Sar Le Mijn 1985

ANDRIES SARLEMIJN
C O N V E R G E N C E IN THE P H I L O S O P H Y OF SCIENCE?
A Contribution on the Possibility o f East-West Discussions 'in the
FieM o f the Philosophy o f Science*
1. INTRODUCTION
The main theme of this paper is a historiographical one. There is, I am con-
vinced, convergence between scientific methodology and dialectical phi-
losophy. This is a process that we can observe in Western countries like
West Cermany and the United States. Also, the philosophers of the Soviet
Union have become more and more interested in the problems and results
of the Western philosophy of science. The first aim of this article is to explain
under what conditions a tendency to convergence exists in the Western
philosophy of science towards a dialectical way of thinking. 1 will treat
this question in Sections 1-5. In Section 6, I will show how far the dialectical
philosophy of the Soviet Union is compatible with philosophy of science
as it is conceived in Western countries. At the end of my examination I make
some remarks about opportunities for East-West discussions.
This evolution towards convergence is an interesting one. In the past,
the representatives of the two directions (we cannot speak about schools,
because every direction has many schools) were concentrated on different
problems, believed in the uniqueness of its own methods, read publications
representative of their own direction and used different methods and ter-
minologies. The evolution can be described in a nutshell as follows:
(1) a gradual conversion of many dialectical philosophers to modern

logic has taken place, or at least to a more positive attitude to it 1 and
(2) a better appraisal of dialectical philosophy by a number of leading
proponents of scientific methodology exists. 2
Before treating and explaining the convergence-tendency in detail I start

with some preliminary remarks. Firstly, the present thesis about convergence
is an exacting one, but the space at my disposal is limited. As in the economic
and sociological theories of convergence, I have to make some assumptions
about what is essential in the historical process, too, and about what will
Studies in Soviet Thought 30 (1985), 305-336. 0039-3797/85.10

© 1985 by D. ReidelPublishing Company.
306 ANDRIES SARLEMIJN
be left out of consideration. Here I assume that the shift from neo-positivism
to Popperianism and thence to Kuhn's, Feyerabend's, Lakatos' philosophy
of science and structuralism is the decisive process in the scientific methodo-
logy of the Western world. Other Western philosophies of science will not
be considered. Secondly, my convergence thesis applies only to undogmatic
interpretations of dialectical philosophy. To my way of thinking, dogmatic
dialectical philosophers believe unconditionally...
(a) that they are saying something meaningful every time they quote
Hegel or Marx, 3 or
(b) hold that Hegel's or Marx's problems should be discussed in the
way originally proposed, 4 or
(c) hold their own explanation to be the only one possible, s
In science a lot of things have changed. Next to the Euclidean there are
non-Euclidean geometries; next to the classical non-classical (e.g. intuitioni-
stic) logics have been developed and accepted; and, in mechanics, we have
classical and non-classical theories. These theories are opposed to each other
and nevertheless accepted. I do not know similar situations before (let us
say) 1900. Therefore, the problems of scientific methodology have changed
too and we cannot believe dogmatically that Hegel and Marx solved current
problems of scientific methodology.
2. THE GROWING UNITY OF POSITIVE SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE

AND THE RELATIVELY WELL-FOUNDED EXCLUSION OF THE
DIALECTICAL WAY OF ANALYSING IN THE CONTEXT OF
POSITIVE RESEARCH
After these preliminary remarks, now we come to my detailed historio-

graphical considerations. I shall first deal with the neopositivist puzzle
model. 6 The main thesis of the neopositivists is their assertion that physical
science itself, just like a puzzle, leads to a homogeneous picture of the world.
Looking at the history of the natural sciences in a certain way, we have to
admit, that they are right when they point out that in this history there
have, in fact, been such tendencies time and again.
In antiquity, physics dealt with the nature of material processes, whereas
mechanics meant knowledge of manual trades and technical subjects. 7
CONVERGENCE IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 307
Nevertheless, in the time of Descartes, Galileo and Leibniz, no distinction

between these disciplines was made. This tendency continued in Newton's
mechanics: 8 astronomy lost its fundamental independence when Kepler's
planetary laws could be interpreted as special laws of force by virtue of the
concept of gravitation. Newton's example became a school of thought, for,
in the 19th century, Kroenig, Clausius, Maxwell and Boltzmann tried to
describe heat as they did the movement of particles. Their aim was to
derive laws of thermodynamics from mechanics. Also, Thompson, Maxwell,
Helmholtz and Boltzmann aimed at building up electrodynamics as a unitary
systematic analogy with mechanics. This came about after Hertz discovered in
1887 the electromagnetic waves named after him. Light could now be inter-
preted as electromagnetic waves of a given wavelength. The fundamental dis.
tinction between magnetic, electrical and optical phenomena was thus under-
mined. In 1905, a similar unification was developed, because the theory of
relativity eliminated antitheses between mechanics and electrodynamics. Like-
wise, the quantum theory linked up previously discrete fields, for instance,
the radiation theories, the atomic theories and statistical mechanics.
What was it that induced scientists to seek a coherent and unified picture
of the world? Was it belief in some fundamental structure of particle or
wave? Or was it a pure intuitive idea about the way that should be followed
for solving physical problems? Or was it the desire for a comprehensive
theory? These and similar questions with regard to the development of
scientific problems with which Kulm, Lakatos and Feyerabend were later
to concern themselves, were left open by the neopositivists. They were
interested in the process of increasing positive knowledge. In the neo-
positivistic analysis of this process the personal motivation of the scientists
and their personal aims to explain certain phenomena were left out of con-
sideration, because they were regarded as unimportant for evaluation of
positive knowledge itself. In detail, there are three characteristics of the
neopositivistic way of treating the growth of positive knowledge:
(a) the unity and increase of positive knowledge were formulated in

a neo-Kantian way;
(b) an analysis of the history of science could not lead to a well-founded
idea about the processual growth of positive knowledge, because
in history, positive knowledge had been always mixed up with non-
positive ('metaphysical') thoughts;
(c) the increase of positive knowledge could be guaranteed by applying

rules of modern logic to scientific sentences.
These three characteristics must be dealt with to show that a dialectical me-
thod was difficult to accept in the context of this neopositivistic program.
2.1. Neo-Kantianism and the Unity of Positive Knowledge
The problem of the unity of positive knowledge can be formulated in the

following terms: How is the work of scientists to be judged, if it is to gain
acceptance as a component of the final positive picture as a whole? The
neopositivist confronted with this problem faces a real dilemma. 9 On the
one hand he would like to solve it, so that scientific development is not
misled by what he considers as pseudoproblems. On the other hand, how-
ever, he knows it to be insoluble by empirical means. The final 'picture'
will never be given as long as the history of science is not finished. In
this sense, the unity of positive scientific knowledge ('the final picture')
is a metaphysical (not empirical) object.
The dilemma is met with in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason in another
form. There, the homogeneity of the physical sciences is an asymptotic
point corresponding to a thing-in-itself. 11 This thing is, however, only an
apparent object ("Seheinob]ekt") and must be considered as such. Ap-
pearance can be misleading and give rise to metaphysics but, again, belief
in this object has in Kant's Critique the function of stimulating and syste-
matizing researchJ 2
Avenarius and Mach, both of them precursors of neopositivism, tried
to eliminate the body of problems relating to the thing-in-itself by means
of their principle of economy. 13 The founder of the Vienna Circle (Wiener
Kreis) Moritz Schlick, 14 also concerned himself with the problemJ s
By the influence of Avenarius, Mach and Schlick the development of
science became a problem that was formulated in the works of the Vienna
Circle in neo-Kantian terms. 16 In the spirit of this tradition, Neurath dis-
allows any assertion on the physical picture of the world, because to him,
and also to Kant, it would be a metaphysical one. And, in the neopositivist
literature, statements on the nature of the absolute, the unconditional, or
in other words, statements on the nature of the thing-in-itself are always
deduced as examples of metaphysical statementsJ 7
In spite of that, Neurath believes is in the integral picture of the world.

This belief, in turn, is in full agreement with tradition. In Unified Science
as Encyclopedic Integration 19 he describes unification in the following
metaphorical terms: all scientists are in search of the still-missing pieces
of a mosaic. The picture does not mean that every scientific achievement
will be accepted forever without criticism. The positivist is critical and
knows that there is no knowledge that holds true for ever. 2° Experiments
and apparatus can be continuously improved. Formulated in terms of the
figure of speech: the stones long since fitted into a mosaic are in due course
taken out by other scientists, repolished or changed and replaced somewhere
else in the mosaic. Neurath knew that very well himself; his expression
"Encyclopedic Unity" was intended to emphasize that the aim of scientific
development has to remain an open problem. 21
Neurath, :z Carnap and Morris founded the International Encyclopedia
of Unified Science 22 with the intention of promoting publications on those
"cross-links" already established between the sciences. And again these stimu-
late the application of methods already applied with success elsewhere to
problems of a different nature. One can seek in vain among the neopositivists
for further information on the development of science, the reason for which
arises, in part, out of the second point I have mentioned: the neopositivist
view on history.
2.2. History of Science Without Metaphysics?
Few works of the neopositivists are concerned with the history of science. 24
And usually, the historical considerations are very brief. Why do the neo-
positivists evince little interest in the history of science? I already formulated
the answer: according to positivists science in the past was mixed with
metaphysical (non.empirical or non-mathematical) ideas. From the historio-
graphical writings of Neurath, it is evident that he still accepted Comte's
three-stages law, 2s according to which the increase of pure positive scientific
knowledge will come only after a search for religious or metaphysical ex-
planations have ceased. Furthermore, the neopositivists regard Newton's
mechanics as metaphysics because of the latter's absolute space-and-time
concepts. 26 And metaphysics is unscientific. But Newton's influence on
science did not cease until the end of the past century. Therefore, the neoposi-
tivist assumptions make a very short tale in the history of science. The
historian can thus provide tittle information on the development of the

sciences. Under these circumstances, even the 'prehistory' of pure positive
science becomes uninteresting: a solution of the demarcation problem has
to be assumed in order to allow the historian to establish the factors which
either slowed down or accelerated the movement in the direction of pure
positive knowledge. That is not an interesting method of researching the
history of science.
The neopositivist method has another disadvantage, however, and can
lead to premature conclusions. Let us consider the following example. Non-
Euchdean systems were, as we know, developed during the 19th century.
In the context of the philosophy of science, they represented a break with
a two.thousand.year-old tradition. What Plato, Eudoxus, Euclid, Kant and
many others had believed, namely, that mathematics determines the structure
of the world unconditionally ("a priori"), was wrong. The acceptance of
the general theory of relativity, in which non-Euclidean geometry was ap-
plied, showed that mathematicians had to be considered as creators of sys-
tems from which the physicists choose the appropriate one for formulating
new theories. 27
The neopositivists rightly asserted that the creators of the new mathe-
matics and physics were obliged to set themselves up in opposition to, and
prevail, against the dominating Kantian school. On this point I agree'; but,
the neopositivist conclusion goes much further and maintains that every
philosophy of science is unconditionally false and that there is only one
meaningful kind of scientific endeavour and that is to put forward pro-
positions and concepts that are based on physical reality. These propositions
and concepts can be formulated accurately only by mathematical or logical
means. The positivists did their best in this direction and hoped that their
efforts would contribute to the development of science. However, they
overlooked three circumstances:
(1) Their own methodology was based on a certain philosophy of

science. 2s
(2) New ideas or concepts of certain physical phenomena can not
be introduced from the very beginning in a strictly positive sense.
Galileo's concepts about fall, movement, void and so on, were not
exact from the beginning. That was the case with Newton's concept
of gravitation, t o 0 . 29
(3) Only a certain kind of scientific knowledge is positive in the strictest

sense: for instance, the technological knowledge of materials can be
said to be positive. But theories of relativity and quantum-mechanics
are not positive in a strict sense surely; the theoretical concepts of
these theories cannot be reduced to phenomena which are immediate-
ly observable, g°
2.3. Logic in Favour of Neopositivism?
Not all neopositivists were convinced of this point. Reichenbach and in

particular Neurath, al had their doubts about the plausibility of the positivist
program with logical methods. Hempel and Carnap, on the contrary,
fought for decades with the problem on how verification, demarcation, in-
duction, empirical and theoretical concepts could be defined by means
of modern logic. In the 1950s it became clear a2 that all problems could
not be solved by the neopositivist program. Especially the theoretical
concepts offered a big obstacle. The neopositivists, after years of research,
came to realize this to some extent themselves. In 1954, Hempel wrote a
sharp attack against operationalism, 33 although at the beginning, the opera-
tionalistic reduction of theoretical concepts seemed to be compatible with
neopositivism. 34 Hempel - and in a certain sense also Carnap - discovered
that not all concepts could be reduced to observations with well-defined
instruments.as
The conclusion should have been that not all scientific knowledge was
positive. But the program was abandoned completely in the 1960s. 36
2.4. Neopositivism and Dialectics Are Incompatible
For a school of thought which enthusiastically seeks to establish the empirical

and logical relationships between positive scientific knowledge and observa-
tions, a dialectical philosopher can give rise to irritation with his considerations
about change in meaning of terms, about the evolution of ideas or programs
and about conceptual changes. Such problems should in the methodology
of positive knowledge, be avoided as much as possible. A dialectical philo-
sopher can say that positive knowledge is a very restricted kind of knowledge.
That is true in a certain sense, but the theory of knowledge, which is only
concentrated on conceptual changes, is no less restricted.
The divergence between methodology and dialectical philosophy was

very great in the years between 1930 and 1951 (the year of the publication
of Quine's article). In this period, the Western philosophy of science was
concentrated on the foundations of positive knowledge.
This judgement did not, however, apply to the relationship between
methodology and materialism. Marx is very often named amongst the pre-
decessors of neopositivism. 37 And Schlick, Frank and Neurath even applaud
Lenin's criticism of Avenarius and Mach. But with regard to logic and meth-
odology, the opposition against dialectics was great. 3s
We assume now, that Popperianism is one of the most important succes-
sors of neopositivism in the field of methodology and we will see how great
the difference becomes in this period.
3. EVOLUTION OF THEORETICAL SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE
Popper replaced the neopositivist puzzle model with a Darwinist one. To

Popper, a theory is comparable with a biological creature, leading an in-
dependent life, but dependent for all that on its environment. And just as
in the theory of evolution, only the fittest species survive, the strongest
theory survives in the development of science? 9 Although I can discover
in this Darwinism on the part of Popper nothing more than a suggestion of
a metaphorical use of language, I will fall in with it.
3.1. Evolution and Pluralism
What is meant here by "dependence on or independence of environment

on the part of a theory"? This expression illustrates the contrast with the
positivists. To the latter, physical laws were purely mathematical formulae
which served as brief and efficient abbreviations for summarizing scientific
experiences. To Popper, on the other hand, a theory is (or: should be) a set
of true and generally applied propositions. The general application of a
theory cannot, however, be deduced from the particular propositions based
on experience. That is why any attempts to give theories an inductive founda-
tion have no prospect of success. In that sense, theories live divorced from
their environment. 4° The contact between them is restored by Popper's
falsificationist demand that single space-time propositions should be deduced
from theories. This guarantees the possibility that experience of the physical
world can contradict theory. And, in the event of a scientist acting in ac-
cordance with Popper's principle of critical testing, he then looks seriously
for many different situations which could lead to refuting such a theory. If
the many attempts at refutation fail, then it is clear that the theory is indeed
general and full of information, al
The falsificationist methodology leads to a complex evaluation of the
concept "evolution" (or: growth of knowledge). Popper considers several
doctrines on evolution: the positivist, the Marxist and the Darwinist. Seen
from the positivist standpoint, the history of science is a unique process
which, according to Popper, automatically leads to an integral picture of
the physical world. From the Marxist viewpoint the history of economics is a
unique transition from primitive society to socialism. A dogmatic Darwinist
concentrates purely on the unique evolution from amoeba of human beings.
The dogmatic Hegelian believes that in history spirit prevails Unconditionally
and without limits. 42 Popper considers these doctrines of evolution to be
unfruitful for the following two reasons:
(1) Their subject is holistic, that is, a unique process. This concept is
incompatible with that of 'critically testing a generally applicable
theory about history' which presupposes a set of, in principle, re-
peatable situations.
(2) Holism contradicts the requirement of having to formulate the con-
ditions of hypothetically accepted laws.
This criticism evokes two questions:
(1) Is not Popper's own view holistic? Does he not assume that the final
scope of scientific evolution is the fittest theory?
(2) In what sense is Popper's view about the growth of knowledge condi-
tional?
We will consider these two points in detail.
3.2. Conditional Growth of Scientific Knowledge

(a) The growth of knowledge is methodologically guaranteed and not by any
historical law. Just as in the positivist development model, the falsificationist
model also leads to a dilemma, to wit, the aim of the history of science is to
say that the most general theory is, in Darwinist terms, the fittest theory:
- the final aim of scientific evolution is the highest measure of approximation

to truth and this situation is reached when the most generally applied
theory is formulated and critically tested; iff we take this for granted;
then, falsificationism will lead to another question:
- what kind of a theory is the theory about the growth of knowledge?
how can the theory of the final aim of science be tested?
There are three ways out of the dilemma. The first is chosen by Popper in
his Logic of Scientific Discovery in which the rules that apply to the object
theory are not the same as those which govern the theory of cognition
as a metatheory. 43 Later on, Popper formulated criteria with which the
concrete steps taken in the development could be determined: methodolo-
gical standards take the place of speculations about the final aim of scientific
evolution. He agreed that, to begin with, the most general theory is the
most improbable, since the number of its potential falsifiers is greatest. 44
But this formulation is at least very counter-intuitive: scientists usually do
not think that they aim for the most improbable theory. Therefore, Popper
continued to look for a less surprising standard. In 1961, Popper postulated
a new theory T2 as compared to an older theory TI . . .
is more accurate than T1,

-
- is more general and informative than T1,

- is more detailed than T~,
- has passed tests which T1 failed to do,
- has proposed new tests a n d . . .
- brought into association with one another problems which until then
were not related, as
So heterogeneous a list must lead to inconsistent evaluations. 46 For that

reason, Lakatos reduces Popper's six relationships to only two:
- a theory T2 is theoreticaly progressive (or 'constitutes a theoretically

progressive problem-shift'), if each new theory has more empirical content
than its predecessor T j, that is, if it predicts some novel, hithero unex-
pected fact;
- a theory T2 is empirically progressive (or 'constitutes an empirically
progressive problem-shift'), if some of this excess empirical content is
also corroborated, that is, if T2 leads to the actual discovery of some

new fact. 47
From this standard Lakatos comes to the definition of scientific and non-
scientific attitudes: "We 'accept' problem shifts as 'scientific' only if they
are at least theoretically progressive; if they are not, we 'reject' them as
'pseudoscientific'-.48 Lakatos's new standard has three consequences:
(a) Falsification of a theory T is not required for the rejection of T and
there is no rejection before the emergence of a better theory. 49 (b) Meta-
physical theories are positively evaluated and retained as long as they explain
problematic instances by content-increasing changes in the auxiliary hypo-
theses appended to it. s° (c) The new criterion involves the consequence
that the historian, who wants to reconstruct the rational evolution of science,
looks for the history of programs: he looks for series of theories and their
problem-shifts. The evolution of a program P is rational, as long as it legiti-
mates the hope of theoretical progress. A program Pa is rationally aban-
doned in favor of P2, when the theories of P2 can explain what the theories
of P1 explain and when P2 guarantees more theoretical progress, sl
Even if Lakatos's concept of the growth of knowledge is less problematic
than Popper's, it remains a difficult question to see why it is that scientists
(unconsciously) always pick comparable systems of concepts so that the
claims of their theories can be compared, too. This is the reason why Kuhn
and Feyerabend s2 reject Popperianism and Lakatos's methodology of scienti-
fic research programs.
(/9) The growth o f knowledge depends on social conditions. In Popper's

view, scientific evolution is not unconditional; it depends on at least three
factors: the readiness of scientists to set up many different theories and
to test them; their readiness to choose the 'best' theory (in the described
meaning); and, finally, the intellectual freedom of the scientists to act in
this way. The last condition must be safeguarded by the political system, s3
3.3. The Theoretical Evolution in the Context o f Falsificationism is not

Dialectical
Set-theoretical calculations are not dialectical. Also, when we compare

the set of phenomena which can be explained with theory T1, with the set
of phenomena which can be explained with another theory T2, it makes

no sense to introduce conceptual changes or dialectical contradictions.
Also, in the context of the critical tests of a theory, conceptual changes
and dialectical contradictions make no sense. The reason is that, in all these
situations, it is assumed that the universe of discourse remains the same.
As long as a Popper scholar holds his hypothetical-deductive model true by
excluding individual psychological problems 54 (for instance concerning the
acceptance of theories by individual scientists) and not considering situations
in which scientists do not understand each other (because of different con-
ceptual schemata), ss or just analysing theoretical progress with logical or
set-theoretical instruments, there is no reason to accept a dialectical meth-
odology. In this context, Popper's attacks against dialectics are consistent.
A dogmatic dialectical philosopher can easily show that Popper's inter-
pretation of Hegel's and Marx's terminology is historically wrong, s6 but
the effect of this refutation is not great. Lakatos's and Feyerabend's in-
tentions were undogmatic because they were not primarily interested in
the restoration of a tradition that went back to Hegel or Marx. Their scope
was to show that certain historical discussions and decisions cannot be
explained in the context of Popper's hypothetical-deductive model. On
this point, Lakatos and Feyerabend agree with each other. However, there
is a big difference between them. Lakatos likes to explain, why a program
is accepted; and he likes to show, under what conditions a decision about
a theory and a decision about a program was rational. He does not claim
a prognosis about the success of the evolution of programs: "One can be
'wise' only after the event", s7
Feyerabend points out a completely different aspect in the history of
science. He tries to show that the beginning of (let us say) a new program
can never be rationalized, ss Galileo's attacks against Aristotelianism were
in the beginning, especially when Galileo was writing his De Motu, unscien.
tific in the Lakatosian meaning. Galileo worked on his laws of fall in spite
of the Lakatosian standards: by this standard Galileo should have followed
the Aristotelian program or that of Tartaglia, Benetti or Ubaldo.59
Although the attacks of Feyerabend against Lakatos are violent, they
do not contradict each other. Feyerabend points out that a fruitful evolu-
tion never starts in a rational way; whilst Lakatos points out, that after
a certain time of evolution ("after the event"), a rationally grounded de-
cision is possible.
However, Feyerabend and Lakatos both concentrated on decisions which

were not an object of analysis in the Popperian hypothetical-deductive
model. A refutation of Popper's attacks against the method was not needed.
The problem was different: Feyerabend and Lakatos were interested in
the shifts of conceptual schemata (expression of Kuhn) 6° and not - or
at least not only - on the hypothetical-deductive model.
4. DEVELOPMENT OF CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUNDS OF THEORIES
Lakatos and Feyerabend have - as Lakatos put it - 'out-Poppered Popper'

by falsifying falsificationism and demanding the application of the principle
of theoretical pluralism not only on the object level, but also, on the meta-
level. 61 These were, however, primarily tricks to infuse new life into the
discussion which had ground to a stop. To be loyal Popperians was not
their aim.
In the actual dialogue the Popperian insists first on agreement, critical
testing and freedom from contradiction. The critical dialectical philosopher
(like Lakatos and Feyerabend) postpones his counter-move. He concentrates
on the shifts in meaning of the metaterms ("induction", "deduction", "ex-
planation", "causality", "appearance", "perception", "measuring", etc.)
and of the object-terms ("force", "mass", "wave", "particle", etc). Parti-
cularly in the transition from the science of antiquity (up to 1500) into
classical science (1500-1900), and from there to modern science, these
changes in meaning have influenced the acceptance or rejection of theories
to a greater extent than the ostensibly decisive experiments. The Cartesians,
for instance, thought they could interpret movement as a pulse effect while
Newtonians, at the same time, were working with greater success, on the
concept of actio in distans. And this concept of the actio in distans, was
for the physicists in France and Germany only the main obstacle to accepting
Newton's theory of gravitation. Until the end of the 18th century, these
countries' cartoons showed how ridiculous gravity and actio in distans ap-
peared. This example shows that the so-called critical tests do not always
convince. 62 The concepts which accompany physical theories must make
sense for the community of scientists; if not, then experiments lack any
force.
The acceptance and the success of a theory are subjects which cannot
be treated in the context of the Popperian hypothetical-deductive model.
Popper excludes these themes from his methodological analysis: 63 "No

theory of knowledge should attempt to explain why we are successful in
our attempts to explain things." Disappointed with this attitude, Lakatos
can only answer with a rhetorical question: "What then should a theory
of knowledge attempt to explain?"
The critical dialectical philosophers protest not only against the reduction
of the process of scientific progress by elimination of conceptual problems.
They protest against the Popperian postulate of consistency, too: the set of
accepted theories should be consistent and the relationship between theories
and "facts" should be consistent, too: otherwise, the situation will be seen
- in the context of the hypothetical-deductive model - as problematic.
But many fruitful theoretical evolutions in history started with contradicting
the accepted theories, or with ideas which contradict the "facts". Prout's
teaching, later to be hailed as the cornerstone of modern atomic theory, was
in the opinion of Prout himself, in conflict with the observations of those
days. Successful developments (in Prout's case, in chemistry, in Einstein's
case, in optics, and in that of Bohr, in quantum theory) were launched
despite being in conflict with so-called "consistency". 64 Lakatos and
Feyerabend believe that such facts can only be explained as follows. Scien-
tists, for instance Newtonians or Cartesians, take a positive decision as a
conceptual framework, in the hope of being able to set up successful theories;
then they accept the risk that their research programs will be problematic
to begin with. No research is without conceptual problems and no success
can be reached without solutions to problems of definitions of concepts.
Do Lakatos and Feyerabend accept a dialectical logic which is independent
of historical processes? On this point, there are differences between Lakatos
and Feyerabend. And these differences must be partly attributed to the
personal evolution of the two thinkers. Feyerabend changed his philosophy,
which was in the beginning Popperian; he assumed several dialectical ele-
ments in his way of thinking without accepting a doctrine which has any
similarity to dialectical logic. 6s He is fascinated by the complexity of the
historical evolution of science only and irritated by the simplicity of the
explanation of this evolution given by many philosophers of science.
The study of Popper's works brought about Lakatos' liberation from
Hegelianism, as he himself put it. 66 But how far did Lakatos give up his
Hegelianism? In order to answer this question, I am obliged to interpret
Hegel's dialectical "logic" as a metaphilosophy on philosophical programs.
Then, the comparison becomes possible and it shows striking agreements:

(a) to both of them, the start of a program is full of contradiction, to Lakatos
because new theories of observation are implicit in the program and ipso
facto contradict so-called reality. To Hegel, the reason is that a philosophical
program always introduces conceptual formulations that are foreign to
reality. (b) to both of them, the realization (Lakatos talks of "verification")
of a program leads to new insights into reality. (c) according to both, the
"contradiction" between program and realization cannot be fully overcome.
(d) in some texts, Lakatos gives the impression that he accepts a suprahis-
torical hierarchy of concepts and theories (like Hegel did in a certain sense); 6~
in other texts, he declares, that this should be seen as a misunderstanding. 68
Lakatos would like to disavow Hegelianism on three points. (a) Only the
programs develop dialectically; the scientific theories, however, must satisfy
logical and critical standards; but expressed differently, a similar distinction
is found in Hegel, nevertheless. 69 (b) Lakatos is of the opinion that there is
no natural saturation point for a program, because there are no natural
limits to human imagination which can give fruitful impulses to a program, v°
On this point, Lakatos really differs from Hegel, who liked to show that
concepts can change and become other; for non-idealists, these changes
are the most difficult point in Hegel's philosophy. (c) Programs, in Lakatos's
view, guarantee content.increasing theory formulation. On this point, Lakatos
opts for Hegelianism without the anti-formal-logic attitude and for Popperia-
nism without historiographical sterility.
Finally, I would like to emphazise some difficulties of conceptual analysis,
in general, and dialectical analysis in particular. (a) Concepts as purely mental
entities are very difficult to distinguish precisely. Let us take as example,
the concept "mass" in relativistic mechanics. And let us assume that two
physicists have it in mind whilst making their relativistic calculations and
afterwards pointing to the phenomena, to which the results of the calcula-
tions (and also the concept of mass) should be applicable. The critical ques-
tion is: was the content of the concept "mass" in the mind of both physicists
identical? There is no operational criterion that allows us to decide this.
And it is very probable that the content of the concepts differs. Usually
physicists give different answers, when they are asked to describe the content
in colloquial language. Kuhn has often pointed out this difficulty very
clearly 71 and he has tried to eliminate it with his concept 'paradigm'. Kuhn
thought a paradigm would prevent differences in content of concepts (in
the minds of physicists) from becoming problematic or would lead to funda-

mental discussions in "normal" times. But, afterwards, he had to concede
that the paradigm concept was problematic in itself.
(b) The second difficulty is connected with the former. What is the cri-
terion for a conceptual change, or, as Kuhn called it, a revolution? Of course,
we must accept that there is a completely different way of thinking in the
classical period of physics compared with the modern period of physics.
For a historian it is not so difficult to show this. But the criterion to deter-
mine the turning point is not easy to formulate. Kuhn's concept "revolution"
and the dialectical concept "negation" suggest that it is possible to describe
in the history of physics an objective turning point without introducing
conceptual schemata which were inspired by the scientific interests of the
historian himself. Or let me illustrate the same difficulty with a question:
Why should not we accept a revolution between Galileo's thoughts during
his writing of D e M o t u and his later thoughts about the same subject when
he was working toward his Discorsi? 72 The only answer can be: because
that change of thoughts and concepts is of no interest for the subject that
w e , historians, like to examine. Depending upon our subject of consideration
we could call every change of thoughts and of concepts a "revolution".
If we accept this, then we do not look for the objective structure of scientific
revolutions or of (so-called) dialectical negations in the history of science;
then we only try to show that our conceptual schemata are adequate for
the aims of our historical study (like a physicist shows, that the mathematical
calculus, which he is using, is adequate for his physical theory). Both diffi-
culties can under certain circumstances be avoided by the structuralists.
5. EVOLUTIONS OF FORMAL STRUCTURES
The structuralists investigate inter-theoretical relationships using purely

formal means with the aid of the so-called Sneed's formalism. They do
not equate a theory - as the Popper school assumed - with a set of sen.
tences. Empirical sentences arise only out of the theoretically intended
applications. In this context, a theory becomes an ordered pair; that is, it
arises out of a mathematical structure and out of the field of intended ap-
plications. The expression "evolution of a theory" acquires, in the struc.
turalist context, a special meaning. Thanks to successive increases, both
in the elemental structure and the corresponding empirical applications,
a hierarchy of their elements arises which makes impressive comparisons

possible, for instance, between the formulations o f particle mechanics of
Newton, Lagrange and Hamilton.
The structuralist program enables us to emphasize important aspects of
the gnoseology of mathematical physics. In mathematical physics, the mathe-
matical structure forms the "spectacles" through which the practitioner
of this discipline "looks" at the phenomena of his analysis. The evolution
of his "spectacles" is, in a certain sense, the evolution of his way of analysing.
Nevertheless, this concept o f evolution is not a strictly historical process;
as Stegmtiller says:
While the concept of a progressive theory-evolution still captures a 'realistic idea',

being reminiscent of a 'progressive research program' in the sense of Lakatos, 'perfect
theory-evolution' denotes a 'utopian ideal' for which, in all probability, there are no
historical examples. 73
First of all, the history of the formal is not identical with the using of the
means for theory-construction and, secondly, the formal hierarchy between
theory-nets - a hierarchy in which a theory-net Ni+~ is a proper refinement
of N i - does not correspond to the factual history of mathematical physics.
Let us formulate it in a simple way: Ni÷a can be founded historically before
Ni, although it formally follows after Ni. The structuralist concept of
"evolution" does not explain (and does not claim to explain) historical
processes. This became clear after the discussion between Stegmtiller, Sneed
and Kuhn in 1976. 74
We can now turn back to our central topic and ask: is there any relation-
ship between the structuralist way of analysing theory-nets and a dialectical
analysis of the evolution of ideas and concepts in history? The answer is
" n o " - as long as the structuralist program is followed in a strictly formal
way. The work on theory-nets can be seen as a strictly formalistic way of
practicing mathematics: working with introduced formulae, applying in-
troduced rules and interpreting them afterwards.
But the claims of structuralism are not a true formal analysis for every
scholar. Stegmfiller, for instance, often postulated that the structuralist
program should be applicable to conceptual changes, too. Two philosophers
of Bielefeld University, Diederich and Fulda, showed the consequences o f
this postulate: their work, albeit with Sneed's formalism slightly modified,
explained the differences among economic concepts as introduced by Marx
in his Das Kapital.7s This example shows a real convergence: at least, the
problems are becoming the same.
6. CONVERGENCE?
I showed a certain change in the climate of the Western philosophy of science:

a dialectical way of analysing (for instance, of Feyerabend or Lakatos) is
accepted, or at least, seen as worthy enough to be discussed; also, a topic
which is always emphazised in the dialectical tradition, namely, the historical
or hierarchical-static evolution of concepts is accepted as a serious subject
for analysis in the philosophy of science. Not a dogmatic preference for
a certain tradition, coming from Hegel and Marx, but two kind of problems
influenced this change - the problems concerning the acceptance of theories
and the problems concerning the methodological (not historical!) relations
between theories. And I showed that the convergence of the traditions can
be observed as soon as the mentioned problems (acceptance, hierarchical
relations) are connected with questions concerning concepts and conceptual
change independent of empirical statements or formalisms.
What is the evolution in the USSR? To answer this question I will treat
three topics: the liberation of logic from dialectics, the history of dialectics
and the possibility of an East-West discussion.
6.1. Emancipation of Logical Analysis
The history of the fate of logical analysis at the philosophical faculties in

the USSR can be derided into four periods: (a) the beginning up to 1930,
(b) the so.called "Stalinist" period (until 1950), (c) the period of the funda-
mental discussions and confrontations in the 1950s and 1960s, (d) the
period after (let us say) 1970.
In the beginning, the belief that a dialectical logic as an alternative to
mathematical logic could be developed predominated. The consequence
was that the Russian tradition of logic 76 was not continued and that the
few philosophers who were still interested in logic made concessions; they
admitted that movement and evolution cannot be analysed by means of
formal logic. In the meantime philosophers were more occupied with funda-
mental problems than with analysis. Should in dialectical materialism the
materialistic way of analysing (searching for "mechanical" explanations)
be preferred to the dialectical way? This question overshadowed all attention

to other detailed questions. This question became more and more mixed up
with political questions.
Also this was the case of the judgement about logical analysis; this logic
- after the final decision was made around 1930 - become politically
suspect. Mitin, one of the leading philosophers of that time, taught in 1934
that formal logic is always
a most trustworthy weapon in the hands of the predominating exploiting classes, . . .

a bastion of religion and obscurantism. 77
And in the official Soviet Encyclopedia of 1936 we read, that formal logic
is...
the lowest stage in the development of human knowledge, replaced by dialectic . . . . Formal
logical thinking is a characteristic trait of Menshevism frequently noted by Lenin, who
leveled devastating dialectical criticism at the menshevik formal-logical deductions... 78
These judgements influenced the method of analysis only of the philosophers

in the USSR. We should not forget that research into logic and the founda-
tions of mathematics continued at the mathematical faculties. P. S. Novikov
and A. I. Mal'cev published several works on classical set theory without
any political consequences. A. A. Markov and N. A. ganin worked on con-
structivistic logic and A. N. Kolmogoroff analysed the relationships be-
tween classical and constructivistic logic. A special authority was Sofija A.
Janovskaja, who taught logic since 1936 at the Lomonosov-University of
Moscow. Also, she was interested in the history of mathematics and was
the editor of the translations of several Western results of logical analysis
(by Tarski, Hilbert-Ackermann, Camap, Turing, etc). We can conclude,
that research in logic was done in the years before 1946;but in the faculties
of philosophy logic was eliminated by the dialectical method.
The climate changed in the 1940s. In November o f 1946, the Central
Committee of the Communist Party decided that logic was to be assigned
at Soviet schools. But no textbooks existed. Therefore, the old textbooks
from the Tsarist times reappeared. The materials and even the examples
remained the same. 79 In 1946, Strogovi6 and, in 1947, Asmus published
an introduction, s° In the middle of the 1950S, many groups and schools
for the study of mathematical logic were founded, sl That would have been
impossible, if the faculties of mathematics had not ignored the directives
against the doctrine of "exploiting classes" as logic - as we have seen before

- was called in the 1930s.
6.2. Emancipation of the Philosophy of Science from Dialectics?
One can imagine that the reintroduction of formal (mathematical) logic

was difficult to comprehend for many Soviet philosophers. For decades,
it had been forbidden to teach logic at the faculties of philosophy. But
in 1950, the 'Linguistic Letters' of Stalin were published and logic had
to be accepted. 81 But authoritative decisions do not solve all problems;
already in 1949, Strogovi6 had remarked: s2 "Students ask questions and
they have to be answered". Two decades of discussions began.
I think that it is not of much value to analyse all conferences and public
discussions which were dedicated to this subject. I do not deny that much
effort was dissipated. But all the proposed solutions to the problems are
forgotten now in the USSR and do not have any influence upon the con-
temporary situation. Therefore, I think that we should concentrate on
the essential point. Logic had been forbidden for decades in the faculties
of philosophy in favor of dialectics; but what did "dialectics" mean at that
time for the Soviets? The dialectical way of thinking was associated with
the acceptance of three "laws", which say, (a) that quantitative changes
imply qualitative changes, (b) that evolution can be described in terms
of "negation of negation" and, finally, (c) that every object can be seen
as a union of two aspects which are in "conflict" with each other. Often,
the meaning of "union and conflict between two opposite aspects of a
subject" becomes associated with "objective contradiction" (whatever
that may mean).
In 1938, Stalin gave some directives about the interpretation of these
so-called 'laws'. 83 And, at that time, it was clear that a logical analysis of
the meaning of the 'laws' could not be made.
But in the 1950s the background of the discussion changed completely,
Logical analysis had to be accepted. Not only the aforementioned Party
decision, but also, successful technical engineering 84 made it impossible
to deny the value of mathematical-logical analysis. The new situation gave
rise to several fundamental problems: what is the relationship between logic
and dialectical method? What is the meaning of the aforementioned "laws"
of dialectics? In the 1950s and 1960s many solutions were proposed, but
the opinions still differed. The Party no longer imposed a solution. Nowadays,
every Soviet philosopher has his own concept of fundamental questions.
This means that they are free to develop their own philosophies as long
as they use the formulae of the three laws. After 1970, there has been no
further fundamental confrontation. The consequence is that after 1970,
the teachers of mathematical logic do their job, and the teachers of dialectical
philosophy do the same. Only Professor Narskij is interested in the tension
between dialectics and logic. 8s But another consequence is that, strictly
speaking, no Soviet program for the philosophy of science exists. The ap-
parent unity implies only the use of similar terminology.
6.3. Does Convergence Exist? Is an East-West Dialogue on Themes o f

the Philosophy o f Science Possible?
After about 1970, mathematical logic and set theory became accepted
(without any discussion) as useful means for analysing problems of the
philosophy of science. Also, since then, important publications in the West
have been discussed in 'the Voprosy filosofii and in the Filosofskie nauki.
Often, dialectical terminology has not been used in the context of these
publications. In this sense, a convergence and the possibility of a dialogue
between Soviet and Western philosophers of science exist.
But the chance of a dialogue is limited. Explicitly, no Soviet philosopher
dares to give up the dialectical "laws". s6 The formulae of these "laws"
function as magic words with which everyone can show his orthodoxy.
NOTES
* I am very grateful to Dr Peter R. Attwood, who corrected my English. I am also

indebted to Prof Dr P. P. Kirschenmann and Dr Ir P. A. Kroes for their useful comments
on a draft version of this article.
1 In West Germany, the so-called "Positivismusstreit in der deutschen Soziologie,
has influenced many dialectical philosophers, amongst them, R. Bubner and H. F.
Fulda. R. Bubner (Frankfurt a/M) thinks that the contradiction in the trial-and-error-
method of Popper which leads to the rejection of a hypothesis, can be interpreted as
a dialectical contradiction. In Dialektik und Wissenschaft, (Suhrkamp Frankfurt a.M.,
1973, p. 143), Bubner says: "Wenn Popper sich . . . tiber die verwirrende Vieldeutigkeit
des deutschen Wortes 'aufheben' beklagt, so ist daran zu erinnern, dass dieses Wort
ziemlich genau das Verfahren bezeichnet, dessen die Trial-and-Error-Methode sich hin-
sichtlich des Widerspruchs selber bedient." Bubner's interpretation of "dialectical
contradiction" can lead to the elimination of any point for serious discussion between
analytical and dialectical philosophers. The interesting point is not the fact that Bubner
does not see any difference between Hegel and Popper, but the fact that Bubner eli-
minates the difference between the two methods. From another point of view, H. F.
Fulda (Heidelberg) sees an important theme in the theory of action, that unifies the
analytical (Fulda thinks especially of Austin) and dialectical ways of thinking. See,
e.g., his 'Pragmatische Aspekte des Verstehens', in Patzig, G. (Hrsg.), Logik, Ethik,
Theorie des Geisteswissenschaften, Felix Meiner, Hamburg, 1977, pp. 209-224. In
the USSR, there is a lot of literature about the philosophy of science in which logical
methods are applied, as if a dialectical logic never existed.
2 Here, I do not think only of Lakatos and Feyerabend, but of R. Rorty, W. yon O.
Quine, D. Davidson and H. Putnam, too, who were the most important speakers at
the Hegel-Kongress of Stuttgart in June 1981.
3 Certainly I do agree with Bubner (see Note 1) when he says that there is a certain
similarity between Hegel's logic of history and Kuhn's structure of scientific revolutions.
But the point is, what does the statement about this similarity do to clarify the history
of physics?
4 Hegel's scholars often assert that his meaning of "logic" is different from the meaning
of the word in mathematical context. They are right. Also, they are right in asserting
that historians and interpreters should begin by accepting the meaning that Hegel gives
to the term. However, in the context of the explication things change. If we wish to
believe that Hegel's logic refers to the context of modern sciences, then we have to
compare the different meanings so that the Hegelian meaning of 'logic' is not taken
for granted.
5 An interpretation of a historical text aims to clarify a certain concept; on the other
hand, an explication likes to show that the concept is still useful for solving certain
real problems. Therefore, there can be great differences between interpretations and
explications. Moreover, explanations aim to solve the problem rather than to save
primarily an historical authority. The first consequence is that great differences exist
between explications. The second is that explications can be accompanied by sharp
criticisms, as was the case with Lakatos's undogmatic dialectical philosophy of science.
In 'Popper on Demarcation and Induction' (I. Lakatos, Philosophical Papers, Vol. I,
ed. by J. Worrall and G. Currie, Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, 1978, pp. 1 3 9 -
167) Lakatos (on p. 139) says that he had made "a final break with the Hegelian out-
look" which he held originally; but his methodology for Research Programs with its
"dialectic of positive and negative heuristic" is hardly anti-Hegelian; it is undogmatic.
See his 'Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific research programs', in: I.
Lakatos, Philosophical Papers, pp. 8 - 1 0 1 , especially, p. 52. Lakatos's undogmatic way
of treating the dialectical method enables him to clarify the Copernican revolution
and the rise of modern physics, from a certain point of view. See his 'Why did Coper-
nicus's Research Program Supersede Ptolemy's?' (together with E. Zahar) in: R. S.
Westman, The Copernican Achievement, University of Califonia Press, Berkeley, 1975,
pp. 3 5 4 - 3 8 3 and E. Zahar, 'Why did Einstein's Research Program Supersede Lorentz's,
in: The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 24, 1973, pp. 9 5 - 1 2 3 and pp.
2 2 3 - 2 6 2 . I have to admit, however, that a philosopher of science (like Lakatos) has
a task that differs from that of a historian who likes to interpret texts precisely.
6 Otto Neurath uses the expression "mosaic of empirical science": "The history of
this evolution of empirical science and scientific empirism can be regarded as the history
CONVERGENCE IN T H E P H I L O S O P H Y OF SCIENCE 327
of a 'mosaic', the pattern o f which has been formed by combining new observations
and new logical constructions o f diverse character and origin . . . . Science as a whole
can be regarded as a combination o f an enormous number o f elements, collected little
by little."; see O. Neurath, 'Unified Science as Encyclopedic Integration', in: Encyc-
loped& and Unified Science (International Encyclopedia o f Unified Science, Vol. I),
pp. 1 - 2 7 , p. 3.
7 See F. Krafft, Dynamische und statische Betrachtungsweise in der antiken Mechanik
(Boethius, Bd 10), Wiesbaden, 1970.
8 See I. B. Cohen, Geburt einer neuen Physik, yon Kopernikus zu Newton (Sammlung
Natur und Wissen, Bd. 8), K. Desch: Mtinchen, 1961.
9 Carnap was very well aware o f this problem o f neopositivistic philosophy o f science.
In 1938, he wrote: "Thus there is at present no unity o f laws. The construction o f
one homogeneous system o f laws for the whole o f science is an aim for the future
development o f science. This aim cannot be shown to be unattainable. But we do not,
of course, know whether it will ever be reached,"; R. Carnap, 'Logical Foundations
o f the Unity o f Science', in: Encyclopedia and Unified Science (International Encyc-
lopedia o f Unified Science, Vol. 1), pp. 4 2 - 6 2 , p. 61.
lo In a Dutch article, Otto Neurath says that nothing is k n o w n about the final unity
o f science: "De empirist kan toch aUeen maar toonen, in hoeverre er reeds eenheid is.
Ten opzichte van een ideaal systeem der wetenschap weet hij 'a priori' n i e t s , . . . , alles
wordt door hem in zekeren zin open gelaten, niets staat vast, alles is vloeiende . . . . Het
logische empirisme bereidt een synthese voor in de eenheidswetenschap. Of deze syn-
these alien zal bevredigen, die voor bet menschelijke denken ~ n gebouw wensen? . . .
Het zijn open vragen." O. Neurath, 'Eenheidswetenschap als empirische synthese', in
Synthese 3 (1938) pp. 1 0 - 1 7 , p. 17.
11 In Immanuel Kant's Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Reclam; Leipzig (o.J.), p. 631 (A
568) we read: "Ideen . . . sind noch weiter yon der objektiven Reaht~it entfernt, als
Kategorien ; denn es kann keine Erscheinung gefunden werden, an der sic sich in concreto
vorstellen liessen. Sie enthatten eine gewisse Vollst~indigkeit, zu welcher keine m6gliche
empirische Erkenntnis gelangt, und die Vernunft hat dabei nut eine systematische
Einheit im Sinne, welcher sie die empirisch m6gliche Einheit zu n~ihern sucht, ohne
sic jemals v61lig zu erreichen."
12 Kant himself does not use the word "believe" ("Glaube"), but his famous " . . . als
ob . . . " : "Denn das regulative Gesetz der systematische Einheit will: dass wir die Natur
so studieren sollen, als ob allenthalben ins Unendliche systematische und zweckm~issige
Einheit bei der gr6sstm6glichen Mannigfaltigkeit angetroffen wtirde." (A 701), Kritik
• . . (see Note 11), p. 736.
13 Not a thing-in-itself, but a concept o f the world (Weltbegriff) is - Avenarius thinks
- the instrument for systematizing our empirical knowledge; see. R. Avenarius, Kritik
der reinen Erfahrung, 2 B~inde, Fues Leipzig, 1888 and 1890, and also Der menschliche
Weltbegriff, Reisland, Leipzig, 1981. E. Mach, Die Analyse der Empfindungen und
das Verhi~ltnis des Physischen zum Psychischen, Jena, Fischer, 1900.
14 Schlick himself did not want to establish a new school o f philosophy, but he was
made founder o f the Vienna Circle by the Verein Ernst Mach, especially b y Neurath,
Hahn and Carnap; in August 1929, they wrote: "Anfang 1929 erhielt Moritz Schlick
einen sehr verlockenden Ruf nach Bonn. Nach einigem Schwanken entschloss er sich,
in Wien zu bleiben. Ihm und uns wurde bei dieser Gelegenheit zum erstenmal bewusst,
dass es so etwas wie einen 'Wiener Kreis' der wissenschaflichen Weltauffassung gibt,
der diese Denkweise in gemeinsamer Arbeit weiterentwickelt". See 'Wissenschaftliche

Weltauffassung, Wiener Kreis', in: O. Neurath, Gesammelte philosophische und methodo-
logische Schriflen, Bd 1, (Hrsg v. R. Hailer & H. Rutte), H61der-Pichler-Tempsky, Wien,
1981, pp. 2 9 9 - 3 3 6 , p. 300.
is M. Schlick, 'Positivismus und Realismus', in Erkenntnis 3 (1932/33), pp. 1 - 3 1 ,
especially p. 28; M. Schlick, 'Quantentheorie und Erkennbarkeit der Natur', in Erkennt-
his 6 1936, pp. 3 i 7 - 3 2 6 .
16 The similarity between neo-Kantianism and neopositivism appears only in the con-
text of the problem of unifying scientific knowledge.
17 See, for instance, R. Carnap, 'Alte und neue Logik', in Erkenntnis 1, (1931/32)
pp. 1 2 - 2 6 , and R. Carnap, 'tkoerwindung der Metaphysik dutch logische Analyse der
Sprache', in Erkenntnis 2 (1933), pp. 2 2 8 - 2 4 8 .
18 "We cannot anticipate a 'final' axiomatization", O. Neurath, 'Unified Science . . . '
(see Note 6), p. 19.
19 (See Note 6), pp. 3, 12-15.
20 M. Schlick, 'Die Wende der Philosophie', in: Erkenntnis 1 (1931/32), pp. 4 - 1 1 :
"Der Gedanke, fiir ihre Satze nur Wahrscheinlichkeit in Anspruch zu nehmen, lag
frtiheren Denkern fern; sie h~itten ihn als mit der Wiirde der Philosophie unvertr~iglich
abgelehnt" (p. 10). See also Note 10.
21 See Notes 6 and 18.
22 Neurath took the initiative for editing the encyclopedia as he had also done for the
formulation and the editing of the Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung (see Note 14).
2a John Dewey was not a neopositivist, but he was invited to publish an article in
the first volume. At the end of the thirties, the program of the unity of science became
a more important program than that of pure neopositivism for Neurath. This explains
his connections with those people, whom he called his "Dutch Signffici friends"; with
them, Neurath conceived the plan to found the new Journal Synthese. Neurath told
about this friendship in 'After six years', in Synthese 5 (1946), pp. 7 7 - 8 2 ; this article
is missing from the list of Neurath's publications in: O. Neurath, Empiricism and
Sociology (ed. by M. Neurath and R. S. Cohen), Reidel, Dordrecht-Boston, 1973,
pp. 4 4 1 - 4 5 9 .
24 Only in the works of Frank, Neurath and Reichenbach, do we find reflections
which deal with aspects of the history of philosophy and of science. See for instance:
P. Frank's Modern Science and its Philosophy (second ed.), Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, 1950, Philosophy of Science; the Link between Science and Philosophy,
Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1957 and his Foundations of Physics (sixth
printing), University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1969. Neurath combined sociological
analysis with historical problems. See, for instance, his Empirische Soziologie; der
wissenschaftliche Gehalt der Geschichte und National6konomie, Springer, Wien, 1931.
H. Reichenbach's Der Aufstieg der wissenschaftlichen Philosophie (1951) in H. Rei-
chenbach, Gesammelte Werke, Bd 1, Vieweg, Braunschweig, 1977, pp. 8 5 - 4 5 0 is an
analysis of the history of philosophy with the intention of showing what philosophical
doctrines had stimulated and what doctrines had impeded the evolution of 'scientific'
philosophy. Reichenbach's From Copernicus to Einstein (Dover, New York, 1970
(originally published in 1927)) is very short (only 123 pages); after few pages about
Copernicus, Huygens and Newton, the author discusses the opics that occurred at the
end of the 18th century.
25 G. Nuchelmans (Overzieht van de analytische wifsbegeerte, Spectrum, Utrecht,
C O N V E R G E N C E IN THE P H I L O S O P H Y OF SCIENCE 329
1969, p. 130) seems to draw a different conclusion; he even denies any connection
between Comte's positivism and neopositivism: "Op dezelfde wijze zou het bestanddeel
'postivisme' kunnen suggereren, dat ook Auguste Comte een bijzondere invloed op de
Wiener Kreis heeft gehad. Dat is echter niet het geval". I must concede that Neurath
criticized Comte's formulation of the law. That is, for instance, the case in 'Wege der
wissenschaftlichen Weltauffassung', in Erkenntnis 1 (1930/31), pp. 106-125. But
the difference between Comte and Neurath is not that Neurath denied the three types
of knowledge. The only point is that Neurath emphasizes a tendency towards scientific
explanation which is present from the beginning. In other words, Neurath did not
accept an exact historical demarcation between the three stages. Also, Comte did not
intend to do so: already because he thought that every science had to pass through
the three types of knowledge before it came to purely formal and positive knowledge.
Therefore, the difference between Comte and Neurath concerns only incidental points
(when Neurath criticized Comte, he had pedagogical aspects in mind). Nuchelrnans
judged the relation between Comte and the new movement in the twenties and thirties
differently - I think - , because he did not make a distinction between logical positivists
(Carnap, Hempel) and other neopositivists (Neurath, Reichenbach). Not all neopositivists
believed in the value of logic (see Note 31). And, of course, Nuchelmans was right to
deny the influence of classical positivism on the logical positivists Carnap and Hempel.
26 'Unified S c i e n c e . . . ' (see Note 6), p. 9: " N e w t o n . . . was a scientist in whom theolo-
gical speculations and scientific empiricism existed partly side by side, partly in actual
connection - he speaks, for instance, about space as sensorium Dei."
27 The neopositivist idea about the analyticity of mathematics (especially of geometry)
had been historically prepared by Albert Einstein himself. See A. Einstein, 'Geometrie
und Erfahrung', in: Preussische Akademie-Vortri~ge, Springer, Berlin: 1926 (also in:
Sitzungsberichten der Akademie, 1921, pp. i23-130), 'Eine naheliegende Erg~inzung
des Fundamentes der allgemeinen Relativit~itstheorie', in: Preussische Akademie der
Wissenschaften, Sitzungsberichte, 1921, Tell I, pp. 261-264. In the first-named article,
Einstein says: "Der yon der Axiomatik erzielte Fortschritt besteht n~mlich darin, dass
dutch sie das Logisch-Formale vom sachlichen bzw. anschaulichen Gehalt sauber getrennt
wurde . . . " (p. 124). This way of distinguishing between mathematical and non-formal
(empirical, physical) analyses agrees with Hilbert's; we often see Neurath Using this
distinction in his attacks on Kant's a-priori philosophy of mathematics. Nevertheless,
we must not believe that all neopositivists agreed about the philosophy of mathematics.
A. Fraenkel followed Hilbert's formalism; Schlick was inclined to accept Russell's
logicism, thinking that it was more in agreement with logical positivism; Carnap's posi-
tion was more or less the same; but none of the neopositivists thought that intuitionism
should be rejected. We can even say that Poincar~'s intuitionism formed the first stimulus
for the very first participants in the Vienna Circle of 1907; the origin of this group is
told by P. Frank in the introductory chapter of the second edition of Modern Science
and . . . (see Note 24). Material for analysing the neoposifivist views about the founda-
tion of mathematics can be found in Erkenntnis 1 (1930/31), pp. 127-310 and in
Bli~tter fiir deutsche Philosophie, 1930/31 (4), 259-381. Later in 1939, R. Carnap
wrote his Grundlagen tier Logik und Mathematik (Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft
Darmstadt, 1973).
z8 Scientific philosophy is science and not philosophy, just like the neopositivists
thought in the beginning. O. Neurath, 'Eenheidswetenschap . . . ' (see Note 10), p. 15;
"Alle leden van de 'Kring' waren her er over eens, d a t e r naast de wetenschappelijke
formuleringen geen plaats was voor bijzondere wijsgeerige formuleeringen, d a t e r

derhalve niet een boven de wetenschappen staande wijsbegeerte is, die aan de vakweten-
schappen haar leeringen g a f e n die de grondslagen diet wetenschappen kon analyseren.
Juist de relativiteitstheorie had doen zien, dat de wijsgeeren de traditioneele ruimte-
en tijdvoorstellingen alleen maar hadden gemummfficeerd . . . " . Neurath says that
scientific knowledge, which is cut off from its empirical or mathematical foundation
and presented as an absolute insight, is philosophical knowledge. Agreeing with this,
Reichenbach tried to show in his Aufstieg . . . (see: Note 24) that philosophy comes
from a false kind of abstraction; see Aufstieg... p. 9 5 - 1 0 3 .
29 Lakatos ('Falsification a n d . . . ' (see Note 5) p. 47, 69 and 72) pays much attention
to the discussion between Newtonians and Cartesians. But on some points, his analysis
of these discussions does not agree with the views of some historians; compare, for
instance, his presentation with that of R. Hooykaas (Das Verhi~ltnis yon Physik uncl
Mechanik in historischer Sicht, Wiesbaden, 1967). Another point is that Lakatos does
not pay attention to the technological factors and, on that point, many scientists in
France and Germany thought that Descartes' program was stronger than Newton's;
this point is emphasized by D. S. L. Cardwell, Technology, Science and History, Heine-
mann, London, 1972 (see especially pp. 4 8 - 4 9 ) .
3o W. de Ruiter ('De bijdragen van Ernst Mach aan de natuurwetenschap', in Kennis
en Methode 6 (1982), pp. 3 8 - 6 0 ) shows that on many points Mach's philosophy of
science was only contrary to the factual development of physics in the 20th century;
especially, the increase in theory of relativity and quantum-mechanics cannot be ex-
plained in terms of Mach's neopositivist philosophy.
31 "Many people think that logic (or logistic) is, as it were, an antidote to metaphysical
speculations; that is wrong", O. Neurath, 'Unified S c i e n c e . . . ' (see Note 6), p. 19.
32 Willard van Ormand Quine's 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' (1951), in W. van O.
Quine, From a Logical Point of View; Logico-Philosophical Essays, Harper, New York,
pp. 2 0 - 4 6 generated uncertainty among the neopositivists themselves. The dogmas
pointed out by Quine dealt with separation of analytic from synthetic truth and with re-
ductionism. Quine's treatment of these dogmas is purely 'from a logical point of view':
he did not solve the problems produced by his treatment of these dogmas. Quine showed
that analytic truth was not completely independent of its content; nevertheless, we
cannot (and this is a difficult semantic problem) say that the truth which results from
the application of Euclidean geometry depends upon the context in which it is applied.
Secondly, Quine showed that reductionism is an empiricist dogma; but we must accept
that knowledge exists in which idealizations and theoretizations are reduced (for in-
stance, that scientific knowledge which is frequently used in technology); what is (and
this again is a difficult problem, especially, in the context of technological sciences)
the place of this kind of knowledge amongst other kinds of knowledge?
33 'A Logical Appraisal of Operationalism' is reprinted in C. G. Hempel's Aspects of
Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science, Free Press, New
York, 1965, pp. 123-134.
34 "Bridgman's operational analysis of the meaning of physical concepts was especially
close to the positivistic view of Carnap, Frank, and von Mises, and even to certain
strands of Wittgenstein's thought" is H. Feigl's judgment on 'The Wiener Kreis in
America', in The Intellectual Migration, Europe and America, 1930-1960 (ed. by
D. Fleming and B. Bailyn), Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1969, pp. 6 3 1 -
673, p. 645.
C O N V E R G E N C E 1N THE P H I L O S O P H Y OF S C I E N C E 331
35 Long before Quine's article of 1951 (see note 32), C. G. Hempel had made critical
analyses of the empirical criterion of meaning in his 'Problems and Changes in the
Empiricist Criterion of Meaning' (1950) and his 'The Concept of Cognitive Significance:
a Reconsideration' (1951); both articles were translated into German and printed in J.
Sinrtreich (ed.): Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, DTV, Miinchen, 1972, pp. 104-144.
36 The problems were not yet solved; see Note 32.
37 See for instance 'Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung...' (see Note 14); Marx is quoted
as much for his materialism (empiricism) as for his dialectical method. In the 'Intro-
duction' of A. J. Ayer's Logical Positivism, Free Press Glencoe, I11., 1959, p. 4 the
editor explains: "Karl Marx is included neither for his logic nor his metaphysics but
for his scientific approach to history.'
38 In no neopositivist work can a text be found in which Hegel is quoted with ap-
proval and, I think, neither Marx nor Lenin would have been supported either, if the
confirmed Marxist, Neurath, had not been a member of the Circle.
39 Popper's theory of gnoseological evolution is presented in 'Evolution and the Tree
of Knowledge' which is Chapter 7 of his Objective Knowledge; an Evolutionary Ap-
proach, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1973. But the expressions 'Auslese der Theorien'
and 'Methode der Auslese' in Logik der Forschung; Mohr, Ttibingen, 1969 (p. 73 and
93) indicate that already in 1934 Popper had an idea for a theory of evolution.
40 They are living in the so-called 'Third World' which was introduced for the first
time, by Popper, in 'On a Theory of the Objective Mind', in Akten des XIK Interna-
tionalen Kongresses fi~r Philosophie, Bd I, Herder: Wien, 1968, pp. 2 5 - 5 3 .
41 1 know that I omit a lot of questions here. In 'Popper z u m . . . ' (see Note 5), Lakatos
ingeniously alluded to several of these questions. In this article, ! cannot treat the
matter with such sophistication.
42 Popper's criticism of the dialectical (Marxist) and positivist concepts of evolution
is presented in The Poverty o f Historicism, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1960
and in 'What is Dialectic?', in K. R. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations, the Growth
of Scientific Knowledge, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969 and in The Open
Society and its Enemies, Princeton, 1950.
43 Popper's logic of scientific discovery does not claim to be either a description or
an explanation of the factual historical process of science: "Sofern der Forscher seinen
Einfall kritisch beurteilt, ab~indert oder verwirft, k6nnte man unsere methodologische
Analyse auch als eine rationale Naehkonstruktion der betreffenden denkpsychologischen
Vorg~ingen auffassen. Nicht, dass sie diese Vorg~inge so bescbreibt, wie sie sich tats~ichlicb
abspielen: sic gibt nut ein logisches Gerippe des Priifungsverfahrens." Logik der For-
schung (see Note 39), p. 7. But Lakatos postulates that the history of science should
confirm a metatheory (like the logic of scientific discovery) and his analysis of factual
evolutions leads to the conclusion: "Falsfficationist historiography is the 'falsified'.
But if we apply the same meta-falsificationist method to inductivist and conventionalist
historiographies, we shall 'falsify' them too", see I. Lakatos, 'History of Science and its
Rational Reconstruction', in: I. Lakatos, Philosophical Papers, Vol. I, (J. Worrall and G.
Currie, eds.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1978, pp. 102-138, pp. 128/29.
44 Popper shows that content increases with the increasing improbability of a theory in
the following way: "Writing Ct(a) for 'the content of the statement a', and Ct(ab) for
'the content of the conjunction a and b', we have
(1) Ct(a) <. Ct(ab) >>-Ct(b).

This contrasts with the corresponding law of the calculus of probability

(2) p(a) >~p(ab) <<.p(b)
where the inequality signs of (1) are inverted. Together these two laws, (1) and (2),
state that with increasing content, probability decreases, and vice versa; or in other
words, that content increases with increasing improbability"; see: 'Truth, Rationality,
and the Growth of Knowledge', in K. R. Popper, ConJectures . . . (see Note 42),
pp. 215-250, p. 218. This concept of (ira)probability is related to Popper's falsi-
ficationism in the following sense: the possibility to falsify a proposition A is smaller
than the possibility to falsify the conjunction of the propositions A and B: A A B;
that is the case, because A A B states more than A. L. Wittgenstein was the first to
try to deduce a theory of probability from truth-functional theory in his Tractatus
logico-philosophieus, Logische-philosophische Abhandlung, Suhrkamp. Frankfurt
a/M, 1969 (see especially the propositions 5.1, 5.15, 5.151, 5.152, 5.154-5.156; in
5.15 the measure of probability is formulated by Wittgenstein for shared truthgrounds
of two propositions). For a long time this theory of probability influenced the philo-
sophy of science, but Stegmiiller broke this tradition with his Personelle und statistische
Igahrscheinlichkeit, 2 Bd, Springer, Berlin, 1973. See also H. Freudenthal's critical
review of this book in Statistica Neerlandica, 1974 (Okt), pp. 225 - 2 2 7 .
4s See 'Truth, r a t i o n a l i t y . . . ' , p. 232.
46 Werner Diederich: "Es ist zu beftirchten, dass eine so heterogene Liste in manchen
F~illen zu inkonsistenten relativen Bewertungen fiihrt; z.B. k6nnte (2) ftir ein Theorien-
paar erftillt sein, ohne dass auch (4) anf dieses Paar zutriife. Insoweit solche F~ille anftre-
ten, kann gr6ssere Wahrtheitsniihe einer Theorie t2 gegeniiber einer Theorie t l (Vs(t2)
> Vs(tl)) gar nicht positiv mit allen angegeben Kriterien fiat eine Bevorzugung yon
t 2 vor t 1 korrelieren. Wie schon bei dem Begriff des (empirischen) Gehalts . . . zeigt
sich auch bei dem Begriff dcr Wahrheitsn?ihe, dass Popper ein bis zur lnkonsistenz
tiberbestimmtes Explikandum dutch ein einziges, sogar quantitatives Expfikat darstellen
will, dessen Ad~iquatheit er nicht iiberzeugend nachweist - oder auch nut an Beispielen
wissenschaftlicher Theorien wirklich durchrechnet - und in der Tat auch kanm wird
nachweisen k6nnen", see W. Diederich, 'Einleitung' in W. Diederich (Hrsg), Beitr~ge zur
diaehronischen Wissenschaftstheorie, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a/M, p. 12. Diederich reproach-
ed Popper here for not using the formula which had been proposed by Popper himself.
47 See 'Falsification...' (see Note 5), p. 33/4.
48 Loc. cit., p. 34; Lakatos introduced, as I see it, a really acceptable criterion of demar-
cation. A physicist who adheres to the Cartesian way is no longer acceptable.
49 "Contrary to naive falsificationism, no experiment, experimental report, observation
statement or well-corroborated low-level falsifying hypotheses alone can lead to falsifica-
tion. There is no falsification before the emergence o f a better theory". See Loc. eit., p. 35.
so "We retain a syntactically metaphysical theory as long as the problematic instances
can be explained by content-increasing changes in the auxiliary hypotheses appended
to it". SeeLoc. cir., p. 41.
sl The choice in favor of a certain program, as described by Lakatos, is sometimes
the result of a war: "When two research programs compete, their first 'ideal' models
usually deal with different aspects of the domain (for example, the first model of
Newton's semi-corpuscular optics described light-refraction; the first model of Huygens's
wave optics light4nterference). As the rival research programs expand, they gradually
encroach on each other's territory and the nth version of the first will be blatantly,
CONVERGENCE IN THE P H I L O S O P H Y OF S C I E N C E 333
dramaticaly inconsistent with the mth version of the second. An experiment is repeated-
ly performed, and as a result, the first is defeated in this battle, while the second wins.
But the war is not over: any research program is allowed a few such defeats. All it
needs for a comeback is to produce an (n + 1)th or (n + k)th contentincreasing version
and a verification of some of its novel content. If such a c o m e b a c k . . , is not forth-
coming, the war is l o s t . . . " Loc. cir., p. 71/2.
52 See the articles of T. S. Kuhn and P. K. Feyerabend in I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave
(Hrsg), Kritik und Erkenntnisfortschritt, Vieweg, Braunschweig, 1974 (This German
edition contains more articles than the English version which was published in 1970).
See also: P. K. Feyerabend, Wider den Methodenzwang, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a/M,
1976 and Erkenntnisffirfreie Menschen, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a/M, 1979.
53 See The Poverty... (see Note 42), especially p. 90.
54 This was the decisive point concerning the opposition of Popper's and Lakatos'
program in the theory of knowledge. Popper separated this theory from all psychological
problems like the invention of a physical theory (Logik der Forschung, pp. 6 - 7 )
for the acceptance of such a theory (see 'Conjectural Knowledge', in K. R. Popper,
Obfective Knowledge (see Note 39), pp. 1 - 3 1 , p. 23). But, in accordance with Kuhn,
Lakatos also considered the process of accepting theories too and pointed out that
decisions in this context should be rationalized, too. On the other hand, Popper thought
that the acceptance and success of physical theories were only subjects of psychological
analysis.
5s T. S. Kuhn introduces this expression in The Copernican Revolution, Planetary
Astronomy in the Development of Western Thought, Harvard University Press, Cam-
bridge, 1979 (10th ed.), p. 38: "But conceptual schemes have psychological as well
as logical functions". Later, in his more famous (but not better) Structure of Scientific
Revolutions 'conceptual scheme' is replaced by 'paradigma'. It was Lakatos' intention
to analyse the logical 'functions' of the schemes.
s6 I always observed in my class on logic that students can prove A, 7 A ~- B after a
few lessons• How could Popper's proof of the same theorem in 'What is Dialectic?'
(see Note 42) make such a deep impression?
s7 'History of Science and Its Rational Reconstruction', in I. Lakatos, Philosophical
• .(see Note 5), pp. 1 0 2 - 1 3 8 , p. 113.
.
s8 In the Chapter 6 - 9 of Wider . . . (see Note 52) Feyerabend tried to show that,
firstly, Galileo had to introduce a new theory of observation in order to make his Co-
pernican views acceptable.
s9 See S. Drake and I. E. Drabkin (eds), Mechanics in Sixteenth Century Italy, The
University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, Milwaukee, London, 1969.
60 In 'Vorwort' of T. S. Kuhn, Die Entstehung des Neuen (Hrsg v. L. Kr~iger), Suhr-
kamp, Frankfurt a/M, 1977, pp. 3 1 - 4 8 (especially on p. 41) Kubn explains how he
moved from the concept of conceptual scheme to the (vague) concept of paradigm.
The most interesting point is that physicists (as Kuhn points out), indeed, are able to
define concepts of "mass" and so on, theoretically, which are generally accepted. (see
also Note 55)
61 'History of Science . . . ' (see Note 57); Lakatos tries to show that "history 'falsifies'
falsificationism".
62 See the cartoon (from the British Museum) which is printed in Chapter 8 of J.
Bronowski's The Ascent of Man; the Dutch translation of this book is edited by Gaade,
Amerongen (1978).
63 Popper, 'Conjectural . . . ' (see Note 54), p. 23, Lakatos, 'Popper on . . . ' (see Note
5), p. 167.
64 Lakatos distinguishes two kinds of inconsistency: inconsistency in the strongest
sense of the term ("Two propositions are inconsistent if their conjunction has no model
• . . " ) and inconsistency in an informal sense ("In this informal sense two propositions
may be (weakly) inconsistent given the standard interpretations of some characteristic
terms even if formally, in some unintended interpretation, they may be consistent.
For instance, the first theories of electron spin were inconsistent with the special theory
of relativity if 'spin' was given its ('strong') standard interpretation and thereby treated
as a formative term; but the inconsistency disappears if 'spin' is treated as an uninter-
preted descriptive term"). Lakatos again distinguishes different kinds of informal in-
consistencies: "We have to appreciate the crucial methodological difference between
the inconsistency introduced by Prout's program and that introduced by Bohr's. Prout's
research program declared war on the analytical chemistry of his time . . . Bohr's re-
search program contained no analogous design: its positive heuristic . . . would have
left the inconsistency with the Maxwell-Lorentz theory unresolved." Outside of the
discussions about research programs (in the context of the strict formal evaluation
of theories) the postulate of consistency should be accepted; Lakatos: "But consistency
- in the strong sense of the term - must remain an important regulative principle",
see Lakatos, 'Falsification a n d . . . ' (see Note 5), pp. 56-58.
6s See 'Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge', in: M.
Radner and S. Winokur (eds.), Analysis o f Theories and Methods of Physics and
Psychology (Minnesota Studies IV), Minneapolis, 1970, pp. 17-130; the content of
this article differs completely from the content of Feyerabend's book of the same
title. In the article (and not in the book), Feyerabend makes it clear that he wants
to be identified as a dialectical philosopher and he disapproves Lakatos for not having
done so: "That a dialectical study of mathematics can lead to splendid discoveries,
even today, is shown by Lakatos's Proofs and Refutations... One must praise Lakatos
for having made such excellent use of his Hegelian upbringing. On the other hand one
must perhaps also criticize him for not revealing his source of inspiration... So that
he prefers being mistaken for a Wittgensteinian to being classified with the dialectical
tradition to which he belongs?", p. 115.
66 'Popper on . . . ' (see Note 5), p. 139: Popper's "philosophy helped me to make
a final break with the Hegelian outlook which I held for nearly twenty years".
67 In Lakatos' 'History of science . . . ' (see Note 57), p. 120, we read: "One way to
indicate discrepancies between history and its rational reconstruction is to relate the
internal history in the text, and indicate in the footnotes how actual history 'misbe-
haved' in the light of its rational reconstruction". In posthumous published remarks
'A Postscript on History of Science and its Rational Reconstruction' Lakatos concedes
that be applied this expositional device in his description of the evolution of mathema-
tics in his 'Proofs and Refutations', in British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 14
(1963), pp. 1 - 2 5 , 120-139, 221-243. Lakatos used again the same method in his
accounts of the Proutian and Bohrian programs; see Lakatos' 'Falsification and . . . '
(see Note 55), pp. 5 2 - 6 8 . Hegel's supra-historical hierarchy is described in A. Sarlemijn,
Hegel's Dialectic (Sovietica, Vol. 33), Reidel, Dordrecht & Boston, 1975. Lakatos'
'Postscript' is published in Philosophical Papers (see Note 5), pp. 189-192.
68 In the 'Postscript' (see Note 67, p. 192), Lakatos declared that his distinction be-
tween text and footnotes had been an "unsuccessful joke". But Lakatos was not
C O N V E R G E N C E IN THE P H I L O S O P H Y OF SCIENCE 335
convincing, because he still maintained that "all histories of science are always phi-
osophies fabricating examples"! I do not think, that historians are doing research only to
add footnotes to philosophical explanations.
69 In my Hegel's Dialectic (see Note 67), I revealed Hegel's distinction between Ver-
stand (understanding) and Vernunft; this corresponds to Lakatos's distinction between
the empirical research (which requires understanding) and reflection about programs.
In 'Falsification and . . . ' (see Note 5) on p. 65/6, Lakatos writes: "The dialectic of
research programmes is then not necessarily an alternating series of speculative conjec-
tures and empirical refutations. The interaction between development of the programme
and the empirical checks may be very varied - which pattern is actually realized depends
only on historical accident".
70 On this point, Lakatos had changed his mind in "Falsification and . . . ' (see Note
5): "There is no such thing as a natural 'saturation point'; in my Proofs and Refutations
I was more of a Hegelian, and I thought there was; now I use the expression with an
ironical emphasis. There is no predicable or ascertainable limitation on human imagina-
tion in inventing new, contentincreasing theories or on the 'cunning of reason' (List
der Vernunft) in rewarding them with some empirical s u c c e s s . . . " (p. 72).
71 T. K. Kuhn treats this question several times in his Entstehung des Neuen (see
Note 60), 'Vorwort' (pp. 31-48); 'Die Beziehungen zwischen Wissenschaftsgeschichte
und Wissenschaftstheorie' (pp. 51-71), 'Die grundlegende Spannung: Tradition und
Neuerung in der wissenschaftlichen Forschung' (pp. 308-327) and 'Neue Uberlegungen
zum Begriff des Paradigma' (pp. 389-421).
72 In the perspective of modern physics, Galileo should not have neglected, in the
beginning, the results of scientists such as Oresme, Tartaglia and Benedetti; see E. J.
Dijksterhuis, The Mechanization o f the Worm Picture, Clarendon Press; Oxford, 1961,
S. Drake, Galileo at Work, His Scientific Biography, Univ. of Chicago Press: Chicago
& London, 1978 and K. Fischer, Galileo Galilei, Beck, MiJnchen, 1983.
73 W. Stegmtiller, The Structuralist View o f Theories, a Possible Analogue o f the Bour-
baki Programme in Physical Science, Springer, Berlin, 1979, p. 31.
74 The journal Erkenntnis dedicated a special issue to this topic in 1976; the issue
contained articles by J. Sneed, W. Stegmtiller and T. S. Kuhn. It is interesting to note
that Kuhn used the same arguments against Sneed's structuralism as he did in his critic-
ism of Lakatos in 'Bemerkungen zu Lakatos' (in: Kritik...; see Note 52).
75 W. Diederich & H. Fulda, 'Sneed'sche Strukturen in Marx' 'Kapital' ', in: Neue Hefte
far Philosophie, Heft 13, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, G6ttingen, 1978, pp. 47-80.
76 Before 1888, M. I. Karinski wrote his Klassifikaci]a vyvodov (published in St. Peter-
sburg). Other authors working on logic before 1917 were: Vladislavlev, Troitsky,
Vvedensky, Chicherin, Snegiryov, Prodan, Rutkovski. In 1956, selected works of
Karinski and Rutkovski reappeared in Izbrannye trudy russkich logikov XIX. veka,
Moskva, 1956.
77 M. M. Mitin, DialektiPeski] i istori~eski] materializm, Moskva, 1934, p. 223.
7a Bol~aja sovetska]a bnciklopedija p. 172 of Volume LVII of the 1936-edition.
79 See A. Filipov, Logic and Dialectic in the Soviet Union (with a foreword by E.
Nagel), New York, East European Fund, 1952 especially Chapter 2. The same evolution
was treated from another point of view by A. A. Zinov'ev 'Logic in the USSR' in
Contemporary Philosophy. A Survey (ed. by R. Klibanski), La Nuova Italia, Firende,
1968.
8o V. F. Asmus, Log&a, Moskva, 1947; M. S. Strogovi~, Logika, Moskva, 1946.
81 Members of the group in Moscow were: A. A. Zinov'ev, G. A. Smilnov, J. A.

Sidorenko, A. M. Fedina, P. W. Tavanec. A. I. Uemov worked in Odessa and O. F.
Serebrjannikov and I. N. Brodski in Leningrad.
82 The question of how logic should be introduced into curricula was discussed at
the All-Union Conference of Heads of Sections of Marxism-Leninism.
83 The interpretation can be found in Kratkii kurs istorii vseso]uzno] kommunisti?esko]
partii(bolT~evikov). The text has been translated and edited in several languages. The
German edition o f 1939 contains the interpretation on pages 126 - 159.
84 In the USSR, the first computer with a many-valued system (SETUN) was con-
structed in 1958.
8s See for instance, I. S. Narskij, Materialisti~eska]a dialektika kale metod konkretnogo
nau~nogo issledovani]a, Znanie, Moskva, 1972. When I visited Lomonossov-University
in 1974, the discussion between logicians and dialecticians had stopped completely.
However, the students were asking themselves how they could bring the courses in
logic into line with Narskij's syllabus. This situation can be found in Western universities,
too.
86 In 1959 the Osnovy marksizma-leninizma and Osnovy Marksistskoj fllosofii brought
unity to the interpretation of these 'laws'. Those books were used for several years in
schools in Eastern European countries. However, philosophy could not reach agreement.
I analysed the discussions concerning the interpretation of the 'laws' during the period
1965-74, but leaznt nothing that was worth publishing. Every Soviet philosopher has
his own interpretation (if he has one); for instance, Narskij thinks that "dialectical
contradiction" has a logical meaning, but others think that such a contradiction is
nothing more than "opposite sides of the unity of an object". The same differences
concerning the interpretation of the other 'laws' can be observed. In conclusion, the
program (or should I write programs?) of the Soviet philosophers shows a purely ter-
minological unity without the unity of a conceptually well determined scope.
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ANDRIES SARLEMIJN

(1) a gradual conversion of many dialectical philosophers to modern

Before treating and explaining the convergence-tendency in detail I start

Studies in Soviet Thought 30 (1985), 305-336. 0039-3797/85.10

2. THE GROWING UNITY OF POSITIVE SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE

After these preliminary remarks, now we come to my detailed historio-

Nevertheless, in the time of Descartes, Galileo and Leibniz, no distinction

(a) the unity and increase of positive knowledge were formulated in

(c) the increase of positive knowledge could be guaranteed by applying

2.1. Neo-Kantianism and the Unity of Positive Knowledge

The problem of the unity of positive knowledge can be formulated in the

In spite of that, Neurath believes is in the integral picture of the world.

2.2. History of Science Without Metaphysics?

historian can thus provide tittle information on the development of the

(1) Their own methodology was based on a certain philosophy of

(3) Only a certain kind of scientific knowledge is positive in the strictest

2.3. Logic in Favour of Neopositivism?

Not all neopositivists were convinced of this point. Reichenbach and in

2.4. Neopositivism and Dialectics Are Incompatible

For a school of thought which enthusiastically seeks to establish the empirical

The divergence between methodology and dialectical philosophy was

3. EVOLUTION OF THEORETICAL SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE

Popper replaced the neopositivist puzzle model with a Darwinist one. To

3.1. Evolution and Pluralism

What is meant here by "dependence on or independence of environment

This criticism evokes two questions:

We will consider these two points in detail.

3.2. Conditional Growth of Scientific Knowledge

- the final aim of scientific evolution is the highest measure of approximation

is more accurate than T1,

- is more general and informative than T1,

So heterogeneous a list must lead to inconsistent evaluations. 46 For that

- a theory T2 is theoreticaly progressive (or 'constitutes a theoretically

also corroborated, that is, if T2 leads to the actual discovery of some

(/9) The growth o f knowledge depends on social conditions. In Popper's

3.3. The Theoretical Evolution in the Context o f Falsificationism is not

Set-theoretical calculations are not dialectical. Also, when we compare

of phenomena which can be explained with another theory T2, it makes

However, Feyerabend and Lakatos both concentrated on decisions which

4. DEVELOPMENT OF CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUNDS OF THEORIES

Lakatos and Feyerabend have - as Lakatos put it - 'out-Poppered Popper'

Popper excludes these themes from his methodological analysis: 63 "No

Then, the comparison becomes possible and it shows striking agreements:

the minds of physicists) from becoming problematic or would lead to funda-

5. EVOLUTIONS OF FORMAL STRUCTURES

The structuralists investigate inter-theoretical relationships using purely

a hierarchy of their elements arises which makes impressive comparisons

While the concept of a progressive theory-evolution still captures a 'realistic idea',

I showed a certain change in the climate of the Western philosophy of science:

6.1. Emancipation of Logical Analysis

The history of the fate of logical analysis at the philosophical faculties in

be preferred to the dialectical way? This question overshadowed all attention

a most trustworthy weapon in the hands of the predominating exploiting classes, . . .

These judgements influenced the method of analysis only of the philosophers

against the doctrine of "exploiting classes" as logic - as we have seen before

6.2. Emancipation of the Philosophy of Science from Dialectics?

One can imagine that the reintroduction of formal (mathematical) logic

6.3. Does Convergence Exist? Is an East-West Dialogue on Themes o f

* I am very grateful to Dr Peter R. Attwood, who corrected my English. I am also

der diese Denkweise in gemeinsamer Arbeit weiterentwickelt". See 'Wissenschaftliche

formuleringen geen plaats was voor bijzondere wijsgeerige formuleeringen, d a t e r

(1) Ct(a) <. Ct(ab) >>-Ct(b).

This contrasts with the corresponding law of the calculus of probability

81 Members of the group in Moscow were: A. A. Zinov'ev, G. A. Smilnov, J. A.