ORIENTACIÓN Y PERSPECTIVAS DE

LA POLÍTICA EXTERIOR VENEZOLANA

VENEZUELAN FOREIGN POLICY

ORIENTATION AND PERSPECTIVES
Dr. Miguel Ángel Martínez Meucci
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The Bolivarian Revolution´s Foreign Policy.

The Essentials
• As a revolutionary state, Venezuela has intended to “export its revolution” and
increase its relative power.
• The “Bolivarian Revolution” (now BR) rejects the fundamentals of liberal
democracy.
• Its ideological proposal may vary according to the moment and the audience,
but always revolves around the idea of socialism.
• Beyond ideological affairs, Venezuelan geopolitics is about oil.
• Venezuelan current diplomacy is completely centered on the figure of Chávez.
No autonomy relies on the foreign service.
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Hugo Chávez: Official Visits (2006-2011)

24
6
2
14

11
85

Latin America: 85
Europe: 24
Middle East: 14
Maghreb/Africa: 11
Asia: 6
North America: 2

Source: Adriana Boersner Herrera / January 2011

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Oil plays the main role:

– At the international arena, Venezuela means
oil, and oil markets remain always very
concerned with Venezuelan current affairs.
– Nowadays, 94% of Venezuelan exports are oil.
– Venezuelan government depends on oil
revenues for about 50% of its total income.
– “Oil Diplomacy” is not new for Venezuela:
• San José’s Agreement (1980) to promote
liberal democracy.
• Petrocaribe (2005) to promote “Socialism”
(500.000 b/d delivered without receiving cash)*
* Source: Gustavo Coronel, http://www.eluniversal.com/2010/10/25/imp_eco_art_estiman-que-cuba-gan_2080812.shtml
 Venezuelan Crisis and Oil Markets (2001-2006) 4

Opposition Referendum
Strike 2003 2004

Financial Times, August 17, 2004

Source: http://www.wtrg.com/oil_graphs/crudeoilprice0105.gif
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Pragmatism vs. Ideology

• USA-Venezuela relations:
– During the Bush’s first term, the bilateral relations were tough.
– Since 2005 (second Bush’s term), both countries have come to a
relative modus vivendi.
– The stability settled by the pragmatic oil linkage is prevailing over
ideological disputes.

• Latin America
– Despite some distrust, the BR has yielded
substantial (and unaccountable) oil and
commercial benefits to other countries.
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Strong Economic Ties between Venezuela and the USA

Between 1 and
1,4 million barrels
per day goes to
the USA from
Venezuela.

Persistent rise in
oil prices (2004 /
2008) and the
modest power of
the BR explain
the pragmatic
modus vivendi
reached between
both countries.

Source: http://www.coha.org/economic-realities-affecting-us-venezuela-relations/
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Coming to an Equilibrium
After having reached the zenith of its external influence in 2008, the BR
seems constrained into its own boundaries, due to several circumstances:
• Oil prices have drop since 2008 until now.
• Decline of Venezuelan oil production (see next slide).
• Politically expensive involvements in Colombia and Honduras.
• Several electoral defeats (December 2007, November 2008, August
2010).
• Latin America is living times of steady economic growth.

“Exporting the revolution” seems impossible with moderate oil prices,

but the hemisphere have pragmatically accepted Chávez´s regime.

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Venezuela’s Oil Industry is loosing capacities

Bolivarian Revolution
• Economic Nationalism
caused a relevant drop
in Venezuelan oil
production.

• This fall is expected

to be continued.

• Foreign influence
developed by Chávez’s
administration will
probably be diminished.

Source: http://www.wtrg.com/oil_graphs/PAPRPVE.gif
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• Oil prices are decisive.
Venezuelan Imports • USA remains essential, but not as much as before.
• China and Brazil consolidated its position.
(2000-2010) • Colombia suffered by politics.

Opposition
Strike

USA

China
Brazil
Colombia

Source: elaborated by the author, with data coming from http://nt5000.aladi.org/siicomercioesp/

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The “Revolution” is now entrenching itself

• As “exporting the revolution” is now hard and several problems
are rising in Venezuela, the BR needs to reinforce its inner control.

• Foreign policy seems now oriented to strengthen ties with

countries that tolerate Chávez´s illiberal behavior.

• BR’s foreign policy seems now oriented to support its inner

appetite for social control:
• Subjugating private economy (exchange controls, restrictive laws,
expropriations, etc.)
• Substituting private production by imports from “allies countries” (PDVSA
centralizes now many kind of imports, according to the BR’s guidelines)
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“New Friends”: BRIC, autocracies and others

• China, the biggest new partner:
• The goal is to export 1 million b/d to China and reduce the USA´s influence.
• PDVSA says Venezuela is exporting now 460.000 b/d to China; other sources
assure the real number is 200.000 (100.000 fuel oil and 100.000 crude)*.
• Conoco Phillips, Exxon Mobil and BP are gone. Without these companies, it
would be difficult to export 1 million b/d to China within 5 or 6 years.

• Brazil, to which BR has reoriented many Venezuelan imports. With

Lula, Brazil showed great tolerance toward Chávez’s actions.
• Colombia is trying to recover the lost relationship with Venezuela.
• Iran, a special relationship (oil producers/revolutionary/illiberal).

* Source: Gustavo Coronel, http://www.bancaynegocios.com/energia-y-petroleo/item/2002-deber%C3%A1n-invertir-

m%C3%A1s-de-120-mil-mdd-en-faja-del-orinoco-en-pr%C3%B3ximos-6-a%C3%B1os
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“New Friends” participate now in Oil Production

“Orinoco Belt”:
•30 blocks into 4 areas:
Boyacá, Junín, Ayacucho y
Carabobo.
•19 blocks developed by
joint ventures with CVP
(Venezuelan Oil
Corporation) and…
•22 foreign companies,
mainly state owned:

94,1 billions of crude oil barrels have Russia: Lukoil / Gazprom Malaysia: Petronas
China: CNPC Uruguay: Ancap
been certificated until 2008.
Cuba: Cupet India: ONGC
Iran: Petropars Chile: ENAP
$ 120 billions planned to be invested Brazil: Petrobras …and others.
during the next 6 years, 60% by PDVSA Ecuador: Petroecuador Only Chevron, ENI
Argentina: Enarsa and Repsol YPF
(a goal very hard to accomplish…)
Vietnam: Petrovietnam seem reliable.
Sources: http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/Venezuela/Oil.html y http://servicios.iesa.edu.ve/portal/CIEA/EC%202007-2008c.pdf
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Projections 2011-2012
A) Since 2008, “exporting the revolution” doesn’t seem a choice.
Instead, Chávez is now oriented to reinforce its inner position.

B) Venezuelan oil will continue to yield benefits to many countries.

However, this flow could be affected by decreasing production.

C) Tunisia, Egypt… With deep unrest in the Middle East, the chance
for rising oil prices seems high, and the BR would be reinforced.

D) The chance of an hypothetical Chávez’s “Gaddaffization” (an

autocracy tolerated as long as it guarantees oil exports) may be
elevated if the oil prices go up.
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Proposals for Constructive Relations

A) Multilevel Diplomacy: congressmen, local governments, federal
institution, are all useful ways to improve current relations.

B) Civil Society to the OAS: a wider representation in hemispheric

organizations should help to enforce democracy and human
rights.

C) Interamerican Net of Universities: the academia may constitute

an equilibrate channel of communication, in the middle of severe
disagreements.

D) New CAF/BID financial instruments to ease capital returns to LA:

Latin American savers may improve the chances to invest their
money in the region.