BASDEV

VS
STATE OF PEPSU

Citation:1956 AIR 488, 1956 SCR 363

Bench: AIYAR, N. CHANDRASEKHAR

BHAGWATI, NATWARLAL H.
 PROVISIONS OF IPC INVOLVED

• Section 76

• Section 302

• Section 304

Type to enter a caption.

 FACTS OF THE CASE

1.The appellant Basdev, a retired military Jamadhar from the

village of Harigarh and a few others were also from the same
village.
2.He is charged with the murder of a young boy named Maghar
Singh, aged about 15 or 16.
3.Both of them and a few others of the same village went to attend
a wedding in another village.
4.All of them went to the house of the bride to take the midday
meal on the 12th March, 1954
1.Some had settled down in their seats and some hadn’t.
2.The appellant asked Maghar Singh, the young boy to step aside a
little so that he may occupy a convenient seat.
3.But Maghar Singh did not move.
4.The appellant whipped out a pistol and shot the boy in the abdomen.
5.The injury proved fatal.
6.The party that had assembled for the marriage at the bride's house
seems to have made it very merry and much drinking was involved.
7.The appellant Jamadar boozed quite a lot and he became very drunk
and intoxicated.
 DECISION OF SESSION COURT

The learned Sessions Judge says "he was excessively drunk'? and
that "according to the evidence of one witness Wazir Singh
Lambardar he was almost in an unconscious condition". This
circumstance and the total absence of any motive or premeditation
to kill were taken by the Sessions Judge into account and the
appellant was awarded the lesser penalty of transportation for life.
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION IN HIGH COURT OF PEPSU

Special leave was granted by this Court limited to the question whether
the offence committed by the petitioner fell under section 302 of the
Indian Penal Code or section 304 of the Indian Penal Code having regard
to the provisions of section 86 of the Indian Penal Code. Section 86
 which was elaborately considered by the High Court runs in these terms:

"In cases where an act done is not an offence unless done with a
particular knowledge or intent, a person who doe& the act in a state of
intoxication shall be liable to be dealt with as if he bad the same
knowledge as he would have had if he bad not been intoxicated, unless
the thing which intoxicated him was administered to him without his
 QUESTION FOR CONSIDERATION BEFORE COURT

It is no doubt true that while the first part of the section speaks of
intent or knowledge, the latter part deals only with knowledge and a
certain element of doubt in interpretation may possibly be felt by
reason of this omission. If in voluntary drunkenness knowledge is to
be presumed in the same manner as if there was no drunkenness, what
about those cases where mens rea is required. Are we at liberty to
place in-

tent on the same footing, and if so, why has the section omitted intent
in its latter part? This is not the first time that the question comes up
 JUDGEMENT OF COURT

According to the court as far as the knowledge is concerned on the basis of the
evidence it can be assumed that the petitioner was not completely intoxicated
and hence his capacity of form a specific intent can be assumed as when if he
were in a normal state of mind.
Hence forth it can be concluded that the offense committed by the petitioner falls
under section 302 of IPC as there was not much evidence to prove that he was in
the state where he couldn’t make any specific intention or motive.
On this finding the offence is not reduced from murder to culpable homicide not
amounting to murder under the second part of section 304 of the Indian Penal
Code. The conviction and sentence are right and the appeal is dismissed.
 Court reasoning:
In order to check whether the consequence of the petitioner falls under section 302 or
304 of IPC, at first we must differentiate we must differentiate motive, knowledge and
intention. Motive is something which forms an intention and knowledge is the
consequences of the act. In most of the cases the intention and knowledge are almost the
same. There are also situations in which the 3 ideas are interchangeable.

On the following basis:

Based on the nature of the weapon used, it can be decided whether drunkenness can be
avoided or not. For example if a drunken man uses a stick we may not find a bad intent.
But at the same time when a weapon like gun is used, then in this case the fact that the man
was drunk can be ignored.
n Regina v. Cruse and Mary his wife: It appears that both the parents of the daughter,
I

had been drunk. Hence in this case drunkenness is no excuse for any crime whatever, yet it
is often of very great importance in cases where it is a question of intention. A person may
be so drunk as to be utterly unable to form any intention at all, and yet he may be guilty of
very great violence.
Evidence of drunkenness which find out whether the accused was incapable of forming the
specific intent is essential to constitute the crime should be taken into consideration with
the other facts proved in order to determine whether or not he had this intent.

Hence in this case the evidence of drunkenness falling short of a proved incapacity in the
accused to form the intent necessary to constitute the crime, and merely establishing that
his mind was affected by drink so that he more readily gave way to some violent passion,
does not rebut the presumption that a man intends the natural consequences of his acts.