You are on page 1of 2

Tsunami & beyond srilanka An event beyond all predictions struck the island on 26 December 2004, affecting not

only the peace process but the entire social fabric of Sri Lanka. As people celebrated the monthly poya festivities, the mighty waves of the tsunami cast their fury, killing 30, 000 people and leaving many more injured, homeless and orphaned. Initially there was optimism that the nation would come together in the face of catastrophe, but the optimism soon faded into argument over aid distribution, reconstruction, and land tenure and ownership. Meanwhile Kumaratunga, seeking to extend her presidential term, sought to have the constitution altered. However, her plans were thwarted by a Supreme Court ruling, which directed that presidential elections occur in 2005. Among the numerous contenders, two candidates were the most likely victors the then prime minister, Mahinda Rajapaske, and the opposition leader, Ranil Wickremasinghe. With an LTTE boycott on voting, Rajapaske, supported by the JVP and the Jathika Hela Urumaya (a party of Buddhist monks), won by a narrow margin. The LTTEs motives for the boycott were unclear but their actions cost Wickremasinghe an expected 180, 000 votes and the presidency, and, perhaps, the country a better chance at peace. As president, Rajapaske pledged to replace the Norwegian peace negotiators with those from the UN and India; to renegotiate a cease-fire with the LTTE; to reject Tamil autonomy; and to refuse to share tsunami aid with the LTTE. Such policies did not auger well for future peace. Meanwhile, LTTE leader Prabhakaran insisted on a political settlement during 2006, and threatened to intensify action if this did not occur. Within days of coming to power, Rajapaske reneged on his first undertaking and invited the Norwegians to continue their negotiations. But tensions were high and once again Sri Lanka was perched on a precipice. Killings, assaults, kidnappings and disappearances occurred on both sides, and commentators predicted the worst. As the first anniversary of the tsunami approached, world leaders, aid agencies and the global community pleaded with the government and the LTTE to stop the violence and return to the peace talks. Both parties agreed, and in February 2006 the Norwegians were able to help negotiate a statement that included commitments to a cease-fire and to further talks. Cracks were already showing in the Norwegian-brokered ceasefire when it was signed in February 2006, and by March the Sri Lankan Navy and the LTTE were again trading deadly salvos off the east coast near Trincomalee. Massive Sri Lankan Airforce airstrikes were delivered against the LTTE after an escalation in suicide and mine attacks, some targeting civilian populations. More than 60 people died when a bus travelling fromAnuradhapura struck a land mine. By August the fighting in the northeast was the most intense since the 2002 ceasefire, and peace talks in Geneva in October failed again. In June 2007 Sinhalese-Tamil tension further increased when police forced hundreds of Tamils from Colombo citing security concerns. A court ordered an end to the expulsions, but the actions set the scene for a period characterised by attacks and counter-reprisals from both sides. The optimistic days of negotiation and ceasefire seemed more distant than ever. In January 2008 the Sri Lankan government officially pulled out of the ceasefire agreement, signalling a single-minded dedication to ending the 25-year-old civil conflict by military means. It was a dedication reinforced by its response to the LTTE offer of a unilateral ceasefire in support of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in Colombo. The Sri Lankan response was emphatic. Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa (the younger brother of the president) dismissed the offer outright by claiming: "The ceasefire announcement is a ploy by the LTTE when it is being militarily weakenedto strengthen it militarily under the guise of holding negotiations. There is no need for the government to enter into a ceasefire agreement with the LTTE." A change in military strategy saw the Sri Lankan security forces fight fire with fire with an increase in guerrilla-style attacks. By July 2008 the important LTTE naval base of Vidattaltivu had been captured, and by August the Sri Lanka Army had entered the LTTEs final stronghold, the jungle area of the Vanni. The Sri Lankan government stated that the army was on track to capture the LTTE capital Kilinochchi by the end of 2008. Faced with a series of battleground defeats, the LTTE struck back with another suicide bomb in Anuradhapura, this time killing 27 people, including a former general in the Sri Lanka Army. The governments prediction of the capture of Kilinochchi by the end of 2008 was only a few days out, and on 2 January 2009 Sri Lankan forces entered the town that had been the de facto capital of the unofficial Tamil Eelam state since 1990. On 8 January 2009 the LTTE abandoned the Jaffna peninsula and retreated for a final stand in the Vanni jungle. Amid growing claims of civilian casualties and humanitarian concerns for the 250,000 noncombatants hemmed in by the fighting, foreign governments and the UN called for an immediate ceasefire in February 2009. The Sri Lanka Army pushed on and on 6 February, just two days after Sri Lankas independence day, the LTTE naval base at Chalai was captured, effectively cutting off fuel, munitions and arms smuggled from other countries. Compared with just 12 months earlier, the LTTE had lost 99% of the territory it once controlled. Across the following three months, the ongoing success of the Sri Lankan military restricted the LTTE to an increasingly narrow coastal strip on the countrys northeast coast. While international concern grew for the welfare of the tens of thousands of Tamil civilians trapped by the fighting, the LTTE achieved a final defiant air strike into the heart of the Sri Lankan capital. Two light aircraft flown by the Black Air Tigers conducted suicide missions into two Sri Lankan air force installations, killing two people and injuring 45. In March 2009 the Sri Lankan government confirmed former LTTE military commander Karuna as the Minister of National Integration and Reconciliation, completing his transition since defecting from the LTTE in 2004. Amid claims that the Sri Lankan military was bombing Tamil civilians in supposedly safe areas, and counter claims that the LTTE was using Tamil civilians as human shields and stopping them from leaving the conflict zone, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay accused both sides of war crimes. Amid intense humanitarian concerns for the plight of an estimated 50,000 Tamil civilians confined to a single stretch of beach, the LTTE offered the Sri Lankan government a unilateral ceasefire. Given the Sri Lankan militarys objectives were so close to being fulfilled it was naturally dismissed as a joke by the Sri Lankan Defence Secretary. Other efforts by Swedish, French and British diplomats to inspire a truce were also dismissed by a Sri Lankan government with ultimate battleground success in its sights after three decades. The reported April 2009 defection of two senior LTTE figures only increased their resolve for a decisive military solution. The end came in May 2009 when the Sri Lankan military announced it had captured the last sliver of coastal land and had surrounded a few hundred last remaining LTTE fighters. The LTTE responded by announcing they had silenced their weapons and that the battle had reached its bitter end. Several senior LTTE figures were reported killed, including LTTE leader Vellupillai Prabhakaran. It is estimated up to 50,000 Tamil civilians escaped the fighting in the last 72 hours of the conflict. Significant support for the battleground victory exists with the majority Sinhalese population, but the conditions of Tamil economic and ethnic exclusion that inspired the LTTE for so long still remain as challenges to be acknowledged and addressed. Amid United Nations concerns that up to 7000 Tamil civilians were killed in the final five months of the war, international pressure grew to produce a political solution for the future of the Tamil community in Sri Lanka. What is certain is that the future may reveal the truth about the final days of the conflict, a truth potentially concealed by progaganda from both the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE.

Tsunami- maldivs The stand-off between government and people continued without any obvious resolution throughout 2004, although international protests increased with human rights advocates Friends of Maldives attending the World Travel Market and handing out flyers to delegates to increase awareness of the countrys domestic problems and the increased readership of anti-Gayoom Internet sites within the Maldives. On the morning of 26 December 2004 the Indian Ocean tsunami devastated countries throughout the region. While it could have been much, much worse for the Maldives, whose vast, deep inter-atoll channels absorbed much of the strength of the wave, the result was still devastating. Eighty-three people were confirmed dead, with a further 25 feared dead, their bodies never having been discovered. Twenty-one islands were devastated, with over 11, 000 people made homeless, many of whom continue today to exist as IDPs (internally displaced persons). Large numbers of resorts were closed and although one was totally abandoned, the rest were rebuilt with incredible speed, nearly all being open again a year later. In the aftermath of these terrible events, President Gayoom did at least drop charges against many of the Black Friday protestors and they were released, although at the time of writing the situation is still not very positive. While its clear that torture has ceased being a major part of imprisonment in the Maldives,

brutality both in and out of jail continues and basic freedom of expression is still not respected anywhere. The next few years will probably be key to the future of the country Gayoom is under pressure and few expect him to last much longer. However, with no tradition of democracy, no independent print media and paperthin civil society, theres little reason for optimism even if Gayoom does relinquish power any time soon.

You might also like