I.

A. No. The debtor cannot be compelled to pay the interest. Under the New Civil Code, an
agreement for the payment of a monetary interest must be expressly made in writing to be a civil
obligation. If it is not in writing, the obligation to pay the monetary interest is a case of natural
obligation, which does not grant the creditor a right of action to enforce their performance.
Hence, debtor cannot be compelled to pay the monetary interest.
B. No because the under novation, interest rate cannot be the subject matter of novation because
what is required is that it be in writing.

II.
A. They are solidary debtors because of ambiguity, under Negotiable instruments law the phrase
“I promise to pay” pertains to solidarity NIL Art. 17(g). There has to be a clear intention that the
obligation is joint in nature. I promise to pay is deemed joint and severally and pertains to
solidarity.
Art. 1207 that when the law so provides.
B. X Y and Z are solidary creditors because of the phrase “to any of our aforesaid creditors”
which means that A B and C can pay either X Y or Z for the entire obligation.
C. As a General Rule Yes because there was no consent of assignment given by Y and Z. Art.
1213. However, Therefore he can compel A . He cannot recover becaus....

III.
A. No because it is an alternative contract, X cannot insist to be paid under the option. The right
of choice is solely to the debtor. The debtors have not communicated which option they will pay
X. He can insist but again the right to choose how to pay belongs to the debtors.
If they choose to give the luxury sports car and communicated to X, Art. 1205 paragraph two will
take effect.

Yes, because the right of choice was given to the creditor. The loss of the luxury of the car can be
claimed through the value of the car and damages. A B and C will still pay because they are
solidary. Art. 1205 paragraph two.
B. Yes, because of the nature of the contract entered into with X. They intended themselves to be
solidarily liable to X. Art. 1225 first paragraph. It is not susceptible to partial performance and
also applies to definite things.

IV.
A. Her contention is correct because it is under the loan agreement and it is different from a
contract of deposit. P155 63 Compensation. They are different contracts. Art. 1287 Compensation
shall not be proper when one of the debts arises from a depositum or from the obligations of a
depositary or of a bailee in commodatum.
Hope’s contention is incorrect because the right of compensation exists. The requisites of
compensation is in Art. 1279.
Yung A, mali si Hope, kase, the right of compensation exists - Enumerate mo na iyang requisites
for compensation.

B. Conventional subrogation is a mode of extinguishment of the obligation. The credit that is

transferred to a third person is no longer the same obligation of the debtor to the previous
creditor, but a new one. Hence, in conventional subrogation it is possible that the defects of the
previous obligation may already be cured in the new obligation. Additionally, the debtor’s
consent is necessary in conventional subrogation.
Assignment of credit, on the other hand, is not a mode of extinguishment of obligation. The credit
that is transferred to a third person is very same obligation of the debtor to the creditor. Hence, if
there are defenses which the debtor can interpose against the assignor, he can likewise interpose
those defenses against the assignee. Additionally, in assignment of credit, the debtor’s consent is
not necessary for the validity of the assignment

C. Distinguish between the doctrine of constructive fulfillment of a suspensive condition and the
rule of constructive fulfillment of mixed conditional obligations.

V.
A. Yes the bank’s contention is correct because a manger’s check is not legal tender. Basis is
what is legal tender under BSP circular. P118 119 Rabuya book. Art. 1249.
The general rule is that a creditor cannot be compelled to pay by check. However, if it’s an
exercise of a right like the right of redemption, the Civil Code provision on payment of
obligations do not apply. Instead what applies is the settled rule that a mere tender of a check is
sufficient to compel redemption. Biana vs Jimenz. Rabuya; P121Rabuya

B. No the bank’s contention is not correct because under the requisites of consignation, it does
not apply to the right redemption.

VI.
A. The status of the contract is unenforceable because both parties are incapacitated. The contract
can be ratified by the parents.
B. Art. 1407 the contract becomes voidable.

VII.
A. The contract is perfect and valid but is not enforceable because it was not in writing. Sale of
real property must be in writing and in a public document. Dalion vs CA.; Art. 1357

B. The contract is not obligatory because it is not enforceable... It is perfected but there is no
obligatory force because it is not in writing... It is a defective contract.
Binding force of obligation ex contractu. P337 Rabuya 8.2.5

It must be perfected, valid, and enforceable. Because it is not enforceable there is no obligatory
force. Art. 1159.

VIII.
A. The contract is inexistent because the parties never intended to be bound by the contract
because the price was not really paid.

B In Article 1381 (1) and (2), the contract entered into by the guardian or legal representative on
behalf of the ward or absentee must not involve contracts of disposition or encumbrance of real
property of the ward or absentee without judicial approval, otherwise, the contract is
unenforceable under Article 1403 (1), NCC. Hence, the contracts referred to in Article 1381 (1)
and (2) are contracts other than disposition and encumbrance of the real property of the ward or
absentee where the latter suffers lesion by more than ¼ of the value of the property and the
contract is not approved by the court. If the contract is approved by the court, it is perfectly valid.

C If the contract is unauthorized, or entered into by one on behalf of another without

authorization, the contract is unenforceable generally. Exception: If the unauthorized contract
relates to the sale of a parcel of land, in which case, the contract is void pursuant to Article 1874
of the Civil Code. Under this law, if the agency relates to the sale of a parcel of land or any
interest therein, the authority of the agent is required to be in writing; otherwise, the sale made by
the agent is void.
d. Unenforceable because the sale of land is covered by the statute of frauds.

e. During the lifetime of the reservista, the interest of the reservatario is merely inchoate. The
property, during that time, is regarded as future inheritance and may not, therefore, be the object
of any contract; otherwise, the contract is void. Since it is possible for the reservatario to lose the
property even if the resolutory condition is fulfilled if it is dealt to a buyer in good faith, the
reservatario must protect/preserve his inchoate interest during the lifetime of the reservista.