Raffaele Torella

From an Adversary to the Main Ally
The Place of Bharthari in the Kashmirian øaiva Advaita
Raffaele Torella
GENERALLY speaking, we know very little of what happened in the atelier of Indian philosophers, owing to the total lack of personal notes left by them, not to speak of ßworkingû journals. For example, we know nothing of the inner developments which made øaïkaranandana abandon øaivism and embrace Buddhism (or viceversa), 1 or of the possible intellectual wanderings of a Maõóana Mi÷ra between Pårva and Uttara Mãmà§sà. Apparently less dramatic but at least equally puzzling was the change of attitude of the Pratyabhij¤à school towards Bharthari, which took place very quickly in the span of only one generation and caused a difference between Somànanda and Utpaladeva, the recognized founder of the Pratyabhij¤à and its systematizer, respectively, closely bound to each other by a direct guru-÷iùya relationship.2

1. 2.

On this very interesting author, see recently Krasser 2001. Somànanda's criticism of Bharthari has received the attention of several eminent scholars: Gaurinath Sastri 1959: 59-61, 68-73; Seyfort Ruegg 1959: 113-14; Gnoli 1959: 55-63; Filliozat 1992: 471-74; Dwivedi 1993.

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The significance of looking into such a change of attitude, which in a broader sense is also a paradigm change, goes far beyond the mere fact of clarifying a little mystery in the doctrinal history of one of the most important philosophical schools of traditional India. To investigate the problematic aspects of distancing oneself from one's own guru, and, lastly, to show how the choice of the opponents and allies may be the outcome of a definite plan rather than a consequence of mere liking or disliking some world-view. Such an enquiry can shed additional light not so much on some points of Bharthari's doctrine but on the way it was received by other schools, and, more generally, on his lasting and pervading influence in Indian philosophical thought, also outside the range of grammatical speculation. What first strikes us is the fact that Somànanda, after giving an outline of the main tenets of his øiva-based philosophy in the forty-nine verses of the first chapter of the øivadùñi, 3 immediately embarks on a very aggressive and detailed criticism of a few crucial points of Bharthari's philosophy, without naming him directly but referring to vaiyàkaraõas in general. Let us first summarize the contents:
The Grammarians who think of themselves as so clever Þ says Somànanda, quoting passages from the Vàkyapadãya and the vtti Þ claim that the supreme Brahman is to be identified with Pa÷yantã Vàc, but the latter at the most is identifiable with the power of Knowledge that corresponds to the plane of Sadà÷iva Þ definitely not to the highest plane. In fact, as the word itself says, Pa÷yantã ßseesû something.
3. The first chapter has been translated into English by Raniero Gnoli (1957). The same author has also translated (into Italian) the second chapter (1959).


Raffaele Torella
But what is the nature of its objects? If we say that they are externalized images that it itself has produced, we must ask ourselves whether they are real or unreal. In the first case the distinctive feature of this philosophy is lacking, namely seeing the manifestation as illusory (vivarta). On the other hand, the unreality of what it sees would have repercussions for it, rendering it asatya, which is inadmissible. If the cause of this perceiving of unreal things is nescience, it is the latter that must be established as being real or not. If it is real, then Pa÷yantã is contaminated by it. If it is not real, it is not understood how there can be a relation between a real thing and an unreal one. The same is also true of its creation. Moreover, this nescience cannot be seen as an attribute either of Pa÷yantã (for the above-mentioned reasons); or of something else, since nothing real exists apart from it. Nor is it to be considered as independent, because then it would be impossible to suppress it. Nor can avidyà be imputed only to the middle level, because in any case it is Pa÷yantã that is the cause of it. If Pa÷yantã is to be identified with the sphoña, we must ask ourselves how words, unreal as they are, can manifest it. Even the belief that pronouncing a correct word leads to heaven results in attributing, to the only reality that can be its subject, characteristics which are contrary to its nature, such as the desire for particular fruitions, etc. It is not possible to posit as the highest reality that which, because of its very nature, always remains Þ however you put it Þ an instrument of action (vàc). Not even identifying the ÷abda-tattva without beginning and end with Parà Vàc makes sense, since this means identifying the object (sound) with the instrument (voice). If, then, Pa÷yantã is said to be only a proper noun and hence, to escape all the criticism concerning the fact of seeing, etc., and that it is only the feminine ending that counts Þ which is intended to express its being the power of Knowledge Þ, the reply is that, if it has nothing to do with seeing, it is insentient and therefore cannot be the power of Knowledge either.

From an Adversary to the Main Ally


Then, the attributes that a verse 4 assigns to Pa÷yantã are criticized one by one. And so on this vein, until his final outburst:
But why on earth have you left the sphere of grammar and taken it into your head to deal with a field which is not yours, like philosophy? Þ Torella 2002: XIX-XX

We can detect three main targets in Somànanda's criticism: (1) the identification of parabrahman with ÷abdaråpa-pa÷yantãparàvàc, (2) the claim of vyàkaraõa to go beyond the narrow domain of grammar proper and constitute a world-view, and (3) as a world-view, its preaching the unreality of manifested universe, just as within the field of linguistic speculation it upholds the basic unreality of sounds with respect to the sphoña they are supposed to reveal. It is apparent that we are in front of two competing world views. So, does Utpaladeva understand the debate to come, when, in the short bhåmikà to the second chapter, he contrasts ã÷varàdvayavàda and ÷abdaparabrahmàdvayavàda, and takes his subsequent arguments against ÷abdàdvaitavàda as aimed to refute the latter?5 Two crucial points are represented by the concepts
4. avibhàgà tu pa÷yantã sarvataþ sa§htakramà, svaråpajyotir evàntaþ såkùmà vàg anapàyinã. This verse, frequently quoted, is included (with reserve) by Rau Þ along with the entire passage to which it belongs Þ in the kàrikà text (I.167); Iyer, instead, takes it as a quotation given in the vtti. 5. ã÷varàdvayavàda eva yuktiyukto na tu ÷abdaparabrahmàdvayavàda iti vaktu§, vaiyàkaraõopeta÷abdàdvaita§ tàvan niràkartum upakramamàõa àha (øivadùñi-vtti p. 36, ll. 4-5). The ã÷varàdvayavàda guarantees the satyatà of the universe (ibid., p. 88, l. 7; p. 89, l. 29).


Raffaele Torella

of avidyà and vivarta, which he also discusses later on, in Chapter VI, when dealing with the various schools of vedàntavàdins. However, whereas Somànanda will treat them in a few verses, he devotes a full chapter to ÷abdàdvaitavàda. Since we may not think that a highly sofisticated doctrine like that may have represented a direct challenge to ã÷varàdvayavàda in the Kashmir of his times in terms of ßpopularity,û we are left with the hypothesis that Somànanda attacks it precisely because this is theoretically too close to the new øaiva dar÷ana that he has set out to build. This could explain the total lack of fair play in his attitude to Bharthari, which resembles the fiery fightings between insiders rather than the cold dismissal of a full outsider. By ßtotal lack of fair playû I refer both to the unnecessary sarcastic remarks and the punctilious pointing out of seeming contradictions in terminology, which show a Somànanda deliberately unwilling to catch the gist of Bharthari's conception and expound it by doing justice to its boldness and originality. Somànanda does not show any interest, not even a negatively critical one, in Bharthari, the epistemologist and grammarian, but only in his metaphysics of ÷abdabrahman. In fact, most of Somànanda's attention is caught by the famous first verse of the Brahmakàõóa and the almost equally famous verse, quoted in the vtti, where the nature of Pa÷yantã is described (see above note 4). Then, while concluding the main part of his criticism with a very basic observation (ßwhy on earth have you grammarians left grammar aside to seek `liberating wisdom,' which is not your business?û), he adds that this would-be knowledge is also expressed in another work of theirs, called Samãkùà. 6
6. II.72-73ab vaiyàkaraõatৠtyaktvà vij¤ànànveùaõena kim, bhavatàm aprastutena na kevalam ihoditam. vij¤ànàbhàsana§ yàvat samãkùàyàm udàhtam.

From an Adversary to the Main Ally


Utpaladeva clarifies that Somànanda is referring here to a verse (again, of a metaphysical content) from another work by Bharthari, the øabdadhàtusamãkùà, or rather úaódhàtu o, as a passage from Utpaladeva's vtti seems to presuppose,7 and as the Spandapradãpikà reads.8 However, as a seeming exception, Somànanda, at the very beginning of the chapter (II.10ab), does quote an ßepistemologicalû verse, the well-known na so 'sti pratyayo loke yaþ ÷abdànugamàd te (Vàkyapadãya I.131ab). But, in the course of his rather wild attack, he apparently forgets it. Or, more probably, I believe, what he had in mind in quoting that verse was rather its being used as an anvaya argument to prove the ÷abda nature of the ultimate cause of manifested world (so again a metaphysical content). Knowing the central role that Bharthari will play in the Pratyabhij¤à philosophy from Utpaladeva onwards, we are legitimately curious to see how the latter might have put up with his so much disparaging master. Disappointingly, Utpaladeva remains more or less impassive in commenting on him, and we have to read his vtti very attentively to detect just some very slight traces of disagreement here and there. The most reasonable explanation could have been that the vtti is an early work, and Utpaladeva, after originally sharing his master's views on Bharthari, changed his mind. But this is not how things stand, since the vtti is obviously posterior
Then, the KSTS edition becomes rather confused: obviously, the ÷loka beginning with dikkàlàdio (p. 84, ll. 4-5), included in the vtti, in fact belongs to the øivadùñi. 7. 8. dhàtuùañkopagamàd bhedavàde de÷akàlayogo 'va÷ya§bhàvãti (øivadùñivtti p. 86, l. 4). p. 10. The form Dhàtusamãkùà, which occurs on p. 4, is likely to be only an abbreviation of the latter. On this work, see Gaurinath Shastri 1959: 61; Iyer 1968: 9-10.


Raffaele Torella

to the ä÷varapratyabhij¤àkàrikà, which it quotes and refers to frequently. The impression is that Utpaladeva consciously plays with a certain ambiguity. He never declares openly his disagreement with his master Somànanda on the judgement about Bharthari as a whole, but, for example, it seems to be not by chance that when Somànanda's ruthless attacks are just reaching their apex, he cites in the vtti the name of their ßvictimû by putting before it quite unexpectedly the epithet vidvad- (p. 84, l. 3). Another point of the vtti deserves our attention. In verse II.199 Somànanda gives voice to an opponent who objects to vàc being considered (by Somànanda) a mere karmendriya, not too different from an organ of locomotion, like the foot. In the process of reaching a reflective awareness of something (the opponent says) vàc stands first, taking the form of knowledge itself. Somànanda totally overlooks this quite reasonable objection, and impatiently returns to what concerns him more at the moment: the examination and demolition of Pa÷yantã. Utpaladeva, for his part, takes the argument very seriously and develops it thoroughly, but in such a way that it is clear that he is no more dealing with an opponent's view but with one of his own favourite doctrines: the centrality of the word for the arising of knowledge and the process of understanding, which he owes precisely to Bharthari. Then, to take up again the thread of Somànanda's discourse, he concludes abruptly: àstam anyad etat (p. 49, l. 13). In fact, a bit too overtly he had put his own words into the opponent's mouth. Instead, in what I have listed above as point (2) Utpaladeva appears to be in real agreement with his master. The Grammarians should refrain from pushing their pretensions too far to claim that their thinking is able to
9. vimar÷ànubhavenaiùà yathà vàk prathama§ ÷rità, lakùyate bodharåpeõa na tathà caraõàdikam.

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embrace the totality of being. The aim of grammar, Utpaladeva says, is to teach correct words, being able, as such, to cause the comprehension of meaning, whereas sa§yag-j¤àna must be pursued by the øàstras having liberation as their aim.10 So, vyàkaraõa, even in the prestigious and culturally very complex form that it has received particularly from Bharthari's contribution, cannot claim to a full autonomy, but is expected to be, or to become, only a means in a wider religiophilosophical context. This is precisely what Utpaladeva intends to do, when he integrates Bharthari's teaching into the new øaiva theology. But, as I said earlier, when Utpaladeva writes his commentary on the øivadùñi, he has already made his choices and composed his masterwork, the ä÷varapratyabhij¤àkàrikà. In it, the presence of Bharthari, particularly Bharthari the epistemologist, is overwhelming. What is the reason that has made Utpaladeva appropriate Bharthari's teaching by going, against his guru Somànanda? The reason, to my mind, is to be sought in the structure itself and the motivations of the ä÷varapratyabhij¤àkàrikà. If we look into the two seminal works of the Pratyabhij¤à, we realize that they belong to two different orders both in contents and addressees. More rooted in the øaiva scriptures, on the one hand, and more ßself-centredû on the other Þ and consequently more willing to dispose of any antagonist doctrine Þ is the øivadùñi. More analytical and ßstrategicalû is the ä÷varapratyabhij¤àkàrikà, which, instead of dispersing its philosophical energies against an undifferentiated multiplicity of opponents, very lucidly selects
10. arthapratãtihetusàdhu÷abdànu÷àsanavyàpàram eva [ o råpa§?] vaiyàkaraõatva§ tyaktvà mokùaprayojanaiþ ÷àstraiþ yat samyagj¤ànam anusaraõãya§ tadanveùaõena bhavatৠkaraõãyatvenàprastutena na ki§cit Þ øivadùñi-vtti, p. 83, l. 3; p. 84, l. 1


Raffaele Torella

just one, the most prestigious philosophical (and also religious) tradition of the Kashmir of that time, outside the øaiva tradition (to which instead the other great tradition of Kashmir, the Vaiùõava Pà¤caràtra is more or less closely related). For various reasons (the principal one probably being the wish to present the new Pratyabhij¤à theologians as the champions of the entire øaiva tradition against the main common antagonist; see Torella 2002: XXI-XXIII), these privileged opponents are the Buddhists, especially those belonging to the so-called logico-epistemological school (Torella 1992). Buddhist doctrines are criticized also by Somànanda, who did know of Dharmakãrti Þ two verses of his Pramàõavàrttika are easily recognizable in the øivadùñi (I.45cd-46ab11 and VI.3912) Þ but there the Buddhists are opponents just like many others, without being extended the special status they have in the work of Utpaladeva, for whom they, admired and attacked in an equally strong way, are, so to speak, the most intimate enemies.13 To Utpaladeva, the criticism of their positions is of


d÷yante 'tra tadicchàto bhàvà bhãtyàdiyogataþ, tatra mithyàsvaråpa§ cet sthàpyàgre satyatedùàm. Þ Cf. Pramàõavàrttika III.282 kàma÷okabhayonmàdacaurasvapnàdyupaplutàþ, abhutàn api pa÷yanti purato 'vasthitàn iva, Utpaladeva's comments make even more evident that Dharmarkãrti is the source (p. 33, l. 7 kàma÷okabhayàdiyogàc ca te te bhàvàþ puraþ sphuranto d÷yante).


bhedavàn iti lakùyatve dùñànto 'sti na tàd÷aþ, gràhyagràhakasa§vitter bhedavàn iva lakùyate. Þ Cf. Pramàõavàrttika III.354 avibhàgo 'pi buddhyàtmaviparyàsitadar÷anaiþ, gràhyagràhakasa§vittibhedavàn iva lakùyate.


I owe this expression to my friend Prof. Arindam Chakrabarti.

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substantial help in building and refining the Pratyabhij¤à philosophy; the two processes run in fact parallel. Two radically different world-views are at stake here: the depersonalized universe of the Buddhists, made of discrete and discontinuous realities tentatively connected in the ultimately unreal net of vyavahàra Þ unreal insofar as it is the product of a ßsecondaryû conceptual thought Þ, and the absolutely unitary universe of the øaivas, identified with and penetrated by a supreme Person, øiva, who runs through it like a golden thread unifying all the seeming multiplicity and dynamically transforming the apparently other into himself and himself into the other. Closely connected with Utpaladeva's choice of establishing the Buddhists as the main opponents is his adoption of Bharthari as the main ally. At this point some questions may be asked: why Bharthari? and, again: can he really be ßusedû against the Buddhists? What has been historically their attitude to him? A straightforward answer is not possible, but, indirectly, precisely their problematic reaction to him represents the fulfilment of a primary requirement for being a very strong adversary, that is, the fact of not being a total outsider but of sharing much of the same problems and presuppositions. In fact, Utpaladeva could have confronted the Buddhists simply by opposing to them the teachings of the Scriptures, which he did but only in a very secondary way, by adding an âgama-adhikàra as a third chapter, but after the fully dialectical J¤àna- and Kriyà-adhikàra. Then, we should not forget that the Buddhist pilgrim I-tsing is even told that Bharthari was a Buddhist (Takakusu 1896: 178-180). I cannot enter here into a detailed scrutiny of the Buddhist reaction to Bharthari, 14 which starts in a rather
14. For a general survey see Lindtner 1993, which however contains not a few problematic points (see also Nakamura 1972).


Raffaele Torella

enigmatic way, with Diïnàga reproducing more than thirty verses from the Sambandhasamudde÷a, which thus come to form the main body of his Traikàlyaparãkùà, a work apparently dealing with an entirely different subject from the verses quoted (Frauwallner 1959: 113-116; Houben 1995: 273-274; interestingly, later Buddhist authors like Praj¤àkaragupta and Manorathanandin, and also non-Buddhist, like Jayaratha, do not show any doubt about Diïnàga's authorship of them, (see Frauwallner 1959: 114, n. 49). For Diïnàga and Dharmakãrti, particularly the latter, Bharthari plays the role of inspirer and opponent at the same time, leaving unmistakable traces in the elaboration of the theory of apoha, both in its more strictly linguistic version and in the broader one, investing the whole of conceptual thought. The most thorough, and explicit, treatment of Bharthari's doctrines can be found in the Tattvasa§graha15 (in Diïnàga and Dharmakãrti's work we have to read it mainly between the lines), but the limits of space make me shift from the very elaborate pages of øàntarakùita and Kamala÷ãla (cf. Giunta 2003) to the commentary of J¤àna÷rãbhadra on the Laïkàvatàrasåtra, extant only in a Tibetan translation (Unebe: 2000), which, if certainly much less philosophically significant, has nonetheless the merit of presenting the main lines of the Buddhist attitude to Bharthari in a quite clear and straightforward way. An additional reason for focusing on J¤àna÷rãbhadra is his belonging to Kashmir and living just a few decades later than Abhinavagupta. In explaining the Laïkàvatàrasåtra, perhaps among the Buddhist scriptures the one which shows the most radical criticism of the cognitive power of language and its closely associated
15. See, particularly, the whole of the øabdabrahmaparãkùà, øabdàrthaparãkùà vv. 866-1211, Pratyakùalakùaõaparãkùà vv. 12121360, Anumànaparãkùà vv. 1361-1485, ørutiparãkùà passim.

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conceptual thought,16 J¤àna÷rãbhadra quotes as many as fortysix verses from the Vàkyapadãya. Interestingly, most of them, the ones of a linguistic-epistemological import, are quoted with approval, and are used, sometimes mixed with Dharmakãrti's
16. This important såtra (unfortunately, imperfectly edited and even more imperfectly translated into English) dwells on this subject at several points under the form of questions of Mahàmati to the Bhagavat. They belong to three main orders: the relationship between conceptual thought and language, the relationship between word and meaning, and whether language can guarantee the ßrealityû of the things it designates. The first two questions receive more or less the same answer (p. 86 bhagavàn àha | na hi mahàmate vàg vikalpàd anyà nànanyà; p. 155 bodhisattvo mahàsattvo rutam arthàd anyan nànyad iti samanupa÷yati artha§ ca rutàt). Also the motivations are basically the same: if they were not different, there could not be a cause/effect relationship between them; if, on the other hand, they were different, the meaning could not be manifested (p. 87 yadi punar mahàmate vàg vikalpàd anyà syàd avikalpahetukã syàt | athànanyà syàd arthàbhivyakti§ [Unebe's emendation, also confirmed by the following passage] vàg na kuryàt. sà kurute; p. 154 ojalpo vikalpavàsanàhetuko rutam ity ucyate [. . .] yadi ca punar mahàmate artho rutàd anyaþ syàd arutàrthàbhivyaktihetukaþ syàt. sa càrtho rutenànupravi÷yate pradãpeneva dhanam). J¤àna÷rãbhadra adds in his vtti that the words never touch external objects, and meanings are not directly connected with them but only shaped by vikalpa: the fact that J¤àna÷rãbhadra conceives of the circularity of vikalpa-languagemeaning is underlined by his quoting here the famous verse ascribed to Diïnàga vikalpayonayaþ ÷abdà vikalpàþ ÷abdàyonayaþ (Unebe 2000: 333-34). Words can tell us nothing about the reality of things (p. 104 abhilàpasadbhàvàd bhagavan santi sarvabhàvàþ, bhagavàn àha, asatàm api mahàmate bhàvànàm abhilàpaþ kriyate. . .). Yet, language and conceptualization are not to be simply dismissed, they can (or have to) be used by the bodhisattvas as a means to the supreme goal (p. 155 evam eva mahàmate vàgvikalparutapradãpena bodhisattvà mahàsattvà vàgvikalparahitàþ [otà§?] svapratyàtmàryagatim anupravi÷anti).


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verses!, as a support of the equation upheld by the Buddhist såtra between language and conceptualization:17 they are not strictly speaking the same thing but, indeed, one is the source of the other. Different is the case with Bharthari's ßmetaphysicalû verses dealing with ÷abdabrahman, etc. which are instead quickly dismissed. 18 In treasuring the linguisticepistemological teachings of Bharthari, J¤àna÷rãbhadra moves along the same lines as Dharmakãrti and øàntarakùita, but in a much more simplistic way. In fact, unlike J¤àna÷rãbhadra, Dharmakãrti and øàntarakùita were well aware that Bharthari did not limit the pervasion of language to the conceptual thought but considered it an intrinsic feature of any kind of cognition, including the perceptual one, and they strongly objected to this. We can now revert to Utpaladeva's philosophical atelier. In order to undermine the discontinuous universe of the Buddhists he decides to avail himself precisely of the latter doctrine, the language-imbued nature of knowledge, which is meant to demolish its main foundation-stone, the unsurpassable gulf between the moment of sensation and that
17. The citation of Bharthari's verses is, however, not always appropriate; cf. that of VP I.47 whose buddhisthaþ ÷abdaþ is wrongly identified with the vikalpa of the Laïkàvatàrasåtra, whereas in fact it refers to sphoña. But at least one Buddhist philosopher, Diïnàga, did not conceal his potential appreciation also of Bharthari's metaphysical ideas, provided that they be read in a Vij¤ànavàda perspective and by introducing, accordingly, some change in terminology; cf. the case of term brahma, found in a verse (most probably coming from Bharthari's úaó/øabda-dhàtusamãkùà) incorporated into the Traikàlyaparãkùà, whose Tibetan translation rnam shes presupposes in the Sanskrit original its substitution with vij¤ànam or cittam (Frauwallner 1959: 113 n. 47; Lindtner 1993: 201).


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of conceptual elaboration, representing, as it were, the very archetype of the Buddhist segmented reality. It is because of this that some of the most famous, and crucial, verses of the ä÷varapratyabhij¤àkàrikà originate.19 As far as the metaphysical background is concerned, there is nothing essentially new in this doctrine, the scriptural sarva÷aktivilolatà ßeffervescence of all powers (in any reality)û of the øivadùñi (I.11b) implicitly already contained it. What Utpaladeva needed was a shared, if controversial, strong ßphilosophicalû argument. The omnipervasiveness of language is an epistemological version of the omnipervasiveness of øiva, and at the same time calls for the integration into the spiritually dynamic øaiva universe. Moreover, this allowed Utpaladeva to connect himself with the speculations on vàc and the phonemes found in the Kula and Trika tantras. The supreme Consciousness is the supreme Word, Pa÷yantã becomes a power of the supreme Lord. In this way, the formerly despised Bharthari is raised to the core itself of the Pratyabhij¤à. Did Utpaladeva accept the whole of Bharthari's doctrine? I should say not. He accepted just
19. I.V.11 svabhàvam avabhàsasya vimar÷a§ vidur anyathà, prakà÷o 'rthoparakto 'pi sphañikàdijaóopamaþ. ßThe essential nature of light is reflective awareness; otherwise light, though ßcolouredû by objects, would be similar to an insentient reality, such as the crystal and so on.û (tr. Torella 2002: 118). I.V.13 citiþ pratyavamar÷àtmà paràvàk svarasodità, svàtantrya§ etan mukhya§ tad ai÷varya§ paramàtmanaþ. ßConsciousness has as its essential nature reflective awareness; it is the supreme Word that arises freely. It is freedom in the absolute sense, the sovereignty of the supreme Selfû (tr. Torella 2002: 120). I.V.19 sàkùàtkàrakùaõe 'py asti vimar÷aþ. katham anyathà, dhàvanàdy upapadyeta pratisa§dhànavarjitam. ßEven at the moment of direct perception there is a reflective awareness. How otherwise could one account for such actions as running and so on, if they were thought of as being devoid of determinate awareness?û (tr. Torella 2002: 125).


Raffaele Torella

what matched his own well-gauged requirements. Other very significant aspects of Bharthari's thought are instead rejected, like the theory of sphoña. 20 Apparently, Utpaladeva did not propose his own answer to the crucial question ßwhat is the meaning-bearer?,û looking for an alternative to the sphoña.21 It will be his pra÷iùya Abhinavagupta to do so: his solution (see Torella 2004) seems well in line with Utpaladeva's thought. References
Bhagavadutpalàcàrya, The Spandapradãpikà: A Commentary on the Spandakàrikà, ed. M.S.G. Dyczkowski, Varanasi, 1990. Bharthari, Vàkyapadãya (Målakàrikàs), Bhartharis Vàkyapadãya, ed. W. Rau, Abhandlungen fr die Kunde des Morgenlandes, 42, Wiesbaden 1977. Dharmakãrti, Pramàõavàrttika with the Commentary ßVttiû of âcàrya Manorathanandin, critically ed. Swami Dwarikadas Shastri, Varanasi 1968. Laïkàvatàrasåtra, ed. Bunyiu Nanjio, Biblioteca Otaniensis, vol. I, Kyoto 1956 (Engl. tr. D.T. Suzuki, The Laïkàvatàrasåtra Þ A Mahàyàna Text, London 1932). øàntarakùita, Tattvasa§graha with the Commentary ßPa¤jikàû of Kamala÷ãla, vols. I-II, critically ed. Swami Dwarikadas Shastri, Varanasi 1981. Somànanda, øivadùñi with the Vtti by Utpaladeva, ed. Pandit Madhusudan Kaul Shastri, KSTS LIV, Srinagar 1934. Utpaladeva, ä÷varapratyabhij¤àkàrikà with Vtti (see Torella 2002).


Utpaladeva deals with the sphoña doctrine in the øivadùñi-vtti but only as an opponent's theory, while commenting on Somànanda, who strongly criticized it at II.58-61ab; see also øivadùñi-vtti p. 87 (on II.77). The doubt, which is bound to remain such, is whether he treated this subject in the ä÷varapratyabhij¤à-vivti or ñãkà, now almost completely lost.


From an Adversary to the Main Ally


Dwivedi, R.C. (1993), ßBharthari and Kashmir Shaivism,û Annals of Bandharkar Oriental Research Institute 72-73, Amtamahotsava (19171992), pp. 95-107. Filliozat, P.S. (1994), ßBharthari and Tantra,û in Filliozat, P.S., Bhatta, C.P. Narang, S.P. (eds.), Pandit N.R. Bhatt Felicitation Volume, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, pp. 463-480. Frauwallner, E., (1959), ßDignàga, sein Werke und sein Entwicklung,û Wiener Zeitschrift fr die Kunde Sd- und Ostasiens 3, pp. 83-164. Gaurinath Shastri, (1959), The Philosophy of Word and Meaning: Some Indian Approaches with Special Reference to the Philosophy of Bharthari, Calcutta Sanskrit College Research Series, No.V, Calcutta. Giunta, P. (2003), Il buddhismo e la tradizione filosofico-grammaticale brahmanica: il rapporto tra øàntarakùita e Bharthari alla luce delle citazioni del Vàkyapadãya nel Tattvasa§graha e nel suo commento, Tesi di laurea, A.A. 2002-2003, Facolt… di Studi Orientali, Università di Roma ßLa Sapienzaû (Superv. Prof. R. Torella). Gnoli, R. (1957), ßøivadùñi by Somànanda, Chapter I,û East and West, 8, pp. 16-22. ÞÞÞ (1959), ßVàc. Il secondo capitolo della øivadùñi di Somànanda,û Rivista degli Studi Orientali 34 (1-2), pp. 57-75. Houben, J.E.M., (1995), The Sambandha-Samudde÷a (Chapter on Relation) and Bharthari's Philosophy of Language, Gonda Indological Studies 2, Groningen. Iyer, K.A.S. (1969), Bharthari, A Study of the Vàkyapadãya in the light of the Ancient Commentaries, Poona: Deccan College. Krasser, H. (2001), ßOn the dates and works of øaïkaranandana,û in Torella, R. (ed.), Le Parole e i Marmi, Studi in onore di Raniero Gnoli nel suo 70o compleanno, 2 vols., Serie Orientale Roma, IsIAO, Roma, pp. 489-508. Lindtner, Ch. (1993), ßLinking up Bharthari and the Bauddhas,û in S. Bhate, S. Bronkhorst, J. (eds.), Proceedings of the First International Conference on Bharthari, Pune, January 6-8 1992, Asiatische Studien/ tudes Asiatiques, 47.1, pp. 195-213. Nakamura, H. (1972), ßBharthari and Buddhism,û in Saksena, B.R. Chaturvedi, S.P. Misra, A.P. (eds.), K.C. Chattopàdhyàya Felicitation


Raffaele Torella
Volume (Journal of the Gaïgànàtha Jhà Kendrãya Sanskrit Vidyàpeeth, 27-28), 2 vols., pp. 395-405.

Seyfort Ruegg, D. (1959), Contributions … l'histoire de la philosophie linguistique indienne, Publications de l'Institut de Civilisation Indienne, 7, Paris. Takakusu, J. (1896), I-tsing Þ A Record of the Buddhist Religion as Practised in India and Malay Archipelago, tr. . . . , Oxford. Torella, R. (1992), ßThe Pratyabhij¤à and the Logical-Epistemological School of Buddhism,û in Goudriaan, T. (ed.), Ritual and Speculation in Early Tantrism: Studies in Honor of Andr‚ Padoux, State University of New York Press, Albany, pp. 327-45. ÞÞÞ, (2002), The ä÷varapratyabhij¤àkàrikà of Utpaladeva with the Author's Vtti, Critical Edition and Annotated Translation, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, (II edn., originally published in Serie Orientale Roma LXXI, IsMEO, Roma, 1994). ÞÞÞ, (2004), ßHow is verbal signification possible: understanding Abhinavagupta's reply,û Journal of Indian Philosophy, 32 (2-3), pp. 173-88. Unebe, T. (2000), ßJ¤àna÷rãbhadra's interpretation of Bharthari as found in the Laïkàvatàravtti ('phags pa langkar gshegs pa'i 'grel pa),û Journal of Indian Philosophy 28, pp. 329-60.

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