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Introduction to science studies: from

philosophy via history to sociology

Claus Emmeche
Center for the Philosophy of Nature and Science Studies
Faculty of Science
University of Copenhagen
http://www.nbi.dk/~natphil/

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Introduction to science studies: from
philosophy via history to sociology

Claus Emmeche
Center for the Philosophy of Nature and Science Studies
Faculty of Science
University of Copenhagen
http://www.nbi.dk/~natphil/

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Why philosophy of science ?

Why study philosophy of science ?


Simple answer: A human being = a thinking animal. To think is also to
ponder. To ponder is also to self-reflect: Why do I do what I do? Do
I do it the right way? Is it good for me and others? Could it be
better?
Why do I do research?
Possible answers: It’s fun. It make me understand the world better. I
can make a living of it - perhaps even a career? I can give
something back to society. It’s worth the efforts for its own sake.
And what is research, really??
- is science something special?
- just a tool to predict or manipulate nature?
- does it carve nature at its joints?
- Humankinds only hope for survival?
These questions (and suggestions) have all kinds of
implications, and philosophy - as well as history & sociology
of science - provide ressources to approach them

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A crash course tour in the history of
philosophy of science: 1. Plato and...

Plato (428-348 BC) and the Pythagorean view of nature


• ”the real” = the mathematical harmony present in nature
• ”Science” (i.e. physics, philosophy of nature) ≈ Knowledge
of this harmony ≈ insight into the fundamental structure of
the universe
confer Galileo (1564-1642): the book of nature stands open to
our gaze, yet we have to understand its language -
mathematics - to be able to read it!
• Pythagoreans: Mathematical relations, which fit
phenomena count as explanations of why things are as
they are
• Rival point of view (e.g. Geminus, 1st Cent. BC):
mathematical hypothesis ≠ physical theories about the
structure of the universe. Thus, distinguish between
• to ”save the appearances” by superimposing mathematical
relations on the phenomena
• to explain why phenomena are as they are

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A crash course tour in the history of
philosophy of science: 1. ... Ptolemy

Ptolemy (c.100-178 AD)


• More than one model can be
constructed to save the
appearances of planetary
motions: A moving-eccentric
model may be equivalent to an
epicycle-deferent system
—> This lead to a tradition saying
that the astronomer should
construct mathematical models
to save the appearances but
should not theorize about ”the
real motions” of the planets.
A planet orbits point x in a circular path called the
epicycle. The deferent is the circular path that point x
takes around the centre of motion, C. This is not the
same point as the location of the Earth. The offset is
called the eccentric. Different planets would have
different eccentrics, deferents and epicycles. The
resultant path traced out by a planet could account for
retrograde motion and variations in brightness.
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... to make a long history short

Philosophy of science before the 19th Century:

No clear distinction between scientists and philosophers of


science. Philosophical issues was discussed by scientists
having different ideals of science, e.g.:
• realism (science aims at making true theories about the structure of
the work) vs. instrumentalism (science aims at making models useful
to account for observations and making precictions)
• inductivism (knowledge from observations) vs. hypothetical-
deductive view of science

Three compeeting traditions


• the Platonic-pythagorean (e.g., astronomy)
• the Aristotelian (e.g., natural history)
• the Archimedian (e.g., mechanics)

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Next quick-step: Positivism

Here is Carnap.
Rudolf Carnap
He was a positivist. (1891-1970)
However, ”positivism” means different things!
- at least 4 meanings:

• Classical positivism (19th Century): Comte


• Logical positivism/empiricism (20th C.): Carnap et al
NB: this is the mother of ”philosophy of science” sensu an
institutionalized field of academic research!
• Commonsense positivism or positivism as an ethos
• Positivism as a pejorative

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19th Century: Comte’s positivism

A. Comte
(1798-1857)
Comte was one of the big ”system builders” of the 19th C.;
his ”positive philosophy”, in Cours de Philosophie Positive (6
volumes, 1830-1842) witness the emergence of a self-
conscious scientific (or scientist?) spirit

The positive is:


What is real (non-imagined)
no loose speculations, but the real and experience-based
What is useful
skepticism regarding ”armchair philosophy”
What is certain (beyond discussion)
What is precise
distancing the vague and opaque in contemporary phylosophy
What is edifying
Philosophy should helt build up, not break down

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19th Century: Comte’s positivism

A. Comte
(1798-1857)
• ”positive philosophy” - the idea of enlightenment and belief in progress
• founder of sociology; one of the ”systems builders” of the 19th C.
• a conception of the system of sciences: Unity and universalism, and a
historical tendency towards unification of all sciences

Comte’s progressionist philosophy of history:


The theological stage - belief in supernatural powers
• Animism
• Polytheism
• Monotheisme
The metaphysical stage - belief in abstract powers complexity generality
• Isolated speculation
• Branches of philosophy
Sociology
• Philosophical systems Biology
The scientific stage belief in invariant patterns Chemistry
• Specific matters of fact
• Fewer and fewer, more general facts (theories)
Physics
Astronomy

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20th Century: Logical positivism

A forerunner to logical positivism:


Ernst Mach (1838-1916)

”The goal which it


[physical science] has set
itself is the simplest and
most economical abstract
expression of facts” (from
the Essay ”The economical
nature of physical inquiry” ).

Mach held that scientific laws are summaries of experimental


events, constructed for the purpose of human comprehension of
complex data. Thus scientific laws have more to do with the mind
than with reality as it exists apart from the mind.
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Logical positivism,
the Vienna Circle, 1923 - 1936

Rudolf Carnap
(1891-1970)
Otto Neurath
Moritz Schlick (1882-1945) Alfred J. Ayer
Ludwig Wittgenstein
(1882-1936), (1910-1989),
1932: Positivism 1936: Language,
(1889-1951)
and Realism Truth, and Logic

Herbert Feigl
Carl G. Hempel
(1902-1988)
(1905-1997)
Hans
Reichenbach
(1891-1953)
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20th Century: Logical positivism

The Second
International
Congress for
the Unity of
Science,
København,
June 21.-26.,
1936

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Logical positivism
- some characteristics

The total
Rationality, ”positive knowledge is
knowledge” cumulative

(analytic and
Anti-metaphysical: synthetic)
sharp distinction ’nonsense’ knowledge
( incl. Hegel and
between Science / Heidegger in philosophy
Non-science and nazism in politics)

Source of knowledge: Laws and theories


observations + logic (cf.
”logical empiricism”)
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data data data ...
Logical positivism
- some characteristics

Language has a logical structure


What is meaningful = what is
verifiable logical positivism’s
(by implication, metaphysics is
considered as meaningless) favourite
A mirrowing relation between philosophy of language
language and reality (the ”Fido-
Fido’s bread
Fido-theory”)

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Logical positivism
- some characteristics

Construction of general
knowledge through
induction and deduction:
”the hypothetical-
deductive method”

Unified science (methodological monism) ...


Mathematical physics becomes the ideal science
Theory-reduction and logical analysis are seen as tools
for unified science
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Logical positivism
- summary of its characteristics

1. Analytic/synthetic distinction
 all math and logic are seen as analytic (makes possible to treat mathematical
knowledge within an empiricist frame)
 Kant - Geometry - Discovery of Non-Euclidian geometries - Einstein - 2 kinds of
geometry: analytic and synthetic!
2. Verificationist theory of meaning
3. The language of Observation and the language of Theory are seen as
sharply separated
 ”the iron bar lights red” // ”Helium atoms have each 2 e– ”

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the language
of Theory

the language
of
Observation

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Logical positivism
- summary of its characteristics

1. Analytic/synthetic distinction
 all math and logic are seen as analytic (makes possible to treat mathematical
knowledge within an empiricist frame)
 Kant - Geometry - Discovery of Non-Euclidian geometries - Einstein - 2 kinds of
geometry: analytic and synthetic!
2. Verificationist theory of meaning
3. The language of Observation and the language of Theory are seen as
sharply separated
 ”the iron bar lights red” // ”Helium atoms have each 2 e– ”
4. Logic as a main tool for philosophy
 Deductive logic as a guaranty of truth, - but what about inductive logic !? It
became important to develop an inductive logic. Carnap did a great work, but
ultimately failed.
5. Context of Discovery (opdagelsessammenhængen) vs. Context of Justification
(begrundelsessammenhængen)

 Philosophy takes care of C.o.Just. while History and Psychology studies the
C.o.Disc.
 (implied): a teleological picture of the scientific method (as intrinsicly goal-
directed towards objective knowledge) with an asymmetry between expanations
of ’good’ and ’bad’ science. Only bad science, pseudoscience, etc., needs
’external’ historical or psychological explanations.

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Logical positivism
- summary of its characteristics

6. Science should be value-free


7. Emphasis on ”facts” and the objectivity of science.
 Objectivity conceived as methods to secure a mirror-
like relation between theories and observations
8. Methodological reductionism: theory-reduction
9. Ontological reductionism: physicalism (i.e., the belief
that the world is ultimately of a physical nature) or
eventually phenomenalism (as in Mach: sense
impressions are the ultimate stuff of all knowledge)

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Further senses of “positivism”
- as a pejorative / skældsord

In some contexts, ”positivist” is used as expressing criticism


or disapproval:
• ”Do you think that the social sciences should only
contribute knowledge to form a basis for ”a piecemal
social engineering” as Popper would have it?! - that’s
plein positivism!”
• ”Sociology reduced to quantitative statistics! What a
positivistic idea !”

Remember the ”Positivismusstreit” in German social science in


1950s and 1960s: What kind of social science should there
be, — should it be ”critical” or merely ”descriptive”,
”marxist” or ”positivist” ?
This controversy keeps reappearing.
E.g., the controversy over the ’right’ of scientists and scholars
to have special measures of quality in research in the
natural, the human and the social sciences.

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Further senses of “positivism”
- as an ethos

What is an ethos?
”the ethos of science” (R. Merton)
A practically-moral way to take a stance or act, an attitude, a set of
social norms and values
May be expressed at special occasions, in salutary speeches etc.; but
more often an ethos is expressed in actions and not in words.

(not a consistent philosophical position)


(not an ideology in the sense of ”false consciousness” or a ”political
agenda”)

An ideology in the sense of a non-scientific ”practical everyday stance”

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“The positivist ethos of science”

Science is the highest form of cultural human activity.


Science aims at positive, certain knowledge, by means of the scientific method
(hypothetical-deductive, theory-testing, falsification, etc.).
Science is (or should be) autonomous; only guided by curiosity and the inner
developmental logic of each speciality.
Knowledge is justified, true (or very probable) beliefs. Truth is an epistemic, not
an ontologic (about being) or axiologic (about values) concept.
Knowledge is neutral regarding use or misuse. There is no ”ethically wrong” or
”irresponsible” knowledge; only knowledge used wrongly in specific situations.
There is (or should be) a sharp division between science and non-science like
politics, religion, etc.
Use/misuse is a political question. If a researcher asserts anything about this, it is
in his/her role not as a researcher but as a citizen, a lay person, a politician.
Natural science is only committed to search for true knowledge, not ”good
knowledge”. Science forms the basis for technology that can be applied to
acceptable or intolerable purposes, but the ethics and politics involved in this is
foreign to science.

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“The positivist ethos of science”

The exaxt wording of the ethos in the slide above is mine (C.E.),
but it is seen in many contexts. Here is the so-called CUDOS
version, due to a founder of the sociology of science, Robert K.
Merton:

According to Merton, the ethos of science can be expressed in the


norms
• Communism (knowledge is a common good)
• Universality (science is for all disregarding social, political,
religious etc. background)
• Disinterestedness (objectivity)
• Organized Skepticism (the system of critical testing and
evaluation)

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Scientism?!
“The positivist ethos ofEthnochauvinism?
science”
- in crisis ?

Science is the highest form of cultural human activity.


Science aims at positive, certain knowledge, by means of the scientific method
(hypothetical-deductive, theory-testing, falsification, etc.).
Science is (or should be) autonomous; only guided by curiosity and the inner
developmental logic of each speciality.
Knowledge is justified, true (or very probable) beliefs. Truth is an epistemic, not
an ontologic (about being) or axiologic (about values) concept.
demand of
Knowledge is neutral regarding use or misuse. There is no ”ethically wrong” just oneor
”irresponsible” knowledge; only knowledge
emphasis onused wrongly in specific situations.
method is
like ”art pour
There is (or should
l’art” - a naive be) a sharp certainty
division is
between science and non-science like
wildly
politics,
view religion, etc.
of science. a dead end, restrictive
Use/misuse
Should society and leads
is a political question. If a researcher asserts anything about this, it is
payin indefinitely
his/her role not philosophically
?! as a researcher to
but as a citizen, a lay person, a politician.
A social contract skepticism
Natural science is only committed to search for true knowledge, not ”good
(or payback)Science
knowledge”. is forms the basis for technology that canabe applied to
naive
needed or
acceptable ! intolerable purposes, but the ethics andconception
politics involved in this is
of how
foreign to science. science in fact
develops
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Knowledge cannot fully
“The positivist ethos of science”be accounted for like that.
- in crisis ? Values and knowledge
cannot be separated
Can science
Science justify
is the highest itself
form ?
of cultural human activity.
Science aims at positive, certain knowledge, by means of the scientific method
(hypothetical-deductive, theory-testing, falsification, etc.).
Science is (or should be) autonomous; only guided by curiosity and the inner
developmental logic of each speciality.
Knowledge is justified, true (or very probable) beliefs. Truth is an epistemic, not
an ontologic (about being) or axiologic (about values) concept.
Knowledge is neutral regarding use or misuse. There is no ”ethically wrong” or
”irresponsible” knowledge; only knowledge used wrongly in specific situations.
There is (or should be) a sharp division between science and non-science like
Should
politics, this free
religion, etc.the
scientist
Use/misuse is a of special
political question. If a researcher asserts anything about this, it is
responsibility?
in his/her role not as a researcher but as a citizen, a lay person, a politician.
Natural science is only committed to search for true
you knowledge,
cannot alwaysnot ”good
knowledge”. Science forms the basis for technology
separate usethat can be applied to
of knowledge
acceptable or intolerable purposes, but the ethics
from and politics involved
achievement of in this is
foreign to science. knowledge

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Can the
“The positivist ethos of science” scientist always
distinguish
- in crisis ? There are many between his
forms of role as a
Science is often political expertise - not scientist and his
Science is the highest form of cultural human activity.
althouth it pretends to only scientists active interests
Science aims
appearat positive,
neutral certain knowledge, by means of the scientific method
are experts! in funding,
(hypothetical-deductive, theory-testing, falsification, etc.).
patents, or his
Science is (or should be) autonomous; only guided by curiosity and the inner
role as a
developmental logic of each speciality. politically
Knowledge is justified, true (or very probable) beliefs. Truth is anengaged
epistemic,citizen
not
What we consider to be science today
an ontologic (about being) or axiologic (about values) concept. ?
May be considered ideology tomorrow or in 50 years
Knowledge is neutral regarding use or misuse. There is no ”ethically wrong” or
”irresponsible” knowledge; only knowledge used wrongly in specific situations.
There is (or should be) a sharp division between science and non-science like
politics, religion, etc.
Use/misuse is a political question. If a researcher asserts anything about this, it is
in his/her role not as a researcher but as a citizen, a lay person, a politician.
Natural science is only committed to search for true knowledge, not ”good
knowledge”. Science forms the basis for technology that can be applied to
acceptable or intolerable purposes, but the ethics and politics involved in this is
foreign to science.

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“The positivist ethos of science”
- in crisis ?

Science is the highest form of cultural human activity.


A dangerous
Science illusioncertain
aims at positive, to knowledge, by means of the scientific method
think you can free science
(hypothetical-deductive, theory-testing, falsification, etc.).
of ethical involvement Today, science
Science is (or should be) autonomous; only guided by curiosity andand
the inner
and responsability technology are tightly
developmental logic of each speciality.
interwoven activities
Knowledge is justified, true (or very probable) beliefs. Truth is an epistemic, not
(”technoscience”)
an ontologic (about being) or axiologic (about values) concept.
Knowledge is neutral regarding use or misuse. There is no ”ethically wrong” or
”irresponsible” knowledge; only knowledge used wrongly in specific situations.
There is (or should be) a sharp division between science and non-science like
politics, religion, etc.
Use/misuse is a political question. If a researcher asserts anything about this, it is
in his/her role not as a researcher but as a citizen, a lay person, a politician.
Natural science is only committed to search for true knowledge, not ”good
knowledge”. Science forms the basis for technology that can be applied to
acceptable or intolerable purposes, but the ethics and politics involved in this is
foreign to science.

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And now on to history …

Cf. the title of presentation: Introduction to science


studies: from philosophy via history to sociology

Positivism: focus on science as a product (context of


justification of knowledge)

Kuhn, briefly:
• focus on science as a micro-social historical process
• View of theories as conceptual structures embedded in
historically situated social framework (paradigms)
• Questioning the continuity and cumulative nature of
knowledge (revolutions)
• Context of discovery and context of justification is not so
neatly separated: The paradigm frames beforehand how Thomas S. Kuhn
(1922-1996)
to ask questions and how to interpret a discovery - thus,
he sets out to understand the context of normal-science
practice on a deeper level.

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HPS: History and Philosophy of Science

Kuhns scheme of
Contrast to positivism and Popper: scientific development:
The development of science is not trivially
cumulative, but discontinous Pre-paradigmatic science
Anomalies (not ”falsification”) is a part of
normal science Normal Science
Scientific development is a question of not (puzzle solving)
only ”theory”, but also social factors
and values. Science is not foreign to
values. Even ”data” are ”theory- Crisis (if some
ladden” and thus connected to the anomalies become
wider conceptual scheme that a too serious)
paradigm constitutes.
No definitional demarcation criterium: Revolution
”Science” as a concept is a cluster of
family likenesses (as concepts like
”game”). New Normal Science

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etc.
HPS: History and Philosophy of Science

Characteristics of Kuhn as a founder of the HPS tradition:

• Kuhn is an internalist: ”the social” as a set of factors influencing science is


mainly of an intellectual character and mainly manifest within the development of
a paradigm, and especially in between paradigms

• Kuhn is an externalist regarding the phases of crisis & extraordinary science


between two rival paradigms: Here, social factors external to science may play a
role in the process of science.

• Kuhn a relativist? Yes, but not an irrationalist: The process of theory-choise is


not irrational, yet it is not following any special algorithm or predefined set of
methodological norms independent of any paradigm

• Kuhn’s critique of positivism: He contested some elements of the ”positivist


ethos” of science ... (e.g., ”Science aims at positive, certain knowledge, by means
of the scientific method (hypothetical-deductive, theory-testing, falsification”), but
was more critical to positivism as a philosophy than as an ethos (or that ethos’
implications for science policy).

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HPS: History and Philosophy of Science

What is ”the HPS tradition” ?


• Study science in context ”history of science
• Science is a human activity, and not a purely without philosophy of
logical or theoretical process science is blind, and
• To know about scientific change, one must look at
philosophy of science
without history of
how science was actually conducted. Philosophy is
science is empty”
not enough. History of science provides important
Norwood Russell Hanson
sources for analysing philosophical issues like
confirmation, justification, theory choise,
discoveries, controversies, etc. HOPOS, The
International
• Thus, Kuhn’s impact is the turn or transformation Society for the
of classical (logicist) philosophy of science into an History of
Philosophy of
integrated study of the history and philosophy of Science,
scientific development: the HPS tradition. scistud.umkc.edu/hopos/

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HPS: History and Philosophy of Science

Kuhn’s legacy is contested:


• Kuhn the revolutionary: A relativist What’s next? In the Wikipedia entry
for History_and_philosophy_of_science
himself, questioning the ’objectivity’ of you find that
science and the inevitable nature of ” More recently the sociology of
scientific progress. His own theory seemed science and technology studies have
become popular topics and a few HPS
like a revolution in (positivist) philosophy of
departments have become Science
science. Studies departments, e.g., the School
of History and Philosophy of Science at
• Kuhn the conservative: He distanced the University of New South Wales was
himself from the more philosophically- known as the School of Science and
Technology Studies (STS) from the
’radical’ interpretations of his work, and can mid-1980s until 2001. For this reason it
be seen as a conservative regarding the can be argued that the fields are
identical and that the difference is only
implications for science policy: Society one of emphasis. While it may seem
should not interfere with the everyday that STS is a broader concept, leaving
room for other approaches to science
workings of science, and a certain amount
such as sociology of science, HPS
of indoctrination in the normal-science departments are not usually as
(ph.d. student) education of scientists exclusive as a literal interpretation of
the name might imply.”
seems necessary.
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STS: Science and Technology Studies

Barry Barnes & Davis Bloor


SSK, Sociology of STS, Science and Technology Studies
Scientific Knowledge:
• the study of how social, political,
• Barry Barnes & Davis and cultural values affect scientific
Bloor (Edingburgh research and technological
school): A Strong innovation, and how these in turn
Programme for a SSK: affect society, politics, and culture
you must give sociological • an interest in viewing science and
explanations for technology as socially embedded
erroneous as well as true enterprises.
beliefs - they should be
• an interest in studying
treated symmetrically. SSK Practitioners relationships between
• Harry Collins (Bath include Gaston technoscientific innovations and
school): The sociology of Bachelard, David society, from new perspectives
scientific experiments and Bloor, Paul (e.g., and anthropology, but also
of forms of expertise Feyerabend, Elihu literature, art history, cultural studies,
• General sociology of M. Gerson, Thomas gender studies, history of
knowledge (Berger & Kuhn, Susan Leigh consciousness, medicine, law and
Luckmann) Star, Anselm computer science).
Strauss, Lucy • Concern over the direction and the
Suchman, Harry risks of science and technology.
Collins, and others.
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STS: Science and Technology Studies

Thus, STS includes STS, Science and Technology Studies


• the study of how social, political,
studies of the and cultural values affect scientific
research and technological
pathway from innovation, and how these in turn
research to affect society, politics, and culture
• an interest in viewing science and
technology technology as socially embedded
enterprises.
(and invoices), • an interest in studying
and the relationships between
technoscientific innovations and
accompanying society, from new perspectives
instrumentalization of (e.g., and anthropology, but also
literature, art history, cultural studies,
science, and the risks gender studies, history of
consciousness, medicine, law and
and uncertainties computer science).

involved. • Concern over the direction and the


risks of science and technology.

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Questions for discussion

1 Why is it problematic (or wrong) to claim that


”natural science is an exemple of positivist science”
?

2 Discuss what became of the idea that all sciences


had certain (unifying) characteristics in common - is
it all gone?
• Still, there must be a difference between art and
science, or religion and science - but which ones?
• Isn’t true that the method of the natural sciences is
the experimental method?

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