BATTLE ANALYSIS

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 Stand-to;
 Fire;
 Earthquake; and

 Feeling Sleepy.

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 References;
 Aim;
 Introduction;
 Kursk Operational Environment;
 Cause;
 Course;
 Consequence;
 Principles of War; and
 Conclusion.
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 Kasdorf, C.B. (2000). THE BATTLE OF KURSK – AN ANALYSIS OF STRATEGIC AND
OPERATIONAL PRINCIPLES. U.S. Army War College.
 R.Simms, C.B. (2003). Analysis of the Battle of Kursk. Amor
 http://www.battleofkursk.org/Battle-of-Kursk-Facts.html

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 To present the analysis of the Battle of Kursk using the
Principles of War method

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 Top 10 Facts about Battle Of Kursk.mp4

 The Battle of Kursk occurred in July 5 - Aug 23, 1943 around the Soviet city in western Russia as
Germany launched OPERATION CITADEL

 Lasted about 50 days and nights

 Involved over 4 million people from both sides, with some 200,000 residents of Kursk who died in the
battle
 70,000 artillery guns, 23,000 tanks and 12, 000 warplanes were involved

 German’s last chance to regain dominance on the Eastern Front during WWII and would be their final
blitzkrieg offensive
 Soviet Union’s Leader – Joseph Stalin

 Germany’s Leader – Adolf Hitler

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  City of Kursk – a strategically located focus road &
railways that allowed Germans army great flexibility in
forward & lateral movements along Eastern Front or
allow the Soviets a staging point for retaking Ukraine.

 terrain in the Kursk AO generally favored the defender

which includes cities of Kursk & Prokhorovka

 many small rural towns provided cover and

concealment for dismounted defending forces

 several major obstacles to mounted attack - 4 major

rivers running generally east-west that divide the Kursk
salient into several sections

 Major rivers and salient geometry forces the German

army into 2 avenues of approach – easily predicted by
Russian defenses
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 The Soviet Army was the last standing obstacle to German dominance following
the defeat of France and the evacuation of British soldiers from Dunkirk

 Hitler believed that the destruction of Red Army would further lead to the
neutralization of the British Empire

 22 June 1941, Germany invaded Russia with what is still the largest operation in
human history – achieving countless victories in early months

 Hitler’s response to the epic defeat by the Soviet Army at the Battle of Stalingrad

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 Many historians attribute the Soviets victory to their improved equipment and
numerical fire power. However, if one observes the battle from the principles of
war, it is obvious that Germany's inability to adapt 2 to these principles was just as
destructive to their cause as the Russian War industry or its endless supply of
soldiers.

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 Ratio of forces in favor of the defender (Soviet)
*1.9-to-1 advantage in tanks;
CONCENTRATION
OF FORCE *2.5 -to-1 advantage in men ;
*2.1-to-1 advantage in field guns.

 Further demonstrated by the density of antitank & mines in

the region: 12-15 antitank guns per km & 1600 antitank
mines per in the Kursk salient

 Germans clearly do not have the mass needed to defeat the

Soviet defenses

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Soviets had great success in
securing their operation around the
Kursk salient
*made extensive use of deception
*carefully camouflaging real positions
while emplacing 1,000km of false
trenches, 900 mobile dummy tanks,
and 13 false airfields
*troops movements were executed in
the salient at night as much as
possible
*any mention of preparation for the
operation over the radio was
prohibited
*face-to-face coordination only with
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subordinates commanders
German security was compromised many
times during preparation for Operation
Citadel
*British intelligence had cracked Germany’s
enigma communications security code, passing
information to the Soviets
*Soviets had a much clearer picture of Germany’s
intent for the 1943 summer offensive
SECURITY
*Susceptibility of German lines of communication
to partisan attack
* Even more damaging to Citadel was the
valuable intelligence on German troop
dispositions that the partisans provided
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 Soviets displayed a better economy of force over the
German attacker
 The Germans, in deciding to attack without regard for a
strategic reserve, displayed a poor understanding of
Economy of economy of Effort
 Left the entire Eastern Front open to the subsequent Soviet
Effort counterattack.
 In essence, they lacked the minimum essential combat
power for the secondary effort of a strategic reserve.

Soviets displayed a conservative view of economy of Effort

 decided that they had enough forces to face the German
army in a defense, but not an attack

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 Germans ceded surprise during Operation Citadel
 initial date for Operation Citadel was 3 May 1943
 but a series of orders postponing Citadel eventually pushed
the attack to 4 July because of the weather and Hitler’s
desire to include the newest tanks in his offensive.
SURPRISE
Soviets aware of plans for a German offensive into the
Kursk salient as early as the last weeks of March 1943
 Soviets were building a well-prepared defense
 Impossible to conceal the intent and even location for an
offensive
 Regardless of the above, the Germans attacked without the
element of surprise

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