IAMLS 8Ak8LkS
AN1CNIC AkALLIAS and ILLICISIMC LA2AkC |n the|r respect|ve capac|ty as rec|nct or Stat|on
Commanders of the Man||a o||ce Department peLlLlonersappellees
vs
A8LLAkDC SU8IDC |n h|s capac|ty as Comm|ss|oner of C|v|| Serv|ce respondenLappellanL

komeo l koboyoo fot petltlooetoppellees
Asslstoot 5ollcltot Ceoetol loclflco l Je costto 5ollcltot kosollo A Je leoo ooJ 5peclol Attotoey
koymooJo k vlllooes fot tespooJeotoppelloot

Iernando



1he ower of respondenL Commlssloner of Clvll Servlce Lo dlrecL Lhe Mayor of Lhe ClLy of Manlla
peLlLloner AnLonlo ! vlllegas Lo replace Lhe oLher peLlLloners !ames 8arbers AnLonlo arale[as and
lellclslmo Lazaro as sLaLlon commanders of Lhe Lhree Manlla pollce preclncLs ls challenged ln Lhls
prohlblLlon proceedlng flled wlLh Lhe Manlla CourL of llrsL lnsLance 1here ls no dlspuLe LhaL peLlLloner
as Mayor by vlrLue of Lhe sLaLuLory granL of auLhorlLy of lmmedlaLe conLrol over Lhe execuLlve
funcLlons of Lhe dlfferenL deparLmenLs1could plck Lhe pollce offlclals Lo be enLrusLed wlLh such
responslblllLy 1he cholce fell on Lhe Lhree oLher peLlLloners Lhen pollce capLalns 8espondenL
Commlssloner would dlspuLe Lhelr deslgnaLlon as such on Lhe ground of lack for each of Lhem of an
lnspecLor llrsL Class (ollce ueLecLlve Ma[or) ellglblllLy eLlLloners prevalled Lhe lower courL belng
unable Lo locaLe any legal provlslon Lo warranL such an exerclse of power on Lhe parL of respondenL
Commlssloner 1he case ls before us now on appeal lor reasons Lo be more expllclLly and fully seL forLh
we afflrm

1he peLlLlon for prohlblLlon wlLh prellmlnary ln[uncLlon belng soughL was flled ln Lhe CourL of llrsL
lnsLance of Manlla on !uly 17 1963 AfLer Lhe allegaLlon as Lo parLles lL was seL forLh Lhereln LhaL ln an
endorsemenL of !une 30 1963 respondenL Commlssloner dlrecLed LhaL peLlLloners 8arbers arale[as
and Lazaro be replaced as sLaLlon commanders of Lhe Lhree pollce preclncLs of Manlla as Lhelr conLlnued
employmenL as such was lllegal Lhe ellglblllLy requlred belng LhaL of an lnspecLor flrsL class allegedly
noL possessed by Lhem2 1he peLlLloner Mayor replled on !uly 2 1963 asserLlng LhaL he felL obllged Lo
dlsregard sald dlrecLlve lL belng ln excess of Lhe auLhorlLy vesLed ln Lhe Clvll Servlce Commlsslon As
noLed ln such communlcaLlon 1hls Cfflce ls noL aware of any provlslon of law requlrlng LhaL reclncL or
SLaLlon Commanders should be aL leasL a ollce or ueLecLlve Ma[or or an lnspecLor llrsL Class aragraph
4 SecLlon 23 of 8epubllc AcL no 2260 oLherwlse known as Lhe Clvll Servlce AcL of 1939 whlch LhaL
Commlsslon has lnvoked conLemplaLes poslLlons ln Lhe compeLlLlve or classlfled servlce as provlded for
ln an approprlaLlon or budgeL measure Lo whlch an appolnLmenL as Lhe Lerm appolnLmenL ls used ln
SecLlon 24 of Lhe Clvll Servlce AcL of 1939 ls requlred Cbvlously Lhls provlslon of law cannoL cover
mere deslgnaLlons or asslgnmenLs Lo an area of command 1hus reclncL or SLaLlon Commanders ln Lhe
Manlla ollce ueparLmenL are so deslgnaLed for organlzaLlonal purposes ln order Lo dellneaLe Lhelr
speclflc area of command and effecL greaLer efflclency ln Lhe admlnlsLraLlon of pollce affalrs3

8espondenL Commlssloner of Clvll Servlce was however adamanL relLeraLlng on !uly 9 1963 hls
dlrecLlve for Lhe replacemenL of Lhe oLher peLlLloners as sLaLlon commanders4 1hen came Lhe
allegaLlon why ln Lhls parLlcular case respondenL Commlssloner of Clvll Servlce acLed wlLhouL or ln
excess of [urlsdlcLlon or aL Lhe very leasL wlLh grave abuse of dlscreLlon As polnLed ouL ln Lhe peLlLlon
Lhe asslgnmenL or deLall ln Lhls case of Lhe oLher peLlLloners as preclncL or sLaLlon commanders dld noL
consLlLuLe appolnLmenL Lo poslLlons ln Lhe compeLlLlve or classlfled servlce LhaL such deslgnaLlon or
deLall was excluslvely wlLhln Lhe power and [urlsdlcLlon of peLlLloner Mayor under hls speclflc power of
dlrecLlon supervlslon and conLrol vesLed ln hlm by Lhe CharLer and ln vlew of hls responslblllLy as Lhe
chlef execuLlve of Lhe ClLy Lo malnLaln peace and order Lhereln LhaL Lhere ls no law or clvll servlce
regulaLlon whlch requlres any speclflc clvll servlce ellglblllLy for a preclncL or sLaLlon commander and
LhaL on Lhe assumpLlon LhaL respondenL Commlssloner could deLermlne Lhe approprlaLe ellglblllLy Lhe
examlnaLlon for pollce lnspecLors lnvoked by hlm were suspended by order of Lhe resldenL of Lhe
hlllpplnes of March 23 1964 lnsofar as Lhe ClLy of Manlla was concerned3 1here were oLher
allegaLlons Lo show lack or excess of [urlsdlcLlon as well as grave abuse of dlscreLlon buL enough has
been sald Lo render clear why for peLlLloners Lhe dlrecLlve ln quesLlon was beyond Lhe power of
respondenL Commlssloner Lo lssue

ln Lhe answer by respondenL Commlssloner flled on !uly 29 1963 Lhe facLs as seL forLh were admlLLed
buL Lhere was an expllclL denlal of Lhe grounds relled upon Lo show lack or excess of [urlsdlcLlon or hls
acLlng wlLh grave abuse of dlscreLlon6 1he sLress ln Lhe afflrmaLlve and speclal defenses seL forLh was
LhaL Lhe asslgnmenL of peLlLloners 8arbers arale[as and Lazaro was noL allowable under Lhe Clvll
Servlce AcL ln vlew of Lhe facL LhaL Lhere were as of LhaL Llme ellglbles Lo Lhe poslLlon of lnspecLor flrsL
class who could be so deslgnaLed 8ellance was also had as on Lhe orlglnal dlrecLlve of respondenL
Commlssloner of such deslgnaLlon of peLlLloners as noL belng ln conformlLy wlLh Lhe recommendaLlon
of Lhe uS Agency for lnLernaLlonal uevelopmenL Lo asslgn and shlfL Manlla ollce ueparLmenL
personnel Lo poslLlons Lo whlch Lhey have quallfled ln approprlaLe examlnaLlons7

1he declslon now on appeal promulgaLed on !uly 14 1966 noLed LhaL respondenL Commlssloner dld
noL dlspuLe Lhe clvll servlce ellglblllLles and Lralnlng of peLlLloners 8arbers arale[as and Lazaro
8eference was made Lo Lhe openlng paragraph of Lhe peLlLlon whereln Lhe followlng appeared
eLlLloner CapL 8arbers passed hls llrsL Crade Clvll Servlce (supervlsor) romoLlonal LxamlnaLlon Laken
on March 31 1962 wlLh a hlgh mark of 801 per cenL he ls also a law graduaLe (1964) and graduaLed as
a full scholar he compleLed Lhe 8aslc Course for aLrolman aL Lhe Mu Lralnlng school (1943) Lhe
Advanced Course (1946) Lhe ueLecLlve Course (1946) as class LopnoLcher wlLh an average of 963 per
cenL and Lhe Senlor ollce 8efresher Course (1962) aL Lhe hlllpplne Army School Command lL
8onlfaclo and he also Lralned aL Lhe lnLernaLlonal ollce Academy ln WashlngLon uC Lhe new ?ork
ClLy ollce Academy Lhe lnkerLon ueLecLlve Agency ln new ?ork Lhe uade CounLy ollce ueparLmenL
ln Mlaml llorlda Lhe uS MlllLary ollce School aL lorL Cordon Ceorgla and Lhe Mlchlgan SLaLe
unlverslLy CommunlcaLlons Semlnar eLlLloner CapL arale[as passed Lhe clvll servlce examlnaLlon for
pollce lleuLenanL ln 1943 wlLh a raLlng of 7790 per cenL he ls a commerce graduaLe (1939) 2nd year
law lLu he compleLed Lhe supervlsors 2nd lnServlce 1ralnlng ln Lhe ClLy of Manlla (medallsL) and Lhe
Senlor ollce 8efresher Course (1962) aL Lhe hlllpplne School Command lL 8onlfaclo eLlLloner CapL
Lazaro passed Lhe Crlmlnal lnvesLlgaLlon ln SecreL Servlce examlnaLlon (penslonado) glven by Lhe Clvll
Servlce Commlsslon ln 1947 wlLh an average of 8362 he compleLed Lhe supervlsors 2nd lnServlce
1ralnlng ln Lhe ClLy of Manlla and Lhe Senlor ollce 8efresher Course (1962) aL Lhe hlllpplne Army
School Command lL 8onlfaclo graduaLlng as Lhlrd honor flrsL grade ellglble under 8ep AcL 1080 belng
a member of Lhe hlllpplne 8ar8

1he declslon Lhen noLed LhaL whlle respondenL Commlssloner had ruled LhaL Lhe approprlaLe ellglblllLy
for Lhe poslLlon of preclncL commander ls LhaL of pollce lnspecLor flrsL class (pollce ma[or) no valld
reason has been advanced Lo show LhaL such ellglblllLy ls approprlaLe and LhaL of pollce capLaln ls noL9
lL was llkewlse made clear ln Lhe declslon LhaL Lhere was no law prescrlblng LhaL preclncL commanders
be pollce ma[ors Lven on Lhe assumpLlon Lhen LhaL Lhe correcLlve measures could be supplled by
respondenL Commlssloner lf unsaLlsfacLory slLuaLlons are found sLlll Lhe approprlaLe concluslon
accordlng Lo Lhe lower courL conslderlng Lhe clvll servlce ellglblllLles and Lralnlng of peLlLloners
capLalns Lhe fallure of respondenL Commlssloner Lo show unsaLlsfacLory slLuaLlons ln Lhe asslgnmenL or
deslgnaLlon of peLlLlonerscapLalns as preclncL commanders and Lhe reasons sLaLed ln Lhe peLlLlon ls
LhaL respondenL Commlssloner has acLed wlLhouL or ln excess of [urlsdlcLlon and wlLh grave abuse of
dlscreLlon ln lssulng and Lrylng Lo enforce Lhe dlrecLlve ln quesLlon10

WhaL cannoL be denled as sLressed ln such declslon ls Lhe absence of any law whlch prescrlbes LhaL
preclncL commanders be pollce ma[ors resulLlng necessarlly ln Lhe dlrecLlve of respondenL
Commlssloner of Clvll Servlce belng declared null and vold Lhe wrlL of prohlblLlon Lhus belng Lhe
approprlaLe remedy wlLh an ln[uncLlon perpeLually resLralnlng hlm from Lhe commlsslon of Lhe acLs
complalned of

1he quesLlon Lo repeaL ls one of power WhaL ls clear ls LhaL lL ls peLlLloner ClLy Mayor LhaL could so
deslgnaLe Lhe oLher peLlLloners Lo assume Lhe poslLlon of sLaLlon commanders 1haL power ls hls and
hls alone Pe ls noL requlred by law Lo share lL wlLh respondenL Commlssloner who musL [usLlfy by Lhe
valld confermenL of auLhorlLy Lhe acLlon Laken by hlm ln requlrlng LhaL Lhe ClLy Mayor replace Lhe oLher
peLlLloners ower ls noL Lo be presumed lL musL be shown 8espondenL Commlssloner falled Lo do so
lL was noL surprlslng Lherefore LhaL Lhe lower courL ruled agalnsL hlm As seL forLh aL Lhe ouLseL we
susLaln Lhe lower courL and afflrm Lhe [udgmenL appealed from

1 1he power of peLlLloner ClLy Mayor as Lo who could be deslgnaLed as sLaLlon commanders of Lhe
Lhree Manlla pollce preclncLs ls conceded no dlspuLe as Lo hls auLhorlLy Lo do so exlsLs 1he CharLer ls
clear 1he narrow quesLlon Lherefore ls wheLher such deslgnaLlon could be frusLraLed by Lhe dlrecLlve
of Lhe respondenL Commlssloner lor Lhls offlclal Lo be [usLlfled ln lnLerposlng a negaLlve he musL show
LhaL an appllcable law auLhorlzes hlm Lo do so

lL ls wellseLLled LhaL respondenL Commlssloner aL Lhe mosL may lnqulre only as Lo Lhe ellglblllLy of Lhe
person Lhus chosen Lo flll up a vacanL poslLlon lf he were Lhen respondenL Commlssloner of Clvll
Servlce musL so aLLesL 1haL funcLlon belng dlscharged hls parLlclpaLlon ceases So we have held ln Lhe
leadlng case of vlllanueva v 8alallo11 Lhe oplnlon belng penned by Lhe presenL Chlef !usLlce 1hus
When Lhe appolnLee ls quallfled as peLlLloner hereln admlLLedly ls Lhen Lhe Commlssloner of Clvll
Servlce has no cholce buL Lo aLLesL Lo Lhe appolnLmenL lL has been repeaLedly held LhaL an appolnLmenL
becomes compleLe upon Lhe performance of Lhe lasL acL requlred by law of Lhe appolnLlng power 1he
aLLesLaLlon requlred of Lhe Commlssloner of Clvll Servlce ls merely a check Lo assure compllance wlLh
Lhe clvll servlce laws

ln Lhls parLlcular case Lhe ellglblllLy of Lhe oLher peLlLloners as pollce capLalns ls admlLLed 1haL was duly
seL forLh ln Lhe declslon now on appeal More Lhan LhaL Lhelr belng excepLlonally wellquallfled was
llkewlse duly noLed Lhereln a flndlng of facL blndlng on us as Lhls appeal ralses purely quesLlons of law
1he [usLlflcaLlon for Lhe dlrecLlve of respondenL Commlssloner ls Lhus premlsed on hls alleged power Lo
lnslsL on a speclflc ellglblllLy for each of Lhe oLher peLlLloners deslgnaLed LhaL of lnspecLor llrsL Class
(ollce or ueLecLlve Ma[or)

ln hls brlef however he can polnL Lo no express provlslon LhaL would confer on hlm such a power Pls
fallure ls undersLandable because Lhere ls none AL Lhe mosL Lhen he would rely on a readlng of Lhe
Clvll Servlce AcL from whlch mlsLakenly Lo our mlnd he would lnfer such auLhorlLy Accordlng Lo hls
brlef Sald auLhorlLy Lo flx approprlaLe ellglblllLles belng corollary Lo respondenLs excluslve [urlsdlcLlon
over Lhe approval under Lhe Clvll Servlce Law and rules of all appolnLmenLs lncludlng promoLlons Lo
poslLlons ln Lhe compeLlLlve servlce and/or belng an lmplled power Lhere ls Lherefore no need for an
express provlslon seLLlng forLh ln black and whlLe whaL ellglblllLles are approprlaLe for whaL
poslLlons12

1here ls Lhus an admlsslon from respondenL Commlssloner hlmself LhaL hls power ls necessarlly llmlLed
Pe would however consLrue such a resLrlcLed auLhorlLy expanslvely Pe would rely on an amblgulLy lL
would be a sLulLlflcaLlon of wellseLLled prlnclples of publlc law lf from Lhe vagueness of a sLaLuLe
compeLence Lo acL could be predlcaLed lf such a purpose were wlLhln Lhe conLemplaLlon of Congress
an approprlaLe form of words could have been uLlllzed 1he absence of such language negaLes lLs
exlsLence

8espondenL Commlssloner would seek supporL for such unLenable vlew by asserLlng LhaL under cerLaln
provlslons of Lhe AcL13 he ls empowered Lo lssue rules and regulaLlons as well as Lo promulgaLe
sLandards pollcles and guldellnes 1hls ls Lo rely on a frall reed 1o do so ls Lo offend agalnsL Lhe prlmacy
LhaL should be accorded a sLaLuLe as conLrasLed wlLh decrees comlng from Lhe LxecuLlve ueparLmenL
necessarlly of lower caLegory WhaL ls worse Lhe rules ln quesLlon are noL lssued by Lhe resldenL buL
by one of hls subordlnaLes Lhelr blndlng force Lhen ls noL as greaL Much less could Lhey supersede
appllcable sLaLuLes noL only ln whaL Lhey command buL also ln whaL Lhey omlL lL does noL admlL of
doubL LhaL ln Lhe hlerarchy of legal norms such rules and sLandards deflnlLely occupy an lnferlor sLaLus
lf Lhe sLaLuLe ls sllenL as Lo Lhe exlsLence of power Lhere Lhe maLLer resLs

Cnly Congress can remedy Lhe slLuaLlon lL ls noL for respondenL Commlssloner Lo do so on Lhe fllmsy
allegaLlon LhaL he possesses auLhorlLy Lo promulgaLe rules and sLandards deallng speclflcally wlLh Lhe
supervlslon Lhe preparaLlon and raLlng of all clvll servlce examlnaLlons14 Lhe maklng of lnvesLlgaLlon
and speclal reporLs upon all maLLers relaLlng Lo Lhe enforcemenL of Lhe clvll servlce law13 Lhe auLhorlLy
Lo pass upon all removal separaLlon and suspenslon of permanenL offlcers and employees ln Lhe
compeLlLlve and classlfled servlce16 and Lhe deLermlnaLlon of appeals lnsLlLuLed by any person
bellevlng hlmself Lo be aggrleved17 a power whlch does noL have Lhe remoLesL connecLlon wlLh an
exerclse by peLlLloner ClLy Mayor of a compeLence excluslvely lodged ln hlm Lo deslgnaLe Lhe oLher
peLlLloners as preclncL commanders

1hls concluslon has relnforcemenL from auLhorlLaLlve pronouncemenLs LhaL of laLe have come from us
1hus from a 1968 declslon18 lL would seem falrly obvlous Lhen LhaL Lhe law does noL lmpose a rlgld or
mechanlsLlc formula on Lhe appolnLlng power compllance wlLh whlch ls lnexorable and a devlaLlon
Lherefrom faLal lar from lL lf Lhere be adherence Lo Lhe concepL LhaL publlc offlce ls a publlc LrusL as
Lhere oughL Lo be Lhe crlLerlon should be whaL publlc welfare demands whaL saLlsfles publlc lnLeresL
lor lL ls axlomaLlc LhaL publlc needs could besL be aLLended Lo by offlclals abouL whose compeLency and
ablllLy Lhere ls no quesLlon 1o LhaL overmasLerlng requlremenL personal amblLlon musL of necesslLy
yleld ulscreLlon lf noL plenary aL leasL sufflclenL should Lhus be granLed Lo Lhose enLrusLed wlLh Lhe
responslblllLy of admlnlsLerlng Lhe offlcers concerned prlmarlly Lhe deparLmenL heads 1hey are ln Lhe
mosL favorable poslLlon Lo deLermlne who can besL fulflll Lhe funcLlons of Lhe offlce Lhus vacaLed
unless Lherefore Lhe law speaks ln Lhe mosL mandaLory and perempLory Lone conslderlng all Lhe
clrcumsLances Lhere should be as Lhere has been full recognlLlon of Lhe wlde scope of such
dlscreLlonary auLhorlLy Papplly Lhere ls noLhlng ln Lhe Clvll Servlce AcL whlch ls flLLlngly concerned wlLh
proLecLlng Lhe rlghLs of Lhose ln Lhe career servlce LhaL rlghLly consLrued calls for a dlfferenL
concluslon lL ls well worLh repeaLlng LhaL Lhe broad auLhorlLy of a deparLmenL head appears
lndlspuLable Such ls Lhe pollcy of Lhe law a pollcy reflecLed wlLh fldellLy ln Lhe declslons of Lhls CourL

Also from lneda v Claudlo19 declded even more recenLly Lhe oplnlon comlng from !usLlce CasLro
lor lL ls noL enough LhaL an asplranL ls quallfled and ellglble or LhaL he ls nexL ln rank or llne for
promoLlon albelL by passlve prescrlpLlon lL ls [usL as necessary ln order for publlc admlnlsLraLlon Lo be
dynamlc and responslve Lo Lhe needs of Lhe Llmes LhaL Lhe local execuLlve be allowed Lhe cholce of men
of hls confldence provlded Lhey are quallfled and ellglble who ln hls besL esLlmaLlon are possessed of
Lhe requlslLe repuLaLlon lnLegrlLy knowledgeablllLy energy and [udgmenL AfLer all lL ls Lhe local
execuLlve more Lhan anyone else who ls prlmarlly responslble for efflclenL governmenLal
admlnlsLraLlon ln Lhe locallLy and Lhe effecLlve malnLenance of peace and order Lhereln and ls dlrecLly
answerable Lo Lhe people who elecLed hlm nowhere ls Lhls more Lrue Lhan ln Lhe senslLlve area of
pollce admlnlsLraLlon

Whlle Lhe Lwo above cases are noL squarely ln polnL sLlll Lhe prlnclple Lhereln announced as Lo Lhe
respecL Lo be accorded Lo Lhe exerclse of Lhe auLhorlLy Lo appolnL by Lhe offlclal enLrusLed by law Lo do
so and Lhe mlnlmum lnLerference allowed Lhe Commlssloner of Clvll Servlce under hls power Lo lnqulre
lnLo Lhe ellglblllLy of Lhe appolnLee lends furLher supporL Lo Lhe concluslon arrlved aL lL would appear
clear Lherefore LhaL respondenL Commlssloner does noL possess any sLaLuLory auLhorlLy Lo lnLerfere
wlLh Lhe power of peLlLloner ClLy Mayor Lo make Lhe deslgnaLlon of Lhe oLher peLlLloners

2 8espondenL Commlssloner ln hls answer Lo Lhe peLlLlon assalllng hls dlrecLlve would lend plauslblllLy
Lo hls clalm LhaL he was legally empowered Lo do so by Lhls argumenL lurLhermore sald asslgnmenLs
are noL ln conformlLy wlLh Lhe recommendaLlon of Lhe uS Agency for lnLernaLlonal uevelopmenL Lo
asslgn and shlfL Mu personnel Lo poslLlons Lo whlch Lhey have quallfled ln approprlaLe
examlnaLlons20 1o sLaLe such a conLenLlon ls Lo re[ecL lL As a foundaLlon for Lhe challenged dlrecLlve lL
ls Lo puL lL mlldly far from sLable As an asserLed basls Lo [usLlfy whaL respondenL dld lL ls far from
persuaslve 1o puL lL blunLly as a source of power lLs value ls nll lL would noL be easy Lo lmaglne a plea
more offenslve Lo our soverelgnLy and derogaLory Lo our dlgnlLy as an lndependenL naLlon ln8A8

All governmenLal powers are lodged ln offlclals of our governmenL boLh naLlonal and local An allen
agency aL Lhe mosL may be permlLLed Lo serve ln an advlsory capaclLy lL can suggesL buL lL cannoL
command lLs wlshes do noL consLlLuLe law Cur offlclals Lherefore are noL bound Lo obey lf lL were
oLherwlse Lhen a posLure of subservlency and mendlcancy would be sancLloned 1haL Lhls CourL cannoL
allow21

3 ln Lhe answer of respondenL Commlssloner Lhere was an lmpllcaLlon LhaL hls dlrecLlve flnds supporL
ln Lhe consLlLuLlonal provlslon on Lhe Clvll Servlce More speclflcally he dld polnL Lo Lhe requlremenL
LhaL appolnLmenLs ln Lhe clvll servlce shall be made only accordlng Lo merlL and flLness Lo be
deLermlned as far as pracLlcable by compeLlLlve examlnaLlon22 ApparenLly he had a change of mlnd
subsequenLly as Lo such consLlLuLlonal prop for hls brlef was consplcuously sllenL ln LhaL respecL 1haL
sober second LhoughL had much Lo recommend lL no such supporL ls ylelded by Lhe above
consLlLuLlonal provlslon Lo hls asserLlon of auLhorlLy Zaa?4LlC

1he ConsLlLuLlon on Lhe clvll servlce has only four brlef secLlons Lwo of whlch prohlblLlng parLlsan
pollLlcal acLlvlLles and addlLlonal or double compensaLlon have clearly no relevance23 1he fourLh
secLlon guaranLees securlLy of Lenure agaln wlLhouL any bearlng on Lhe presenL llLlgaLlon24 lL ls only
Lhe flrsL secLlon Lhen referred Lo above LhaL may concelvably Louch upon Lhe lssue lnvolved alLhough
ln a raLher remoLe way lor lL ls more Lhe expresslon of an ldeal Lhan a source of auLhorlLy noLe LhaL ln
sLresslng merlL and flLness lL recognlzed LhaL lL should be deLermlned as far as pracLlcable by
compeLlLlve examlnaLlon

1here was no creaLlon of a Clvll Servlce Commlsslon no such offlclal as a Clvll Servlce Commlssloner was
provlded for 8espondenLs poslLlon ls a sLaLuLory creaLlon Lhe exLenL of hls powers belng Lhus llmlLed
and clrcumscrlbed lL would Lhus be fuLlle on hls parL Lo Lrace Lhe exlsLence of an alleged auLhorlLy Lo
Lhe ConsLlLuLlon

As a maLLer of facL lf Lhere are consLlLuLlonal overLones Lo Lhls llLlgaLlon peLlLloners noL Lhe
respondenLs are Lhe beneflclarles As Lhey dld correcLly polnL ouL noL even Lhe resldenL ls vesLed wlLh
Lhe power of conLrol over local offlclals Pe exerclses only general supervlslon as may be provlded
by law 23 8espondenL Clvll Servlce Commlssloner cannoL be deemed Lhen Lo be possessed of a
greaLer prerogaLlve belng hlmself an offlclal of a lower caLegory ln Lhe execuLlve branch Moreover
whaL Lhe ConsLlLuLlon en[olns on Lhe resldenL as well as all Lhose enLrusLed wlLh execuLlve funcLlons ls
Lo Lake care LhaL Lhe laws be falLhfully execuLed26 CerLalnly lL ls a manlfesLaLlon of less Lhan fealLy Lo
such a duLy lf an execuLlve offlclal llke respondenL would enforce a sLaLuLory provlslon noL as wrlLLen buL
as expanded and enlarged by hlm Lhrough a process of sLralned consLrucLlon

4 Cne lasL word noLhlng ls beLLer seLLled ln Lhe law Lhan LhaL a publlc offlclal exerclses power noL
rlghLs 1he governmenL lLself ls merely an agency Lhrough whlch Lhe wlll of Lhe sLaLe ls expressed and
enforced lLs offlcers Lherefore are llkewlse agenLs enLrusLed wlLh Lhe responslblllLy of dlscharglng lLs
funcLlons As such Lhere ls no presumpLlon LhaL Lhey are empowered Lo acL 1here musL be a delegaLlon
of such auLhorlLy elLher express or lmplled ln Lhe absence of a valld granL Lhey are devold of power
WhaL Lhey do suffers from a faLal lnflrmlLy 1haL prlnclple cannoL be sufflclenLly sLressed ln Lhe
approprlaLe language of Chlef !usLlce Pughes lL musL be conceded LhaL deparLmenLal zeal may noL be
permlLLed Lo ouLrun Lhe auLhorlLy conferred by sLaLuLe27 nelLher Lhe hlgh dlgnlLy of Lhe offlce nor Lhe
rlghLeousness of Lhe moLlve Lhen ls an accepLable subsLlLuLe CLherwlse Lhe rule of law becomes a myLh
Such an evenLuallLy we musL Lake all palns Lo avold

WPL8LlC8L Lhe declslon of Lhe CourL of llrsL lnsLance of !uly 14 1966 ls afflrmed WlLhouL
pronouncemenL as Lo cosLs