INDIA – US

Bilateral Relationship

The frequency of high-level visits and exchanges between India and the U.S. has gone up
significantly of late.

External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj’s visit to USA (September 2015)

• The visit was part of the UNGA meet.

• She also participated in the meetings with the Foreign Ministers of the G4, IBSA,
BRICS, Commonwealth and SAARC.

• She met with her US counterpart. It signaled the first political level engagement
between the Obama administration and the Modi government, and was significant
given the strain in India-U.S. ties in the past few months.

PM Modi’s visit to US (September 2014)

• He held meetings with President Obama, members of the U.S. Congress and political
leaders, including from various States and cities in the U.S., and interacted with
members of President Obama's Cabinet.

• He also reached out to the captains of the U.S. commerce and industry, the American
civil society and think-tanks, and the Indian American community.

• The two countries reached an agreement on a MoU between the Export-Import Bank
and an energy agency, which provides up to $1 billion to help India develop low-carbon
energy alternatives and aid US renewable energy exports to India.

US SoS John Kerry’s visit to India (January 2015)

• His visit was aimed at laying the groundwork for Obama’s India visit.

• He also attended the Vibrant Gujarat Summit among other major dignitaries.

US President Obama’s visit to India (January 2015)

• He was the Chief Guest at India's Republic Day, the first US President to have been so.
 • During the visit, the two sides issued a Delhi Declaration of Friendship and adopted a
Joint Strategic Vision for Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean Region. This specifically
addressed maritime territorial disputes involving China and, among other things,
affirmed the importance of safeguarding maritime security and ensuring freedom of
navigation and freedom of the air throughout the region, especially in the South China
Sea.

• Both sides elevated the Strategic Dialogue between their Foreign Ministers to Strategic
and Commercial Dialogue of Foreign and Commerce Ministers.

• The two leaders also announced a breakthrough on nuclear-related issues that could
help implement the US-India civil nuclear deal.

• US President Obama also heralded the relationship between the two largest
democracies saying that “America can be India’s best partner.”

• The announcement of four "pathfinder” projects under the DTTI rubric involving
relatively minor technologies was made.

US Secretary of Defence Ashton Carter’s visit to India (June 2015)

• He and Manohar Parrikar signed the documents to renew the ten-year US India Defence
Framework Agreement.

PM Modi’s visit to US (September 2015)

• He held a bilateral meeting with President Obama, interacted with leaders of business,
media, academia, the provincial leaders and the Indian community, including during
his travel to the Silicon Valley.

• During the visit, the top executives of tech giants pledged support for Digital India
initiative.

• PM Modi also declared that India, US have responsibility to shape Asia Pacific’s future,
and that the dynamic Asia Pacific region will shape the course of this century.

• The two countries also call for reform to the UNSC.

External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj’s visit to USA (September 2015)

• She attended the UNGA meet.

• On the sidelines, she also attended the inaugural US-India-Japan trilateral ministerial
dialogue. Together, these three countries represent a quarter of the world's population
 and economic production power. Some of the issues that were discussed were
maritime security, freedom of navigation and overflight.

• The inaugural US-India Strategic and Commercial Dialogue also took place.

PM Modi’s visit to USA (March-April 2016)

• The visit was for the purpose of attending the Nuclear Security Summit.

• In the summit, PM Modi announced several key initiatives taken by his government in
the area of nuclear security and non-proliferation, including countering nuclear
smuggling and deployment of technology to deter nuclear terrorism.

• He announced India’s support to IAEA’s central role in nuclear security by a further

contribution of USD1 million to the nuclear security fund.

• Finally, it was also announced that India will host a meeting of Global Initiative to
Combat Nuclear Terrorism in 2017.

• Modi also sought the NSG membership for India.

PM Modi’s visit to USA (June 2016)

• This visit was termed as a “consolidation” by the Foreign Secretary of India.

• The joint statement issued during the visit, spoke of the two countries pledging to
“provide global leadership on issues of shared interest”.

• At the U.S-India Business Council, PM stressed on the “reform to transform” message,

to do away with the apprehensions about the pace of reform of the Indian economy
and the lack of ease of doing business. His message to his American audience also was
that developed countries must open their economies not only to goods but also
services from developing economies like India.

• One of the major announcement was that the U.S. recognised India as a “major
defence partner”.

• PM Modi also proceeded to observe that “India had moved beyond the hesitations of
history” suggesting that India has firmly put its Cold War compacts behind it.
According to M.K. NARAYANAN, the two largest democracies in the world thus
appeared finally to be on the same page.

• The PM also addressed the two houses of the US Congress upon invitation by the
Speaker. It was not only an opportunity to engage with a political body that has been
supportive of India’s strategic aspirations, but also to ensure continued bipartisan
consensus on India when a new administration takes office.
Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar’s visit to US (August 2016)

• This resulted in the signing of the Logistics Exchange Memorandum Agreement (LEMOA)
that will give the militaries of both countries access to each other’s facilities for
supplies and repairs.

• The US Secretary of Defence Ashton Carter welcomed India’s membership of the

Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and reaffirmed the U.S. support for India’s
membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).

• They also discussed cooperation on capabilities to augment India’s capacity for

maritime domain awareness

• He also said that the designation of major defence partner allows defence trade and
technology-sharing of a higher grade. The designation also supported the two
"important handshakes" between the two nations, he noted.

o The first handshake is strategic, as the U.S. rebalances to the Asia-Pacific, and
India extends its reach towards east, in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region.

o The second handshake, is technological and is demonstrated in the Defence

Technology and Trade Initiative.

According to him, these two handshakes have brought our two militaries closer
together.

2nd Indo-US Strategic and Commercial Dialogue (September 2016)

• The Dialogue was elevated into a Strategic and Commercial Dialogue (S&CD) during the
visit of US President Barack Obama to India in January 2015.

• The first S&CD was held on September 22, 2015 in the US.

• The two-way trade between the countries stood at about USD 109 billion last year

DEFENCE COOPERATION
Defence ties have been a pillar of the two countries’ burgeoning relationship, and have been
consolidated in three ways:
 1. Defence procurement from the U.S. as well as co-development projects, which are
worth over $14 billion;

2. In coordination, cooperation and sharing of information between the two defence

forces; and

3. Increasingly, on the idea of working together on operations on piracy, peacekeeping

and patrolling.

It was in 2005 that India and the U.S. signed their first Defence Cooperation Agreement. This
agreement was renewed and expanded in 2010 and 2015, leading to a loosening of strict
controls that existed regarding the transfer of excluded categories of technologies.

This engagement is growing in complexity and sophistication. Issues of co-development and

co-production of military equipment have also gathered some momentum, but have seen only
modest progress over the past two years.

But now, the recognition of India as a Major Defence Partner (or, a “major partner of equal
status”) of the U.S., a designation specially created to describe this new relationship and one
that is just short of a military alliance, becomes a clarion call for deeper and more
substantive defence ties, especially given the understanding that India will receive license-
free access to a wide range of dual-use technologies for defence production. This signals an
even more dynamic phase in defence cooperation and indicates the long road covered in
taking defence ties forward in the last few years. The tying in of the co-production and co-
development of technologies covering naval, air and weapons systems under the Defence
Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI) with the Make in India mission is another positive
development.

LEMOA
Around 2007-2008, the U.S. made initial moves to get India to sign three foundational
agreements viz., the Logistics Support Agreement (LSA); the Communications Interoperability
and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA); and the Basic Exchange and Cooperation
Agreement (BECA) for Geo-spatial Cooperation. While India welcomed the idea of relaxation
of technology norms, it resisted signing the foundational agreements on the ground that it
undermined India’s strategic autonomy.

What is the agreement and what are its implications?

The Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement is the agreement that the U.S. has
assiduously pursued since 2002 and which India had, till now, resolutely refused to endorse.
The Defense Ministers from both the nations have consequently gone to great lengths to
explain that LEMOA does not amount to a military pact.

According to ASHOK K. MEHTA, it is much more than just an agreement, it is a strategic

binding between India and US.
LEMOA only facilitates establishing “mutual basing facilities”. This would be on a case-by-case
basis, intended to help speed up humanitarian relief operations as also emergency evacuation
from conflict-prone regions. In certain circumstances, it could also help smoothen operational
logistics between the navies of the two countries. It does not mention setting up of
“permanent bases” in either country.

Since India does more joint exercises with US more than any other country, this agreement
will also help in reducing the paper-works for even the smallest such exercises.

It enables the Indian navy and air force specially, should the need arise, to tap into the
logistic train of the US wherever it is available, and vice versa. Some scholars believe that
since US is such an overwhelming militarily superior power, that it is currently in India’s
advantage as it increases its sustainability. But there is also a geopolitical subtext. How India
uses it is a political decision but now there is an enabling framework.

In this direction, the creation of the India Rapid Reaction Cell in the Pentagon, the first
country-specific cell of its kind, for simplifying defense collaboration, is another small but
significant step toward overcoming bureaucratic bottlenecks.

However, strategic experts, especially those in the West, are of the view that the LEMOA is a
critical link in the U.S.’s plans for a larger pivot towards Asia. Also, that it is intended to meet
the threat from an increasingly assertive China.

Moreover, M.K. NARAYANAN believes that with LEMOA in place, it is almost certain that
pressures would intensify to sign the other two foundational agreements — CISMOA and BECA,
and if India were to sign them, it could convey an impression that India had gone from
becoming a “major defence partner” to a significant “non-NATO ally”.

STRATEGIC RELATIONS
-Views of KANWAL SIBBAL:

India-U.S. ties have been transformed in recent years, best exemplified with the newly
declared global strategic partnership between the two countries.

The India-U.S. relationship is being increasingly consolidated. However, like in any such
relationship — especially between the world’s foremost political, military, economic and
technological power and a large developing country advanced in certain sectors of the
knowledge economy, but beset with serious problems of poverty as well as at unequal stages
of development internally — differences are normal.

Much work lies ahead to make the India-U.S. relationship a "defining one” in the 21st century,
but we are headed in the right direction.
-Views of NIRUPAMA RAO:

• What sets the current India-U.S. relationship apart is its political and economic heft
and the growing geopolitical and security dimensions of the friendship.
• India under Mr. Modi has moved beyond the hesitations of history, as the Prime
Minister put it, to a state of “comfort, candour and convergence” in its
“extraordinary” partnership with the U.S.

• Both India and the U.S. have consciously set aside the estrangements and alienation of
the past, they are elaborating the concept of a regional and global commons defined
by the values of democracy, good governance, the centrality of development, the
celebration of plurality and diversity, open and inclusive security structures that
ensure the management of regional tensions, particularly in the maritime space. The
references to oceanic security (which is as they should be, considering particularly the
organic connectivity between the Bay of Bengal and the South China Sea) are bound,
no doubt, to be observed with a gimlet eye in Beijing, which has already vented its
discomfort with what we should all acknowledge is the welcome confidence and
assertion with which India is engaging partners like the U.S., Japan, Australia, Vietnam
and Singapore in the maritime sphere.

• Moreover, the bonhomie that PM Modi and President Barack Obama exude has had a
salutary impact on diplomatic ties.

-Views of M. K. NARAYANAN:

• India-U.S. relations are hardly a “zero-sum game”. Overcoming “the hesitations of

history” is one thing; not ignoring the lessons of history is equally, if not more,
important.

• The U.S. is a true practitioner of the art of “realpolitik”. Changes in policy are
constantly effected to suit its global requirements. In Europe, for example, today the
U.S. seems to be preparing to jettison its long-standing “special relationship” with the
U.K. In West Asia, as U.S.-Iran relations improve, Saudi Arabia is now the new villain on
the block.

• The geopolitical situation across the region in South Asia is more confused today than
it was only a few years back. Geopolitical alignments are changing at a bewildering
pace. As India moves closer to the U.S., Russia is seen to be coming closer to China, in
terms of South China Sea and opposing US attempts to stall a missile defence system in
Asia. Russia is also enhancing its partnership with ASEAN and currently carving out a
zone of influence for itself in Central Asia. India does not figure in any of these plans.
When the strategic balance across the entire Asian region is undergoing a seismic shift,
India cannot be seen to be playing a losing hand. The main players, today, are the
U.S., Russia and China. The current effort of countries such as China and Russia is to
restrict, if not exclude, U.S. influence from the region, labelling it as a non-Asian
power.
 • The U.S.’s role in the region is thus becoming restricted, leaving it with few
alternatives.

• Hence, India’s leaders need to reflect whether this is the opportune moment for the
country to reset its compass and move away from its long-term insistence on strategic
autonomy. It is also hardly the time to be seen to be the ally of One Power, that too
one whose power seems to be waning. It might diminish India’s image in the region
and beyond.

-Views of C RAJA MOHAN:

All major actions in the world of foreign policy, as elsewhere, have consequences; some
intended and other unintended. This would result in either a “do-nothing” strategy or the
strategy which ignores the consequences of what one does.

Modi’s challenge, therefore, is two-fold: Move decisively to take full advantage of the entente
with America; at the same time, anticipate and manage some of the inevitable consequences
of the new strategic warmth towards Washington. If external possibilities saw India wring its
hands in the past, Delhi must now broaden its diplomatic activism to reduce the potential
costs and maximize benefits.

US – RUSSIA Relations and Implications on INDIA

With the two countries repeatedly failing to reach a disagreement over the Syrian conflict,
talk about a post-Cold War partnership between the world’s two greatest military powers is
now a thing of the past. It looks like a throwback to the Cold War days with Russia and the
U.S. fighting a proxy war in Ukraine, leading two competing military operations in Syria and
raising allegations and counter-allegations on a host of issues, ranging from human rights
violations and breaking international norms to interfering in each other’s domestic politics.

The real problem is that the Cold War-era mistrust between Washington and Moscow was
never really buried.

To be sure, Russia is a shadow of what the Soviet Union was at its peak. But in an
international system largely dominated by the U.S., Russia, still an extremely consequential
military power, remains the key player whose cooperation is necessary to resolve several of
today’s crises.

In this light, it is important to remember that the U.S. had always been suspicious of India’s
relations with Russia, that go back to the period of non-alignment. And today, as U.S.-Russia
relations are at their nadir since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the U.S. can be expected to try
and further weaken India-Russia relations that are lately facing some strain. Furthermore,
given Pakistan’s location, it would be a mistake to believe that the U.S. would completely
detach itself from Pakistan.

Moreover, coincidence or not, Moscow and Beijing held high-level strategic exchanges with
Pakistan when India was about to sign the LEMOA. Moscow said the development of
constructive relations with Pakistan is an important factor in ensuring regional stability and
international security. It expressed appreciation for the sacrifices Pakistan has made in the
fight against terrorism.

India must, therefore, strive to ensure that the West does not treat Russia as a “rogue” nation
or try to isolate and weaken it through sanctions and other means, as that could only be
counterproductive. The Iran nuclear deal shows that even the most complex international
issues could be resolved if Russia and the U.S. work together with creative diplomacy. Ideally,
that should set the model for U.S.-Russia partnership.

US – CHINA Relations and Implications on INDIA

According to SRINATH RAGHAVAN, the argument that India needs such a relationship with the
US in order to deal with China is specious. Indeed, by echoing the US line on “freedom of
navigation” in the South China Sea – starting with Mr. Modi’s visit to the US in September 2014
– India has unnecessarily muddied the waters. As a response to this, China has taken unkindly
to our strategic embrace of the US in this way. Beijing’s behaviour on a range of issues from
NSG to Nepal is clearly an indication of the toughening Chinese stance towards India on things
that they would otherwise have let pass.

As per MK BHADRAKUMAR, in the light of the recent trends in Indo-US relations, Beijing has
underlined the “in-depth development of bilateral practical cooperation and sound
coordination and cooperation” between China and Pakistan in international and regional
affairs and reiterated China’s willingness to “constantly enrich the connotation of China-
Pakistan all-weather strategic and cooperative partnership”.

TRADE AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS

Despite the advances in political and defense ties, one area that has not seen expected
results after Modi’s first two years is the India-U.S. economic relationship.

There is a growing feeling among political and economic observers that bilateral economic
relationship has reached a plateau.

• There has been no significant progress on negotiations of the Tantalization Agreement.

• There is deathly silence on the Bilateral Investment Treaty – an area of priority for
American businesses, but a thorny one for the Indian government, especially on
taxation and investor state dispute settlement.
 • India also continues to remain on the US government’s intellectual property rights
watch list.

• India’s quest for APEC membership remains in the realm of vision, and there has not
been any progress on that front. And also with the TPP, India is being kept out of the
most dynamic economies in the Asia-Pacific. In short, India’s emerging partnership
with the US in the Asia-Pacific will stand on a weak economic leg.

QUESTION MARK ON INDIA’S STRATEGIC AUTONOMY

With the increasing number of agreements being signed and high level visits, questions are
being raised on India’s policy of non-alignment and strategic autonomy.

-Views of SRINATH RAGHAVAN:

New Delhi should ponder the limits of such a misshapen relationship with US. The engagement
with the US of every Indian government since 1991 has been premised on the idea of
leveraging these ties for the internal transformation of India. If the current state of bilateral
and multilateral economic relations persists, we might end up in a position where India
bolsters American strategic primacy with little to show in return.

-Views of UDAY BHASKAR (Director, Society for Policy Studies):

The non-aligned predication is no longer a postulate for India, especially since the Indo-US
nuclear agreement.

-Views of ARUN MOHAN SUKUMAR

The new symphony in India-U.S. ties does not limit New Delhi’s engagement with other world
powers or emerging economies
For its declaratory intent alone, the joint statement signed during the visit of Prime Minister
Narendra Modi to Washington D.C. sets India’s foreign policy on new and untested waters. The
claim that it “tilts” India towards the U.S., however, needs to be examined seriously.

• Even though India made concessions in climate change, but China also made similar
commitments. Rather in return for India’s commitments, the U.S. agreed to pursue
membership in the International Solar Alliance (ISA), which is an Indian initiative.

• Defence cooperation, as envisioned by the joint statement, is an area where the “tilt”
seems pronounced. However, India’s designation by the U.S. as a ‘major defence
partner’ is not by itself likely to translate into any meaningful engagement.

The India-U.S. joint statement clearly nudges New Delhi towards new climate, trade and
cyber regimes, the economic and strategic implications of which Indian negotiators should
assess. It does not, however, limit India’s engagement with the G77, China, or other emerging
economies. In fact, New Delhi should work with like-minded countries to balance U.S.
preferences in new regimes.

While optics matter in strategic cooperation, the rhetoric of the joint statement on defence
issues is unlikely to turn heads in Moscow. China will view the pronouncement with concern,
but if India-China ties have lost steam in recent months, it is on account of New Delhi’s
failure to engage consistently with the top leadership of the Communist Party.

The test of strategic autonomy will be in the Modi government’s ability to carry its relations
with other crucial players, using the limited diplomatic resources at its disposal.

-Views of M.K. BHADRAKUMAR (Former Ambassador to US)

Needless to say, it is a most awkward juncture in international politics for India to wear on its
sleeve and flaunt its growing alliance with the US, when both Russia and China are nearing
towards Pakistan. Pakistani foreign policy and diplomacy seems to be in sync with the spirit of
our times, whereas India appears to belong to a bygone era, transfixed on its ‘unipolar
predicament’.
India’s move to align itself closely with the US is bucking the contemporary trend. There is
not a single case in recent times of a country outside the NATO system is wanting to align with
the US militarily.
On the other hand, at a time when most countries are diversifying their external relations and
intensely networking, India’s foreign policy is moving in the opposite direction. It is
consciously limiting its foreign-policy options.
LEMOA was kind of a litmus test for the relations into getting India away from non-alignment
and de-couple from the obsession with strategic autonomy, and to identify with US strategic
and regional policies in a more harmonious way. So with the signing of the agreement, from
the US narrative, it believed that India has taken a leap of faith.

Moreover, the LEMOA will get noted not only in Moscow and Beijing but also many regional
capitals. It will not enhance India’s influence or prestige in its neighborhood. Rather, it has
the possibility of creating a precedent for South Asian countries to have similar framework
agreement involving China. And India cannot object to Sri Lanka or Bangladesh or Maldives
giving similar access to the Chinese Navy. In fact, it may also cause misgivings in the Iranian
mind. Therefore, it is not in India’s interests to be identifying – albeit indirectly – with the US’
interventionist policies in West Asia.
All things considered, therefore, prudent thing would have been to stick to preserving India’s
strategic autonomy.