DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT

JURISPRUDENCE
ON LABOR STANDARDS
AND LABOR RELATIONS
1
• LABOR STANDARDS:
• MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS SET BY LAWS, RULES AND REGULATIONS AND OTHER ISSUANCES
RELATING TO: WAGES, HOURS OF WORK, COST OF LIVING ALLOWANCES, AND OTHER
MONETARY AND WELFARE BENEFITS, INCLUDING THOSE SET BY OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY
AND HEALTH STANDARDS

LABOR RELATIONS
• RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEES
• MECHANISMS BY WHICH THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT ARE NEGOTIATED,
ADJUSTED AND ENFORCED
• INTERACTIONS AND PROCESSES ON HOW THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES ARE EXERCISED, HOW
AGREEMENTS ARE REACHED, AND HOW WORKPLACE RELATIONSHIP IS ENHANCED
 DIRECTLY HIRE
DIRECTLY HIRE

EMPLOYEE
EMPLOYEE
HIRE THROUGH
HIRE THROUGH
A
A
RECRUITMENT
RECRUITMENT
AGENCY
AGENCY
EMPLOYEE

ENGAGE A
EMPLOYER ENGAGE A
CONTRACTOR
CONTRACTOR

CONTRACTOR’S EMPLOYEE
CONTRACTOR’S EMPLOYEE
TYPES
TYPESOF
OFEMPLOYMENT
EMPLOYMENT

1. Regular employment INDEFINITE PERIOD OF EMPLOYMENT

2. Casual employment
3. Seasonal employment
4. Probationary employment DEFINITE PERIOD
OF EMPLOYMENT

5. Project employment
6. Fixed-term employment
 REGULAR EMPLOYEE

WHERE, NOTWITHSTANDING ANY WRITTEN OR ORAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE

EMPLOYER AND THE EMPLOYEE TO THE CONTRARY:

1) THE EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN ENGAGED TO PERFORM

ACTIVITIES WHICH ARE USUALLY NECESSARY OR DESIRABLE
IN THE USUAL BUSINESS OR TRADE OF THE EMPLOYER; OR
2) THE EMPLOYEE HAS RENDERED AT LEAST ONE YEAR OF
SERVICE, WHETHER SUCH SERVICE IS CONTINUOUS OR
BROKEN, WITH RESPECT TO THE ACTIVITY IN WHICH HE IS
EMPLOYED AND HIS EMPLOYMENT SHALL CONTINUE WHILE
SUCH ACTIVITY EXISTS; OR
3) THE EMPLOYEE IS ALLOWED TO WORK AFTER A
PROBATIONARY PERIOD.
 CASUAL EMPLOYEE

WHERE AN EMPLOYEE IS ENGAGED TO PERFORM A

JOB, WORK OR SERVICE WHICH IS MERELY
INCIDENTAL TO THE BUSINESS OF THE EMPLOYER,
AND SUCH JOB, WORK OR SERVICE IS FOR A DEFINITE
PERIOD MADE KNOWN TO THE EMPLOYEE AT THE
TIME OF ENGAGEMENT; PROVIDED, THAT ANY
EMPLOYEE WHO HAS RENDERED AT LEAST ONE YEAR
OF SERVICE, WHETHER SUCH SERVICE IS
CONTINUOUS OR NOT, SHALL BE CONSIDERED A
REGULAR EMPLOYEE WITH RESPECT TO THE
ACTIVITY IN WHICH HE IS EMPLOYED AND HIS
EMPLOYMENT SHALL CONTINUE WHILE SUCH
ACTIVITY EXISTS.
 SEASONAL EMPLOYEE

WHERE AN EMPLOYEE IS ENGAGED TO WORK

DURING A PARTICULAR SEASON ON AN ACTIVITY
WHICH IS USUALLY NECESSARY OR DESIRABLE IN
THE USUAL BUSINESS OR TRADE OF THE EMPLOYER.

PROBATIONARY
PROBATIONARYEMPLOYEE
EMPLOYEE

Where the employee is on trial by an employer

during which the employer determines the
qualification of the employee for regular
employment.
 PROJECT EMPLOYEE

WHERE THE EMPLOYMENT HAS BEEN FIXED

FOR A SPECIFIC PROJECT OR UNDERTAKING,
THE COMPLETION OR TERMINATION OF
WHICH HAS BEEN DETERMINED AT THE
TIME OF THE ENGAGEMENT OF THE
EMPLOYEE.
I. RIGHT TO LABOR STANDARDS.

II. RIGHT TO SECURITY OF TENURE

AND DUE PROCESS.

III. RIGHT TO SELF-ORGANIZATION

AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING.
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
JAIME N. GAPAYAO, vs.
ROSARIO FULO, JUNE 13, 2013

SEASONAL WORKER?
REGULAR WORKER?
JAIME N. GAPAYAO, vs.
ROSARIO FULO, JUNE 13, 2013

FARM WORKERS GENERALLY FALL UNDER THE DEFINITION OF

SEASONAL EMPLOYEES. WE HAVE CONSISTENTLY HELD THAT
SEASONAL EMPLOYEES MAY BE CONSIDERED AS REGULAR
EMPLOYEES. REGULAR SEASONAL EMPLOYEES ARE THOSE
CALLED TO WORK FROM TIME TO TIME. THE NATURE OF THEIR
RELATIONSHIP WITH THE EMPLOYER IS SUCH THAT DURING THE
OFF SEASON, THEY ARE TEMPORARILY LAID OFF; BUT
REEMPLOYED DURING THE SUMMER SEASON OR WHEN THEIR
SERVICES MAY BE NEEDED. THEY ARE IN REGULAR
EMPLOYMENT BECAUSE OF THE NATURE OF THEIR JOB, AND NOT
BECAUSE OF THE LENGTH OF TIME THEY HAVE WORKED.
Andrew James McBurnie Vs. Eulalio Ganzon, EGI-Managers, Inc. and E.
Ganzon, Inc., . October 17, 2013.

CONSIDERING THAT MCBURNIE, AN AUSTRALIAN, ALLEGED

ILLEGAL DISMISSAL AND SOUGHT TO CLAIM UNDER OUR
LABOR LAWS, IT WAS NECESSARY FOR HIM TO ESTABLISH,
FIRST AND FOREMOST, THAT HE WAS QUALIFIED AND DULY
AUTHORIZED TO OBTAIN EMPLOYMENT WITHIN OUR
JURISDICTION. A REQUIREMENT FOR FOREIGNERS WHO
INTEND TO WORK WITHIN THE COUNTRY IS AN EMPLOYMENT
PERMIT, AS PROVIDED UNDER ARTICLE 40, TITLE II OF THE
LABOR CODE.
Andrew James McBurnie Vs. Eulalio Ganzon, EGI-
Managers, Inc. and E. Ganzon, Inc., . October 17,
2013.

IN WPP MARKETING COMMUNICATIONS, INC. V. GALERA, WE

HELD THAT A FOREIGN NATIONAL’S FAILURE TO SEEK AN
EMPLOYMENT PERMIT PRIOR TO EMPLOYMENT POSES A
SERIOUS PROBLEM IN SEEKING RELIEF FROM THE COURT.

CLEARLY, THIS CIRCUMSTANCE ON THE FAILURE OF

MCBURNIE TO OBTAIN AN EMPLOYMENT PERMIT, BY ITSELF,
NECESSITATES THE DISMISSAL OF HIS LABOR COMPLAINT.
PEPSI VS. MOLON, February 18, 2013

1. THE UNION WILL RECEIVE 100% OF THE SEPARATION PAY BASED

ON THE EMPLOYEES’ BASIC SALARY AND THE REMAINING 50%
SHALL BE RELEASED BY MANAGEMENT AFTER THE NECESSARY
DEDUCTIONS ARE MADE FROM THE CONCERNED EMPLOYEES;

2. BOTH PARTIES AGREE THAT THE RELEASE OF THESE BENEFITS

IS WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE FILING OF THE CASE BY THE
UNION WITH THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION;

3. THE UNION UNDERTAKES TO SIGN THE QUITCLAIM BUT SUBJECT

TO THE 2ND PARAGRAPH OF THIS AGREEMENT.
PEPSI VS. MOLON, February 18, 2013

THE COURT IS UNCONVINCED.

AS CORRECTLY OBSERVED BY THE CA, THE SEPTEMBER 1999

QUITCLAIMS MUST BE READ IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE
SEPTEMBER 17, 1999 AGREEMENT, TO WIT:
2. BOTH PARTIES AGREE THAT THE RELEASE OF THESE BENEFITS
IS WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE FILING OF THE CASE BY THE
UNION WITH THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION;
3. THE UNION UNDERTAKES TO SIGN THE QUITCLAIM BUT
SUBJECT TO THE 2ND PARAGRAPH OF THIS AGREEMENT.
PEPSI VS. MOLON, February 18, 2013
THE LANGUAGE OF THE SEPTEMBER 17, 1999
AGREEMENT IS STRAIGHTFORWARD. THE USE OF THE
TERM "SUBJECT" IN THE 3RD CLAUSE OF THE SAID
AGREEMENT CLEARLY MEANS THAT THE SIGNING OF
THE QUITCLAIM DOCUMENTS WAS WITHOUT
PREJUDICE TO THE FILING OF A CASE WITH THE
NLRC. HENCE, WHEN RESPONDENTS SIGNED THE
SEPTEMBER 1999 QUITCLAIMS, THEY DID SO WITH
THE REASONABLE IMPRESSION THAT THAT THEY
WERE NOT PRECLUDED FROM INSTITUTING A
SUBSEQUENT ACTION WITH THE NLRC.
 
ROYAL PLANT WORKERS UNION,
Petitioner,
vs.
COCA-COLA BOTTLERS
PHILIPPINES, INC.
-CEBU PLANT,
Respondent.

G.R. No. 198783, April 15, 2013

Violation of the Labor Code

Violation of the Occupational

Safety and Health Standards

Violation of the CBA

Violation of Justice and Fair Play

Violation of Article 100, Labor

Code
LABOR CODE

The rights of the Union under any labor

law were not violated. There is no law
that requires employers to provide
chairs for bottling operators. The CA
correctly ruled that the Labor Code,
specifically Article 132 thereof, only
requires employers to provide seats for
women. No similar requirement is
mandated for men or male workers. It
must be stressed that all concerned
bottling operators in this case are men.
OSHS

There was no violation either of the

Health, Safety and Social Welfare
Benefit provisions under Book IV of the
Labor Code of the Philippines. As
shown in the foregoing, the removal of
the chairs was compensated by the
reduction of the working hours and
increase in the rest period. The
directive did not expose the bottling
operators to safety and health hazards.
CBA

The CBA between the Union and

CCBPI contains no provision
whatsoever requiring the
management to provide chairs for
the operators in the
production/manufacturing line
while performing their duties and
responsibilities.
CBA

Since the matter of the chairs is

not expressly stated in the CBA, it
is understood that it was a purely
voluntary act on the part of CCBPI
and the long practice did not
convert it into an obligation or a
vested right in favor of the Union.
JUSTICE AND FAIR PLAY

The Court completely agrees with the CA ruling

that the removal of the chairs did not violate the
general principles of justice and fair play because
the bottling operators’ working time was
considerably reduced from two and a half (2 ½)
hours to just one and a half (1 ½) hours and the
break period, when they could sit down, was
increased to 30 minutes between rotations. The
bottling operators’ new work schedule is certainly
advantageous to them because it greatly
increases their rest period and significantly
decreases their working time. A break time of
thirty (30) minutes after working for only one and a
half (1 ½) hours is a just and fair work schedule.
PRINCIPLE OF NON-DIMINUTION

The operators’ chairs cannot be

considered as one of the employee
benefits covered in Article 100 of the
Labor Code. In the Court’s view, the
term "benefits" mentioned in the non-
diminution rule refers to monetary
benefits or privileges given to the
employee with monetary equivalents.
CONTRACTING AND SUBCONTRACTING

(CONTRACTOR & PRINCIPA

SUBCONTRACTOR) L

Service Contract

COMPANY

Employment
Contract REGULAR EMPLOYEE
CASUAL EMPLOYEE
PROJECT EMPLOYEE
SEASONAL EMPLOYEE
WORKER PROBATIONARY EMPLOYEE
FIXED-TERM EMPLOYEE
ALPS TRANSPORTATION vs. ELPIDIO M. RODRIGUEZ
JUNE 13, 2013

(CONTACT TOURS PRINCIPA

MANPOWER ) L

Service Contract

ALPS

Employment
Contract

WORKER
ALPS TRANSPORTATION vs. ELPIDIO M. RODRIGUEZ
JUNE 13, 2013

The presumption is that a contractor

is a labor-only contractor unless he
overcomes the burden of proving
that it has substantial capital,
investment, tools, and the like.
While ALPS Transportation is not
the contractor itself, since it is
invoking Contact Tours status as a
legitimate job contractor in order to
avoid liability, it bears the burden of
proving that Contact Tours is an
independent contractor.
ALPS TRANSPORTATION vs. ELPIDIO M. RODRIGUEZ
JUNE 13, 2013

It is thus incumbent upon ALPS

Transportation to present sufficient
proof that Contact Tours has
substantial capital, investment and
tools in order to successfully impute
liability to the latter. However, aside
from making bare assertions and
offering the Kasunduan between
Rodriguez and Contact Tours in
evidence, ALPS Transportation has
failed to present any proof to
substantiate the former's status as a
legitimate job contractor. Hence, the
legal presumption that Contact Tours is
a labor-only contractor has not been
overcome.
BENIGNO M. VIGILLA, ALFONSO M. BONGOT,
ROBERTO CALLESA, LINDA C. CALLO, NILO B.
CAMARA, ADELIA T. CAMARA, ADOLFO G. PINON,
JOHN A. FERNANDEZ, FEDERICO A. CALLO, MAXIMA
P. ARELLANO, JULITO B. COST ALES, SAMSON F.
BACHAR, EDWIN P. DAMO, RENA TO E. FERNANDEZ,
GENARO F.CALLO, JIMMY C. ALETA, and EUGENIO
SALINAS, Petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE COLLEGE OF CRIMINOLOGY INC. and/or
GREGORY ALAN F. BAUTISTA, Respondents.

G.R. No. 200094 June 10, 2013

 PRINCIPA
(MBMSI) L

Service Contract

PCCr

Employment
Contract

JANITOR AND
JANITRESS
 FACTS

SOMETIME IN 2008, PCCR DISCOVERED THAT THE CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION OF MBMSI

HAD BEEN REVOKED AS OF JULY 2, 2003.

ON MARCH 16, 2009, PCCR, THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, RESPONDENT GREGORY ALAN F.
BAUTISTA (BAUTISTA), CITING THE REVOCATION, TERMINATED THE SCHOOL’S RELATIONSHIP
WITH MBMSI, RESULTING IN THE DISMISSAL OF THE EMPLOYEES OR MAINTENANCE
PERSONNEL UNDER MBMSI, EXCEPT ALFONSO BONGOT (BONGOT) WHO WAS RETIRED.

IN SEPTEMBER 2009, THE DISMISSED EMPLOYEES, LED BY THEIR SUPERVISOR, BENIGNO

VIGILLA (VIGILLA), FILED THEIR RESPECTIVE COMPLAINTS FOR ILLEGAL DISMISSAL,
REINSTATEMENT, BACK WAGES, SEPARATION PAY (FOR BONGOT), UNDERPAYMENT OF
SALARIES, OVERTIME PAY, HOLIDAY PAY, SERVICE INCENTIVE LEAVE, AND 13TH MONTH PAY
AGAINST MBMSI, ATTY. SERIL, PCCR, AND BAUTISTA.
 FACTS

FOR AND IN CONSIDERATION OF THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF ______________, AS AND BY

WAY OF SEPARATION PAY DUE TO THE CLOSURE OF THE COMPANY BROUGHT
ABOUT BY SERIOUS FINANCIAL LOSSES, RECEIPT OF THE TOTAL AMOUNT IS
HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGED, I _______________, X X X FOREVER RELEASE AND
DISCHARGE X X X METROPOLITAN BUILDING MAINTENANCE SERVICES, INC., OF
AND FROM ANY AND ALL CLAIMS, DEMANDS, CAUSES OF ACTIONS, DAMAGES,
COSTS, EXPENSES, ATTORNEY’S FEES, AND OBLIGATIONS OF ANY NATURE
WHATSOEVER, KNOWN OR UNKNOWN, IN LAW OR IN EQUITY, WHICH THE
UNDERSIGNED HAS, OR MAY HEREAFTER HAVE AGAINST THE METROPOLITAN
BUILDING MAINTENANCE SERVICES, INC., WHETHER ADMINISTRATIVE, CIVIL OR
CRIMINAL, AND WHETHER OR NOT ARISING OUT OF OR IN RELATION TO MY
EMPLOYMENT WITH THE ABOVE COMPANY OR THIRD PERSONS.
 QUITCLAIM AND RELEASE

THE NLRC AND THE CA CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE

RELEASES, WAIVERS AND QUITCLAIMS EXECUTED
BY PETITIONERS IN FAVOR OF MBMSI REDOUNDED
TO THE BENEFIT OF PCCR PURSUANT TO ARTICLE
1217 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE.
 NATURE OF LIABILITY
AS CORRECTLY POINTED OUT BY THE
RESPONDENTS, THE BASIS OF THE SOLIDARY
LIABILITY OF THE PRINCIPAL WITH THOSE
ENGAGED IN LABOR-ONLY CONTRACTING IS THE
LAST PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 106 OF THE LABOR
CODE, WHICH IN PART PROVIDES: “IN SUCH CASES
LABOR-ONLY CONTRACTING, THE PERSON OR
INTERMEDIARY SHALL BE CONSIDERED MERELY
AS AN AGENT OF THE EMPLOYER WHO SHALL BE
RESPONSIBLE TO THE WORKERS IN THE SAME
MANNER AND EXTENT AS IF THE LATTER WERE
DIRECTLY EMPLOYED BY HIM.”
 NATURE OF LIABILITY

SECTION 19 OF DEPARTMENT ORDER NO. 18-02

ISSUED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT (DOLE), WHICH WAS STILL IN
EFFECT AT THE TIME OF THE PROMULGATION OF
THE SUBJECT DECISION AND RESOLUTION,
INTERPRETS ARTICLE 106 OF THE LABOR CODE.
 NATURE OF LIABILITY
THE DOLE RECOGNIZED ANEW THIS SOLIDARY
LIABILITY OF THE PRINCIPAL EMPLOYER AND THE
LABOR-ONLY CONTRACTOR WHEN IT ISSUED
DEPARTMENT ORDER NO. 18-A, SERIES OF 2011,
WHICH IS THE LATEST SET OF RULES
IMPLEMENTING ARTICLES 106-109 OF THE LABOR
CODE.
QUITCLAIM AND RELEASE

CONSIDERING THAT MBMSI, AS THE LABOR-ONLY

CONTRACTOR, IS SOLIDARILY LIABLE WITH THE
RESPONDENTS, AS THE PRINCIPAL EMPLOYER, THEN THE
NLRC AND THE CA CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE
RESPONDENTS’ SOLIDARY LIABILITY WAS ALREADY
EXPUNGED BY VIRTUE OF THE RELEASES, WAIVERS AND
QUITCLAIMS EXECUTED BY EACH OF THE PETITIONERS IN
FAVOR OF MBMSI PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 1217 OF THE CIVIL
CODE WHICH PROVIDES THAT "PAYMENT MADE BY ONE OF
THE SOLIDARY DEBTORS EXTINGUISHES THE OBLIGATION."
 BPI CASE,
G.R. NO. 174912, JULY 24, 2013

Whether or not the act of BPI to outsource the

cashiering, distribution and bookkeeping functions
to BOMC is in conformity with the law and the
existing CBA.
 PRINCIPA
(BOMC) L

Service Contract

BPI

Employment
Contract

EMPLOYEES
 BPI CASE,
G.R. NO. 174912, JULY 24, 2013

It is to be emphasized that contracting out of services is not illegal perse. It is an

exercise of business judgment or management prerogative. Absent proof that the
management acted in a malicious or arbitrary manner, the Court will not interfere
with the exercise of judgment by an employer. In this case, bad faith cannot be
attributed to BPI because its actions were authorized by CBP Circular No. 1388,
Series of 1993 issued by the Monetary Board of the then Central Bank of the
Philippines (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas). The circular covered amendments
in Book I of the Manual of Regulations for Banks and Other Financial
Intermediaries, particularly on the matter of bank service contracts. A finding of
ULP necessarily requires the alleging party to prove it with substantial evidence.
Unfortunately, the Union failed to discharge this burden.
 BPI CASE,
G.R. NO. 174912, JULY 24, 2013

BPI stresses that not a single employee or union member

was or would be dislocated or terminated from their
employment as a result of the Service Agreement. Neither
had it resulted in any diminution of salaries and benefits
nor led to any reduction of union membership.

As far as the twelve (12) former FEBTC employees are

concerned, the Union failed to substantially prove that
their transfer, made to complete BOMC’s service
complement, was motivated by ill will, anti-unionism or
bad faith so as to affect or interfere with the employees’
right to self-organization.
 BPI CASE,
G.R. NO. 174912, JULY 24, 2013

The Court agrees with BPI that D.O. No. 10 is but a guide to
determine what functions may be contracted out, subject to
the rules and established jurisprudence on legitimate job
contracting and prohibited labor-only contracting. Even if the
Court considers D.O. No. 10 only, BPI would still be within
the bounds of D.O. No. 10 when it contracted out the
subject functions. This is because the subject functions
were not related or not integral to the main business or
operation of the principal which is the lending of funds
obtained in the form of deposits. From the very definition of
"banks" as provided under the General Banking Law, it can
easily be discerned that banks perform only two (2) main or
basic functions – deposit and loan functions.
 BPI CASE,
G.R. NO. 174912, JULY 24, 2013

Thus, cashiering, distribution and bookkeeping are but

ancillary functions whose outsourcing is sanctioned under
CBP Circular No. 1388 as well as D.O. No. 10. Even BPI
itself recognizes that deposit and loan functions cannot be
legally contracted out as they are directly related or
integral to the main business or operation of banks. The
CBP's Manual of Regulations has even categorically
stated and emphasized on the prohibition against
outsourcing inherent banking functions, which refer to any
contract between the bank and a service provider for the
latter to supply, or any act whereby the latter supplies, the
manpower to service the deposit transactions of the
former.
GSIS vs. ALCARAZ, FEBRUARY 6, 2013

BERNARDO WAS EMPLOYED FOR ALMOST TWENTY-NINE (29)

YEARS5 BY THE METRO MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
(MMDA) IN MAKATI CITY. HE WORKED AT THE MMDA AS
LABORER, METRO AIDE AND METRO AIDE I.
SOMETIME IN FEBRUARY 2004, BERNARDO WAS DIAGNOSED
WITH PULMONARY TUBERCULOSIS (PTB) AND COMMUNITY
ACQUIRED PNEUMONIA (CAP). ON MAY 13, 2004, HE WAS
CONFINED AT THE OSPITAL NG MAKATI. HE WAS DISCHARGED
ON MAY 19, 2004 WITH THE FOLLOWING DIAGNOSIS: ACUTE
DIFFUSE ANTEROLATERAL WALL MYOCARDIAL INFARCTION,
KILLIPS IV-1, CAP HIGH RISK, PTB III AND DIABETES MELLITUS
TYPE 2.6
ON JANUARY 15, 2005, BERNARDO WAS FOUND DEAD AT THE
BASEMENT OF THE MMDA BUILDING.
GSIS vs. ALCARAZ, FEBRUARY 6, 2013

1. Myocardial infarction which caused

Bernardo’s death cannot be said to have
been aggravated by the nature of his
duties.
2. There was no evidence showing that
it was the performance of his duties that
caused the development of myocardial
infarction as it was a mere complication
of diabetes mellitus, a non-occupational
disease.
3. His heart ailment, therefore, cannot
be considered an occupational disease.
GSIS vs. ALCARAZ, FEBRUARY 6, 2013

To be sure, a reasonable mind

analyzing these facts cannot
but arrive at the conclusion
that the risks present in his
work environment for the
entire duration of his
employment precipitated the
acute myocardial infarction
that led to his death.
GSIS vs. ALCARAZ, FEBRUARY 6, 2013

Based on the evidence on record, we find as the CA did, that the nature of
Bernardo’s duties and the conditions under which he worked were such as to
eventually cause the onset of his myocardial infarction. The stresses, the
strain, and the exposure to street pollution and to the elements that Bernardo
had to bear for almost 29 years are all too real to be ignored. They cannot but
lead to a deterioration of health particularly with the contributing factors of
diabetes and pulmonary disease.
Bernardo had in fact been a walking time bomb ready to explode towards the
end of his employment days. Records show that the debilitating effect of
Bernardo’s working conditions on his health manifested itself several months
before his death. As early as May 3, 2004, Bernardo was already complaining
of shortness of breath and dizziness. From May 13 to 19, 2004, he had to be
confined at the Ospital ng Makati and was diagnosed with acute myocardial
infarction which caused his death on January 15, 2005 while he was at work.
GSIS vs. ALCARAZ, FEBRUARY 6, 2013

With the resolution, it should be obvious that by itself, a heart disease, such
as myocardial infarction, can be considered work-related, with or without the
complicating factors of other non-occupational illnesses. Thus, the Court so
ruled in Rañises v. ECC,20 where it emphasized that the incidence of acute
myocardial infarction, whether or not associated with a non-listed ailment, is
enough basis for compensation.

Resolution No. 432 provides (as one of the conditions) that a heart disease is
compensable if it was known to have been present during employment, there
must be proof that an acute exacerbation was clearly precipitated by the
unusual strain by reason of the nature of his work.
GSIS vs. ALCARAZ, FEBRUARY 6, 2013

As a final point, we take this occasion to

reiterate that as an agency charged by law
with the implementation of social justice
guaranteed and secured by the Constitution
– the ECC (as well as the GSIS and the
SSS) – should adopt a liberal attitude in
favor of the employees in deciding claims
for compensability, especially where there
is some basis in the facts for inferring a
work-connection to the accident or to the
illness. This is what the Constitution
dictates.
 TERMINATION BY
EMPLOYER
• JUST CAUSE – REFERS TO A WRONGDOING
COMMITTED BY THE EMPLOYEE ON THE BASIS OF
WHICH THE AGGRIEVED PARTY MAY TERMINATE
THE EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP. 

• AUTHORIZED CAUSE - REFERS TO A CAUSE

BROUGHT ABOUT BY CHANGING ECONOMIC OR
BUSINESS CONDITIONS OF THE EMPLOYER.
54
 JUST CAUSES OF
TERMINATION
• SERIOUS MISCONDUCT OR WILLFUL
DISOBEDIENCE BY THE EMPLOYEE OF THE
LAWFUL ORDERS OF HIS EMPLOYER OR
REPRESENTATIVE IN CONNECTION WITH HIS
WORK;
 
• GROSS AND HABITUAL NEGLECT BY THE
EMPLOYEE OF HIS DUTIES;
55
 
 

• FRAUD OR WILLFUL BREACH BY THE EMPLOYEE OF

THE TRUST REPOSED IN HIM BY HIS EMPLOYER OR
DULY AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE;
 
• COMMISSION OF A CRIME OR OFFENSE BY THE
EMPLOYEE AGAINST THE PERSON OF HIS EMPLOYER OR
ANY IMMEDIATE MEMBER OF HIS FAMILY OR HIS DULY
AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVES; AND
 
• OTHER CAUSES ANALOGOUS TO THE FOREGOING.

56
 AUTHORIZED CAUSES

• INTRODUCTION OF LABOR SAVING

DEVICE;
• REDUNDANCY
• RETRENCHMENT
• CLOSURE OR CESSATION NOT DUE TO
SERIOUS BUSINESS LOSSES;
• DISEASE 57
INTEGRATED MICROELECTRONICS, INC., VS. ADONIS A. PIONILLA
August 28, 2013

The essential issue for the Court’s resolution

is whether or not its Resolution dated
January 14, 2013 should be reconsidered.
Among others, IMI contends that to award
Pionilla reinstatement and full backwages
would not only be excessive and unfair, but
would be contrary to existing principles of
law and jurisprudence.

The motion for reconsideration is partly

granted.
INTEGRATED MICROELECTRONICS, INC., VS. ADONIS A. PIONILLA
August 28, 2013

The essential issue for the Court’s resolution

is whether or not its Resolution dated
January 14, 2013 should be reconsidered.
Among others, IMI contends that to award
Pionilla reinstatement and full backwages
would not only be excessive and unfair, but
would be contrary to existing principles of
law and jurisprudence.

The motion for reconsideration is partly

granted.
INTEGRATED MICROELECTRONICS, INC., VS. ADONIS A. PIONILLA
August 28, 2013

IN CERTAIN CASES, HOWEVER, THE

COURT HAS CARVED OUT AN
EXCEPTION TO THE FOREGOING RULE
AND THEREBY ORDERED THE
REINSTATEMENT OF THE EMPLOYEE
WITHOUT BACKWAGES ON ACCOUNT
OF THE FOLLOWING: (A) THE FACT
THAT DISMISSAL OF THE EMPLOYEE
WOULD BE TOO HARSH OF A PENALTY;
AND (B) THAT THE EMPLOYER WAS IN
GOOD FAITH IN TERMINATING THE
EMPLOYEE.
INTEGRATED MICROELECTRONICS, INC., VS. ADONIS A.
INTEGRATED MICROELECTRONICS, INC., VS. ADONIS A.
PIONILLA
PIONILLA
August 28, 2013
August 28, 2013

IN THIS CASE, THE COURT OBSERVES THAT: (A) THE PENALTY

OF DISMISSAL WAS TOO HARSH OF A PENALTY TO BE IMPOSED
AGAINST PIONILLA FOR HIS INFRACTIONS; AND (B) IMI WAS IN
GOOD FAITH WHEN IT DISMISSED PIONILLA AS HIS
DERELICTION OF ITS POLICY ON ID USAGE WAS HONESTLY
PERCEIVED TO BE A THREAT TO THE COMPANY'S SECURITY. IN
THIS RESPECT, SINCE THESE CONCURRING CIRCUMSTANCES
TRIGGER THE APPLICATION OF THE EXCEPTION TO THE RULE
ON BACKWAGES AS ENUNCIATED IN THE ABOVE-CITED CASES,
THE COURT FINDS IT PROPER TO ACCORD THE SAME
DISPOSITION AND CONSEQUENTLY DIRECTS THE DELETION OF
THE AWARD OF BACK WAGES IN FAVOR OF PIONILLA,
NATHANIEL N. DONGON, vs.
RAPID MOVERS AND FORWARDERS CO., INC., August 28,
2013

UNDER THE FOREGOING STANDARDS, THE

DISOBEDIENCE ATTRIBUTED TO PETITIONER
COULD NOT BE JUSTLY CHARACTERIZED AS
WILLFUL WITHIN THE CONTEMPLATION OF
ARTICLE 296 OF THE LABOR CODE. HE
NEITHER BENEFITTED FROM IT, NOR THEREBY
PREJUDICED THE BUSINESS INTEREST OF
RAPID MOVERS. HIS EXPLANATION THAT HIS
DEED HAD BEEN INTENDED TO BENEFIT
RAPID MOVERS WAS CREDIBLE. THERE
COULD BE NO WRONG OR PERVERSITY ON HIS
PART THAT WARRANTED THE TERMINATION
OF HIS EMPLOYMENT BASED ON WILLFUL
DISOBEDIENCE.
NATHANIEL N. DONGON, vs.
RAPID MOVERS AND FORWARDERS CO., INC., August 28, 2013

FOR WILLFUL DISOBEDIENCE TO BE A GROUND, IT IS REQUIRED

THAT: (A) THE CONDUCT OF THE EMPLOYEE MUST BE WILLFUL
OR INTENTIONAL; AND (B) THE ORDER THE EMPLOYEE
VIOLATED MUST HAVE BEEN REASONABLE, LAWFUL, MADE
KNOWN TO THE EMPLOYEE, AND MUST PERTAIN TO THE DUTIES
THAT HE HAD BEEN ENGAGED TO DISCHARGE.
NATHANIEL N. DONGON, vs.
RAPID MOVERS AND FORWARDERS CO., INC., August 28, 2013

WILLFULNESS MUST BE ATTENDED BY A WRONGFUL

AND PERVERSE MENTAL ATTITUDE RENDERING THE
EMPLOYEE’S ACT INCONSISTENT WITH PROPER
SUBORDINATION. IN ANY CASE, THE CONDUCT OF THE
EMPLOYEE THAT IS A VALID GROUND FOR DISMISSAL
UNDER THE LABOR CODE CONSTITUTES HARMFUL
BEHAVIOR AGAINST THE BUSINESS INTEREST OR
PERSON OF HIS EMPLOYER. IT IS IMPLIED THAT IN
EVERY ACT OF WILLFUL DISOBEDIENCE, THE ERRING
EMPLOYEE OBTAINS UNDUE ADVANTAGE DETRIMENTAL
TO THE BUSINESS INTEREST OF THE EMPLOYER.
JEROME M. DAABAY, vs. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS., INC
August 19, 2013

THE COURT HAS RULED, TIME AND

AGAIN, THAT FINANCIAL
ASSISTANCE, OR WHATEVER NAME
IT IS CALLED, AS A MEASURE OF
SOCIAL JUSTICE IS ALLOWED ONLY
IN INSTANCES WHERE THE
EMPLOYEE IS VALIDLY DISMISSED
FOR CAUSES OTHER THAN
SERIOUS MISCONDUCT OR THOSE
REFLECTING ON HIS MORAL
CHARACTER.
ALILEM CREDIT COOPERATIVE, INC.,
ALILEM
now CREDIT
known COOPERATIVE,
as ALILEM MULTIPURPOSEINC., COOPERATIVE, INC., vs.
now knownM.asBANDIOLA,
SALVADOR ALILEM MULTIPURPOSE COOPERATIVE,
JR., February 25, 2013 INC., vs.
SALVADOR M. BANDIOLA, JR., February 25, 2013

UNDER THE NEW POLICY, ONE OF THE

GROUNDS IS THE "COMMISSION OF
ACTS THAT BRINGS DISCREDIT TO
THE COOPERATIVE ORGANIZATION,
ESPECIALLY, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,
CONVICTION OF ANY CRIME, ILLICIT
MARITAL AFFAIRS, SCANDALOUS
ACTS INIMICAL TO ESTABLISHED AND
ACCEPTED SOCIAL MORES.
ALILEM CREDIT COOPERATIVE, INC.,
ALILEM
now CREDIT
known COOPERATIVE,
as ALILEM MULTIPURPOSEINC., COOPERATIVE, INC., vs.
now knownM.asBANDIOLA,
SALVADOR ALILEM MULTIPURPOSE COOPERATIVE,
JR., February 25, 2013 INC., vs.
SALVADOR M. BANDIOLA, JR., February 25, 2013

TO BE SURE, AN EMPLOYER IS FREE TO REGULATE ALL

ASPECTS OF EMPLOYMENT. IT MAY MAKE REASONABLE
RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ITS
EMPLOYEES WHICH BECOME PART OF THE CONTRACT OF
EMPLOYMENT PROVIDED THEY ARE MADE KNOWN TO THE
EMPLOYEE. IN THE EVENT OF A VIOLATION, AN EMPLOYEE
MAY BE VALIDLY TERMINATED FROM EMPLOYMENT ON THE
GROUND THAT AN EMPLOYER CANNOT RATIONALLY BE
EXPECTED TO RETAIN THE EMPLOYMENT OF A PERSON
WHOSE LACK OF MORALS, RESPECT AND LOYALTY TO HIS
EMPLOYER, REGARD FOR HIS EMPLOYER’S RULES AND
APPLICATION OF THE DIGNITY AND RESPONSIBILITY, HAS
SO PLAINLY AND COMPLETELY BEEN BARED.
ALILEM CREDIT COOPERATIVE, INC.,
ALILEM
now CREDIT
known COOPERATIVE,
as ALILEM MULTIPURPOSEINC., COOPERATIVE, INC., vs.
now knownM.asBANDIOLA,
SALVADOR ALILEM MULTIPURPOSE COOPERATIVE,
JR., February 25, 2013 INC., vs.
SALVADOR M. BANDIOLA, JR., February 25, 2013

WHILE RESPONDENT’S ACT OF ENGAGING IN EXTRA--

MARITAL AFFAIRS MAY BE CONSIDERED PERSONAL TO HIM
AND DOES NOT DIRECTLY AFFECT THE PERFORMANCE OF
HIS ASSIGNED TASK AS BOOKKEEPER, ASIDE FROM THE FACT
THAT THE ACT WAS SPECIFICALLY PROVIDED FOR BY
PETITIONER’S PERSONNEL POLICY AS ONE OF THE GROUNDS
FOR TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT, SAID ACT RAISED
CONCERNS TO PETITIONER AS THE BOARD RECEIVED
NUMEROUS COMPLAINTS AND PETITIONS FROM THE
COOPERATIVE MEMBERS THEMSELVES ASKING FOR THE
REMOVAL OF RESPONDENT BECAUSE OF HIS IMMORAL
CONDUCT.
CAVITE APPAREL, INCORPORATED, vs. MICHELLE MARQUEZ
CAVITE APPAREL,
February 06, 2013 INCORPORATED, vs. MICHELLE MARQUEZ
February 06, 2013

BASED ON WHAT WE SEE IN THE RECORDS,

THERE SIMPLY CANNOT BE A CASE OF GROSS
AND HABITUAL NEGLECT OF DUTY AGAINST
MICHELLE. EVEN ASSUMING THAT SHE FAILED
TO PRESENT A MEDICAL CERTIFICATE FOR HER
SICK LEAVE ON MAY 8, 2000, THE RECORDS ARE
BEREFT OF ANY INDICATION THAT APART
FROM THE FOUR OCCASIONS WHEN SHE DID
NOT REPORT FOR WORK, MICHELLE HAD BEEN
CITED FOR ANY INFRACTION SINCE SHE
STARTED HER EMPLOYMENT WITH THE
COMPANY IN 1994. FOUR ABSENCES IN HER SIX
YEARS OF SERVICE, TO OUR MIND, CANNOT BE
CONSIDERED GROSS AND HABITUAL NEGLECT
OF DUTY, ESPECIALLY SO SINCE THE ABSENCES
WERE SPREAD OUT OVER A SIX-MONTH
PERIOD.
CAVITE APPAREL, INCORPORATED, vs. MICHELLE MARQUEZ
CAVITE APPAREL,
February 06, 2013 INCORPORATED, vs. MICHELLE MARQUEZ
February 06, 2013

MICHELLE MIGHT HAVE BEEN

GUILTY OF VIOLATING COMPANY
RULES ON LEAVES OF ABSENCE AND
EMPLOYEE DISCIPLINE, STILL WE
FIND THE PENALTY OF DISMISSAL
IMPOSED ON HER UNJUSTIFIED
UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
 Whatever you do, work at it with all your heart, as working for
the Lord , not for men.
Colossians 3:23

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