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Secure quantum conversation through non-destructive discrimination of highly entangled multipartite states

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September 2009
EPL, 87 (2009) 60008 doi: 10.1209/0295-5075/87/60008 www.epljournal.org

Secure quantum conversation through non-destructive discrimination of highly entangled multipartite states
Sakshi Jain1(a) , Sreraman Muralidharan2(b) and Prasanta K. Panigrahi3,4(c) Indian Institute of Technology-Bombay - Mumbai, 400076, India Department of Information and communication technology, Royal Institute of Technology (KTH) SE-164 40 Kista, Sweden, EU 3 Indian Institute of Science Education and Research Kolkata, BCKV Campus Main Oce - Mohanpur, 741252, India 4 Physical Research Laboratory - Navrangpura, Ahmedabad, 380 009, India
2 1

received 13 July 2009; accepted in nal form 11 September 2009 published online 9 October 2009
PACS PACS

03.67.Hk Quantum communication 03.65.Ud Entanglement and quantum nonlocality (e.g. EPR paradox, Bells inequalities, GHZ states, etc.)

Abstract Quantum conversation is a way in which two parties can communicate classical information with each other using entanglement as a shared resource. We present this scheme using a multipartite entangled state after describing its generation through appropriate circuit diagrams. We make use of a discrimination scheme which allows one to perform a measurement on the system without destroying its entanglement. We later prove that this scheme is secure in a noiseless and a lossless quantum channel.
Copyright c EPLA, 2009

Introduction. Quantum cryptography [13] is one of the signicant applications of quantum information theory, which has also been experimentally realized in various systems [4,5]. It enables one to transmit secret messages between various parties with unconditional security. Quantum secure direct communication (QSDC) [6] is an important branch of quantum cryptography, which uses entanglement as a resource to transmit quantum information in a secure manner, without establishing a random key. In recent years, several QSDC schemes, involving EPR pairs [7] and multiparticle entangled channels [8,9] have been investigated. Most of these protocols involve joint measurements to be carried out on an entangled basis which is a non-trivial task. Instead, measurements on a product basis is often preferred [10]. However, this disturbs the entanglement of the system and makes the state unusable for further applications. Instead, approaches based on non-destructive discrimination (NDD) can be more useful as it enables discrimination between orthogonal quantum states by allowing a product basis measurement without destroying the entanglement of the system [1114]. Characterization of entanglement of greater than four qubits under LOCC is still an unsolved problem. However,
(b) E-mail: (a) E-mail:

sakshi.r.jain@gmail.com sreraman@kth.se (c) E-mail: prasanta@prl.res.in

approaches based on numerical optimization procedures to nd higher qubit entangled states have recently attracted attention [1517]. First, such procedure was studied by Brown et al. [15], who arrived at a highly entangled ve-qubit state given by 1 |5 = (|001 | + |010 | + |100 |+ + |111 |+ ), 2 (1) 1 1 where | = 2 (|00 |11 ), | = 2 (|01 |10 ) are the Bell states. This result was veried by yet another numerical procedure carried out later [16]. This state is maximally persistent [18] and shows a high degree of connectedness [19], which is an indication of genuine multiparticle entanglement. Further, it assumes the same form for all ten (3 + 2) splits. It was shown that, |5 can be used for perfect teleportation and state sharing of an arbitrary two-qubit state [20]. This state can also be physically realized in a cavity QED system, which is insensitive to both cavity decay and thermal eld [21]. The dense coding [22] capacity of this state reaches the Holevo bound, thereby allowing the transmission of ve classical bits using three qubits by consuming only two ebits of entanglement [20]. In this paper, we use the dense coding protocol and an ecient NDD scheme to set up a quantum conversation between two parties. We later prove that this protocol is secure under ideal conditions.

60008-p1

Sakshi Jain et al.

|0 |0 |0 |0 |0 H x H x x Fig. 1: Circuit diagram for the generation of |5 . H |5

For the sake of completeness, we shall discuss the dense coding protocol using |5 as a shared entangled resource [20]. Initially Alice and Bob possess, the rst three and the last two qubits of |5 , respectively. Suppose Alice has a secret message m1 m2 m3 m4 m5 where mi {0, 1} which she wants to send to Bob. To achieve this purpose, Alice operates unitarily on her rst three qubits as, (( 1 2 3 4 5 ) I I)|5 = |5 1 = x I I, = I I I, = I I x ,
2 3 m1 m2 m3 m4 m5 ,

between the 32 orthogonal |5 m1 m2 m3 m4 m5 states after implementing the dense coding protocol thereby allowing the quantum conversation to be established. Subsequently, we check for the security of the presented protocol. Quantum conversation. Generation and initialization. Here, we describe an explicit circuit diagram for the generation of the Brown et al. state a state which was obtained only through numerical searches in the past. As is evident from g. 1, by changing the input |00000 to a dierent computational basis, 32 orthogonal Brown et al. states can be obtained. The above circuit makes the Brown et al. state experimentally realizable in NMR and quantum dot systems. In our quantum conversation protocol, Alice rst prepares an ordered sequence of N copies of the ve-qubit 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 Brown et al. state |5 : [(q1 , q2 , q3 , q4 , q5 )), (q1 , q2 , . . . , N q5 )]. Here the subscripts represent ve dierent qubits in |5 and the superscripts indicate sequential ordering of the N dierent Brown et al. states. Alice then takes the same one qubit from each |5 to form ve ordered sequences corresponding to the ve qubits, generically written as, 1 2 3 N (5) Sk = [qk , qk , qk , . . . , qk ].

(2) if m1 = 1, if m1 = 0, if m2 = 1,

= I I I, if m2 = 0, = z z I, if m3 = 1, = I I I, if m3 = 0, 4 = x I x , if m4 = 1, = I I I, if m4 = 0, 5 = I x x , if m5 = 1, = I I I, if m5 = 0.

(3)

For example, if Alice wants to send the 5-bit classical information 10010 to Bob, the unitary operation that Subsequently, she keeps the particle sequences S1 , S2 , S3 and transmits the sequences S4 and S5 to Bob. Alice would apply on her qubits would be Measurement basis of Alice and Bob. Interestingly, (((x I I)(I I I)(I I I)(x I x ) the state |5 can be written down in two dierent forms as (I I I)) I I)|5 = (|5 100010 ). (4) 1 |5 12345 = (|001 | + |010 | + |100 |+ After performing the unitary operations in the above2 stated manner, Alice sends the three qubits to Bob. Bob, (6) + |111 |+ )12345 , on receiving Alices qubits, performs a joint ve partite von Neumann measurement in the |5 m1 m2 m3 m4 m5 |5 13245 = ([|+ |1 + |+ |0 ]|0+ + [|+ |1 basis and distinguishes these states, thereby obtaining |+ |0 ]|0 )13245 [| |1 + | |0 ]|1+ the message encoded by Alice. The present scheme for bidirectional quantum conver+ [| |1 | |0 ]|1 . (7) sation consists of ve main steps. In the rst and the second step, we generate the entangled state and initial- Alice and Bob exploit this characteristic of |5 to check ize the protocol for a security check. In the third step, an the presence of an eavesdropper. It can be noted that if eavesdroppers check on the multiqubit quantum channel one measures the qubits 4 and 5 by projection on the Bell is performed. Later, we propose a scheme to discriminate basis, i.e., say BM B1 (Bobs Measurement Basis-1), the 60008-p2

Secure quantum conversation through non-destructive discrimination etc.

|5
x

H H

|5 H
x

|0 |0 |0 |0 |0

x x
m1 m2 m3 m4 m5 .

Fig. 2: Circuit diagram for the non-destructive discrimination of |5

rst three qubits of Alice would collapse into one of the computational basis (|001 , |010 , |100 , |111 )123 which now forms the corresponding basis of Alices measurement (AM B1 ). On the other hand, if the state |5 is written as in eq. (7), it can be observed that if Bob measures his two qubits in the basis (BM B2 ): |0+ 45 , |0 45 , |1+ 45 , |1 45 , corresponding Alices measurement basis (AM B2 ) would be: (|+ |1 + |+ |0 )132 , (|+ |1 |+ |0 )132 , (| |1 | |0 )132 and (| |1 | |0 )132 . Utilizing this feature, Alice and Bob can design a defence strategy to guard against eavesdropping in the transmission. An explicit description of this strategy is given below.

system through the circuit diagram shown in g. 2, to discriminate between the 32 orthogonal Brown states non-destructively. The outcome of the circuit with the input state as |5 m1 m2 m3 m4 m5 can be written in general as |5 x |x , where |x is given by |m1 m2 m3 m4 m5 and |5 x is given by | m1 m2 m3 m4 m5 . Thus, Bob now measures the ancillas in the product basis and thereby obtains the classical message.

Establishment of quantum conversation. Bob now has all the ve qubits of the entangled Brown state. Hence, he can encode his message in the rst three qubits by applying unitary operations, as was done earlier by Alice and send the ve qubits to Alice in two sets of (4,5) Eavesdropping check. Bob chooses randomly a su- and (1,2,3). On receiving the entangled state Alice applies ciently large subset (called the sample subset) of the pair of NDD circuit to obtain the secret information and thus the qubits 4 and 5 from the sequences S4 and S5 and measures process continues. Hence, the conversation is established. them either in the basis BM B1 or BM B2 . He then tells Security analysis. Suppose Eve wants to attack the Alice the position of these pairs and the corresponding quantum channel and eavesdrop Alices secret message, chosen measurement basis through a classical channel. thereby rendering the protocol worthless. In the following Alice then measures the set of qubits 1, 2, 3 from the section we show that the protocol is secure against an sequences S1 , S2 , S3 in the corresponding basis AM B1 eavesdroppers attack in ideal conditions i.e., assuming no or AM B2 . Finally Alice and Bob check their measure- noises and losses in the quantum channel. ment outcomes to nd whether the quantum channel is In our protocol, Eve does not have access to all the ve altered. Later, they apply a majority voting technique to qubits at the same time. If she attacks only the encoded determine the error rate. If it turns out to be considerably particles by Alice, she can gain partial information about high, they discard the sample subset and abort the proto- the secret message, since the density matrix for Alices col. Else, they will securely use the remaining entangled system i.e., = |001 001| + |010 010| + |100 100| + pairs of shared |5 to communicate their secret messages |111 111| is a mixed state, though not maximally mixed, as in the next step. as expected in case of quantum channel with odd number Dense coding and NDD. The secret message m1 m2 m3 m4 m5 is encoded by Alice in her three qubits by applying the corresponding local unitary operations as in the dense coding protocol described earlier and sent to Bob. On receiving Alices qubits, Bob applies non-destructive discrimination (NDD) on the ve-qubit Brown et al. state thus obtained and decodes the message without disturbing the entanglement of the system. Inorder to achieve this, he operates on the of qubits. Hence, the attack strategy of Eve would be to prepare an ancilla in the initial state | , intercept the qubits 4 and 5 that are being transmitted by Alice to Bob and make the ancilla interact with them using a unitary operation. Next, when the rst three encoded qubits are sent to Bob, Eve would capture the qubits and make a joint measurement on the encoded qubits and her ancillas. In this way, Eve might obtain some information about Alices secret message.

60008-p3

Sakshi Jain et al. Let the ancilla attached by Eve on the qubits 4 and 5 Comparing eq. (8) with (4), we arrive at the following and the unitary operation performed by her be given conditions, which should be satised in order to avoid by, | and U , respectively. The operations that Eve can introducing error in the measurements: perform can be written in the most general form as 001|1 = 100|1 = 111|1 = 0, U : |00, |00, 00 + |01, 01 + |10, 02 + |11, 03 , 111|2 = 001|2 = 010|2 = 0, (12) 111|3 = 100|3 = 010|3 = 0, |01, |00, 10 + |01, 11 + |10, 12 + |11, 13 , 111|4 = 001|4 = 100|4 = 0. |10, |00, 20 + |01, 21 + |10, 22 + |11, 23 , Solving the eqs. (9) and (10), we obtain the following |11, |00, 30 + |01, 31 + |10, 32 + |11, 33 . conditions on the ancilla states: (8) |03 = |10 , |00 = |33 , Here, |ij , (i, j {0, 1, 2, 3}) are pure ancilla states, |22 = |11 , |21 = |12 , (13) uniquely determined by the unitary operator U . After the |20 = |23 = |10 = |13 = 0, interaction, the quantum state can be rewritten as, |02 = |01 = |32 = |31 = 0. | = [|+ |1 (|00, 00 + |01, 01 + |10, 02 where 0 is a null ket. Similarly, the second case is solved where Alice measures + |11, 03 ) + |+ |0 (|00, 10 + |01, 11 in the basis AM B2 , and Bob measures in the basis BM B2 + |10, 12 + |11, 13 ) | |0 (|00, 20 and the following constraints are obtained. + |01, 21 + |10, 22 + |11, 23 ) | = | , | = | , | |1 (|00, 30 + |01, 31 + |10, 32 + |11, 33 )]13245E (9)
00 22 13 31

Since Bob has a choice of measuring in the basis i.e., Since both the cases must be satised, ancilla qubits BM B1 , BM B2 the problem now breaks down into two cases. In the rst case, when Alice and Bob measure in must obey both eqs. (11) and (12) simultaneously. As a the bases AM B1 and BM B1 , respectively, the state can result, the entire state reduces to, | = |5 |00 E . From the above equation it is evident that the state | is be written as, reduced to a product of |5 and the ancilla. This implies | 132E45 = (|1 |+ + |2 |+ + |3 | that Eve cannot gain any information about Alices secret + |4 | )132E45 , (10) message by measuring the ancillas. Consequently, it can be deduced that the protocol is secure in the conditions, where, where there are no losses or noises in the quantum channel. |1 132E = (|+ |1 |00 + |+ |0 |10 Conclusion. In conclusion, we have presented a | |0 |20 | |1 |30 ) secure quantum conversation (of classical information) scheme involving dense coding through highly entangled +(|+ |1 |03 + |+ |0 |13 ve-qubit states as the quantum channel. We describe | |0 |23 | |1 |33 ), appropriate circuits for the generation of these states which were achieved only through numerical searches in |2 132E = (|+ |1 |01 + |+ |0 |11 the past. This was carried out using NDD of 32 orthogonal | |0 |21 | |1 |31 ) Brown et al. states. We also constructed explicit circuit diagrams for the same. Later, we proved that our schemes +(|+ |1 |02 + |+ |0 |12 are secure to eavesdroppers attack in ideal conditions. In | |0 |22 | |1 |32 ), future, we wish to make a detailed analysis on the type (11) of states that can be used for quantum conversation |3 132E = (|+ |1 |00 + |+ |0 |10 schemes. | |0 |20 | |1 |30 ) (| |1 | + | |0 |
+ 03 + 13

|11 = |33 , |02 = |20 , |01 = |03 = |21 = |23 = 0, |10 = |12 = |30 = |32 = 0.

(14)

| |0 |23 | |1 |33 ), |4
132E

= (|+ |1 |01 + |+ |0 |11 | |0 |21 | |1 |31 ) (|+ |1 |02 + |+ |0 |12 | |0 |22 | |1 |32 ).

The authors acknowledge the NIUS programme undertaken by Homi Bhabha Center for Science Education (HBCSE-TIFR) and Prof. V. Singh of HBCSE for encouragement and discussions. SJ and SM also acknowledge the warm hospitality of the Indian Institute of Science Education and Research (Kolkata), India, where the work was completed. 60008-p4

Secure quantum conversation through non-destructive discrimination etc.

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