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6.7
[1] Fink, E. C., Gates, S.,& Humes B. D.(1998) GAME THEORY TOPICS,
SageUniversityPapersSeriesonQuantitative Applications intheSocial
Sciences,07122.ThousandOaks,CA:Sage.
[2] Robert J. Aumann and Sergiu Hart (1992). Handbook of Game Theory.
NorthHolland.
[3] Arnold,Statisticalpatternrecognition,(1999),ISBN0340741643.
[4] Berger,JamesO,StatisticalDecisionTheoryandBayesianAnalysis
[5] http:://www.econ.rochester.edu/eco108
[6] http://wwwcourse.fas.harvard.edu
[7] http://gamethory.net
[8] http://GameTheoryinGreek.htm
[9] http://verenike.ergasya.tuc.gr/~sakis/GameTheory.html
[10] http://williamking.www.drexel.edu/top/class/histf.html
[11]
http://www.dmst.aueb.gr/gr/Courses/4sem/19_math_prog/PPTS/THEORI
A_PAIGNION.doc
[12] http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/gameheory/#PD
[13] http://www.pitt.edu/~jduffy/econ1200/Lectures.htm
[14] http://www.bsos.umd.edu/econ/econ414/new_page_2.htm
[15] http://icg.fas.harvard.edu/~ec1052/lecture/index.html
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