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Claus Emmeche
Center for the Philosophy of Nature and Science Studies
Faculty of Science
University of Copenhagen
http://www.nbi.dk/~natphil/
Claus Emmeche
Center for the Philosophy of Nature and Science Studies
Faculty of Science
University of Copenhagen
http://www.nbi.dk/~natphil/
Here is Carnap.
Rudolf Carnap
He was a positivist. (1891-1970)
However, ”positivism” means different things!
- at least 4 meanings:
A. Comte
(1798-1857)
Comte was one of the big ”system builders” of the 19th C.;
his ”positive philosophy”, in Cours de Philosophie Positive (6
volumes, 1830-1842) witness the emergence of a self-
conscious scientific (or scientist?) spirit
A. Comte
(1798-1857)
• ”positive philosophy” - the idea of enlightenment and belief in progress
• founder of sociology; one of the ”systems builders” of the 19th C.
• a conception of the system of sciences: Unity and universalism, and a
historical tendency towards unification of all sciences
Rudolf Carnap
(1891-1970)
Otto Neurath
Moritz Schlick (1882-1945) Alfred J. Ayer
Ludwig Wittgenstein
(1882-1936), (1910-1989),
1932: Positivism 1936: Language,
(1889-1951)
and Realism Truth, and Logic
Herbert Feigl
Carl G. Hempel
(1902-1988)
(1905-1997)
Hans
Reichenbach
(1891-1953)
<Udfyld sidefod-oplysninger her>
20th Century: Logical positivism
The Second
International
Congress for
the Unity of
Science,
København,
June 21.-26.,
1936
The total
Rationality, ”positive knowledge is
knowledge” cumulative
(analytic and
Anti-metaphysical: synthetic)
sharp distinction ’nonsense’ knowledge
( incl. Hegel and
between Science / Heidegger in philosophy
Non-science and nazism in politics)
Construction of general
knowledge through
induction and deduction:
”the hypothetical-
deductive method”
1. Analytic/synthetic distinction
all math and logic are seen as analytic (makes possible to treat mathematical
knowledge within an empiricist frame)
Kant - Geometry - Discovery of Non-Euclidian geometries - Einstein - 2 kinds of
geometry: analytic and synthetic!
2. Verificationist theory of meaning
3. The language of Observation and the language of Theory are seen as
sharply separated
”the iron bar lights red” // ”Helium atoms have each 2 e– ”
the language
of
Observation
1. Analytic/synthetic distinction
all math and logic are seen as analytic (makes possible to treat mathematical
knowledge within an empiricist frame)
Kant - Geometry - Discovery of Non-Euclidian geometries - Einstein - 2 kinds of
geometry: analytic and synthetic!
2. Verificationist theory of meaning
3. The language of Observation and the language of Theory are seen as
sharply separated
”the iron bar lights red” // ”Helium atoms have each 2 e– ”
4. Logic as a main tool for philosophy
Deductive logic as a guaranty of truth, - but what about inductive logic !? It
became important to develop an inductive logic. Carnap did a great work, but
ultimately failed.
5. Context of Discovery (opdagelsessammenhængen) vs. Context of Justification
(begrundelsessammenhængen)
Philosophy takes care of C.o.Just. while History and Psychology studies the
C.o.Disc.
(implied): a teleological picture of the scientific method (as intrinsicly goal-
directed towards objective knowledge) with an asymmetry between expanations
of ’good’ and ’bad’ science. Only bad science, pseudoscience, etc., needs
’external’ historical or psychological explanations.
What is an ethos?
”the ethos of science” (R. Merton)
A practically-moral way to take a stance or act, an attitude, a set of
social norms and values
May be expressed at special occasions, in salutary speeches etc.; but
more often an ethos is expressed in actions and not in words.
The exaxt wording of the ethos in the slide above is mine (C.E.),
but it is seen in many contexts. Here is the so-called CUDOS
version, due to a founder of the sociology of science, Robert K.
Merton:
Kuhn, briefly:
• focus on science as a micro-social historical process
• View of theories as conceptual structures embedded in
historically situated social framework (paradigms)
• Questioning the continuity and cumulative nature of
knowledge (revolutions)
• Context of discovery and context of justification is not so
neatly separated: The paradigm frames beforehand how Thomas S. Kuhn
(1922-1996)
to ask questions and how to interpret a discovery - thus,
he sets out to understand the context of normal-science
practice on a deeper level.
Kuhns scheme of
Contrast to positivism and Popper: scientific development:
The development of science is not trivially
cumulative, but discontinous Pre-paradigmatic science
Anomalies (not ”falsification”) is a part of
normal science Normal Science
Scientific development is a question of not (puzzle solving)
only ”theory”, but also social factors
and values. Science is not foreign to
values. Even ”data” are ”theory- Crisis (if some
ladden” and thus connected to the anomalies become
wider conceptual scheme that a too serious)
paradigm constitutes.
No definitional demarcation criterium: Revolution
”Science” as a concept is a cluster of
family likenesses (as concepts like
”game”). New Normal Science