Professional Documents
Culture Documents
impact study
Paul Prisecaru, PhD
Chief Economist
Context: RCC`s 20
years anniversary
What we did
- We used outside experts – economics professors from
the BUES (Bucharest University of Economic Studies);
- Very conservative estimates of consumer savings in
large cases where data was available;
- 10 key industries;
- 19 policy interventions (sanctions, remedies in merger
cases and regulatory interventions), between 2003 and
2016 (most cases after 2007);
- Only simple (easy to replicate) methodologies already
used by established bodies;
- Macroeconomic impact estimation (impact on economic
growth) – rough estimates.
DG Comp methodology
OECD methodology
Is it reasonable?
Total effect of cartels is probably larger
Total effect = Overcharge + Dead Weight Loss + Umbrella Price Effect (?)
RCC`s leaded gasoline case
0.90 Significant increase in the spread
in the 4 months after the sanction
0.80
0.70
0.60
0.50
Price/Liter
0.30
Spread average in 2010- Spread average in 2012-
2011 is 0,015 euro/liter 2013 is 0,038 euro/liter
0.20
0.10
0.00
Medie EUR 27 RO
-
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
2011_1
2011_2
2011_3
2011_4
2011_5
2011_6
2011_7
2011_8
2011_9
2011_10
2011_11
2011_12
2012_1
2012_2
2012_3
Quantity traded
2012_4
2012_5
2012_6
2012_7
2012_8
2012_9
2012_10
2012_11
2012_12
2013_1
2013_2
2013_3
2013_4
2013_5
2013_6
2013_7
2013_8
2013_9
2013_10
2013_11
2013_12
100
150
200
50
250
2011_1
2011_2
2011_3
2011_4
2011_5
2011_6
2011_7
2011_8
2011_9
2011_10
2011_11
2011_12
2012_1
Average price
2012_2
2012_3
2012_4
2012_5
2012_6
2012_7
2012_8
2012_9
2012_10
2012_11
2012_12
2013_1
2013_2
2013_3
2013_4
2013_5
2013_6
2013_7
2013_8
Energy market A – quantity & price before and
2013_9
2013_10
after the elimination of anticompetitive contracts
2013_11
2013_12
800
400
0
1200
1600
2000
2011_1
2011_2
2011_3
2011_4
2011_5
2011_6
2011_7
2011_8
2011_9
2011_10
2011_11
2011_12
2012_1
2012_2
2012_3
2012_4
2012_5
2012_6
Quantity traded
2012_7
2012_8
2012_9
2012_10
2012_11
2012_12
2013_1
2013_2
2013_3
2013_4
2013_5
2013_6
2013_7
2013_8
2013_9
2013_10
2013_11
2013_12
100
200
250
300
350
50
150
2011_1
2011_2
2011_3
2011_4
2011_5
2011_6
2011_7
2011_8
2011_9
2011_10
2011_11
2011_12
2012_1
Average price
2012_2
2012_3
2012_4
2012_5
2012_6
2012_7
2012_8
2012_9
2012_10
2012_11
2012_12
2013_1
2013_2
2013_3
2013_4
2013_5
2013_6
2013_7
2013_8
2013_9
Energy market B – quantity & price before and
2013_10
2013_11
after the elimination of anticompetitive contracts
2013_12
Adjustments to the methodologies
- Cartels imposed by self-regulatory bodies decisions
considered more stable – longer periods taken into account
(Certified accountants – internal regulation of minimum fees for
10 years until prohibition.)
- Downstream markets – smaller affected turnovers in retail due
to relatively small profit margins
- Long term contracts in energy markets – theory of harm (and
effects) similar to a merger
- Precise data available for banking sector impact of the
elimination of early reimbursement fee
- Fuel market – we used the difference between spreads (EU
average vs. RO)
- In order to avoid overestimation (and eliminate risk of
contestation) we used the most conservative values for
affected market dimension and duration!
Highest impact: telecom market
- Prepaid telecom services were plagued by market scale vertical
restraints – RCC imposed drastic structural & behavioural
commitments to the major players
Indicator
Total turnover for the largest 3 operators (Vodafone, Approx. 2.5 billion euros
Orange, Telekom)
Prepaid market % of total market 40%
100
91.8
80
million euro
60
40 46.0 36.4
20
11.2
15.4
0
Total effect Annual effect Total fines Budget
„Distributional Macroeconomic Effects of EU Competition Policy: A General Equilibrium Analysis” by European Commission staff
The new proposal for a Directive to empower the competition authorities of the
Member States to be more effective enforcers and to ensure the proper
functioning of the internal market
Q&A