The interest to be

protected in this tort is

the interest of the
FALSE individual in not being
LIGHT made to appear before
the public in an
objectionable false light or
false position.
False light V. Defamation
False light – The gravamen of the claim is the embarrassment of a person in being made into
something he is not.
Defamation - The gravamen of the claim is reputational harm.
False light cases – (as in publication of private facts), the statement should be actually made
public.
Publication in defamation – is satisfied if a letter is sent to a third person.
False light – the defendant may still be held liable even if the statements tell something good
about the plaintiff.
Defamation – what is published lowers the esteem in which the plaintiff is held.
MANUEL LAGUNZAD, petitioner, vs.MARIA SOTO VDA. DE GONZALES and THE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.G.R. No. L-32066 August 6, 1979

FACTS:
Sometime in August, 1961, petitioner Manuel Lagunzad, began the production of a movie
entitled "The Moises Padilla Story". It was based mainly on the copyrighted but unpublished
book of Atty. Ernesto Rodriguez, Jr., entitled "The Long Dark Night in Negros" subtitled "The
Moises Padilla Story".
The book narrates the events which culminated in the murder of Moises Padilla who was then a
mayoralty candidate of the Nacionalista Party for the Municipality of Magallon, Negros
Occidental, during the November, 1951 elections. Governor Rafael Lacson, a member of the
Liberal Party then in power and his men were tried and convicted for that murder. In the book,
Moises Padilla is portrayed as "a martyr in contemporary political history."
Although the emphasis of the movie was on the public life of Moises Padilla, there were portions
which dealt with his private and family life including the portrayal in some scenes, of his mother,
Maria Soto Vda. de Gonzales, private respondent herein, and of one "Auring" as his girlfriend.
On October 5, 1961, Mrs. Nelly Amante, half-sister of Moises Padilla, for and in behalf of her mother,
private respondent, demanded in writing for certain changes, corrections and deletions in the
movie.
On the same date, October 5, 1961, after some bargaining, the petitioner and private respondent
executed a “Licensing Agreement” where the petitioner agreed to pay the private respondent the
sum of P20,000.00 payable without need of further demand, as follows: P5,000.00 on or before Oct.
10, 1961; P10,000.00 on or before Oct. 31, 1961; and P5,000.00 on or before November 30, 1961.
Also the Licensor (private respondent) grants authority and permission to Licensee (Petitioner) to
exploit, use, and develop the life story of Moises Padilla for purposes of producing the PICTURE, and
in connection with matters incidental to said production, such as advertising and the like, as well as
authority and permission for the use of LICENSOR's name in the PICTURE and have herself portrayed
therein, the authority and permission hereby granted, to retroact to the date when LICENSEE first
committed any of the acts herein authorized.
 After its premier showing on October 16, 1961, the movie was shown in different theaters all over
the country.
Because petitioner refused to pay any additional amounts pursuant to the Agreement, on
December 22, 1961, private respondent instituted the present suit against him praying for judgment
in her favor ordering petitioner 1) to pay her the amount of P15,000.00, with legal interest from the
filing of the Complaint; 2) to render an accounting of the proceeds from the picture and to pay the
corresponding 2-1/2% royalty therefrom; 3) to pay attorney's fees equivalent to 20% of the amounts
claimed; and 4) to pay the costs.
Petitioner contended in his Answer that the episodes in the life of Moises Padilla depicted in
the movie were matters of public knowledge and was a public figure; that private respondent has no
property right over those incidents; that the Licensing Agreement was without valid cause or
consideration and that he signed the same only because of the coercion and threat employed upon
him. As a counterclaim, petitioner sought for the nullification of the Licensing Agreement as it
constitutes an infringement on the constitutional right of freedom of speech and of the press.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled in favour of the private respondent.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not private respondent have any property right over the life of Moises Padilla
since the latter was a public figure.
RULING:
1. Yes. While it is true that petitioner had purchased the rights to the book entitled "The
Moises Padilla Story," that did not dispense with the need for prior consent and authority from
the deceased heirs to portray publicly episodes in said deceased's life and in that of his mother
and the members of his family. As held in Schuyler v. Curtis,” a privilege may be given the
surviving relatives of a deceased person to protect his memory, but the privilege exists for the
benefit of the living, to protect their feelings and to prevent a violation of their own rights in the
character and memory of the deceased."
Being a public figure ipso facto does not automatically destroy in toto a person's right to privacy.
The right to invade a person's privacy to disseminate public information does not extend to a
fictional or novelized representation of a person, no matter how public a figure he or she may
be. In the case at bar, while it is true that petitioner exerted efforts to present a true-to-life
story of Moises Padilla, petitioner admits that he included a little romance in the film because
without it, it would be a drab story of torture and brutality.
The tort may be committed by the media by
distorting the news report. Thus, liability may
result if film or video tape is edited in such a
way that the plaintiff is made to appear to have
committed an illegal act although he actually
did not do so.
ST. LOUIS REALTY CORPORATION vs. COURT OF
APPEALS 133 SCRA 179 [1984]
FACTS:

On December 15, 1968 St. Louis Corp. published an advertisement with a heading “where the
heart belongs” featuring the house of Dr. Aramil but with Arcadio and his family who is not the
real owner of the said house. Upon seeing the advertisement Dr. Aramil wrote a letter to the
Corporation stating that there was a mix-up of residence in their advertisement and asked the
latter to reprint and rectify it because the said advertisement humiliated him and put him into
shame as his colleagues and friends who recognized his house were in a doubt of his integrity, if
he is just renting his house, and if his wife is with another husband. On January 5, 1969, St. Louis
published a reprint of their advertisement but failed to rectify it and put an apology to Dr.
Aramil. Upon seeing this Dr. Aramil decided to put a complain against the corporation and ask
for 8000php for actual damages, 20000 for moral damages and 2000php for attorneys fee.
ISSUE:
Whether St. Louis is liable to pay damages to Dr.
Aramil?
Ruling:
Yes. The case falls under Article 26 which warrants St. Louis to pay for damages. The article
states that “every person must respect the dignity, personality privacy and peace of mind of his
neighbors and other persons”, “Prying into the privacy of another’s residence” and “Meddling
with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another”. The instance case violated the
article when they published an advertisement without any permission from Dr. Aramil that his
house will be featured and Mr. Arcadio with his family depicting the ownership. Though the acts
will not constitute criminal offense, a civil action may be instituted even if no crime is involved
and moral damages may be obtained. In addition, St. Louis was grossly negligent and bad faith is
present when they mix-up residences in their advertisement which is widely circulated and
failed to rectify and make an apology to Dr. Aramil about the incident.
COMMERCIAL APPROPRIATION OF
LIKENESS
The tort of commercial appropriation of likeness has been held to protect various aspects of an
individual’s identity from commercial exploitation: name, likeness, achievements, identifying
characteristics, actual performances and fictitious characters created by a performer. It was even
extended in one case to phrases and other things which are associated with an individual.
Under this right, the unwarranted publication of a person’s name or the unauthorized use of his
photograph or likeness for commercial purposes is an invasion of privacy.
With respect to celebrities, however, the right of publicity is often treated as a separate right
that overlaps but is distinct from the right of privacy. It has been observed that celebrities are
not interested in barring any person from commercially appropriating their likeness. They treat
their names and likeness as property and they want to control and profit therefrom. In invasion
of privacy, damages is measured by the injury to feelings, emotional distress, humiliation and
mental anguish. On the other hand, celebrities who file actions to protect their right to publicity
do so to protect their economic interest. They treat their names and likeness as property which
cannot be encroached upon by another.
The tort of commercial appropriation of likeness or violation of the right of publicity was
involved in Simonette de los Reyes, et al. vs. Mobil Oil Philippines, Inc. (25 CAR 2s 1089 [1978]).
The plaintiffs in the case were commercial models and winners of beauty pageants. They agreed
to lend their services to a project of the First Lady of the Philippines and had their pictures
taken. Later, they discovered that their pictures were used in the calendars of defendant
corporation. The plaintiffs sued for damages and their claim was sustained by the Court of
Appeals because of the violation of their right to privacy.
Policy Considerations.
There are at least three policy considerations behind the right of publicity on the part of
celebrities.
First, the right of publicity vindicates the economic interests of celebrities, enabling those whose
achievements have imbued their identities with pecuniary value to profit from their fame.
Second, the right of publicity fosters the production of intellectual and creative works by
providing the financial incentive for individuals to expend the time and resources necessary to
produce them.
Third, the right of publicity serves both individual and societal interests by preventing what our
legal tradition regards as wrongful misconduct: unjust enrichment and deceptive trade practices.
Personal Right
The right to privacy is a personal right. Consequently, a person is entitled to enter into a
licensing agreement so that his life can be depicted in film.

There would be invasion of privacy if person film’s another’s life or the life of a deceased
without his consent or the consent of the relatives as the case may be.
INTERFERENCE WITH FAMILY AND
OTHER RELATIONS
The Family Code imposes on the spouses the obligation to live together, observe mutual love,
respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. (Article 68). Interference with such
obligations may result in tort liability known as alienation of affection. Alienation of affection
consists of depriving one spouse of the affection, society, companionship and comfort of the
other.
The gist of the tort is an interference with one spouse’s mental attitude toward the other and
the conjugal kindness of marital relations resulting in some actual conduct which materially
affects it.
TENCHAVEZ vs. ESCAÑO G.R. No. L-
19671, November 29, 1965
FACTS:
Vicenta Escaño, 27, exchanged marriage vows with Pastor Tenchavez, 32, on February 24,
1948, before a Catholic chaplain. The marriage was duly registered with the local civil registrar.
However, the two were unable to live together after the marriage and as of June 1948, they were
already estranged. Vicenta left for the United Stated in 1950. On the same year she filed a verified
complaint for divorce against Tenchavez in the State of Nevada on the ground of “Extreme cruelty,
entirely mental in character.” A decree of divorce, “final and absolute” was issued in open court by
the said tribunal. She married an American, lived with him in California, had several children with him
and, on 1958, acquired American Citizenship.
On 30 July 1955, Tenchavez filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, and amended on
31 May 1956, against Vicenta F. Escaño, her parents, Mamerto and Mena Escaño whom he charged
with having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining her husband, and alienating her
affections, and against the Roman Catholic Church, for having, through its Diocesan Tribunal, decreed
the annulment of the marriage, and asked for legal separation and one million pesos in damages.
Vicenta’s parents denied that they had in any way influenced their daughter’s acts, and
counterclaimed for moral damages.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the parents of Vicenta, compelled and induced their daughter to assent to the
celebration of the latters marriage and whether it constitutes an alienation of affection.
RULING:
1. No. There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out of improper motives, aided and
abetted her original suit for annulment, or her subsequent divorce; she appears to have acted
independently and being of age, she was entitled to judge what was best for her and ask that
her decisions be respected. Her parents, in so doing, certainly can not be charged with
alienation of affections in the absence of malice or unworthy motives, which have not been
shown, good faith being always presumed until the contrary is proved.
“Sec. 529. Liability of Parents, Guardians or kin. — The law distinguishes between the right of a
parent to interest himself in the marital affairs of his child and the absence of right in a stranger to
intermeddle in such affairs. However, such distinction between the liability of parents and that of
strangers is only in regard to what will justify interference. A parent is liable for alienation of
affections resulting from his own malicious conduct, as where he wrongfully entices his son or
daughter to leave his or her spouse, but he is not liable unless he acts maliciously, without
justification and from unworthy motives. He is not liable where he acts and advises his child in good
faith with respect to his child’s marital relations, in the interest of his child as he sees it, the marriage
of his child not terminating his right and liberty to interest himself in, and be extremely solicitous for,
his child’s welfare and happiness, even where his conduct and advice suggest or result in the
separation of the spouses or the obtaining of a divorce or annulment, or where he acts under mistake
or misinformation, or where his advice or interference are indiscreet or unfortunate, although it has
been held that the parent is liable for consequences resulting from recklessness. He may in good faith
take his child into his home and afford him or her protection and support, so long as he has not
maliciously enticed his child away, or does not maliciously entice or cause him or her to stay away,
from his or her spouse. This rule has more frequently been applied in the case of advice given to a
VEXATION AND HUMILIATION
The fourth paragraph of Article 26 makes one liable for vexing or humiliating another on account
of his religious beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth, physical defect, or other personal
condition.
Consequently, discrimination against a person on account of his physical defect, which causes
emotional distress, may result in liability on the part of the offending party. Sexual harassment
also falls under this category based on violation of a woman’s right to privacy. Public humiliation
due to lowly station in life may likewise result in liability. For example, a department store
manager who searched a person in public for no other reason than the fact that such person
looked poor will be held liable for damages.
Social equality is not sought by the legal provision under consideration, but due regard for
decency and propriety.
INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
“Emotional distress” means any highly unpleasant mental reaction such as extreme grief, shame,
humiliation, embarrassment, anger, disappointment, worry, nausea, mental suffering and
anguish, shock, fright, horror, and chagrin.
Any party seeking recovery for mental anguish must prove more than mere worry, anxiety,
vexation, embarrassment, or anger. Liability does not arise from mere insults, indignities,
threats, annoyances, petty expressions, or other trivialities. In determining whether the tort of
outrage had been committed, a plaintiff is necessarily expected and required to be hardened to
a certain amount of criticism, rough language, and to occasional acts and words that are
definitely inconsiderate and unkind; the mere fact that the actor knows that the other will
regard the conduct as insulting, or will have his feelings hurt, is not enough
To recover for the intentional infliction of emotional distress the plaintiff must show that:
(a) The conduct of the defendant was intentional or in reckless disregard of the plaintiff;
(b) The conduct was extreme and outrageous;
(c) There was a causal connection between the defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s mental
distress; and,
(d) The plaintiff’s mental distress was extreme and severe
◦ “Extreme and outrageous conduct” means conduct that is so outrageous in character, and so extreme in
degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly
intolerable in civilized society. The defendant’s actions must have been so terrifying as naturally to
humiliate, embarrass or frighten the plaintiff.
Distinguished from defamation.
The Supreme Court distinguished defamation from “emotional distress” by saying that primarily,
an “emotional distress” tort action is personal in nature, i.e., it is a civil action filed by an
individual to assuage the injuries to his emotional tranquility due to personal attacks on his
character. Emotional distress properly belongs to the reactive harm principle while defamation
calls for the application of the relational harm principle. The principle of relational harm includes
harm to social relationships in the community in the form of defamation as distinguished from
the principle of reactive harm which includes injuries to individual emotional tranquility.