THREE MILE ISLAND ACCIDENT

March 28, 1979

Kiran Radhakrishnan
Roll No. 8
PGDISEM - X
 BACKGROUND INFORMATION
• Most significant in the history of US commercial nuclear power
generation history
• Partial core meltdown of Unit 2 of Three Mile Island Nuclear
Generating Station at Dauphin County, PA
• 4 am on Wednesday, March 28, 1979
• Operated by the General Public Utilities and its regional
subsidiary, the Metropolitan Edison Company
 BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Aerial View of Three Mile Island – the two reactors to the left are
the cooling towers of Unit 2 where the accident occurred
 BACKGROUND INFORMATION

A Typical Nuclear Reactor with its components

 ACCOUNT OF THE ACCIDENT
• Events leading to the accident occurred a few seconds after
4 am on March 28, 1979
Elapsed Time Event
00:00:00 Pumps feeding water to the secondary loop are shut down
This was the first of two independent system failures that led to the near
meltdown of the Three Mile Island Nuclear Reactor.
00:00:01 Alarm sounds within the TMI control room
This alarm is disregarded by the operators.
00:00:02
Water pressure and temperature in the reactor core rises
The failure of the secondary loop pump had stopped the transfer of heat
from the Primary Loop to the Secondary Loop. The rise in temperature and
pressure is considered to be part of the normal plant operations, and hence
was ignored.
00:00:03 Pressure Operated Relief valve (PORV) automatically opens
When the pressure of steam in the reactor core rises above safe limits, the
pressure relief valve is designed to automatically open, releasing the excess
steam to a containment tank.
 ACCOUNT OF THE ACCIDENT
00:00:04 Backup pumps for the secondary loop water system automatically turn on
Four seconds into the accident, the secondary loop water pumps are
automatically turned on. This is indicated to the operators by the presence
of lights on the control panel. The operators are not aware that the pumps
have been disconnected and are not functioning.
00:00:09 Boron and Silver control rods are lowered into the reactor. PORV light
goes out, indicating valve is closed.
Lowering of the control rods into the reactor core slows down the rate of
the reaction. The effect of which is also a reduction in the heat produced by
the reactor. When the PORV light went out, the operators incorrectly
assumed that the valve was closed. In reality the valve was not only open
but was also releasing steam and water from the core. This was now a LOCA
(Loss of Coolant Accident)
00:02:00 Emergency Injection Water (EIW) is automatically activated.
The EIW is a safety device that causes water to flow into the reactor core. It
is designed to ensure that when there is a LOCA, the water in the core
remains at a safe level. In the past the EIW system has turned itself on when
there has been no leak so the operators are not unduly concerned by this.
 ACCOUNT OF THE ACCIDENT
00:04:30 Operators observed that the water level in the Primary System is rising
while the pressure is decreasing.
When they observe that the water level in the core was rising, the
operators shut off the EIW system.
00:04:30
Water level in the core still appeared to be rising.
In actuality the water level in the core was dropping, and turning off the
EIW increased the amount of steam being produced by the reactor core.
The combination of steam and water was still being released through the
PORV.
00:08:00
Operator noticed that the valves for the secondary loop backup pumps
were off.
8 minutes into the accident, the closed valve was noticed by an operator.
Once he turned the valves back on the Secondary Water loop is functioning
correctly.
00:45:00 Water level in primary loop continued to drop.
At this point in the accident the operators still do not suspect a LOCA. The
instrument checking the radiation has not registered an alarm, and the
gauges in the control room are wrongly indicating that the water level is up.
 ACCOUNT OF THE ACCIDENT
01:20:00 Primary loop pumps start to shake violently.
Steam produced by the lack of cooling water in the core passes through the
primary loop pumps and causes them to shake. Assuming they are not
functioning correctly the operators turn off two of the four pumps.
01:20:00
Remaining two pumps in the primary loop turned off.
The automatic shut down of the two remaining pumps in the primary loop
caused the water within the nuclear core to stop circulating. This in turn
caused the heated core to convert more water into steam, further reducing
the transfer of heat away from the core.
02:15:00 Water level dropped below the top of the core.
Once the top of the core is exposed the steam is converted to super heated
steam. This reacts with the control rods and produces hydrogen and other
radioactive gases.
02:15:00 Hydrogen gas is released through PORV.
Since the Pilot Operated Relief Valve is still in the open position it allows the
hydrogen gas produced to be released along with the steam.
02:20:00 Operator from next shift arrived and closes PORV backup valve.
02:20:30 Operators received first indication that the radiation levels were up.
 ACCOUNT OF THE ACCIDENT
02:45:00 Radiation alarm sounds and a site emergency is declared.
At this point half the core is uncovered and the radiation level of the water
in the primary loop is 350 times its normal level.
03:00:00 Due to higher radiation levels a General Emergency is declared.
There is still confusion as to whether the core is uncovered or not. There
are some that feel the temperature readings may be erroneous.
07:30:00 Operators pump water into the primary loop and open the PORV backup
valve to lower the pressure
09:00:00 Hydrogen within the containment structure explodes
The explosion is recorded by the instruments in the control room. It is
dismissed as just being a spike caused by an electrical malfunction. The
sound of the explosion heard is thought by some to be a ventilator damper.
15:00:00 Primary loop pumps are turned on
By now a large portion of the core has melted and there is still hydrogen
present in the primary loop. Water from the primary loop pumps is
circulated and the core temperature is finally brought under control.
 ACCOUNT OF THE ACCIDENT
• The reactor had come very close to a meltdown, and was
damaged beyond repair. Cleanup took more than a decade
with costs of around $ 970 million.
• Metropolitan Edison, the plant's owner, had assured that
“everything was under control”. But, there were conflicting
statements about radiation releases. Schools were closed and
residents were urged to stay indoors. Farmers were told to
keep animals under cover and on stored feed.
• The State Governor advised the evacuation of pregnant women
and pre-school age children within a five-mile radius of the
Three Mile Island facility. Within days, 140,000 people had left
the area.
 ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT

Some of the factors which contributed the build-up of the

accident were:
• A water purifier which was under maintenance and a leaking
valve that caused the pumps in the external circuit to close
down.
• Emergency pumps were also blocked off during maintenance
work
• Heat started increasing within the reactor core, and this let
open the safety valve to emit the heat; but the valve
malfunctioned letting off the coolant beyond the intended
levels.
• Design flaw, which indicated by way of a light on a control
panel that the PORV was closed though it was actually open.
 ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT
• The accident was exacerbated by wrong decisions made
because the operators were overwhelmed with information,
much of it irrelevant, misleading or incorrect.
• Decision making under stress; over 100 alarms went off in the
control room during the first few minutes of the accident. This
added to the confusion without providing any useful
information to the operators.
• The inadequate training of the employees at the facility. The
training was the responsibility of Metropolitan Edison and
Babcock and Wilcox.
 RECOMMENDATIONS
• Nuclear reactor operator training has been improved - a
standardized checklist to ensure that the core is receiving
enough coolant under sufficient pressure.
• Improvements in quality assurance, engineering, operational
surveillance and emergency planning have been instituted.
Improvements in control room habitability, "sight lines" to
instruments, ambiguous indications and even the placement
of "trouble" tags were made.
• Improved surveillance of critical systems, structures and
components required for cooling the plant and mitigating the
escape of radionuclides during an emergency were also
implemented.
• Dissemination of industry information and the use of
probabilistic safety assessment and analysis of more probable
events was also instituted.
 BIBLIOGRAPHY
• Was Three Mile Island a `Normal Accident'? – Andrew Hopkins;
Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management; Volume 9, Number 2, June
2001 (pp. 65-72)

• http://www.nucleartourist.com/events/tmi.htm

• Online Ethics Center for Engineering and Research;

http://www.onlineethics.org/cms/4570.aspx

• Science Daily
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2007/01/070129152941.htm