ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION

Managerial Economics Jack Wu

NTUC INCOME: PREMIUMS FOR $200,000 LIFE INSURANCE

female
civil servant group policy maximum coverage limit no medical exam $240

male
$240

individual policy no maximum coverage medical exam required

$991

$1849

IMPERFECT/ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
imperfect information absence of certain knowledge (uncertainty) asymmetric information -- one party has better information than the other

party with worse information also suffers from imperfect information

RISK
uncertainty about benefit or cost arises from imperfect information risk-averse person prefers certain payment to uncertain payments with same expected value risk-averse person will buy insurance

WINE MARKET EQUILIBRIUM, I

8

Price (Hundred $ per case)

supply of good vintage combined supply of good and bad vintage

actual demand (marginal benefit)

demand (marginal benefit) for good vintage

3 2

Quantity (Thousand cases a month)

WINE MARKET EQUILIBRIUM, II

actual demand = combined supply of good and bad at equilibrium price

actual marginal benefit (adjusted for prob of getting bad vintage) = price actual marginal cost (of good vintage) = price

ADVERSE SELECTION
economic inefficiency possible market failure

MARKET FAILURE, I
8 Price (Hundred $ per case)

combined supply of good and bad vintages

actual demand (marginal benefit)

c d F Quantity (Thousand cases a month) 8

2 0

demand (marginal benefit) for good vintage

MARKET FAILURE, II
conventional market: when supply exceeds demand, lower price restores equilibrium wine market with adverse selection: lower price drives out better vintages, leaving even worse adverse selection

LIFE INSURANCE, I
Coverage = $200,000 for 43 year-old male
NTUC Income Singapore Group policy $240 Pacific Century Hong Kong $212

Individual (nonsmoker)
Individual (smoker)

$1849
$1849

$466
$1120

LIFE INSURANCE, II
group policy avoids adverse selection individual policy attracts adverse selection

no maximum policy coverage medical examination required

APPRAISAL
characteristic is objectively verifiable potential gain covers appraisal cost

SCREENING

less informed party indirectly elicits other partys characteristic through structured choice better informed party must be differentially sensitive to the choice

WHOS THE REAL MOTHER?

Solomon: Divide the living child into two, and give half to the one, and half to the other. Woman whose son was alive: give her the living child, and by no means slay it. Other woman: It shall be neither mine nor yours; divide it.

INDIRECT SEGMENT DISCRIMINATION

restricted vis-a-vis unrestricted air fares separate cable channels vis--vis bundle cents-off coupons

MULTIPLE ASYMMETRIES
screening mechanisms may conflict example -- auto insurance policy: higher deductible

screens out bad drivers screens out more risk-averse

AUCTION

auctions to sell: seller doesnt know buyers valuations auctions to buy: buyer doesnt know sellers costs use competitive pressure to force bidders to reveal their information

AUCTION METHODS
open/sealed bidding discriminatory/non-discriminatory pricing reserve price

WINNERS CURSE
In auction to buy: winning bidder over-estimates the true value In auction to sell: winning bidder under-estimates the true cost More severe where

more bidders true value/cost more uncertain sealed-bid auction

SIGNALING

better informed party communicates characteristic through signal cost of signal differs according to characteristic self-selection signal is credible

SIGNALING: EXAMPLES
auto manufacturers extended warranty Intuit money-back guarantee on Quicken U.S. publicly-listed companies -- dividends

ADVERTISING AS A SIGNAL
advertising expenditure must be sunk buyers must be able to detect poor quality information about poor quality must quickly spread and cut into sellers future business

CONTINGENT CONTRACT
Payment is contingent on realized characteristic:

international trade -- buyback (supplier of technology must buy future product) mergers and acquisitions payment in shares

CONTINGENT FEE
Lawyer has better information about likelihood of success at trial contingent fee time-based fee

DISCUSSION

This question applies the technique for deriving a market equilibrium with adverse selection presented in the math supplement. Suppose that the demand for genuine antiques is D = 4 - p, and the supply is S = p - 2, where D and S are in thousands of units a month, and p represents price in hundreds of dollars. In addition, some sellers produce 500 fakes at zero marginal cost.

In a market of purely genuine antiques, what will be (i) the buyers' marginal benefit from a quantity Q, (ii) the sellers' marginal cost of providing a quantity Q, (iii) the market equilibrium price and quantity. In a market including both genuine antiques and fakes, what will be (i) the buyers' marginal benefit from a quantity Q, (ii) the sellers' marginal cost of providing a quantity Q, (iii) the market equilibrium price and quantity.