nCoV Presentations (Consolidated)

DOH CLHD – EMERGING & RE-EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASE PROGRAM
CENTRAL LUZON- CENTER FOR HEALTH DEVELOPMENT
Current Situation: Wuhan Coronavirus Timeline

I. Current Situation: Wuhan Coronavirus Timeline




Jan 25
• 1st confirmed case in Australia and 1st confirmed case in Canada
Jan 26
• China banned wildlife trade
• CCDCstarted developing vaccine against 2019-nCoV
2019-nCoV Global Update: January 29, 2020 3:04pm
• 6,080 individuals confirmed with 2019-nCoV cases in

China alone vs 9,239 individuals suspected cases
• 132* confirmed deaths in China due to nCoV
• 103 recovered in China due to nCoV
• 16-21% of people with the virus in China became
severely ill and 2-3% of those infected have died
• Latest victims ranged in age from 55 to 87 years old
• Most of those killed by the coronavirus so far have
been older men, many with chronic health issues.
•Affected 15 foreign countries on four
continents — Asia, North America, Europe, and
Australia
Source: WHO, *China’s National Health Commission

The following places
outside mainland China
have confirmed cases:
Thailand: 14 cases
Malaysia: 7 cases
Singapore: 7 cases
Japan: 7 cases
6,080
South Korea: 4 cases
132 Vietnam: 2 cases
Hubei 125 Shanghai 1 Sheilongjang 1 Cambodia: 1 case
Henan 2 Hebei 1 Nepal: 1 case
Beijing 1 Hainan 1
Sri Langka: 1 case
70 in 15 countries
United States: 5 cases
Canada: 2 cases
Australia: 7 cases
France: 4 cases
Germany: 4 cases
UAE: 4 cases
Taiwan: 5 cases
January 29, 2020 3:04PM; Macao: 6 cases
(Source: China’a health commissions, foreign government web sites, media
HK: 8 cases
reports)
Pneumonia Case in Philippines
1.) 5- year old boy with flu-like symptoms and history of travel
from Wuhan, China was admitted in Cebu City
- S/Sx: fever, throat irritation, cough (prior entering
Philippines)
- Sample specimen sent to RITM tested (-) for MERSCoV
and SARS
- (+) for non-specific pancoronavirus assay
- Specimen was sent to Australia to identify specific CoV
strain; tested (-) for nCoV
- Patient still has cough but currently afebrile and stable

Pneumonia Case in Philippines
2.) 3 Chinese tourists with flu-like symptoms
- Arrived at Kalibo International Airport from China
- Without history of travel to Wuhan
- Without any known contact with a confirmed nCoV case,
SARS case, or sick animals
- Sample specimen sent to RITM for testing
- All are currently well and tested (-) for nCoV
Persons Under Investigation (PUI) Cases in
Philippines as of January 29, 2020 12NN
• Metro Manila (17)
• MIMAROPA (1)
• Northern Mindanao (1)
• Western Visayas (3)
• Eastern Visayas (1)
• Central Visayas (4)
• Davao (1)
N=28

DAILY FLIGHTS MONITORING
CLARK STATION - DATE AND TIME: JANUARY 28, 2020 5:01 PM TO JANUARY 29 5:00 PM
ARRIVAL
AIRLINE AIRCRAFT FLIGHT # ORIGIN # OF CREW # OF PASSENGERS
DATE TIME
TWAY AIRLINES TW147 INCHEON 1/28/2020 6:14 PM 7 147
EMIRATES EK338 DUBAI 1/28/2020 6:25 PM 16 137
SCOOT TR386 SINGAPORE 1/28/2020 7:05 PM 6 118
ASIANA AIRLINES OZ707 INCHEON 1/29/2020 2:04 AM 8 139
CEBU PACIFIC 5J121 HONG KONG 1/29/2020 12:23 AM 6 148
JIN AIR LJ23 INCHEON 1/29/2020 12:44 AM 6 126
JIN AIR LJ31 BUSAN 1/29/2020 1:22 AM 6 94
JEJU AIR 7C4603 INCHEON 1/29/2020 1:33 AM 7 147
CEBU PACIFIC 5J371 MACAU 1/29/2020 2:00 AM 6 122
AIR ASIA Z25039 INCHEON 1/29/2020 2:35 AM 6 127
PUDONG
CHINA EASTERN MU5045 1/29/2020 2:12 AM 13 88
CHINA
JETSTAR 3K777 SINGAPORE 1/29/2020 6:04 AM 6 144
PAN PACIFIC 8Y771 INCHEON 1/29/2020 10:08 AM 7 107
XIAMEN MF8697 JINJANG 1/29/2020 11:06 AM 9 84
KOREAN AIR KE635 INCHEON 1/29/2020 11:14 AM 13 225
PHILIPPINE AIRLINE PR491 INCHEON 1/29/2020 10:49 AM 7 130
CEBU PACIFIC 5J149 HONG KONG 1/29/2020 10:59 AM 6 147
QATAR QR930 DOHA 1/29/2020 3:13 PM 12 125
JETSTAR 3K778 OSAKA 1/29/2020 4:26 PM 6 97
TOTAL 153 2,452
DOH CLCHD – EMERGING & RE-EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASE PROGRAM
What is a Coronavirus?
• Coronaviruses are a large family of
viruses, some causing illness in people
and others that circulate among animals,
including camels, cats and bats.
• Coronaviruses are zoonotic, meaning
they are transmitted between animals
and people. Image source: Palawan News
• Rarely, animal coronaviruses can evolve

and infect people and then spread
between people such as has been seen
with MERS and SARS.
(Source: WHO)

What is a Novel Coronavirus n(CoV)?
• A novel coronavirus (CoV) is

a new strain of coronavirus
that has not been previously
identified in humans.
(Source: WHO)
Image source: Palawan News

What is 2019-nCoV?
• 2019 Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV) is a virus
(more specifically, a coronavirus) identified as
the cause of an outbreak of respiratory illness
first detected in Wuhan, China.
• Early on, many of the patients in the outbreak in
Wuhan, China reportedly had some link to a
large seafood and animal market, suggesting
animal-to-person spread.
• A growing number of patients reportedly have
not had exposure to animal markets, suggesting
person-to-person spread is occurring.

Signs and Symptoms of Coronavirus
• Patients with confirmed 2019-nCoV infection have reportedly

had mild to severe respiratory illness with symptoms of:
• fever
• dry cough
• shortness of breath
• In severe cases, infection can cause pneumonia, severe acute
respiratory syndrome, kidney failure and even death.
• Symptoms of 2019-nCoV may appear in as few as 2 days or
as long as 14 after exposure

Can humans be infected with nCoV of animal
source?
• Yes
• SARS-CoV - transmitted from civet cats to humans
in China in 2002
• MERS-CoV from dromedary camels to humans in
Saudi Arabia in 2012
• Several known coronaviruses are circulating in
animals that have not yet infected humans.

Animal Source of 2019-nCoV?
• The available genomic sequences suggest a likely single,
recent emergence from a virus related to bat coronaviruses
and SARS-CoV.
• The available sequence information does not provide any
information about severity of associated illness or
transmissibility of the virus.
(Source: CDC)

How is 2019-nCoV Transmitted?
• 2019-nCoV MOT: UNCLEAR
• More likely of RESPIRATORY TRANSMISSION
Two Types of Respiratory Transmission:
1. Droplet-large particles, short range
2. Airborne-smaller particles, longer distances
• 2019-nCoV is similar to Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS),

where human to human transmission occurred through droplets, direct
contact and fomites, but may also be transmitted through smaller
aerosols over long distances, suggesting that the mode of transmission
can be similar
Suspected MOT for 2019 nCoV:
a. Droplet
b. Contact with infected person or objects they come in contact
with
(Source: WHO)

Research
How is 2019-nCoV Transmitted? Update
• New coronavirus is able to transfer between person to person, in a
hospital setting, a family home setting, and also in an intercity
setting which what makes this new disease difficult to control.
• Possible that children and young people who do not show
symptoms may be transmitting the virus, characterizing the
disease as “asymptomatic walking pneumonia.”
• Stressed the importance of quarantining patients as early as
possible, given the early signs of asymptomatic transmission.
• Symptoms of early coronavirus cases showed similarities to SARS
(Source: Yuen Kwok-yung, The Lancet 2020)

How is 2019-nCoV Transmitted?
•KEY FACTOR: Whether the virus can spread
in the absence of symptoms during:
a. incubation period (before symptoms
appear) OR
b. in people who never get sick (carrier)
GENEVA: The World Health Organization (WHO)
said Monday (Jan 27) that it remained unclear if
the deadly corona virus spreading in China and
beyond is contagious during its incubation period,
before symptoms appear.
How big could the outbreak be?
• Estimate that the number of cases may be five or 10 times higher than what
has been reported.
• WHO calculated Reproduction Number (R0) of the virus as between 1.5 to
2.5
• If the R0 is higher than 2-3, more cases should be seen globally by mid
January
With more confirmed cases outside of

China,
More likely scenario estimates show there may be about
6,000 cases
Source: Northeastern University’s

Laboratory for the Modeling of
Biological and Socio-technical
Systems. Estimates as of Jan. 23.
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000

Vaccine for nCoV?
•When a disease is new, there is NO vaccine

until one is developed.

Factors how the virus spread so rapidly:
1. Travel is a major factor

2. Possibly asymptomatic transmission among
children and young people
3. Substantial human-to-human transmission
4. Continued animal or environmental
exposure to a source of infection in Wuhan,
China
Risk Assessment
There is evidence of broader geographic spread across mainland
China and the rest of Asia, Australia, Europe, USA, and Canada
The risk from these outbreaks depends on characteristics of the virus,
including whether and how well it spreads between people, the
severity of resulting illness, and the medical or other measures
available to control the impact of the virus (for example, vaccine or
treatment medications).
Although outbreak may have started as animal-human transmission,
evidence currently supports human-to-human transmission and is
likely to continue
Further information is required to understand how readily the virus
can be transmitted between infected individuals.
HEIC not yet declared but WHO considers this an emergency and
monitoring is constant with already existing international coordinated
health response
"While this outbreak is an emergency in China, it has not yet become a global health emergency,"
WHO spokesman Tarik Jasarevic (WHO officials cited a limited number of cases abroad, and strong,
preventative containment measures in China).

nCoV Surveillance
Case Definitions for Surveillance
The following people should be investigated and tested
for nCoV infection:
1. Severe acute respiratory infection (SARI) in a person with history of
fever and cough requiring admission to hospital, with no other
etiology that fully explains the clinical presentation
And any of the following:
a. a history of travel to or a person who lived in Wuhan, Hubei and

other provinces in China in the 14 days prior to symptom onset; or
b. the disease occurs in a healthcare worker who has been working

in an environment where patients with severe acute respiratory
infections are being cared for, without regard to place of residence or
history of travel.
2. The person develops an unusual or

unexpected clinical course, especially sudden
deterioration despite appropriate treatment,
without regard to place of residence or history
of travel, even if another etiology has been
identified that fully explains the clinical
presentation.
3. A person with acute respiratory illness of any degree or
severity who, within 14 days before onset of illness, had any
of the following exposures:
a. Close physical contact with a confirmed case of NCoV

infection; or
b. A healthcare facility in a country where hospital associated
nCoV infections have been reported; or
c. Visiting or working in a live animal market in Wuhan,
China; or
d. Direct contact with animals (if animal source is identified) in
countries where the nCoV is known to be circulating in animal
populations or where human infections have occurred as a
result of presumed zoonotic transmission
Decision Tool
Decision Tool for Novel Coronavirus Assessment for Bureau of Quarantine and Hospitals
Respiratory Travel History for the past 14
Fever
Infection days
Other History of
(cough Case Category/Intervention
Hubei provinces in Exposure*
≥38°C AND/OR
province China (aside
colds)
from Hubei)
+ + + + Category: Patient Under Investigation (PUI)
Bureau of Quarantine (BoQ)
+ + + -
• Gives mask and isolates PUI
+ + - + • Collects and evaluates the BoQ Health Declaration
+ - + + Card
• Endorses patient for admission in a hospital
+ - + -
• Arranges transportation of PUI to hospital
- + + +/- + Hospitals:
+ - + - • Completes the Case Investigation Form (CIF)
• Trained hospital staff collects specimen (NPS and
+ - - +
OPS) and sends to RITM. (NPS/OPS must be collected
- + - + upon admission and after 24 to 48 hrs)
- + + - • Coordinates with RESU for reporting and transport of
specimens
- + + +
• Manages PUI accordingly
+ - - - Category: Person for Monitoring
Bureau of Quarantine (BoQ)
- + - -
• Collects and evaluates the BoQ Health Declaration Card
- - + - • Advises the person to go on home quarantine for 14
- - - + + days, monitor body temperature daily, and observe any
signs and symptoms of respiratory infection
• If symptoms woersen, immediately notufy the nearest
- - - - hospital for consultation and provide travel history
*Exposure History Includes
a. Close contact with a confirmed case of 2019-nCoV

infection; or
b. A healthcare facility in a country where 2019-nCoV
infections have been reported; or
c. Visiting/working in a live animal market in Hubei Province,
China
d. Direct contact with animals in countries with circulating
2019-nCoV in human and animals

A close contact is defined as:
1. Persons visiting patients or staying in the same close
environment of a nCoV patient.
a. being within approximately 6 feet (2 meters), or within
the room or care area, of a novel coronavirus casefor a
prolonged period of time while not wearing recommended
PPE (e.g. gowns, gloves, N95 respirator, eye protection)
-can include caring for, living with, visiting, or sharing a
healthcare waiting area or room with a novel coronavirus
case; or
b. having direct contact with infectious secretions of a
novel coronavirus case
Cont… A close contact is defined as:
2. Working together in close proximity or sharing
the same classroom environment with nCoV patient
3. Traveling together with nCoV patient i8n any
kind of conveyance
4. Living in the same household as a nCoV case
5. Healthcare associated exposure, including
providing direct case for nCoV patients, working with
healthcare workers infected with nCoV
6. Once the animal source is identified, exposure
to animals, or animal products.
ILI Reporting Form 2020
Severe Acute Respiratory Infection (SARI) CIF
Flow of Reporting for Immediately Notifiable Diseases
Immediate
reporting
within 24
hours from
detection
Flow of Reporting for Immediately Notifiable Diseases
The community, RHU, hospital, clinic
detects PUI
The RHU, hospital, clinic fill up the
ILI CRF. Submit text report and CRF
to ESU, HRH/PDOHO, DSN/DSO
simultaneously.
ESU, HRH/PDOHO, DSN/DSO verify if
the case fits in the nCoV standard
case definition. Report to RESU
immediately (Text report, ILI and
SARI CIF)
RESU verifies if true nCoV PUI.
Assess the case using the Decision
Tool:
Coordinate with HEMS, for hospital
referral and management and
Immediate
specimen collection reporting
The RHU, hospital, clinic fill up the ILI CRF and provide basic
within 24 hours
information through text: from detection
Name, age, sex, date of travel to affected areas, date of
possible exposure, date of onset of illness, s/sx, date person
Surveillance Pathway
1.Verify if fit in nCoV case
standard case definition
2. If yes, report
immediately to RESU
(Text report, submit ILI
CRF 2020, SARI CIF)
1. Verify if true
nCoV PUI
2. If yes, coordinate
with HEMS for
hospital referral
RHU / HC
and management
Text report,
Submit ILI
CRF
Patient Referral Flow
Person seeking consult
with history of travel
Detected in from Hubei and other Detected in Hospital
community provinces of China Facilities
(Public/Private)
Detected in
HOTLINES Ports of Entry
CLCHD: 0918-349-6864
Aurora: 0946-712-1097 Coordinates with RESU
Bataan: 0998-324-2246
Bulacan: 0998-324-2261
Nueva Ecija: 0918-245-4000 Patient fulfills the
no Manage accordingly
definition of PUI (public/private
Pampanga: 0921-368-8549 hospital)
Tarlac: 0998-324-2265
yes
Zambales: 0921-368-8547
RESU coordinates with HEMS for
transfer and referral
DOH Hospitals for isolation:
JBLMRH: Bulacan, Pampanga, Tarlac
Coordinates with designated hospital for
BGHMC: Bataan, Zambales isolation, management, specimen
PJGMRMC/TGH: Aurora, Nueva Ecija, Tarlac collection
Level 2 and Level 3 public/private hospitals
no Manage further as needed, send
(+) nCoV
home with advice
SLH, Lung yes
Center of the
Philippines, Admit at JBLMRH
RITM
Text Report Format
1.Name, Age, Sex,
2.Address
3. Date of Arrival in the Philippines
4.History of travel: Date and place
5.Date of possible exposure
6. W/ history of contact to a confirmed nCoV case: (Yes/No)
7. W/ hx of exposure in a healthcare facility in a country where 2019
nCov have been reported: (Yes/ No)
8. Direct contact with animals in countries with circulating nCoV (Y/N)
9. Fever (Y/N) Temp., Date of Onset
10. Cough: (Y/N), Colds: (Y/N) Date onset
11. Other signs and symptoms: Date Onset
12.Date person was identified/reported to ESU as PUI
13.Date and place pt. was admitted
14.Actions taken: include lab procedures done, date of specimen
collection and date sent to RITM.
15. Daily reporting of pt. health status: Date: Status
nCoV Reporting Forms
Call to Action:
1. Heighten ILI/SARI surveillance in the community and health

facilities
-Mobilize community health workers in identifying potential
nCoV cases/ SARI cases
-weekly analysis of ILI data, identify clustering of cases
-clustering of ILI cases is subject for case investigation →
response
2. Capacitate the hospitals in detection and recognition of cases.
3. Unverified reports are circulating: always conduct verification
4. Daily monitoring of PUM status.

DOH Preparedness Plan: 4 Door Policy
Four Door Approach
• Each door corresponds to an operational objective or

minimize the entry and spread of EID among Overseas
Filipinos, Foreigners and in the Philippines.
• DOOR 1: POINT OF ORIGIN

• Assumption: OFW may have exposure to EID cases in point
of origin
• Objective: Prevent EID case from leaving the point of origin

FOUR DOOR APPROACH:
DOOR 1 – POINT OF ORIGIN/ EXIT
• Actions:
1. Dissemination of the DOH advisory on the prevention and
control of EID
2. Notification to the DFA and/ or DOLE – POEA and/ or DOT
by the traveler of his/ her intention to arrive in the
Philippines
3. Exit screening
4. Medical Consultation for Ill Travelers
*Refer to EVENT section of EREID MOP

Four Door Approach
• DOOR 2: POINT OF ENTRY

• Assumption: There are OFWs or foreign travelers who are
arriving in the country from the EID affected countries
• Objective: To prevent entry/ contain/ mitigate EID case/s
in the country
• Trigger
1. Notification by traveler (PUI/Suspect Case) of occurrence
of symptoms
2. A case was identified by BOQ

FOUR DOOR APPROACH:
DOOR 2 – POINT OF ENTRY
• Actions:
1. DOH advisory on Health Declaration Checklist
2. Completion and submission of Health Declaration
Checklist
3. Medical Screening at Point of Entry
4. Provision of EID Information Package
Leaflets
Advisory on home quarantine period after arrival for
asymptomatic traveler
Thermometer
Contact number of “hotlines”
FOUR DOOR APPROACH:
DOOR 2 – POINT OF ENTRY
• Actions:
5. Coordination of Information on Arrivals
6. Transport of symptomatic traveler in designated DOH
Hospitals for laboratory testing, isolation and
observation
7. Appropriate laboratory testing for EID with 1 – 2 days
isolation while awaiting release of results
8. Advisory Given on Quarantine Period after arrival for
travelers without symptoms

Four Door Approach
• DOOR 3: POINT OF CARE IN THE HOSPITAL OR

COMMUNITY
• Assumption: an EID case has been identified in the

hospital and/or the community
• Objectives:
1. To catch and manage the (PUI/Suspected) case with EID
as early as possible
2. To prevent the spread of EID coming from
(PUI/Suspected) cases

Four Door Approach

COMMUNITY
• Trigger:
of symptoms
2. A case was identified by a surveillance team/BHERT

Four Door Approach

COMMUNITY
• Trigger:
of symptoms

Four Door Approach

COMMUNITY
• Trigger:
of symptoms

FOUR DOOR APPROACH:
DOOR 3 – POINT OF CARE (HOSPITAL)
• Actions:
1. Dissemination of the DOH Advisory on the Prevention
and Control of EID
2. Implementation of Quarantine – Monitoring of Contacts
3. Post-quarantine advisory
4. Notification by traveler of occurrence of symptoms
5. Pick-up and transport of suspected cases

FOUR DOOR APPROACH:
DOOR 3 – POINT OF CARE (HOSPITAL)
• Actions:
6. Triage in health facility
7. Admission
8. Laboratory confirmation
9. Case management
10.Post-discharge care
11.Post-mortem care
12.Sanitation and waste management

FOUR DOOR APPROACH:
DOOR 3 – POINT OF CARE (COMMUNITY)
• Actions:
1. Declaration of outbreak and quarantine
2. Isolation and containment of affected communities
3. Ensuring the security of the containment area
4. Suspension of work and school in and near containment
area
5. Provision of lifelines, basic health services, food, water
and other necessities to affect communities
6. Decontamination

FOUR DOOR APPROACH:
DOOR 3 – POINT OF CARE (COMMUNITY)
• Actions:
7. Community surveillance and contact tracing
8. Conduct of event-based surveillance
9. Post-quarantine advisory
10.Dissemination of the DOH IEC materials/ advertisements
and information on the prevention and control of EID
11.Sanitation and waste management

Four Door Approach
• DOOR 4: CAPACITY SURGE
• POINT OF INCREASED SERVICE DEMAND (HOSPITAL

SURGE)
• Assumption: The number of EID cases exceed the bed
capacity of the EID referral hospitals
• Objective: To prevent further spread and reduction of
mortality from EID

FOUR DOOR APPROACH:
DOOR 4 – CAPACITY SURGE (HOSPITAL)
• Actions:
1. Shift of hospital operations
2. Create, operate and manage the EID Treatment Unit
(ETU) including Laboratory Capacity Transport Cases
from community to ETU in the hospital premises
3. Transport from communities to ETU
4. Hiring of trained health personnel and other personnel
staff

FOUR DOOR APPROACH:
DOOR 4 – CAPACITY SURGE (HOSPITAL)
• Actions:
5. Ensuring the security of the containment area
6. Sanitation and waste management
7. Surge safe burial
8. Dissemination of the DOH IEC materials/ advertisements
and information on the prevention and control of EID

Four Door Approach
• DOOR 4: CAPACITY SURGE

•
• POINT OF WIDESPREAD TRANSMISSION (COMMUNITY
SURGE)
• Assumption: There is extensive human-to-human
transmission in the community
• Objective: To prevent further spread and reduction of
mortality from EID

FOUR DOOR APPROACH:
DOOR 4 – CAPACITY SURGE (COMMUNITY)
• Actions:
1. Declaration of state of emergency
2. Activation of the Emergency Cluster Approach
3. Community Surveillance
4. Isolation and containment of affected communities
5. Create and run the ETU including laboratory capacity
and transport of cases from community ETU in the
community

FOUR DOOR APPROACH:
DOOR 4 – CAPACITY SURGE (COMMUNITY)
• Actions:
6. Transport from Communities to ETU
7. Hiring and deployment of trained health personnel
including foreign medical teams

EVENT (RESPONSE):
Hospital / Health Facility Specific Response
 Standard infection control measures

 Additional precautions maybe required depending on the
transmission of the pathogens suspected
 Infection control procedures in all clinical areas/ disciplines
involved in in-patient care or patient movement
 Transmission-based type of isolation
 Cohorting of patients

EVENT (RESPONSE):
 Infection control measures appropriately adjusted once

pathogen is confirmed
 Timely/ prompt confirmation of diagnosis
 Nurse patients using personalized equipment
 Prophylaxis for close contact given when indicated

EVENT (RESPONSE):
FIRST LINE
 Triage patients before entering the health facility
 Create a triage corner before the registration counter with
a trained triage officer
 Standardized triage form must be used when triaging cases
(includes travel history, exposure to animals)
 All patients screened for suspected EREID disease
 Mask and gloves for health staff

EVENT (RESPONSE):
FIRST LINE
 Triage area NOT air-conditioned, well-ventilated and open
window
 Information and instruction on EREID disease displayed at
all entrances
 Disinfect triage area after each suspected case
 Decontamination room in the triage area

EVENT (RESPONSE):
ROOM DISINFECTION
 Compressed air that might re-aerosolize should not be used
 PPE of personnel doing the cleaning
 Timely decontamination of spillage

EVENT (RESPONSE):
TRANSPORT OF PATIENTS
 One vehicle if possible
 Not more than one fully protected staff to accompany
suspected case
 Switch off the air-conditioning and wind down all windows
 No relatives should accompany patients in the same vehicle
 Driver must also use proper PPE
 Other patients should not share the vehicle
 Vehicle must be disinfected after every case and air-dried
with window would down and park in designated lot

EVENT (RESPONSE):
PROTECTION OF STAFF
 Personal Hygiene
 Personal Protection
 Bathe and change clothing before going home
 Ensure good diet
 Daily and frequent monitoring of all health staff in direct care
and triaging

EVENT (RESPONSE):
FINANCIAL SUPPORT
 Upon the confirmation of PHEI by the EREID team and TWG,
Internal EREID TWG meeting to agree options for financial
support
 After approval of the senior management team (Directors,
ASec, and USec level) the EREID TWG shall be informed of the
decision as well as the regions and provinces where the EREID
epidemic is ongoing

EVENT (RESPONSE):
FINANCIAL SUPPORT
 DOH Central Office will communicate with the DOH Regional
Office and the PHO, MHO, CHO where the EREID happen
about the mechanism of downloading the funds either as
Quick Response Fund (QRF), MOOE, sub allotment or other
fund modalities.
 Using available templates, DOH CO will work with the DOH
RO to generate specific work plans for resource mobilization
and auditing purposes.

Members and Key Functions
OVER-ALL COMMITTEE
Dir. Cesar Cassion – Regional Director
Dr. Juliana Reyes – OIC-Assistant Regional Director
Dr. Lailani Mangulabnan – Chief-Local Health Support Division
Dr. Emily Paulino – DMO V Bulacan
Ms. Graciana Samia – OIC-Chief Administrative Officer
Dr. Maria Eloisa Vidar – Head-Communicable Disease Cluster
Dr. Jessie Fantone – Head-RESU
Dr. Maila Rostrata – Head-DRRM-H

OVER-ALL COMMITTEE
Functions:
Define policies, standards, guidelines and systems
relative to EREID
Oversee the effective and efficient implementation of
each committee of the rapid response team

REGIONAL EPIDEMIOLOGY AND SURVEILLANCE UNIT
(RESU) COMMITTEE
Chairperson: Dr. Jessie Fantone
Vice-chairperson: Ms. Ronna Cabantog
Members: All Disease Surveillance Nurses

REGIONAL EPIDEMIOLOGY AND SURVEILLANCE UNIT (RESU)
COMMITTEE
Functions:
 Coordinate with Epidemiology Bureau (EB) in obtaining information about
EREID surveillance reports in and out of the country that includes the risk
of spread of disease beyond the points of entry in coordination with BOQ
 Ensure the implementation of National Surveillance Systems (e.g. PIDSR,
ESR) from data collection, verification, analysis and reporting.
 Validate and analyze all reports and data received and prepare necessary
reports to authorities
 Determine the risk of spread within and among communities in cities and
municipalities

COMMITTEE
Functions:
 Initiate the coordination with different agencies such as but not limited to BOQ,
government and private hospitals, migrant labor agencies, Department of Foreign
Affairs (DFA), Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), Philippine
National Police (PNP), and Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in the
identification of individuals who are suspected to be potential cases or carriers of
EREID
 Conduct epidemiologic investigations - whereabouts and movements of index cases
 Manage and monitor the EREID surveillance system in the region
 Execute proper handling and transport of laboratory specimen according to the set
guidelines

COMMITTEE
Functions:
 In collaboration with the Field Operations Team, develop the plan and procedures
for EREID outbreak response (OR) and composition of these EREID OR teams
 Provide technical assistance and/or capability building training to partners/other
agencies to enhance capacities for surveillance, risk assessment and response
including monitoring and evaluation
 Coordinate with Disease Prevention and Control Bureau (DPCB), EB, BOQ,
government and private hospitals and other health agencies and facilities for
recognition of the threat spread
 Designate their committee secretariat that will link with the program committee
 Perform other functions as instructed by the Regional Director

DISASTER RISK REDUCTION MANAGEMENT – HEALTH
(FIELD OPERATIONS COMMITTEE)
Chairperson: Dr. Maila Rostrata
Vice-chairperson: Ms. Rosanna Rosell
Members: All Provincial Health Team Leaders
All Development Management Officer IV
Mr. Errol Ernest Dytianquin
Ms. Lana Alene Lozano

DISASTER RISK REDUCTION MANAGEMENT – HEALTH (FIELD
OPERATIONS COMMITTEE)
Functions:
 Activation of Regional Emergency Incident Command System and
Operational Center (OPCEN) upon recommendation of the EREID program
 Mobilize RRTs in coordination with the EREID program
 Mobilization of EREID commodities in affected areas
 Collaborate with OCD as the chairman of RDRRMC for other logistical,
manpower augmentation and response activities
 Continuous monitoring of the health event in coordination with RESU and
EREID program
 Prepare necessary documents for team mobilization in coordination with
EREID

DISASTER RISK REDUCTION MANAGEMENT – HEALTH
(FIELD OPERATIONS COMMITTEE)
Functions:
Prepare and consolidate reports related to the health event in
coordination with EREID program
Document and prepare final report on the health event
Conduct post incident evaluation in coordination with RESU and
EREID program
Perform other functions as instructed by the Regional Director

EMERGING AND RE-EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASE
PROGRAM COMMITTEE
Chairperson: Dr. Maria Eloisa C. Vidar
Vice-chairperson: Ms. Rosellyn Joy Malit
Member: Mr. Genesis G. Gamurot

EMERGING AND RE-EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASE PROGRAM
COMMITTEE
Functions:
 Serve as the lead and chair in convening the RRT to discuss and plan
preparedness measures and health systems strengthening interventions for
possible EREID Outbreak and PHEIC
 Oversee the effective and efficient implementation of EREID preventive
and control measures during outbreak and coordinate the planning,
development of systems and operations of LGUs, local health facilities
and partner agencies
 Focal point for all the network and collaboration for government agencies,
non-health sectors, academe, medical societies and more

EMERGING AND RE-EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASE PROGRAM
COMMITTEE
Functions:
 Focal for the policy creation, revision, and its dissemination and to coordinate
during EREID incidences
 Formulate and recommend policies, standards, guidelines, approaches and
capacity building on the public health prevention and control measures against
EREID
 Conduct capacity building for health and non-health personnel
 Disseminate policies, guidelines and issuances on EREID
 Plan, manage and monitor logistics in preparing and responding to epidemics of
EREID, including the allocation of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), drugs
and medicines, vaccines and ancillaries

EMERGING AND RE-EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASE
PROGRAM COMMITTEE
Functions:
Documents the discussions, recommendations and decisions during
meetings and facilitates the immediate implementation and follow
through of decisions made during meetings
Supervises the various sub-committees and create/establish other sub-
committees as may deem necessary

HEALTH PROMOTION AND COMMUNICATION
COMMITTEE
Chairperson: Ms. Theresa Marie Bondoc
Vice-chairperson: Ms. Trixia Ponio
Members: Mr. Archy Briones
Ms. Lian Ann Pineda
Mr. Adrian De Jesus
HEPO and MIS Staff

HEALTH PROMOTION AND COMMUNICATION COMMITTEE
Functions:
 Based on data submitted by RESU and after confirmation and clearance of
EB, prepare and disseminate press releases, plan and coordinate press
conference on the status of detection, surveillance, and case management of
EREID suspect cases
 Ensure management of all communications pertaining to epidemics and other
public health events and emergencies are correct, up to date and timely, and
are disseminated to the concerned agencies using the most appropriate
channels
 Collaborate with LGUs, DOH hospitals and partner agencies to organize a
speakers bureau to respond to various demands from various sectors

Functions:
 Orchestrate risk communication strategies in terms of EREID pre-event,
crisis, and post event
 Based on technical inputs from the DPCB, EB, WHO and professional
societies, identify key messages that will answer the questions of the general
public and key target groups in the region, and develop and produce various
Information, Education, and Communication (IEC) prototypes and materials
that will answer these questions
 Provide technical assistance and capability building skills programs on risk
communication management during outbreaks and PHEs, including
development of local communication materials to broaden support and
understanding of PHE preparedness among the public

Functions:
 Develop a multi-media communications plan addressed at various target audiences
that will ensure the full dissemination of the identified key messages on EREID,
communicate the various DOH guidelines to the public, enhance national
awareness, and promote positive attitude and behavior to reduce public fear and
anxiety
 Develop and produce risk communication plan and various IEC prototypes and
materials that will also be needed for advocacy, health education and training on
EREID prevention and control by various working groups and committees
 Manage and disseminate information within the context of EREID crisis to the
public, especially to media, to maintain public trust and avoid unnecessary
concerns within the principles of risk communication

Functions:
Mobilize HEPOs at different levels of health care to take charge of the
risk communication and strategies to allay fears and to offer the
appropriate messages according to the context, and support the
community mobilization needed to allay fear and to safeguard the rest
of the population against EREID
Designate their committee secretariat that will link with the program
committee

MANAGEMENT AND SUPPORT COMMITTEE
Chairperson: Ms. Graciana Samia
Vice-chairperson: Ms. Joyce Malonzo
Members: Ms. Lolita Figuracion (Supply Section)
Mr. Rommel Capulong (Supply Section)
Mr. Benjamin Bascara (Supply Section)
Ms. Joyce Malonzo (Finance and Accounting Section)
Ms. Lani Andres (Budget Section)
Ms. Ester Blancaflor (Cashier Section)
Engr. Albert Dumagpi (GSS Section)
Mr. Expedito Nejal (GSS Section)

Logistics:
 Responsible for the conduct of inventory and accounting of all types of EREID
logistics
 Provide all the necessary logistics needed
 Responsible for the delivery of logistics if deemed necessary
Transport:
 Provide vehicle needed for the investigation and monitoring of suspected cases to
the RRT and other circumstances

Finance and Administrative:
Assist and support in the finance service during EREID outbreaks
Account the expenses before, during and after the EREID outbreaks
Provide financial and administrative support to operations and
incident management
Assume administrative functions

PRE-EVENT:
BUREAU OF QUARANTINE (BOQ)
• Assistant IHR Focal Point for the implementation of PSPA
• Lead agency in ensuring that EREID cases are identified and contained in
all ports of entry and exits of the country.
• Minimize international spread of EREID thru vigilant exit protocols and
screening diseases (not just for preventing entry of disease in the country).
• Contribute to early detection and reporting of suspected cases among
international travelers
• Develop and disseminate policies and guidelines on quarantine standards
specific to PHE preparedness
• Lead in coordinating with government and non –government agencies for
the implementation of strict international surveillance

PRE-EVENT:
HEALTH FACILITY DEVELOPMENT BUREAU (HFDB)
• Lead agency in ensuring that all policies on Infection Prevention
and Control and are strictly implemented and enforced in all
health facilities and hospitals

PRE-EVENT:
For Infection Control
• Develop and disseminate policies, guidelines and procedures at various levels of
health care facilities to institutionalize Infection Prevention and Control and sustain
high level commitment in its implementation
• Capacitate health staff and other allied agencies’ personnel through the provision of
capability building and knowledge enhancement programs on Infection Prevention
and Control
• Advocate with various stakeholders at all levels the need for strict implementation
and compliance to IPC Program
• Strengthen linkage/partnership with other agencies to broaden Infection Prevention
and Control Implementation
• Initiate M&E activities to generate baseline data necessary for policy
development/enhancement, development of standards and guidelines and overall
improvement of protocols and procedures on Infection Prevention and Control

PRE-EVENT:
For Health Facility Preparedness
• Develop and disseminate policies and guidelines on EREID preparedness to all
health facilities at both public and private sectors
• Ensure that facilities in all levels have their appropriated preparedness plans
including availability of supplies, work force and other logistical support (vehicles,
communication equipment, etc.)
• Ensure that facilities are compliant with national regulations on minimizing infection
transmission (eq. Isolation rooms, wash areas, waste disposables of highly
contaminated materials)
• Coordinate with relevant agency/office the need to enhance personnel capacities for
preparedness, including surveillance, risk assessment, Infection Prevention and
Control
• Support establishment of subnational laboratories and capacitation of existing ones
for EREID cases.

PRE-EVENT:
FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION
• Lead agency for the detection, identification and containment of
all possible pathogens/contaminants in food, drugs and other
consumer items.
• Develop and disseminate policies and guidelines on regulatory
measures for standards on food, drugs, cosmetics, medical
technology and devices and procedures
• Advocate with stakeholders at all levels the need for
compliance for regulatory measures on various food, medicine
and consumer products as measures for PHE preparedness.

PRE-EVENT:
LGU (PROVINCIAL HEALTH OFFICES)
• Establish and maintain the Rapid Response Teams (RRTs) in all the Local Government units
under their responsibility
• Collect, organize, analyze and interpret surveillance data in their respective areas through their
respective ESUs.
• Verify and report all available essential information (e.g., clinical description, laboratory results,
numbers of human suspects, cases and deaths, sources and type of risk) immediately to RO
and EB.
• Help (e.g., technical, logistics, and laboratory analysis of samples) as requested to supplement
local epidemic investigations and control).
• Ensure risk communication plans and trained workforce are capacitated and able to deliver in
terms of EREID crisis.
• Establish efficient and effective referral systems for EREID suspects and cases from
community, LGUs and to the designated EREID Referral Hospital
• Ensure the functionality of the Provincial Disease Surveillance, Preparedness and Response
Systems

PRE-EVENT:
LGU (MUNICIPAL/CITY HEALTH OFFICES)
• Establish and maintain the Rapid Response Teams (RRTs) in all the Local
Government units under their responsibility
• Collect, organize, analyze and interpret surveillance data in their respective
areas.
• Verify and report all available essential information (e.g., clinical description,
laboratory results, numbers of human suspects, cases and deaths, sources
and type of risk) immediately to PHO, RO and EB
• Implement appropriate epidemic control measures immediately (isolation
and quarantine) as indicated in the guidelines and ordinances developed
• Establish, operate and maintain a municipal/city epidemic preparedness and
response plans

PRE-EVENT:
LGU (MUNICIPAL/CITY HEALTH OFFICES)
• Facilitate submission of immediately/weekly notifiable disease surveillance
reports from public and private hospitals
• Establish efficient and effective referral systems for EREID suspects and
cases from community, LGUs and to the designated EREID Referral
Hospital
• Ensure risk communication plans and trained workforce are capacitated and
able to deliver in terms of EREID crisis.
• Ensure health facility, laboratories and hospital preparedness for EREID
cases
• Ensure the functionality of the Municipal/City Disease Surveillance,
Preparedness and Response Systems

PRE-EVENT:
Other Members of the Health and Non – Health Sectors (DEPED, PNP, DA, DILG,
NDRRMC and others)
• Implement all policies, and adhere to all standards, and requirements
for control and prevention of EIDs and other public health threats
• Implement all policies and adhere to all standards, requirements and
system needed to prepare for and respond to emerging diseases and
public health emergencies set by the health sector
• Coordinate with the DOH in responding to EREID public health
threats
• Participate in interagency related activities led and organized by DOH
• Advocate for the prevention and control of emerging diseases and
other health threats

PRE-EVENT:
Medical Societies ( PSMID, PIDSP, PAFP, PHICS and others)
• Support and give technical expertise in the formulation of clinical guidelines
and management protocols per EREID disease
• Support in the capacity building of public and private physicians and nurses
on the management of EREID cases including infection prevention and
control in health facilities as possible even in the local government units
where infectious disease specialists are lacking
• Participate in the interagency meetings, TWG and forums on EREID
• Support in the advocacy and health literacy on EREID cases as to
prevention and control
• Encourage ID specialists in the country to be part of the network of technical
experts

PRE-EVENT:
Philippine Inter- Agency Committee on Zoonoses (PhilCZ)
Composed of the following agencies from the three government agencies
responsible for the prevention and control of EREID of zoonotic origin.
There is a tripartite agreement between the three government agencies as
stipulated in AO No. 10.
1. Department of Health - DPCB, HEMB, EB, HPCS, BHFD, BoQ, RITM

2. Department of Agriculture - Bureau of Animal Industry (BAI), National
Meat Inspection Services (NMIS) and Agriculture and Fisheries
Information Services (AFIS)
3. Department of Environment and National Resources - Protected
Areas and Wildlife Bureau

PRE-EVENT:
• Ensure that animals and health sectors’ plans, programs and
activities are consistent with the National Strategic Work Plan;
• Review and Develop policies, programs and guidelines to ensure the
proper implementation of the prevention and control program on
zoonosis;
• Develop and coordinate capacity building programs and prioritize
activities towards improving national and local capabilities
• Foster Cooperation and commitment between the animal and human
health sectors through coordination of activities and exchange of
advice and assistance whenever possible

PRE-EVENT:
• Provide recommendations to the President of the Philippines through
the Secretaries of the DA, DOH and DENR in times of crises of as
may be deemed necessary (i.e. epidemics of zoonotic nature)
• Recommend research priorities and ensure dissemination and use of
research findings;
• Organize a pool of experts who will provide technical advice on
zoonotic diseases;
• Coordinate and collaborate with other sectors/organization as may be
necessary, to carry out its duties and responsibilities and
• Monitor and evaluate proper implementation of programs and policies

EVENT/EREID CRISIS: DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH (DOH)
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
• Crisis manager
• Enlist support of AFP, PNP, PCG for enforcing

quarantine of specific areas or facilitating the transport
and conduction of patients to EREID referral health
facilities

QUARANTINE AND IMMEDIATE CONTAINMENT OF EID WITHIN PORTS OF ENTRY
• Bureau of Quarantine (BOQ) is authorized to promulgate and

enforce rules and regulations necessary to prevent the
introduction, transmission or spread of pathogens of Public
Health Emergencies of International Concern.
• Foreign countries Philippines
• Domestic seaport/airport Domestic seaport/airport
• BOQ protocols

Intervention strategies implemented include the following:

• Conduct of health education on EREID, the dissemination of case definitions
of EREID and the issuance of advisories and its dissemination to all
quarantine medical officers and quarantine stations.
• Surveillance, apprehension, detention or isolation of both suspected and
confirmed cases for preventing the introduction, transmission or spread of
such public health emergencies of international concern as specified in the
Department Orders by the Secretary of Health upon the recommendation of
international health surveillance and the Task Force on EREID
• Enforcement of areas of containment within ports of entry to complement
isolation measures in quarantine stations, grounds and anchorages to limit
the potential spread of EREID

• Inspection, fumigation, disinfection, pest extermination of aircraft and sea

vessels
• Vaccination for international travel and medical examination of
aliens/foreigners and nationals leaving the country
• Destruction of animals or articles found to be infected or contaminated as to
be sources of infection to human beings in coordination with other
concerned quarantine agencies such as veterinary quarantine of the Bureau
of Animal Industry and plant quarantine of the Bureau of Plant Industry both
from the Department of Agriculture
• Coordination with quarantine officials in conducting surveillance for EREID in
other countries and coordination with the Epidemiology Bureau and DPCB
for passengers admitted for testing and quarantine

EPIDEMIOLOGICAL INVESTIGATION AND CONTACT TRACING
• EB as lead agency in coordination with the RESU, and under the control and
supervision of the Secretary of Health, shall initiate the coordination with
different agencies in the identification of individuals who are suspected to be
potential cases or carriers of EREID.
– BOQ
– Government and private hospitals
– Migrant labor agencies
– DFA
– DILG
– PNP
– AFP
• National Focal Point for IHR - coordinate with WHO in obtaining information
about EID abroad report any potential cases, outbreaks of EID in the country
EPIDEMIOLOGICAL INVESTIGATION AND CONTACT TRACING
EB likewise is tasked to undertake the following:
• Case definitions and guidelines + orientations and trainings
• Risk of spread of disease beyond the ports of entry under the jurisdiction of
the BOQ
• Risk of spread within and among communities in cities and municipalities
• Epidemiologic investigations - whereabouts and movements of index cases
• Coordination with DPCB, BoQ, DOH Regional Offices, government and
private hospitals and other health agencies and facilities – recognition of the
threat spread
• Reports and updates on the status of disease spread within the community
to the President, the Secretary of Health or any designated point person

TREATMENT OF INFECTED CASES AND CONTAINMENT OF AFFECTED AREAS
DPCB, BHFD, DOH • Isolate, treat, and manage cases of EID

Regional Office, in areas where confirmed and suspected
HEMB cases are found or have been isolated
• Admit patients for hospital quarantine

and clinical management
EREID Referral • Aid in the referral of patients for lab
Hospital testing and reporting to the RESU
• Issue medical certificates and
clearances upon request

• Confirmatory testing
• Biosafety and bio-security
• Coordinate the reporting of results with EB & DPCB
RITM • Pick-up of specimens from identified areas

• Admit for isolation and/or clinical management in
their biocontainment unit
• Support capacitate other trained laboratories for
EREID diagnostics

Support DPCB
Maintain an operations center (OPCEN)
Information management and submission
of reports in coordination with the EB
HEMB Coordinate response strategies, national
RRTs and logistics management DPCB
Ensure coordination with other concerned
agencies. (e.g. NDRRMC, AFP, DSWD)

EVENT/EREID CRISIS:
Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG)
• Secretary of the Interior and Local Government, upon the recommendation
of the Secretary of Health, shall be responsible for mobilizing the community
particularly the barangays by directing the local government units (LGUs) to
monitor the health situation in their respective jurisdictions.
• Assist the DOH in contract tracing by mobilizing the PNP and by exercising
supervision over local governments for the duration of a crisis related to the
spread of EREID.
• Assistance shall be inclusive of facilitating the isolation and control of
quarantine areas, the maintenance of peace and order related to the
management of the areas affected or lending support, augmentation, and
assistance to directives lawfully issued in relation to the management and
control of each crisis.

EVENT/EREID CRISIS:
Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG)
• LGUs shall be encouraged to pass local ordinances for strict observance of
hygiene, sanitation and social distancing if needed.
• Verify and investigate reported EREID cases, clustering or epidemics
immediately and report all essential information to their respective Regional
Offices and DOH central office. This will include the transport and
conduction of patients to EREID Referral hospitals or health centers for
isolation and treatment.
• Community volunteers and barangay brigades will likewise mobilized to
conduct massive surveillance efforts, dissemination of health messages,
assist in the environmental sanitation, advocate observance of personal
hygiene and infection control measures.

EVENT/EREID CRISIS:
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA)
• Coordinate with embassies, consulates and missions to obtain
information from OFWs about the general health situation of
Filipino communities as well as the individual medical condition
called to the embassies’ attention.
• Responsible for gathering useful information about countries on
outbreaks and epidemics by relying on its network of their
colleagues in foreign governments, embassies and consulates
about the potential threat to OFWs.
• Information must be shared with the Task Force and the DOH
in determining the implications for travel and trade.

EVENT/EREID CRISIS:
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA)
• Recommend the implementation of travel and trade restrictions
depending on the situation.
• Coordination with DOLE, POEA and OWWA needed to ensure the
protection and welfare of Filipinos working abroad.
• Provide travel advisories, and such other measures and processes to
prevent the entry into the country of Filipinos or foreign nationals
suspected of having contracted an EREID in their respective places
of employment or in foreign ports of embarkation.
• Foreign Service officials will be oriented on EREID and measures to
prevent contracting possible EREID.

EVENT/EREID CRISIS: Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), Overseas Workers
Welfare Administration (OWWA) and the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA)
• DOLE shall be responsible for providing information through the
Pre-Departure Orientation Seminar (PDOS) and Pre-
Employment Seminar to those departing the Philippines and
bound for affected countries or bound for countries in danger of
an epidemic of an EREID.
• DOLE, OWWA and POEA shall issue advisories to recruitment
agencies and employers and distribute information materials
through the Philippine Overseas Labor Offices (POLOs).
• When so determined by the Secretary of Health and when the
public safety may be compromised, the departure from the
affected country may be halted.
EVENT/EREID CRISIS: Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), Overseas Workers
Welfare Administration (OWWA) and the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA)
• DOLE shall provide updates on the status of Overseas
Filipino Workers and likewise monitor the entry of
overseas Filipino workers who may be deemed as a
threat to public health and provide the necessary
contact details to assist in contact tracing of
individuals who may have been exposed to an EREID.

EVENT/EREID CRISIS:
Department of Education (DepEd)
• Monitor and report the EREID cases detected in schools and
may order the closure of schools, institutions of learning,
vocational, technical or otherwise, including that of private
institutions of learning if found.
• May also suspend classes, or otherwise utilize such buildings
and edifices for purposes of isolating temporarily the suspect or
case until referral to the hospital.
• Help in the dissemination of health information, risk
communication messages and advisories among teachers and
students.

EVENT/EREID CRISIS:
Department of Agriculture (DA)
• DA and its attached bureaus and agencies shall coordinate
closely with the DOH in assessing the potential risks of the
spread of zoonotic diseases to humans.
• Information on suspected incidents of transmission of such

diseases shall be shared with the DOH including affected areas
and individuals, risk of spread outside areas of animal
quarantine and results of laboratory confirmation.

EVENT/EREID CRISIS:
Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC)
• Oversee that infrastructure facilities such as airports, seaports
and other transportation terminals be available in the
implementation of this Executive Order.
• When the public safety requires, as may be determined by the

Secretary of Health, the DOTC shall control the entry and exit
of aircraft, sea craft and other forms of transportation, to
prevent the introduction, transmission and spread of EID in the
country.

EVENT/EREID CRISIS:
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD)
• Assist in the referral of suspected cases for possible
surveillance and contact tracing and will advise potential
patients to go to the nearest health facility.
• In the event of an epidemic that would require a quarantine to
be enforced, the DSWD will help provide essential needs like
food and water to affected communities and psychosocial and
counseling services.
• In preparing the community for a potential outbreak or
epidemic, social workers can aid in the conduct of information
and Dissemination campaigns for EID by the inclusion of
hygiene and sanitation into their trainings.
EVENT/EREID CRISIS:
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI)
• Undertake measures to prevent profiteering activities and
other unscrupulous practices which are inimical to the
public with regards to having the necessary drugs and
medicines and personal protective equipment available to
the public.

EVENT/EREID CRISIS:
Bureau of Immigration (BI)
• Conduct strict arrival and departure inspections including secondary
inspections on passengers going to and coming from affected
countries and the appropriate filling up of health checklist forms.
• Maintain complete arrival and departure records of travelers arriving
from and departing for affected countries
• Provide an accurate list of passengers, with contact details, of flights
identified to have potentially suspected or confirmed cases to the
DOH.
• Coordinate with the Bureau of Quarantine and the Bureau of
Customs in conducting active surveillance for cases of EID.

EVENT/EREID CRISIS:
Philippine National Police (PNP) and the Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP)
• Assist in the contact tracing and quarantine of persons or
communities.
• Help in securing the transfer of patients to the appropriate
health facilities.
• Security and the well-being of health personnel and responders
should be ensured as well as the security of essential needs
and supplies, including drugs, vaccines, medical equipment and
critical infrastructure such as banks and electricity and water
utility services.

EVENT/EREID CRISIS:
Philippine National Police (PNP) and the Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP)
• In potentially enforcing the Quarantine Act, maintenance of law and order
are of utmost concern.
• By helping preserve vigilance against illness among members of the
community, biosecurity and biosafety surveillance will be practiced by law
enforcement officials.
• Checkpoints and other means of curtailing the movements of concerned
persons, vehicles and animals may be enforced if this would apply for a
definite and limited duration of time with due regard to the constitutional
rights of everyone.
• No arrests and detentions shall be enforced except upon lawful processes
emanating from the courts or upon order of quarantine of the Secretary of
Health in accordance with law for preventing the introduction, transmission
or spread of EID
EVENT/EREID CRISIS:
Department of National Defense (DND) and Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)
• Office Of Civil Defense, the National Security Adviser and the
National Security Council Secretariat shall assist the Task
Force through the coordination of information and the national
intelligence community in the task of gathering and evaluating
information on threats to national health security such as
outbreaks and epidemics of EID.,
• Guide the Task Force in strategically assessing the threat of the
spread of epidemics and the appropriateness of the response.
• AFP shall assist the PNP in maintaining peace and order in the
event of an epidemic and in the enforcement of a quarantine in
affected areas.
EVENT/EREID CRISIS:
Philippine Information Agency (PIA)
• As a member of the Presidential
Communications Group, PIA shall conduct
information dissemination and help in the health
education of the public through mass media.
• Help craft messages for the community to aid in
the awareness campaign of the Department of
Health.

EVENT/EREID CRISIS:
Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PHIC)
• Develop various insurance packages for its
members depending on the specific EID to
assist them in defraying the cost of
hospitalization and other related medical
expenses if they contract an EID.

POST-EVENT
• After the initial set of interventions have been done
and the outbreak declared over by DOH in
collaboration with the Local Government Unit affected,
the stakeholders and partners will resume their roles
and responsibilities as in pre- event stage.
• The monitoring and surveillance will continue in
contact screening but decreased frequency of
reporting.

POST-EVENT
• Conduct of After Action Review and
Learning from Previous EREID Crisis
– Generating knowledge from previous experiences
of EREID outbreaks management which the country
had felt would help prevent and better plan future
EREID threats or better manage new EREID
emergencies when they occur.

WHO/DOH recommendation:
• Encourages all countries to enhance their
surveillance for severe acute respiratory infections
(SARI)
• Carefully review any unusual patterns of SARI or
pneumonia cases
• Notify WHO of any suspected or confirmed case of
infection with nCoV.
• Continue strengthening their preparedness for health
emergencies in line with the International Health
Regulations (2005).

DOH Preparedness Plan
• DOH advises the public to practice frequent

handwashing, avoid unprotected contact with farm or
wild animals, practice proper cough etiquette –
maintain distance and cover coughs and sneezes
with a tissue or the crook of your elbow, avoid close
contact with people showing cold or flu-like
symptoms, and ensure that food is well-cooked.

• Activation of RRTas necessary and coordination with
IATF
• Coordinate with Bureau of Quarantine (BOQ) for strict
screening and surveillance of all passengers entering
in the Philippines, especially those from countries
affected with nCoV.
• EB/RESU heightens its community surveillance.
• DOH also enhances its coronavirus laboratory testing
capacity, hospital preparedness, rapid response, risk
communication and information dissemination.

• Securing necessary commodities: Personal
Protective Equipment (PPE) are available at the
BOQ, Centers for Health Development (CHDs), and
DOH Hospitals.
• DOH is also closely monitoring individuals who

manifested signs of respiratory infection and had a
history of travel to China and is coordinating with
WHO and China Center for Disease Control for
updates.

MAILA S. ROSTRATA, MD, MPH
Medical Officer IV
Head, DRRM-H

Incident Command System
Novel Coronavirus

ICS STRUCTURE
CRISIS CONSEQUENCE CESAR C. CASSION, MD, MPH, CESO IV
MANAGEMENT Responsible Official
OIC-ARD-Dr. J. Reyes
RLED - Dr. M. Lapid
MSD CHIEF- Ms. Samia
LAILANI P. MANGULABNAN, MD, MPH
Incident Commander ALBERT DUMAGPI
Safety Officer
JESSIE FANTONE, MD
Public Information Officer
MAILA ROSTRATA,MD
Liaison Officer
ROSANNA ROSELL MARIA ELOISA VIDAR, MD LOLITA FIGURACION GRACIANA SAMIA

Planning Section Chief Operation Section Chief Logistics Section Chief Admin/Finance Chief
Jose Gener Pascual

Irene Joy Margallo /Charisse Custodio Resource Unit
Documentation Unit
THERESA MARIE BONDOC RONNA CABANTOG ERROL ERNEST DYTIANQUIN

ROSELLYN JOY MALIT
TF Health Education & TF Case Investigation & TF Case Referral &
TF PREV & CONTROL
Promotion Reporting Management
Number of Trained Personnel Donning and Doffing of PPE with
Specimen Collection, Storage & Transport
PROVINCE/CITY # OF TRAINED PERSONNEL
Aurora 8
Bataan 11
Bulacan 22
Nueva Ecija 43
Pampanga 31
Tarlac 19
Zambales 13
Angeles City 13
Olongapo City 5
BGHMC 1
PJGMRMC 2
TGH 1
JBLMRH 4

Logistics Report
PPE INVENTORY
PROVINCE PPE SET PROVINCE/CITY/HOSPITAL PPE SET
PHO Aurora 10 PHO Tarlac 23
PDOHO Aurora 10 PDOHO Tarlac 10
PHO Bataan 29 PHO Zambales 14
PDOHO Bataan PDOHO Zambales 68
PHO Bulacan 3 CHO Angeles 10
PDOHO Bulacan CHO Olongapo City 9
PHO Nueva Ecija 18 BGHMC 50
PDOHO Nueva Ecija 16 PJGMRMC
PHO Pampanga TGH 20
PDOHO Pampanga 20 JBLMRH 40
ELJMH 10

Logistics Report
COMMODITIES FOR PICK-UP AT CLCHD
PPE SET W/ PPE SET W/
RECIPIENT PNSS 1L D5LRS 1L
BOOTS (M) BOOTS (L)
PHO Bulacan 10 10 80 85
PHO Nueva Ecija 10 10 80 85
PHO Pampanga 10 50 70 75
PHO Tarlac 8 8 60 65
CHO Olongapo 3 3 25 30
PJGMRMC 5 5 35 40
TGH 3 3 25 30
JBLMRH 5 5 45 45

Logistics Report
COMMODITIES ALLOCATED BY CENTRAL OFFICE FOR PICK-UP
ITEM QUANTITY
PPE sets 200 sets
Gloves 460 boxes
N95 Masks 200 boxes
Hand Disinfectant 220 bottles
Oseltamivir 7,900 capsules
Doxycycline 100,000 capsules

Logistics Report
BUFFER STOCK OF CLCHD
ITEM QUANTITY
PPE set w/ boots (M) 21 sets
PPE set w/ boots (L) 21 sets
PPE set (L) 29 sets
Rain boots 49 pairs
N95 Masks (20’s/box) 24 boxes
Oseltamivir 6,400 capsules

Hotlines
AREA HOTLINE
DOH – CLCHD 0918-349-6864
Aurora 0946-712-1097
Bataan 0998-324-2246
Bulacan 0998-324-2261
Nueva Ecija 0918-245-4000
Pampanga 0921-368-8549
Tarlac 0998-324-2265
Zambales 0921-368-8547
Email support: cl.chd3@gmail.com

Actions Taken
DATE ACTIONS TAKEN
January 16, 2020 • CL-CHD initial meeting with BOQ and JBLMRH activating previously agreed
referral system of possible PUI arriving in any port of entry in Central Luzon
• JBLMRH was designated as the receiving hospital of PUIs detected and
assessed by BOQ following the decision tool for 2019-nCoV.
January 22-23, 2020 • Drafted regional guidelines, IEC materials, reporting forms, WFP for nCoV
preparation and response activities
January 24, 2020 • CL-CHD headed by RD Cassion conducted ocular inspection on the BOQ
facility inside Clark International Airport and Magalang BOQ Bldg.
January 27, 2020 • Meeting with Regional RRT (EREID Program, DRRM-H, HEPO and RESU),
BOQ, JBLMRH, DMOV
January 28, 2020 • JBLMRH MCC Dr. Chichioco with DRRM-H & BOQ staff established PUI traffic
at the BOQ Bldg in Magalang, Pampanga
• Coordination Meeting at Bataan PHO and City of San Fernando
January 29, 2020 • Regional ICS meeting with Asec. Laxamana and Dr. Chichioco of JBLMRH
• Coordination Meeting at City of San Fernando

SARS
2003 A (H1N1) 2009
24 EBOLA
2008
MERSCoV/Ebola
2014-2015
Zika 2016
A(H5N6) 2017
CENTRAL LUZON CENTER FOR HEALTH DEVELOPMENT
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
REGULATION AND LICENSING ENFORCEMENT DIVISION
HOSPITAL ISOLATION ROOM
Ar. EMMANUEL Y. VIOLA

Licensing Officer III
JULIANA M. REYES, MD,MHA

Licensing Officer V
Chief RLED
Administrative Order 2012-0012
Rules and Regulations Governing the New Classification of Hospitals
and Other Health Facilities in the Philippines
GENERAL HOSPITALS SHALL HAVE AS MINIMUM THE SERVICES STIPULATED

UNDER THIS ORDER, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING:
. . . ISOLATION FACILITIES WITH PROPER PROCEDURES FOR THE CARE AND

CONTROL OF INFECTIOUS AND COMMUNICABLE DISEASES AS WELL AS FOR
THE PREVENTION OF CROSS INFECTION;
National Policy on Infection Prevention and
Control in Healthcare Facilities
E. ENVIRONMENT
4. ISOLATION ROOMS SHALL BE PROVIDED FOR HIGHLY COMMUNICABLE

OR YET UNKNOWN NEW INFECTIONS AND FOR THE SEVERELY IMMUNE-
COMPROMISED. THESE SHALL BE AVAILABLE IN ALL HOSPITALS…
Guidelines in the Application for Department of Health
Permit to Construct (DOH-PTC)
LEVEL 1 HOSPITAL
NURSING UNIT
- ISOLATION ROOM WITH TOILET AND ANTE-ROOM WITH SINK AND PPE
RACK AND HAMPER
LEVEL 2 HOSPITAL
EMERGENCY ROOM
- ISOLATION ROOM WITH TOILET AND ANTE-ROOM WITH SINK OR LAVATORY
NURSING UNIT
- ISOLATION ROOM WITH TOILET AND ANTE-ROOM WITH PPE RACK,
SINK/LAVATORY AND HAMPER
LEVEL 3 HOSPITAL
EMERGENCY ROOM
- ISOLATION ROOM WITH TOILET AND ANTE-ROOM WITH PPE RACK, SINK OR
LAVATORY
NURSING UNIT
- ISOLATION ROOM WITH TOILET AND ANTE-ROOM WITH PPE RACK,
SINK/LAVATORY AND HAMPER
An isolation facility aims to control the airflow in the room so that
the number of airborne infectious particles is reduced to a level
that ensures cross-infection of other people within a healthcare
facility is highly unlikely. This may be achieved by:
Control of the quantity and quality of intake or exhaust air.

Maintain different air pressures between adjacent areas.
Designing airflow patterns for specific clinical procedures.
Diluting infectious particles with large air volumes.
Air filtration – HEPA filters, etc.
ANTEROOM
An Anteroom or airlock lobby, when attached to an Isolation room,
functions as:
A controlled area in which the transfer of supplies, equipment and

persons can occur without contamination impacting on the
surrounding health care areas
A barrier against the potential loss of pressurisation
Controls the entry or exit of contaminated air when the anteroom
door is opened
A controlled area where personal protective equipment (PPE) or
clothing can be donned or removed prior to entry/exit of the isolated
contamination area.
The Anteroom will require sufficient space to allow for storage of

Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) i.e. masks, gowns and gloves for
protective isolation.
ISOLATION ISOLATION
ROOM ROOM
ANTE- ANTE-
ROOM ROOM
LIN EN & TO ILET
SUPPLY STO . UTILITY
RO O M A REA
ISOLATION ISOLATION
ROOM ROOM
PRIVATE PRIVATE PRIVATE PRIVATE PRIVATE PRIVATE
ROOM ROOM ROOM ROOM ROOM ROOM
TREA TM EN T NURSE'S
A REA STATION A N TE- A N TE-
RO O M RO O M
PRIVATE PRIVATE PRIVATE PRIVATE PRIVATE PRIVATE PRIVATE PRIVATE PRIVATE

ROOM ROOM ROOM ROOM ROOM ROOM ROOM ROOM ROOM
LOCATION OF ISOLATION ROOM

TOILET
ANTE
ROOM
ISOLATION
ROOM
LOBBY
WAITING AREA
PHARMACY
INFORMATION /
RECEPTION
TOILET
ISOLATION
STRETCHER's AREA
ROOM
WHEELED
TOILET NURSE
STATION
TOILET
EMERGENCY ROOM
MINOR SURGICAL
ROOM
OTHER CONSIDERATIONS:
 Use of Floor tiles or welded vinyl for flooring, for easy cleaning.
 Painted finish wall
 Sliding doors are not recommended due to difficulties in
maintenance and maintaining a seal. But if space is an issue, sliding
doors should only be used as a last resort.
 Doors must be self closing.
 Each entry door must be sealed on its top and sides, including an
adjustable bottom seal.
 It is also advisable to provide fixed view glass on doors to allow for
adequate view of the isolated patient, without health care
personnel having to enter the room.
OTHER CONSIDERATIONS:
 Remove all non-essential furniture and ensure that the

remaining furniture is easy to clean, and does not conceal or
retain dirt or moisture within or around it.
 Place appropriate waste bags in a bin. If possible, use a touch-
free bin. Ensure that used (i.e. dirty) bins remain inside the
isolation. Place a puncture-proof container for sharps disposal
inside the isolation room or area.
CORONAVIRUS
Risk Communication
Theresa Marie V. Bondoc, RN

Health Education and Promotion Officer III
DOH – Central Luzon Center for Health Development
Department of Health, Philippines

Peter Sandman’s Formula
Risk = Hazard + Outrage
Outrage – can mean Fear, Anxiety, Anger, Shame, Loss of Face

Hazard – source of danger

RISK COMMUNICATION STRATEGIES,
PETER SANDMAN
outrage/fear
Outrage Crisis
Management Communication
Emotional
Response
Health Education,
Precautionary
Stakeholder
Advocacy
Relation
apathy
small Hazard big

RISK COMMUNICATION STRATEGIES,
PETER SANDMAN
outrage/fear
Emotional
Response
Precautionary
Advocacy
apathy
small Hazard big

PRECAUTIONARY ADVOCACY
Outrage them to your levels of concern so that they take action--

arouse emotions
• Coronavirus are a large family of viruses ranging from the common

cold to more serious infections such as MERS-CoV and SARS-CoV.
Common signs of coronavirus infection include respiratory
symptoms, fever, cough, shortness of breath, and breathing
difficulties. In severe cases, it can cause pneumonia, acute
respiratory syndrome, kidney failure, and even death.
• On December 31, 2019, a clustering of pneumonia cases of
unknown etiology was reported in Wuhan, China.
• The outbreak was later determined to be caused by a 2019 novel
coronavirus (2019-nCoV), a new coronavirus strain that has not
been previously identified in humans.
Outrage them to your levels of concern so that they take action--

arouse emotions
• As of January 29, 2020, a total of 6,080 confirmed cases have

been reported for nCoV in China alone, according to China’s
National Health Commission
• 132 deaths were reported as of January 29, 2020
• Different countries are affected including Thailand, Japan, South Korea,
Macao, Taiwan, United States, Australia, Malaysia, Nepal, Vietnam,
Canada, and France—all countries has confirmed cases

Strengthen precautionary measures
• Cover mouth and nose with tissue, sleeve, or elbow, when coughing
or sneezing
• Throw tissue into closed bin after use
• Clean hands with soap and water or alcohol-based hand rub after
coughing or sneezing, and when caring for the sick
• Avoid close contact when you are experiencing fever, and cold or
flu-like symptoms
• Avoid crowded places
• Cook food thoroughly, especially meat and eggs
• Boost immune system by having enough rest and eight hours of
sleep, well-balanced diet, and exercise
• Seek medical care if you have fever, cough, and difficulty in
breathing
WATCH OUT for possible cases
• Strengthen monitoring and surveillance from the community level

• Monitor individuals with signs and symptoms of 2019-nCoV
• Immediately report any suspect case of 2019-nCoV

ON USE OF FACE MASK:

IEC Materials Developed

Coughing
Etiquette

MENU OF ACTIVITIES:

ON CIRCULATING FAKE NEWS :

KEY MESSAGES:
 We will be getting back to you once we get hold of the

validated information and data
 System is underway and the Department is taking its step in

addressing this health issue
 For now, please take the necessary measures to prevent

the said disease

Official Website of the DOH where timely information can
be accessed: https://www.doh.gov.ph/2019-nCoV

KUNG MAY KARAGDAGAN PANG KATANUNGAN UKOL SA
CORONAVIRUS O MAY GUSTONG I-ULAT NA KAKILALANG
NAKARARANAS NG MGA SINTOMAS NG SAKIT NA ITO, MAARING
TUMAWAG SA:
0918-349-6864 (DOH-CLCHD)
0946-712-1097 (Aurora)
0998-324-2246 (Bataan)
0998-324-2261 (Bulacan)
0918-245-4000 (Nueva Ecija)
0921-368-8549 (Pampanga)
0998-324-2265 (Tarlac)
0921-368-8547 (Zambales)
“Prevention is more effective than
response once an outbreak
actually occurs.”
-Worsnop

Sources:
1. DOH CO/ CL CHD

2. Word Health Organization
3. China Center for Disease Control
4. Journal: The Lancet
5. Ciaxing Global/CNN Updates
6. EREID MOP

THANK YOU.

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DOH CLHD – EMERGING & RE-EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASE PROGRAM

CENTRAL LUZON- CENTER FOR HEALTH DEVELOPMENT

Current Situation: Wuhan Coronavirus Timeline

I. Current Situation: Wuhan Coronavirus Timeline

I. Current Situation: Wuhan Coronavirus Timeline

I. Current Situation: Wuhan Coronavirus Timeline

I. Current Situation: Wuhan Coronavirus Timeline

• 6,080 individuals confirmed with 2019-nCoV cases in

Source: WHO, *China’s National Health Commission

DOH CLHD – EMERGING & RE-EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASE PROGRAM

DOH CLHD – EMERGING & RE-EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASE PROGRAM

DOH CLHD – EMERGING & RE-EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASE PROGRAM

• Rarely, animal coronaviruses can evolve

DOH CLHD – EMERGING & RE-EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASE PROGRAM

• A novel coronavirus (CoV) is

DOH CLHD – EMERGING & RE-EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASE PROGRAM

DOH CLHD – EMERGING & RE-EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASE PROGRAM

• Patients with confirmed 2019-nCoV infection have reportedly

DOH CLHD – EMERGING & RE-EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASE PROGRAM

DOH CLHD – EMERGING & RE-EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASE PROGRAM

DOH CLHD – EMERGING & RE-EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASE PROGRAM

• 2019-nCoV is similar to Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS),

DOH CLHD – EMERGING & RE-EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASE PROGRAM

(Source: Yuen Kwok-yung, The Lancet 2020)

DOH CLHD – EMERGING & RE-EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASE PROGRAM

With more confirmed cases outside of

Source: Northeastern University’s

0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000

•When a disease is new, there is NO vaccine

DOH CLHD – EMERGING & RE-EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASE PROGRAM

1. Travel is a major factor

DOH CLHD – EMERGING & RE-EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASE PROGRAM

And any of the following:

a. a history of travel to or a person who lived in Wuhan, Hubei and

b. the disease occurs in a healthcare worker who has been working

2. The person develops an unusual or

a. Close physical contact with a confirmed case of NCoV

a. Close contact with a confirmed case of 2019-nCoV

DOH CLHD – EMERGING & RE-EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASE PROGRAM

1. Heighten ILI/SARI surveillance in the community and health

2. Capacitate the hospitals in detection and recognition of cases.

3. Unverified reports are circulating: always conduct verification

4. Daily monitoring of PUM status.

• Each door corresponds to an operational objective or

• DOOR 1: POINT OF ORIGIN

DOH CLHD – EMERGING & RE-EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASE PROGRAM

DOH CLHD – EMERGING & RE-EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASE PROGRAM

• DOOR 2: POINT OF ENTRY

DOH CLHD – EMERGING & RE-EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASE PROGRAM

*Refer to EVENT section of EREID MOP

DOH CLHD – EMERGING & RE-EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASE PROGRAM

• DOOR 3: POINT OF CARE IN THE HOSPITAL OR

• Assumption: an EID case has been identified in the

DOH CLHD – EMERGING & RE-EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASE PROGRAM

• DOOR 3: POINT OF CARE IN THE HOSPITAL OR

DOH CLHD – EMERGING & RE-EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASE PROGRAM

• DOOR 3: POINT OF CARE IN THE HOSPITAL OR

DOH CLHD – EMERGING & RE-EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASE PROGRAM

• DOOR 3: POINT OF CARE IN THE HOSPITAL OR

DOH CLHD – EMERGING & RE-EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASE PROGRAM

DOH CLHD – EMERGING & RE-EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASE PROGRAM

DOH CLHD – EMERGING & RE-EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASE PROGRAM