Property dualism: objections

Michael Lacewing
enquiries@alevelphilosophy.co.uk

© Michael Lacewing
Substance and property dualism
• Substance dualism: minds are not bodies nor
parts of bodies, but distinct substances
– Cartesian dualism: Minds can exist independent of
bodies, and mental properties are properties of a
mental substance
• Property dualism: there is just one sort of
substance, physical substance, but at least
some mental properties are a fundamentally
new kind of property that are not fixed by
physical properties
– Properties of phenomenal consciousness – qualia

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 Rejecting physicalism
• Physicalism: everything that exists is physical or
depends on what is physical
– The only kind of substance is physical
– The only properties that are fundamental are physical
properties – all other properties depend on physical
properties
• Property dualism: some properties of consciousness
are not ontologically dependent on physical
properties
– There are natural laws that correlate mental properties
with physical ones, but it is metaphysically possible for
these correlations to be different

© Michael Lacewing
 Mental causation
• Do mental properties have ‘causal powers’?
– E.g. Do thoughts cause bodily movements and other
thoughts?
• Property dualism doesn’t face the problem that
substance dualism does, because mental properties
are properties of physical substance
• But how do mental properties cause physical
effects?
– This is no objection: any fundamental causal relationship
can’t be further explained (e.g. how does mass bend
space?)

© Michael Lacewing
 Property dualism and science
• Objection: if mental properties cause physical
effects, this is incompatible with science, esp.
neuroscience
– We don’t have good evidence of this
– Some interpretations of quantum mechanics support
the idea that consciousness has effects

© Michael Lacewing
 Epiphenomenalism
• It is appealing to think that every physical
event has a sufficient physical cause
• This is compatible with property dualism if
mental properties make no causal difference to
the world – epiphenomenalism
• Physicalism is right about causation, but wrong
about what exists

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 Counter-intuitive
• Objection: Epiphenomenalism is very
counterintuitive
– Reply 1: it is only some mental properties – qualia –
that are epiphenomenal
– Reply 2: it seems like mental states (e.g. pain) cause
physical effects (e.g. crying) because a brain process
causes both
– So the mental state is correlated with the effect,
but doesn’t cause it

© Michael Lacewing
 Natural selection
• Objection: how and why would epiphenomenal
properties evolve?
– The traits that evolve are ones that causally contribute to
survival and reproduction
• Reply: epiphenomenal mental properties are by-
products of traits (brain processes) that make a
difference to survival
– Not all properties are selected for, e.g. a polar bear
needs a warm coat, and this turns out to be heavy, but
the heaviness doesn’t contribute to survival
– It’s just a fundamental law of nature that some brain
processes are correlated with consciousness

© Michael Lacewing
An objection from introspection
• I know I am in pain, because my belief that I
am in pain is caused by my pain.
• If epiphenomenalism is true, my pain causes
nothing.
• If epiphenomenalism is true, I will believe that I
am in pain if my brain processes are the same,
even if I am not in pain.
• So if epiphenomenalism is true, my belief that I
am in pain is unreliable, and not knowledge.

© Michael Lacewing
 Reply
• Knowledge doesn’t require direct causation
– Suppose the brain state that causes pain also causes
the belief that I am in pain
– Then I wouldn’t (normally) have the belief without
the pain – so my belief is reliable
– So I know when I’m in pain

© Michael Lacewing
 A ‘category mistake’
• Category mistake: To treat a concept as belonging to a
different logical category from the one it actually belongs to
– E.g. Oxford University; team spirit
• Ryle: Substance dualism wrongly thinks that the mind is
another ‘thing’
– It is not a distinct, complex, organised unit, subject to distinct relations of
cause and effect (to lose your mind and lose your keys is not to lose two
things!)
– Mental concepts (of ‘states’ and ‘processes’) do not operate like
physical concepts
• The ‘para-mechanical hypothesis’:
– since physical processes can be explained in mechanical terms,
mental concepts must refer to non-spatial, non-mechanical
processes
– This is a category mistake

© Michael Lacewing
 A ‘category mistake’
• This applies to property dualism – it thinks of mental
properties as part of the same metaphysical framework
as physical and functional properties, only different
• Experiences are not a ‘something’ with peculiar
properties of ‘what it is like’
• ‘What it is like’ to see red is given by describing what
we see when we attend to a red object
– ‘Red’ is the colour of the object, not a property of experience
• Differences between experiences (‘what it is like to see
red is different from what it is like to see blue’) are
simply differences between physical objects

© Michael Lacewing