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 17
Irony and Sarcasm
Herbert L. Colston

Terminology
Although m.my pcopk· likdy fod contid,·nt tlwy know what irony is and how it might be
distinguishl·d from simil.,r concl·1m, litth: agrel•ment holds for a spl·citic definition of irony
~utlicil·nt for \Chobrly purposes. Indl·t·d. some scholars have dismissed entirely the attempt at
cktining irony:

1 will n·frain from l.'ngaging in tltl' vain attempt to define irony.

(Bara. 2010, p. 176)

Some romisteau:y nonl.'thck·ss can be found in characteristics schobrs have noted for irony.
found .irwss ,-.1riom ac,·ounts of ib nattm.", comprehension. and usagt'. Among these are oppo-
sition. rontradii:tiun, nmtr.1indic.1t,·lh1css. contrast. bi-coht'rt:nct', and ret1tcd notions of juxta-
posed incomp.1tihilitics. But the array of forms of irony. and thl· ditfrn:nt mechanisms of creating
or l"Xhihiting thl.'~l· oppositions, contradictions, 1.'tC.. make for great difficulty in settlement of
thr ddinition.11 issul·. Ai:l·onlingly. for present purposes only a brief discussion of some of the
tt·rminok,~- mt·d to distin!,!uish a fl'W typt"S of irony will be pn.·scntl•d.
M.my sdwl.irs have- noted the diffen"nce (and sim.ibrities) hcc,wen irony found in e,·ents or
~itu.11iom in thl· world. vs. thosl· embedded in lan!!lJage or other human communication. the
lattl·r luving receiwd tl1t· most academic .mention. Situati,mal iro111• (LU<:ariello. 1994) has been
lhl'J to labd ironil· l'Ontr.1llicnons or rnincidence~ found in sinutions. As one brief example.
romi,kr a ~wry n·pl>rtl•d llll .m Internet news site ;1bout a woman who was ;trrested for shoplitt-
in~ in the Unitl·d St.ires at J \\'almart ~tore (Hoffi:r. ~ll I ..J.Junt' 3). Acconling to the local mwn 's
Publir S.1fety !)q,artmi:m n·port. •nnong the items sto!l.'n w;is a copy of the Christian Bibk:

an employe1: noticl·d her ~mtring thl~ book-whii:h. as you know. includes specific instruc-
ti1ms not to stt·al-into her purse.

As inJi,·act<d. nh,st researd1 on irony has concemrated on tht· ,·erbal form. J,erbal irony usually
rl·t'ic·r~ to ~roken or written fft'Jti,,11., of 1roni, i:ontr.1Jiniuns. with those i:ontr.1diaio11s falling

234
 Irony and Sarcasm

typically ;1nm~ J JJ acr11,,I c:\'l'nt. situation. etc. v,. a pc:rso n ·s lingui,cic dcpiaio11 of that l'Wnt. etc.
For l'X:1111plc:. comidl'r till' following , hart c:xcerpt, from a rl·cent .\ i1'II' Y.,,k ·nmc., intl·rvicw with
DJvid Ll'tta111a11. cdd1rity and now rl·tiring 111ulti-dcc:1dl· host of A1m·rican latl·-night tdevi-
sion progr.11m ( ltzkoff. 20 I .'i. M.1y 3). as an arr.1y of ex.1111plc:s of verbal irony:

I. (.;Js J1,1rr cf L ·rra,11,111 s!lJ><'lling 11•, 1r111-11p 111011,>lt>g11c.fi>r ,1 m,clio a11dic11rc ,u" 1,1pi1i1,1) :"Evcryching
O.K. at h o 1nl·?"·· Ewrych111g O.K. :it work?""You don ·c tind yomsc:lf tilled with so111e kind
of l' n1 otio11al long111g? Arc: we emotionally ~tabk·?"'
2. (/11 n·s1Ji111., c to a q11c·~·ri,>1111/it>11t n:i?rcts 1wcr rcriri1i1,1):"\Vhen I lefi: Indiana and 111ovcd to Califor-
nia . Whl·ll Rc:gina an d I ckcitkd to haw a b.1by-l·nor111ous .111xic:cy and trcpidation.Thost·
.ire: rhc: rwo higgc~t ch111gs 111 my lifc:. and thc:y workc:d out beyond 111y wildest drl·,um. 1'111
prc:tl·ndi11g chc: sa111c: thing w ill happc:n now. I'll 111i,s it. dc:,pcracdy. Om· of two things:
Thl'rl' will he a rc:aso11abk ,1clulc accepra1Kc: of rr.rn,irion. Or I will tum co a life of crim<.>."
3. (Rq1lri11,1,1 1,111 ,111cstio11 ab,,111 h<11I' tdcl'isio11 !,,,_, rh,ll(l!C<fJ: " I ,ee chat thing, arc ct.:rcainly cliffrr-
c:11t. A lo t of wh.n \\"l' did was dinatc:d by Carson. A guy namc:d DJ\'l' Tl'h c:c, who workc:d
for NBC and was lih· .1 r.1k11t liai,;on-in thl' s:in1c way chat Al Capom· was ;i hl'vc:r,1ge
distributor. hl· ca ml' co us and he said:'Yuu can't have a band.You c:in have: a combo.'"
4. (Rn/JCJ111/i11g to a q11cstio1111/,0111 /,is 2000 l,c11rt m~l!Cf)'):" I was co11cert1L·cl chat I'll ncvc:r be able
to nm .1gain-ch.1t ,,·as my big concern. Bcc.tml' I Jud so rdied 011 running. all my life·, co
gl't 111ysdf dcarhcatlc:d. And of course:, I \\'J, worrit·d chat somc:body would go o n while
I ,v.1s off with m y he,lrt surgery, and be good c:nough char thl'y didn 'c want me hack .As I'm
trying to rc:cOVl'r from quintuple: byp.1ss surgay. rm paranoid char my life is c11ding. And
thc:11 , six weeks ,1fier the surgery. I ran for tivc miles. So Ice ·~ foce it. I am a hl·ro.Thcre\ no
two w,1ys of lo oking at it."
5. p;, a q11c.,rio11 /lu,111r /,is p<11e11ri11/ _firi11g (l1Jcr a 2UOY "sex sca11d11/") : '" Looki ng at it now, yes.
I chink they would hav..: had good reason co fire: llll'. Bm ac the time. I WJS largdy ignorant
as co what . rc:.11ly. I had done. le jmc see med like. O.K ., weU, here\ so1m·body who h.1d JII
intimate: rc:lJti onship with somebody he shoul<ln 'c haw h:id an intimate rd.1tiomhip with.
And I always sai d. '"Wl·ll. who hasn 'c?' co mysdf. Dm tl1t·n. when I was abk co sec fro m the
epiccmer. che ripples. I rhoughc. yeah, they could hJ\'C: fir<.>d me. Out they <lid11't. So I owe
thl'111 chat."
6. ( 7i1 c1 Ji,lfol1'-11p q11c,ric111 avow /Jt't>p/c'.< .-11rprisc ewer r/,c r,111,h>r ,?{ /,is rc,pc>mc r,, rl,C' "sex srmul,zl ") :
"I di<ln ·c know what dse co do. I couldn't chink of a r.:ally good lie•.''

In these excerpt,. Letterman ,zsscrr.<.

a) he may becomc: a criminal (Example 2). and.

b) ht' is a hero (Example: 4).

Letterman also c1;/,:s.

a) if audiL'IKL' llll"lllhcr, Jre emocionJlly stable (Example l ). and.

h) whether any pc:rson exim who has 11,11 cng.1gcd in an illicit imimatt" rdatio mhip (Ex.1111pk 5).

Lettt·rman JddicionJlly 1111,1!.~i?i.::cs that D ave Tehet bc:ars the same rd.1tionship to hem~ a mild-
111Jn11l·red tJknt li.1iso n th.it Al C.1ponc be.m co bein~ a friendly ne1ghho rhood bcvera~e dis-
mhutor (Example: 3). Fin.tlly. Leccerman t.J({; as if his mahilicy to conjure a lie re\ulcmi,: in his
\Uhit'']Ut>nt honc:sr:· .1bouc the sex scandal WJS a major tJiling on hi~ part (Ex.imple 6).

235
Herbert L. Colston

E:1ch of these depictions is contradictory to reality. To just consider examples 2 and 4, Let-
term:111 knows he wou 't actu:tlly become a criminal and that his surgery recovery was not genu-
inely lwroic. Verbal irony thus bears thl' characteristic of a linguistic crl"ation by a speaker or
writl'r, that somehow expresst's soml' proposition, stance. attitude, description, etc., concerning
ohjl·ctive rl·ality. that is somehow contrary to that reality.
A m1mber of rel.ucd forms of irony havt· either been consitkred subtypes of verbal irony. or
at lc.1\t similar/paralld kiuds of tropes. Among many of these arc sarcasm, ironic praise, ironic
rritirimi. hypt·rhole, understatement, irouic analogy, and ironic restatement. Still other forms
arc also considered paralld or similar to verbal irony but rt'side outside of irony accomplished
through lauguage pt·r sc. although language cau certainly he involwd. Some examples of this set
an· satire, parody. visual irouy..md hypocrisy. In the interest of brevity only the former instances
will hl· tn·m·d at length hc:rc.
M.my, although not all, forms of irony enable management of 1wgativity expression issues
(Colstou, 20 15). Sarcasm, as a form of verbal irony is arguably most strongly associated with this
m•g,1tivity expression. Sarcasm is generally considered a nasty, mean-spirited or just relatively
lll'g.1tiw form of verbal irony. USl'd on occasion to cnhancl' the nl·gativity expressed relative to
din•ct, non-figurative criticism (Colston, 1997). It may also afford a nuancl'd expression of m.·ga-
tivity by tinging thl· ll·vcl of critirism 1.·xprem·d (Dews & Winner, 1995; Dews et al., 1995). In
t·ither i11st;i11n-. though, its purposl· is to successfully convey a speaker's desired level of negative
attitude about some rdl·rent event/ situation. Some have argued that sarcasm is the most preva-
ll·ut form of \'t'rbal iruuy (Capdli ct al .. 1990). Others have noted independently that this nega-
tivity l'xpn·ssion managl·m1.·nt seems the primary function of verbal irony (Roberts & Kreuz.
1994: Colston. 20 I 5). It thus mak1.·s st'nse that sarcasm and ncg-ativity management coincide.
lrtmic critid$m and ir,111ic praise (the lattt·r sometimes call,·d irouic complime11t) are terms
ml·d to disrnn bl·t,wen a sp1.•.1ker's expn·ssion of neg.itivity by uttl'ring something seemin~y
po~itiw (e.~ .. " Nice st.1in you've got there"), vs. positive expression through seemingly negative
utter.mrt·s (t·.g., "You rJging psychopath!," s;1id to someone acting kindly). This distinction is
important bl·rausc m,·asur.1bk ditli:rences between the forms arc easily obtained. Ironic criti-
cism (SJy soml·thing positive to expn·ss soml'thing negative), for example, is undc.-rstood more
rl·,1dily .111d is mort· prt'v.,knt than ironic praist• (Sperber & Wilson. 1981 a; Pexman & Glen-
wri~ht. ~\1\17).
H)'ptrb,,lt typir.illy st.1tes the extent. magnitu,ic. severity. quantity. etc.. of some refen!nt topic
as l.ir~a. or at km difli.-rcnt from. n;-ality .is in, "That'll take forever." Hyperbole is occasionally
ro111r.1stc.-d with ut1dtr$latemtt1t. where such magnitude-s. etc., arc typically framed in terms lesser
th.111 n·ality. as in. "It's ju\t a scratch," said about a major injury.
lrtmic atralo,\.'}', also called rt·hutt.11 analogy (Whaley & Holloway. 1996; Colston & Gibbs,
JINX: Cohton. 2t lll0.,) rdi.·rs to tht· leveraging ofJn ironic exprc.-ssion via an analogical construc-
tion. Lt·ttern1Jn 0s ,·ommt·nt in example 3 demonstrates this mt'chanism. In ironic analogy, the
.111.1logic.tl comp.1rison typir,11ly likt·m the ironic structure of a vehicle to that of the associated
tari,:et. l11 the Lt·tt,·rman n,mment. for instance. n·frrring to Al Capone as a "'beverage distribu-
wr.. i~ innnr ally mi.kmated. Trut·. Capont· did distribute.- beverages in Prohibition-era Chicago.
lllmo1~. But hl' did so 1llq(ally .md through violent. g-angster tactics.This ironic structure is then
grJltt·d onto tl1,· rdi.·n:nt pl'rson 0Jw Tc.-bt't, whom Ll·tterlllan wishes to paint also as heJvy-
haudt'd. thn>u!!h the an.1lo!!ou.s ironic.illy un,it'rstJtcd !Jbd ... tah:nt liaison."
lnmic rtstaumtnl n:ti:~ to Jn ironic. \'erbatim repeating of Jn.other stJtc:ment that is d1.~lllon-
~tr.1bh-, "n,niz.
- to ,it·mon,tr,lte tl1Jt ~tatemt'nt's in.iccurJn.· (Colston, 2000b).This ironic form. akm
to mrnir .111.1h)i-~·. .i.lso borrow J l°C>lbtrurtion mel'hJnism from cl,ewhen.-restJtement, for its
fuii.·uomng. Pt·oplc otten re~t.1tc: otht·~ • n-nurk) to qut'stion th,· n:nurk.s or for other n.·asons. If

236
 Irony and Sarcasm

a speaker claims for instance that global warmjng is a hoax, other speakers can rC'pC'at that remark
with incredulous intonation to express their attitude towards the remark, "Global warming is
a ho,,x??!!" This mecharusm can become ironic if the repetition pretends. typically with some
degree of obviousness, to convey agreement, " Oh, YES, absolutely. Global warnung IS a hoax!"

Core Issues and Topics

Perhaps the greatest amount of theoretical and empirical work on verbal irony has attempted
to explain its comprehension. One might initially ask why such an explanation targeted to
verbal irony is even necessary. Given the preponderance of theoretical work in linE,'1.listics, psy-
cholinguistics and allied disciplines that attempt to explain language comprehension in general.
includmg figurative language, why would a separ;1te account of verbal irony compr<'hension he
necessary? The issue for vc:rbal irony is that even if one adopts a more genC'ral co111pn:hension
theory (e.g., Speech Act Theory, Standard Pragmatic Model. Relevance Theory), one still must
explain how the final fully developed comprehension product of an instance of verbal irony
occurs relative to some other prevalent trope like metaphor (Kaufcr. 1981; Haverkatc, 1990).
Although a general account m(i:ht eventually subsume all the intricacies of different tropes and
their comprehension, at present there appears too wide a gap in the interpreted products of
differC'nt tropes like metaphor and verbal irony to enable full explanation by current broad rnrn-
prehension accounts (Gibbs & Colston, 2002; Colston & Gibbs, 2015).
At the least, current broad accounts likely need additional componems to explain specific
differences in irony and metaphor undemanding (among other tropes). such as the difference
in the relation between what is said and implied (Winner & Gardner, 1993). Metaphor, for
instance, conveys sometrung about the similarity between what is said vs. implied when two
mt·taphorical domains are juxtaposed. Verbal irony instead conveys something involving the
opposition between what is said and implied. Metaphor and irony also communicate different
types of meaning. Metaphor primarily addresses or shows something in a novel way about the
referent topic.Verbal irony typically additionally conveys something about the speaker\ attitudes
or opinjons about the topic. Metaphor and irony also may require different concentrations of
comprehension abilities. Understanding metaphor could require listeners to posses\ knowledge
of source and target domains to recognize their similarities. Understanding irony could instead
emphasize that listeners draw inferences about the speaker's state of mind. More spccificJlly.
irony comprehension might require listeners to draw a second-order inference about a speJker's
beliefs and intentions (Winner & Gardner. t 993; Gibbs & Colston. 2(J02). Current broad rnm-
prehension accounts do not seem to provide mechanisms to fully explain the subtleties in these
different kinds of trope understanding.
Another reason for a separate account of verbal irony understanding (or at the least, for
a broad account that could explain the nuances of verbal irony understanding) is to di\pcl a
popular and prevalent folk account of verbal irony understandi ng not found for other tropcs.
Trus account claims that verbal irony involves speakers saying the opJX,sire of what they ime11d
to communicate. This notion of opposition is also formalized by several linguistic approaches
to verbal irony.
Consider next the various accounts of verbJJ irony c·omprehc·nsion proposed from lingui stic.
psychological and psycholinguistic schol.irs. This is not an exhaustive list. nor .tr<.- the accoums
offered in any particular ordt•r, savc for a very loose correspondence co chronology.The folk and
ocher formalized accounts based on opposiaon are treatl"d first.
Folk and Opposition Accounts-That verbal irony mrnh·es a \peJker simply uying
the oppo~itc o t- wh.1t they intend to commurucate is the likely explJnation held among nuny

237
Herbert L. Colston

non-scholars of irony. It is also encapsulated in more formal explanations (Brown & Levinson,
1987; Levin, 1982; Haverkate, JIJ90). A hearer recognizes a speaker's intention to express oppo-
sition in using verbal irony, typically through the use of ironic markers. The hearer then takes
tht· opposite of the speaker's (writer's) stated meaning to achieve the correct comprehension
product.
A number of probkms hold for such a folk or a formalized account based on opposition.
A str.1i~htforward issue is that many forms of verbal irony arc not declarative in form, such that
tht' notion of opposition is less than clear (Kaufer, 1981). Rhetorical questions, for just one
example. can often be ironic For instance, a speaker might ironically utter,

1. Oh. how could I possibly be angry?

whc·n she is in fart livid. Non-dt•clJmtives pose a tough challenge for the Opposition Account
because the oppo~itt' of a question. and in tht· present case, a question not gcnuindy used for ;111
inquiry, is often unclear. Is the spt'akcr not asking for something? Is the speaker asking for the
oppmitt' of what he/she requests?
Ewn in the c.1st• of straightforw.ml declarative ironic statements, however, the problem of
dctining the opposite of what is st.1tcd is very diflicult. The difliculty lies not only in being
unabk· to specify that opposite meaning. but additionally being unable to specify even the initial
non-tiguratiw mt·anin~ one is suppost•d to take the opposite of (Ilrown. 1980; Gibbs & O 'Brien,
1991). For inst.111ce, imagine a spt·aker ironically says during a days-long rJinstorm while on
wintt·r v.1c.1tion in Southt·rn California.

2. Without a doubt, "It N ewr R ai ns in California"

Arcordin!{ to opposition-bast•d accounts. this statCllll'nt. a declarative containing an old popular

song lyric should haw ;\ nontigurative meJning whose opposite is the speaker's intended ironic
meanin~. 13ut wh.1t is the nonfigurative meaning to start? First. such a meaning would be highly
ckpemknt on the context. Tht· meaning would be quite different. for instance, if the statement
,n-re spoken in rcsponst~ to set·ing r.,in, vs. if said in response to another speaker's question about
what the spt·cific lyric w.1s from the populJr 1970s song about Southern California ,wather
(H.unmond & HJzlewood. 1972). But even in the former case with no preceding question, it
is unrkJr if tht· meJnin~ is a direct st.1tement about the fn:que;-ncy of rain in some area, a refer-
ence to ,111 old popul.1r song. both. or something else. The statement also contains a hyperbole
in tht• form of an t·xtrcme cast· formulation (e.g .. "ne\'er'') such that the so-called nonfigurJ-
ti,·t· 111t·.111ing itself 1s Jlready tigm.1tiw. Trying to then glean what part(s) of this meaning is
supp,lst·d to St'r\"l" Js an Jnchor for t.1king an opposite meaning is intractable (e.g., it ALWAYS
r.1ins in Californi.1, it nc\'er IS DRY in C:.tlifornia. it ALWAYS IS DRY in California, it never
rams in PLACES OTHER THAN CALIFORNIA. it is not the case that it never rJins in C;tli-
forniJ . ..). And .ul of this ignort·s tht• initial clJuse in the statement, wh.id1 only multiplies the
problem (e.~.. \\ 1TH J doubt .... without J C ERTAINTY .. .).

Standard Pragmatic Model

Most mo,ic:rn sdwlJrly Jtt<:mpcs to theoretically explain verbal irony compn:hension have thus
.ittt·mptt·,I me.ms ,)tht·r dun upposition. Ont· important comprehension account is essentiJily
Jn extension oi tht• ewmually k·rmcJ. St.11llhnl PrJ~matic Model (SPM) .1pplit·d to irony com-
prdit'nsion (Searle. J 96'1: 1979; Gri,c:. 1975; l 'J89). Th.is approach invol\'t's J multisc.1ge mo,iel

238
 Irony and Sarcasm

that claims hearers will first complete a morpho-syntactic/Iex;cal/semantic analysis of an ironic

remark that would arrive at a complete, .. non-ironic" interpretation that corresponds to the
direct meanings of the words used. within the syntactic structure they inhabit. Upon subse-
quently comparing this interpretation with the rnntext surrounding the situation and realizing
the inappropriateness of this first meaning with that context, the speaker would then conduct a
re-interpretation. This reinterpretation is licensed by the simultaneous operation of the Gricean
cooperative principle and thus the scc111i1~1( violation of the Gricean maxim of quality. This sec-
ond stage amounts to an implicature for re-interpreting the comment to have the ironic mean-
ing initially intended by the speaker.
A number of problems with this approach to irony comprehension can also be identified,
some of which motivate moclch-to-be revit·wed subsequently. Most prominent among these
problems is empirical evidence failing to show consistent and necessarily lengthier comprehen-
sion times for ironic relative to non-ironic remarks as the SPM would pn·d1ct (Gibbs, 1986).This
account also fails to align with other theoretical developments including a search for meaning
and cognitive economy (Gibbs. 1994). Moreover, the SPM was aq,'11ed to be too narrow to
account for instances of irony that stemmed from Gricean maxims other than quality (Kaufcr,
1981; Accardo, 2000; Colston, 2000c). The account also did not readily incorporate the role of a
speaker's attitude towards a referent topic in the use of verbal irony (Attarclo, 2000).

Direct Access
Many accounts proposed to explain verbal irony comprehension implicitly or explicitly claim
special compre hension processes arc required for successful irony comprehension. Whether
these involve opposition computation, reinterpretation or others, many accounts favor the
view that irony comprehension is somehow exceptional. The Direct Acces~ Account. however,
argues that verbal irony comprehension proceeds directly. with no special or separate processing
mechanisms not also found or potentially available for non-ironic (or other kinds of fih'Urative)
language compreht•nsion. The Direct Access Account accepts that verbal irony m11 involve very
rich mechanisms (e.g., allusion to a fixed expression. mimicry. layered meanings), but these arc:
also readily observed in non-ironic and other figurative comprehension . Moreover. there is
no necessity for a multistage comprehension process-verbal irony can i1mead be computed
directly from the utterance and context (Gibbs, 1986).
The Direct Access Account. in making the broad claim about a lack of exceptionalicy in ver-
bal irony comprehension, subsumes or allows for several of the other account, prcsc:nted ht·rc:,
but is at direct odds with some of them. Direct Access can im·olve mention. echo, reminder. and
pretense as well as allusion, contrast and other mechanisms found in other verbal irony com-
prehension accounts (see the following sections) , because these arc also found in nonfiiurative
language comprehension. Direct Access conflicts, however, with the Opposition. SPM. Relevant
Inappropriateness and Graded Salience Accounts that explicitly call for multiple stJges in verbal
irony comprehension, at least on occasion.

Mention/Echo/Reminder
Other modern scholarly anempts to theoretically explain verbal irony co111prchem1on have
attempted to avoid the multistage claims of the Standard Pragmatic Model. One such accou nt
invoked thl.' philosophical usd ml.'ntion distinction to explam verbal irony comprchemion.This
account argut'S that a statement of wrbal irony inrnh-es explicit mc111io11 of a st.nement. belief.
procl.unation. opinion, etc., spoken (written) by some other speaker (writer). rathcr than a direct

239
Herbert L. Colston

11sc of such a statement to express one's own belief. etc.The statement is also typically mentioned
in tht· presence of contextual information that demonstrates its falsehood. In this way. the ironic
speaker detaches him/hl'rself from the mentioned false statement, and achieves verbal irony
accordingly (Sperber & Wilson, 198 la; Wilson & Sperbt·r, 1992; Wilson, 2006).
Initial critirism of this orip:inal mc11fi()/1 view argued that many instances of verbal irony do
not involve a specific quotation of some other speaker or person, but rather simply refer to some
possible belief that r,111/d be held by someone. So a revision that allowed for verbal irony to be
a mention of an attrilmtl'd belil'f was proposed, or that an cr/11> of attributed beliefs can achieve
wrbal irony (Sperber & Wilson. 198(,). The detachment-from-falsehood mechanism is essen-
tially the same as in the original proposal, thou~h. so a speaker still achieves the verbal irony in
this fashion.
Further rl'visions allowed for a broader re111i11dcr of somc p:<.·neral. widely held belief or social
norm, ratht·r than a specific mention of a real or attributed belief (Kreuz & Glucksbcrg. 1989).
Put succinctly, this Mcntion/Erho/R.emindcr family of accounts argues that verbal irony
involves a reminder (via mention, echo or other similar means) of some belief not held by the
speaker but instead reft·renct·d by the spcakcr, while in a context that contradirts the bclicf. all
with the twin goals of demonstrating how the belief is wrong given the current contextual
evidence contradicting it, and detaching the spt·aker from that bdief. So for instance a speaker
saying.

3. Noc a cloud in the sky

during a hurric:me. could be (I) directly quoting another spt"aker (e.g.. a weather forecaster on
an t'.lrlit·r posted ,wbcast) who had l.'rroncously 1m·dictcd cloudless skies, (2) mentioning a belief
attributed to a hypothetical spt·akt·r who also erroneously predicts clear skies, or (3) simply cit-
ing till' genaal socially shared dt·sirc or prcfi.•rcncc for nice weather. Each of these references
involws a rrn1inder ot a viewpoint (c.g .. being happy because the skies are clear) not currently
hdll by tht· sreakn. so the spt·aker detaches him/ herself from that viewpoint and shows how the
viewpomt and anyone who hokh it is wrong.

Pretense
Anotht·r approad1 dewlope,I generally in parallel to the Mcntion / Echo/Reminder Accoum(s)
;1rgues that .111 ironir spe:1kcr ratha tl1Jn just abstractly mt·ntioning. echoing or reminding ht'ar-
t•rs of so111t' real or attributed vit·wpoint, is instead overtly pretc111/i11,(? to be another person,
t·ithcr n-al or hypotlwtical. who holds that viewpoint (Cbrk & Gt•rrig. 1984; Currie, 2006).The
sp,·akt· r then portrays what that other pt'rson would say, often with a derisiw and/or exaggcr-
Jtt'd r h:1rJcH·riz.1tion. as a 111e.111s of making his/hcr pretense transparent. This act also detaches
tht• spe.1ker from wh.1t hisl ht·r portr.1yt'd rhar.1ctcr is advocating. and, in turn. belittles or derides
the- portrayed \'il',,·point and its hokkr(s).
In m.my w.1ys Pretemt· m:1kes the same c!Jims as Mention/ Echo/ Reminder in that an ironic
spt·,1kcr is somd10w demonstr..ning an attributed (.ind false) viewpoint (Spaber, 1984; Wil-
li.um. I 'Jl:\4: Winna. I lJl'tl: Cht·n. I lJlJ I: R1rbe. 1995) . lndecd. Winncr (198X) claimed that both
approarhcs amount to "substitution'' expl.111.nions. But Prctense adds the compo nents of out-
rndit mimirr,· .1nd dt·min.· portr.1~•.i.l as a me.ms of \'i\'idly expbining hO\v a speJkt•r demon-
st~.itt·s his/ ht·; .1ttitthic (typit·ally nt'!['Jtive) tow.mis the reft•rent topic. Ml.'"ntion / Echo/ Rent.inJer
j\ le~s precist• 111 ,·xrlJmin!! how this derisi,·e .1ttitude demonstration is brou!?ht .1bo ut. Other acts
ot mention o r echo c.111 .1rtuJlly ,lemonstrJtt· a spt'Jker's ronrurrcnc,· with the re.u o r attributed

240
 Irony and Sarcasm

statement; thus, Pretense supplies a ready mechanism of showing a speaker's disagreeing attitude
in using verbal irony-derisive or mocking portrayal of what some other speaker would say.
Other scholars have also argued that Pretense is broader than Mention/Echo/Reminder, allow-
ing it to handle dramatic and situational irony (Attardo, 2000) .
Another characteristic of the Pretense Account is its ready alit:,'l1ment with the highly preva-
lent human behavior of mimicry, which supports a wide array of socio-cognitive activities
(e.g., pretend play and human development, social alignment, flattery, portrayal, narrative, cari-
cature, and many others).

Allusional Pretense
This comprehension account incorporated some aspects of both the more traditional SPM and
the newer Mention/Echo/Reminder Accounts (Kumon-Nakamura et al., 1995). The AJlusional
Pretense Account preserves the former by attempting to anchor verbal irony on very specific claims
made in the original Speech Act Theory concerning felicitous speech aces-in some ways a precur-
sor to the Standard Pragmatic Model. The AJlusional Pretense Account also aligned and extended
Mention/Echo/Reminder in calling for"allusion" as a mechanism for reference to socially shared
desires or preferences. This account thus claims chat verbal irony must (I) violate the sincerity
conditions for well-formed speech acts and (2) be spoken in the midst of violated expectations.
The second of these claims is not unique to AJlusional Pretense: most accounts explicitly or
implicitly claim this. But the first clann-enabled explanation of non-declarative forms of verbal
irony, and thus provided a broader and more basic general linguistic process for the triggering of
verbal irony without having to resort to the original Gricean requirement for a violation of the
Quality maxim. Allusional Pretense also avoided the use of mechanisms outside of traditional
comprehension/use theories, such as Mention/Echo/Reminder and Pretense had (use/men-
tion distinctions and mimicry/derisive portrayal, respectively).
The next account revisited the claims in Allusional Pretense concerning verbal irony neces-
sarily riding on (1) felicity conditions for well-formed speech acts (i.e., pragmatic insincerity)
and (2) a violation of expectations-subjecting them to empirical evaluation. It in part con-
firmed these conditions, but also called for some revisions to their scope.

Contrast
This account originated in work that addressed the question concerning why speakers would use·
verbal irony.That work had identified contrast, as in the pervasive C(l11trast cffi'a found throughout
areas of perceptual, cognitive, and social psychology, as a means of explaining mag11itude-of-
neg-Jtivicy judgments in verbal irony comprehension.
Very briefly. hearers (readers) will reliably consider stereotypically sarcastic comments (posi-
tive statements made about negative situations) as more negative in comparison to directly nt·ga-
tive commentary made about the same situations (Colston & O'Brien. 2()0iJa; 2/J(jfJb; Cobton.
2002- although sec Dews & Winner. 1995 and Dews et al .. 191J5 for an alternative explanation
of a dilution of negativity in verbal irony usage). The increased negativity was shown to stem
from a contrast dTect. Ncgative situations (e.g., bad weather) arc seen to be worse whe11 juJ~cd
in the context of positivc commem:.1ry (e.g., " what a beamifol day.,). relative to direct negative
commentary (c.g., " what a terrible d.iy'}A speaker thus using this contrast to produce the more
negative perception is comprehended herself as being more negative. Thi\ suppl.it"s one of the
reasons for why speakers use verbal irony. or at least ironic criticism or sarcasm- to achieve an
enhancement of neg.niviry. or at le:.1st provide some control over le\·eb of expn:ssed negativity.

241
Herbert L. Colston

This mechanism was then applied to the co111prc/1c11sit>11 explan;ltion in a Contrast Account that
largdy resembled Allusional Pretense but that revised one of its primary two claims (Colston,
201J0c).The claim that verbal irony requires the presence of (or inference of) violated expectations.
cksircs. or preferences was empirically confirmed as a necessary condition of comprehension.
Allusional Pretense's other claim, however, of pragmatic insincerity. or a violation of sincerity con-
dition for wdl-fonm·d speech acts, was argued and empirically demonstrated to be too narrow.
A rl·plaCl·ment that pinned verbal irony on a broader violation of 1111y Gricean maxim was
suggestl·d. along with the rcqllirement that the expected, desired, or preferred state of affairs be
pmitioned in r,mtmst to the actual state of affairs that occurred (Colston, 2000c). This revision
,vas arf..rt1ed ;JS necessary to morl' prt:ciscly corral the demarcation of verbal irony from non-irony.
Allusi onal Pretense put the basis of verbal irony on unmet felicity conditions for well-formed
spt·t·ch arts-or, bc·ing pragmatically insincere, along with a violation of expectations. Contrast
put it on a violation of'"')' Grirean m;1xim, induding Manner. along with the same violation of
expectations. This alter.1tio11 allmwd for cases where a speaker is being generally pragmatirally
si11ffrt', but is nom·thdess in violation of a Gricean maxim, and is interpreted ironically.
Consider as an example the vt·ry gcm·ric case of a speaker experiencing an obvious disap-
pointmt·nt. ;111d then in an earnest, disappointed manner (e.g .. head shaking, intonation indicat-
ing disgmt} saying,

"Oh how I low wht•n things turn out the way you want."

1-krl' the spt-.ikt·r is tl'chnically being prag111atically sincere-she adheres to the felicity condi-
tiom for wdl-for111cd speerh ans (Austin. I 962; Searle, I 969; I 979; Kuman-Nakamura et al..
1995). \\/hat shl· says is true: sht• is being informative to the addressee, her attitude is earnest.
and ht·r politl·ne,s lcwl is apt. But she is 111aking her statement as if it matched the events actu-
ally prl·~ent in her curn·nt world. r;1thcr than other events she would prefer to have happened
(violation of Rdevance).
( )thrr instances of wrbal irony that stemmed from each of the other Gricean maxims can
Jlso lw dl·monstratt·d. For instance. ewn violations of Manner can result in at least borderline
wrbJl irony. Comider the case where two assist;lnt basketball coaches enter a room where a
young mJn is supposed to be wJiting to try out for a basketball team. They open the door, only
to Sl'l' dozc•ns of vt>ry tall young men stJnding, waiting for instructions. One coach whispers to
tlw othl·r. " whid1 guy is ours?"The other coach responds, ''the tall one" (Colston. 2000c).
The ContrN Account also called for a positioning of the violated expectations as if in
comr.1~t to n·.1lity. This positioning is inherent in many of the terms used to grapple with irony
expl.111.1tions (t·.g.. oppo~ite. l·ontrary, contrJindicatcd. bi-coherent. etc.). One cannot simply
,·iol.ltl' J maxim (e.g.. rdr,~1nre. m;mnt·r}. in the midst of an expectation violation and achieve
\'t'rbJI irony. Expl'Ctations and re.11ity must be additionally presented i11 t<mtmst with one another
(Col~ton. 2ll0Uc) . Fo r ex.unplt-. consider that a speJker has he-en waiting an hour for a late friend
tt> pick him up. The- friend foully ;1rrives. i-.ri1iltily approaches. and the speaker says angrily,

Ht'rt· .1 ,·iol.1tion of .1 Grict•Jn M.1x.i111 (the infornution presented in the rommenc is oh\'iously
known to tlit· lw.m:r). an,i Jn expt·n.ition \'iol.itio n is pn·~em. but no irony occurs. If the spe.1ker
,wn· inste.1d to s.1y. in till' t'XJrt s.1me earnt·,t .md honest . .111gry tone:

"You ft' timt'!"

0

0 11

242
 Irony and Sarcasm

The difference lies in the presentation of the expectl.'d situation and reality. In the first exam-
ple, the speaker presents the reality (the driver is late) in the midst of that reality (the driver is
late). This could very well lead to a ~c11eratii,11 of the expected situation (the driver being on time)
in the mind of the hearer, at least implicitly. Bue it does not co11trast chat expected situation and
reality.The reality occurred, the expected situation did not, and the speaker states effectively that
the reality occurred. and allows the potential inference that the expected situation did not occur,
but does not create a contrast between expectations and reality.
In the second example, though, the speaker presents the expectt·d situation (the driver being
,,,, time) in the midst of the reality (the driver is late). The second situation thus contrasts the
expected situation and reality. The reality occurred, the expected situation did not. llut here the
speaker states effectively that the expected situation occurred, and therefore concurrently sug-
gests that the reality did not occur.
So in the case of verbal irony. a speaker somehow makes manifest that an expected/ desired/
preferred situation occurred, when it did not. Or conversely s/he presents that a reality did not
occur. when it actually did. These contrasting possibilities are thus the backbone of the irony.
This contrast can be achieved by a variety of mechanisms (e.g .. mention. echo, reminder, pre-
tense. allusion). but they all share the requirement that expectations and rt·ality must contr.ist
with one another.
These revisions by the Contrast Account accomplished three things. First, they allowed for
verbal irony to stem from maxims other than Quality, as proposed origin;illy by Grice and later
criticized by Kaufer (1981). The Contrast Account also could then subsume Mention/Echo/
Rerninder,Allusion and Pretense as 111ccha11is111s by rvhicl, expectations/desires/preferences could
be contrasted with reality. Finally. and perhaps most importantly, the Contrast Account dem-
onstrated how a too-strong reliance on the notion of sequentiality in comprehension could be
limiting the explanatory power of verbal irony comprehension accounts and indeed all forms of
indirect/figurative language comprehension explanations.
The Contrast mechanism is less vulnerable to this sequentiality issue because it is ba\Cd on
perceptual contrast. which involves chc si11111/ta11co11s processing of a target in a contrastin~ or
other context(s). Contrast effects like those claimed in verbal irony comprchemion h:1ve been
found in an enormous arr.iy of domains from sensory effects through perceptual judgmerm of
magnicudes up to social and cognitive judgments of people and situations. None of these effects
requires sequential, encapsulated processing of individual components. That the speech stream
unfolds in time may have led verbal irony explanations to greatly accend to the role of sequenti-
ality in processing, but ocher less temporally dependent mechanisms can still greatly affect how
meaning happens in language.
The next comprehension account ended up making a very similar claim co that by the
Contrast Account concerning a violation of any Gricean Maxim resulting in verbal irony."! his
account also parsimoniously combined two of the emerging neccss.uy conditions for verbal
irony, violation of expectations and flouted Gricean Maxims. This Relev.mc Inappropriaten ess
Account, however, retained the claim for multiple stages in processing, and did not comider
the role contrast mechanisms play in verbal irony. le additionally proposed an idea concerning a
limitation to the extent of a violation of a Gricean Maxim.

Relevant Inappropriateness
Building upon criticisms of preexisting .1pproaches. Accardo (2000) developed the Rdevdnt
ln.ippropriateness Account of verbal irony. Tlm account initially noted ch.it "'irony as a fig-
ure of speech'. (p. 797) appro.iches wen: inadequate. which includcJ (as labeled here·) the

243
Herbert L. Colston

Oppmition, SPM-and by extension older Speech Act explanations not reviewed here, as
well as the Gradl·d Salience Account (see the next section). Opposition and SPM explana-
tions wt•re discounted in mu ch the same way as argued previously here, with the exception of
SPM's rdiance on multiple stages of interpretation, which was preserved. The SPM was also
criti ciZl'd for claiming a rejection of initial (incorrect) comprehension products. This criticism
w,1s argued to support the Graded Salience view (Giora, 1995; 1997; Giora et al., 1998) that
calkd for retention of initial comprehension products for use in comparison with lacer com-
prd1ensio11 products.
The Rdevant Inappropriateness Account then discounted " irony as mention" approaches
larµdy for their seeming failure to provide necessary and sufiicient conditions to logi cally dis-
tinguish imtanct·s of irony and non-irony. The Pretense Account fairs better in that it is argued
to hl· a much broader t•xplanation than the mention approaches.
Th,· altl·rnative view that is presented is in line with Kaufer ( 1981) and is similar co the Allu-
sional Pretense and Contrast Accounts in that it argues that verbal irony must be based more
broadly than 011 a si mple violation of the Grice.m Quality maxim. This account also acknowl-
t:dgcs that tht: violation of any Grice:111 Maxim allows explanations of verbal irony that are left
uncxplai1ml by tht· Standard Pragmatic Model and Allusional Pretense approaches.
Rather than use a Grin·an Maxim violation, however. Attardo utilizes the notion of inap-
pmpri.1te1l('ss as the hinge-pin of wrbal irony. The following definition of inappropriateness is
otlcrt·d:

An utterance II is contt·xtually appropriate if all presuppositions of u are identical to or

comp;1tibk with all the presuppositions of the context C in which u is uttered (c.f. the
notion of"co111mon ground"; Clark, 1996). except for any feature explicitly thematized
and denfrd in 11.
(Attardo, 2000, p. 8 18)

Rde,·.111t lnappropriatl'ness thus does away with the explicit condition of a violation of expecta-
tiom as neccssJry for w rhal irony. By accounting for the intt·rlo(·utors' t·xpcctacions and the fact
that they ·w bl'l'n viol.1tt·d. as bt·ing .1 mhst·t of the presuppositions of the conversational context,
this factor is thus emhe,l,led in the notion of inappropriateness.
This arrount also proposes a "'principle of kast disruption" (Actardo, 2000) chat corr.tls the
extt·nt of the inappropriateness of an ironic utterance. According co this principle, a hearer will
presume that a spt·Jkt•r who viol.itt·s the Gricean Coopcrati\'e Principle' in using verbal irony,
is ,loing so to till" k.m possible t'Xtcnt, such tlut the inc1c•ndcd meaning is still referring co che
contt·xt .111d is thus mt·.111ingfol for the hl·arer. This prevents the heart'r from disengaging from
the conwrs.1ti on entirely as might be the c.1se if a mort' extensive violation of the Cooperative
Prinnplt· were pn·sumt·,1 (e.g .. that the spcJkt•r is genuinely being uncooperJtive).
Att.mlo .tlso ,ugut·d l·onvinongly thJt rdcvance and appropriateness, although often in
coht·n·nct·. an- not coextensin.-. Thus an inst.ince of inappropriateness muse also be relevant to a
h,·.m·r for irony to be achie\'C.!: it cannot just be inappropriatt· in some extensive or random way.
L.1stly. tlw Rdt•,·Jnt ln.1ppropriJteness view also 3ttcmpts to preserve the mulcistage nature
of the;• ,,rigin.tl Sta1hl.m.l Pr.1gmatic Model. This prest•rvation is argued JS necessary co explain
comrreht·mions of nowI instancl's ot \"t.'rbJI irony, where there is no a priori basis upm1 which
to fon.-~t.111 tht' nonti~11.1rati\'e meJning of Jn ironic ucterance.
fu 0 llt' of tl1t' 111ore rc·ceut accounts of \'t'rb.il irony comprehension. Rdevant Jnappropri-
JH'lll'SS ,·mc·rged near the be14inning ot rc~·ard1 on embodit•d simulatio n (see the bter St'ction)
thJt mav lk· :-asrin~ J m·w light on the notion of ~eyuentiality and multistage proc,·ssing. Both
. -
244
 Irony and Sarcasm

Relevant Inappropriateness and Graded Salience maintain the possibility of these in their expo-
sition. This issue is reconsidered below (see the section " New Debates").

Graded Salience
The next comprehension account puts a greater reliance on the lexical processes involvi:d in
verbal irony comprehension than other accounts, emphasizing the potential for irony co be
encoded in the lexicon. This Graded Salience Account (Giora, 1997; 2002; 2007) portends that
multiple influences on the different related sensi:s of words will make certain meanings more
and less salient. The conventionality, frequency, familiarity, and prototypicality of different senses
of words, for instance, will influence whether those sensi:s arc coded in the lexicon or arc made
salient. For instance, if a particular sense of a word is frequently encountered as ironic (e.g., stt1-
pi</, or something similar, as the ironic meaning for "wise''), then that meaning can become
salient and will always be accessed initially when heard/read (e.g.. "wise guy"). Afterward, con-
textual influences can then arise to influence meaning.
The second main idea of the Graded Salience Account concerns indirect negation, or the
idea that if a non-salient meaning is the one intended by a speaker/writer, it will be accessed
subsequently to the salient meaning, but chat salient meaning will not be suppressed completely
as other accounts of negation argue, but rather retained so that a difference between the salient
and non-salient meanings can be computed and the final ironic meaning determined.
The Graded Salience Account has frequ ently been put at odds with the Direct Access
Account, which places more emphasis on the contextual influences, arguing that context can
play a role even prior to lexical processing in the form of expectations for ironic meaning.This
discrepancy is also treated below (see the section "New Debates").

Embodied Simulation
In chis very recent account, which has become a major nt"w development in language process-
ing at large, verbal irony comprehension is considered under the view that a major portion of
language processing involves activation and simulation of neural activity that would occur were
the comprehender actually engaging, sensorily and motorily, with what is stated in language.
whether read or heard. For instance. if a person hears the sentence, " The man is pushing the cart
across the warehouse floor," neural activity can be detected in the person's brain that is extremely
similar to chat observable wt"re the person amlilfly pushing a cart, or _!!c11ui11ely seeing a person
push a cart. in the fashion described. The primary clittt"rcnce in the case of languagt" processing
vs. genuine sensorimotor activity is that the sensory organs and/ or muscles involved are not in
genuine activation during language processing (ht·nce the term,''simulation "). According to this
general view, language processing usurps preexisting sensory and motor programs a_s part of tht"
process of meaning-making (Bergen. 2012). The sensory and motor entailments of'"pushing"
(e.g., the effort, difficulty anJ fatigue involved, momentum that can amass. among many other
things) can then ser\"e to embellish tht" comprehended meaning of the linguistic statement.
Applied to verbal irony. simulation would seem similar to proces~ing of negatt"d or counter-
factual statements. For instance. for a pcrson to comprehend the neiative. "'The bananas are 110 r
on the refrigerator." or coumcrfactual. •·1f there were bananas on the refrigerator.'' a si mulation
of genui ne set"ing ofban:111as on a refrigerator has been found to precede a simubcion of see-
ing a refrigerator without bananas atop. That which is stated as not being present is nonethde,s
initially simulated. An ironic mag~· of an uctaance similar to these. for imtance !>aying. ··Yeah
right. the bananas arc on thc refriger.ltor." in response to soml.'onc claiming bananas rvm· on the

245
Herbert L. Colston

appliance dt•spite their obvious absence, would seem to operate similarly.A sensorimotor simula-
tion of BANANAS would he part of the processing stream, preceding one of a l~EFRlGER.A-
TOR WITHOUT BANANAS (Bergen, 2012).

New Debates
The Embodied Simulation Account applied to verbal irony may seem co rekindle the debate
rt·garding single vs. multiple stages, as is still being wagl·d hy the Relevant Inappropriateness,
Gr.Hkd Salience, Direct Access and Contrast accounts. Direct Access always allowed for the
possibility of reinterpretation, but claimed that it wasn't necessary-ironic comprehensions
could he arhiewd without recourse to multiple stages. Relevant Inappropriateness and Graded
Salience rt·taint•d multiph: stages umkr certain circumstances to explain instances of verbal
irony wht•re rcintnpretations did occasionally occur and for c,1lculations of difft·rences between
statl:d and intl·ndcd meanings. The Contrast account attempted to obviate the issue of sequen-
tiality by claiming that difli:renccs of the sort discussed hy Graded Salience could take place in
a si11111/t,111c1111s fashion, analogous to perct>ption of both figure and ground in pt·rceptual contrast
situations.
That embodit.'d simulation research on negated and countt•rfactual constructions has shown
evicknct• for simulations of that which isn't there, as in a simulation taking place of sensory
activity simil:tr to actuJlly seeing bananas, upon comprehension of language saying bananas
arc not pn•sent. may shed new light on this issue. Embodied simulations of this kind may pro-
vidt• somt· sort of common ground among these different ,1ccounts. These kinds of embodied
simulation an· not in and of themsdves. language comprehension. They are rather support pro-
cesses <~fl.111guage compreht·mion. They can also occur very rapidly. and perhaps to some degree
indept·mlendy of languagt' processing pt·r se. As such, tht·y could align with Contrast, Graded
Salit·nce and Rt·k\'ant Inappropriateness. all of which seek to grapple with influences of stated
and inten,kd mt·anings togetht~r in irony comprehension. But given embodied simulations'
pJralld rather than embt•dded nature with language processing proper, they can also nicdy fit
with a Din·ct Access approach-a heart·r or reader directly processes an ironic mean.ing. but that
meaning <·,m be infiut·nced by the embodied simulations that are triggered during the process
of comprd1ension.
l'n·cisdy how these t'mbodied simulations specifically fit into specific aspects of online verbal
inmy co111prd1ension is t'Sst· nti,11ly tht" forl'front of current research on verbal irony comprehcn-
!>ion. Rt'~olution of the rolt· of embodied simulation in verbal irony is thus important as it can
.1llow n·tint·mt·nt and perhaps imegrJtion of some of the disparate accounts.

Irony and Sarcasm Usage

Of the otht·r ma_1or que~tions askt·d of rcst•arch on \'erbal irony. including sarcasm, the question
of wh.1t it a('(:omplisht.>s f<."1r speJkt'rs lus emergt>d as an important line of research in its own
ridtt. Giwn some Jrgu.1bly comrJwning accounts (e.g .. tht· Cooperative Principle. Cogn.iti\·e
E:·onomy. Rdt•\'atKt' Theory etc.} tlm extol how 1.mguagt> processing ought to function in as
direct a form .1s possiblt· for etticit·nt meJning exchange. what is the benefit for speakers for
using ti!,t\1r:1ti\'C forms like \'erbal irony/ s.1rcam1?
Tltt' simplt· Jnswer to the us.tgt· question is that figuratiw and in<linc·ct forms including wr-
b.tJ iron\' ,111 d s.ircJsm a,Ct)mplish intrirJte meJning for spt.>Jkers tlut justify their existt'nce (s~·e
Cohton·. 20 15). Germ.me to verhJI irony and sJn:asm are such "pragmatic efierts" as managing
nntJti\'Jt)' Jnd n>Lttt·d face is~ues for intt.>rloniturs, accomplishing a variety of complex soci.il

246
 Irony and Sarcasm

and interaction goals, and achieving balance among occasionally competing and offietting com-
municative intentions and m:eds (Slugoski & Turnbull, 1988).
Work has shown, for instance, that speakers can manage face issues among interlocutors and
overhearers through verbal irony, by engineering to a degree the strength and type of negativity
expressed (Colston, 2015). These kinds of pragmatic effects aren't dt·terministic. 13ut speakers
nonetheless can attempt some control over the nuance of their expression by working with
humor, private keys, contrast, and many other meaning manipulators, as well as more global
influences availed to figurative language in general as a way of speaking (i.e., ingratiation, mas-
tery display, distancing, objcctivation, and many others).

Conclusion
Although treatment here was limited to discussion of the varieties of accounts of the com-
prehension of, and to a much lesser extent usage of, verbal irony and sarcasm, many additional
phenomena also surround and abut this family of tropes. Similar broader mechanisms of indirect
meaning expression can be observed in parody, satire, pastiche, visual irony, and others. Hypoc-
risy and situational irony arc also highly related concepts. How comprehension and perfor-
mance of these similar forms of indirectness develops in young children and across the life span
is also sub3ect to much ongoing research, especially in elder populations where less attention has
been directed. How such indirect forms are affected in "normally devc:loping" vs. other popula-
tions is also of much interest to scholars and researchers from many disciplines.
It is interesting to observe the limited research on phenomena par.tile! to verbal irony and
sarcasm, across comprehension, usage, development and diverse population approaches. For ver-
bal irony and sarcasm, the predominant question has concerned comprehension. This is not
always the case for the other phenomena. One inspiration for future research might thus be to
look at questions asked of those other phenomena (e.g., how is pastiche c1ppreci<1tecl, at what age
do people fom, tl,c concept of satire, is there a developmental change in the tolerance of /1ypocrisy)
where the comprehension and perhaps usa~e questions are less prominent. Given the intensely
linguistic basis of verbal irony and sarcasm, the focus on comprehension is understandabk. 13ut
it may shroud other ways of exploring the tropes. Looking to work on sister tropes or similar
phenomena could thus be a fruitful strategy for new ideas.

References
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