Cases

City Government of QC vs. Ericta

1 G.R. No. L-34915 June 24, 1983

German Management & Services, Inc. vs. C.A.

2 G.R. No. 76217 September 14, 1989

Villafuerte vs. CA
3 G.R. No. 134239, May 26, 2005

Custodio vs. CA
4 G.R. No. 116100, February 9, 1996

Bel Air Village Association vs. Dionisio

5 G.R. No. L-38354 June 30, 1989

South Pachem Development Inc. vs. CA

6 G.R. No. 126260, December 16, 2004

Cariday Investment Corporation vs. C.A

7 G.R. No. 83358 August 2, 1989
City Govt. of Quezon City vs. Ericta,
122 SCRA 759 (1983)
Gutierrez Jr., J.

Facts:

Section 9 of Ordinance 6118, S-64, entitled "Ordinance Regulating the Establishment, Maintenance and
Operation of Private Memorial Type Cemetery Or Burial Ground Within the Jurisdiction of Quezon City
and Providing Penalties for the Violation thereof" provides that at least 6% of the total area of the
memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and
have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by
competent City Authorities, and where the area so designated shall immediately be developed and
should be open for operation not later than 6 months from the date of approval of the application. For
several years, section 9 of the Ordinance was not enforced by city authorities but 7 years after the
enactment of the ordinance, the Quezon City Council passed a resolution requesting the City Engineer,
Quezon City, to stop any further selling and/or transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon City where
the owners thereof have failed to donate the required 6% space intended for paupers burial.
Pursuant to this petition, the Quezon City Engineer notified Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. in
writing that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 would be enforced. Himlayang Pilipino
reacted by filing with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal (Branch XVIII at Quezon
City), a petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction
(Special Proceeding Q-16002) seeking to annul Section 9 of the Ordinance in question for
being contrary to the Constitution, the Quezon City Charter, the Local Autonomy Act, and
the Revised Administrative Code.

There being no issue of fact and the questions raised being purely legal, both the City
Government and Himlayang Pilipino agreed to the rendition of a judgment on the
pleadings. The CFI rendered the decision declaring Section 9 of Ordinance 6118, S-64
null and void. A motion for reconsideration having been denied, the City Government and
City Council filed the petition or review with the Supreme Court.
Issue:

Whether the setting aside of 6% of the total area of all private

cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers is
tantamount to taking of private property without just compensation?

Ruling:

The petition for review was DISMISSED. The decision of the CA was affirmed.
Ratio Decidendi:
There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside
of at least 6% of the total area of all private cemeteries for
charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the
promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the
general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a
taking without compensation of a certain area from a
private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of
the municipal corporation. Instead of building or
maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city
passes the burden to private cemeteries.
Ratio Decidendi:
The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private
cemeteries is not covered by Section 12(t) of Republic Act 537, the
Revised Charter of Quezon City which empowers the city council to
prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of population of the city
and to provide for their burial in a proper place subject to the provisions
of general law regulating burial grounds and cemeteries. When the
Local Government Code, Batas Pambansa 337 provides in Section 177
(q) that a Sangguniang Panlungsod may "provide for the burial of the
dead in such place and in such manner as prescribed by law or
ordinance" it simply authorizes the city to provide its own city owned
land or to buy or expropriate private properties to construct public
cemeteries. This has been the law and practice in the past and it
continues to the present. Expropriation, however, requires payment of
just compensation.
Ratio Decidendi:
The questioned ordinance is different from laws and
regulations requiring owners of subdivisions to set aside
certain areas for streets, parks, playgrounds, and other
public facilities from the land they sell to buyers of
subdivision lots. The necessities of public safety, health,
and convenience are very clear from said requirements
which are intended to insure the development of
communities with salubrious and wholesome
environments. The beneficiaries of the regulation, in turn,
are made to pay by the subdivision developer when
individual lots are sold to homeowners.
German Management & Services, Inc. vs. C.A.
G.R. No. 76217 September 14, 1989
FERNAN, C.J.:

FACTS:
Spouses Jose are residents of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA are owners of the land situated in sitio Inarawan,
San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal (the land being disputed in the case at bar.) The spouses Jose executed a special power
of attorney authorizing petitioner German Management Services to develop their property. They have already
acquired the proper permits to do so but they discovered that the land was occupied by the respondent with 20
other farmers (members of the Concerned of Farmer’s Association.) These farmers have occupied the land for the
last twelve to fifteen years prior to the issuance of the permits and they already have their crops all over the
property. In short, they are in actual possession of the land.

Petitioners tried to forcibly drive the farmers away and; demolish and bulldoze their crops and property. The
respondents filed in CFI because they were deprived of their property without due process of law by trespassing,
demolishing and bulldozing their crops and property situated in the land. CFI and RTC denied it but CA reversed
the decision. Petitioners tried to appeal the decision in CA but were denied thus this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondents are entitled to file a forcible entry case against petitioner?

RULING:
The Court resolved to DENY the instant petition. The decision of the Court of Appeals was AFFIRMED.

RATIO DECIDENDI:
Since private respondents were in actual possession of the property at the time they were forcibly ejected by
petitioner, private respondents have a right to commence an action for forcible entry regardless of the legality or
illegality of possession.

Private respondents, as actual possessors, can commence a forcible entry case against petitioner because
ownership is not in issue. Forcible entry is merely a quieting process and never determines the actual title to an
estate. Title is not involved, only actual possession. It is undisputed that private respondents were in possession of
the property and not the petitioners nor the spouses Jose. Although the petitioners have a valid claim over
ownership this does not in any way justify their act of ―forcible entry.
It must be stated that regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property the party in peaceable quiet
possession shall not be turned out by a strong hand, violence or terror. Thus, a party who can prove prior
possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself.Whatever may be the character of his
possession, if he has in his favor priority in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until
he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.

The doctrine of self help, which the petitioners were using to justify their actions, are not applicable in the case
because it can only be exercised at the time of actual or threatened dispossession which is absent in the case at
bar (in fact they are the ones who are threatening to remove the respondents with the use of force.) Article 536
basically tells us that the owner or a person who has a better right over the land must resort to judicial means to
recover the property from another person who possesses the land.

When possession has already been lost, the owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of property. As
clearly stated in Article 536- ―In no case may possession be acquired through force or intimidation as long as
there is a possessor who objects thereto. He who believes that he has an action or right to deprive another of the
holding of a thing must invoke the aid of the competent court, if holder should refuse to deliver the thing.‖
Villafuerte vs. CA,
G.R. No. 134239, May 26, 2005

Chico-Nazario, J.:
 
Facts:
Spouses Reynaldo C. Villafuerte and Perlita Tan-Villafuerte operated a gasoline station on the premises of three (3) adjoining lots at
the corner of Gomez Street and Quezon Avenue in Lucena City. One of these lots is owned by several persons, one of whom is Edilberto de
Mesa, while the other lot is owned by Gonzalo Daleon and his brother Federico. The remaining lot belongs to Mrs. Anicia Yap-Tan, mother of
Perlita.

Edilberto and Gonzalo acquired their respective lots subject to the lease by Petrophil which had built thereon the gasoline station
being managed by the Villafuerte couple. When the lease of Petrophil expired, the Villafuertes obtained a new lease from Edilberto for a
period of one (1) year only and was not renewed after but the Villafuertes continued to operate the gasoline station.

As regards the Daleon brothers, the Villafuertes received demand letters ordering them to vacate the lot but this was ignored and they
continued operating the gas station.

Later on, Edilberto and Gonzalo, without the knowledge of the Villafuertes, caused the closure of the gasoline station by constructing
fences around it. Thus, filed a complaint for damages with preliminary mandatory injunction.
Issue:
Whether Edilberto and Gonzalo correct in fencing the Villafuerte’s business premises.
 
Ruling:
The Decision of the CA was modified.

Ratio Decidendi:
The law on this matter is clear: "(h)e who believes himself entitled to deprive another of the possession
of a thing, so long as the possessor refuses delivery, must request the assistance of the proper authority."
Petitioners' arbitrary conduct of fencing their properties under the claim that they own the same brazenly
violates the law and circumvents the proper procedure which should be obtained before the court.
 
Article 536 of the Civil Code previously quoted explicitly provides for the proper recourse of one who
claims to be entitled to the possession of a thing. When private respondents personally took it upon
themselves to evict petitioners from their properties, which act was in clear contravention of the law, they
became liable "for all the necessary and natural consequences of [their] illegal act."
 The doctrine of self-help contained in Article 429 of the Civil Code could
not be invoked since it finds no application when occupation was effected
through lawful means such as in this case where petitioners' possession of
the lots owned by private respondents was effected through lease
agreements.
 
The principle of damnum absque injuria could not be invoked as this
doctrine only applies "when the loss or damage does not constitute a
violation of a legal right or amounts to a legal wrong" and not to this case
where private respondents clearly violated the law by unilaterally
displacing petitioners from the subject premises.
Custodio vs. CA
G.R. No. 116100, February 9, 1996

Regalado, J.:

Facts:
Mabasa owns a parcel of land with a 2 door apartment. The property is surrounded by other immovables. When
Mabasa bought the land, there were tenants who were occupying the property. One of the tenants vacated the
land. Mabasa saw that there had been built an adobe fence in the apartment in the first passageway that made it
narrower. The fence was constructed by the Santoses. Morato constructed her fence and extended it to the entire
passageway, therefore, the passageway was enclosed. The case was brought to the trial court and ordered the
Custodios and the Santoses to give Mabasa a permanent ingress and egress to the public street and asked
Mabasa to pay Custodios and Santoses for damages.

Issue:
Whether or not Mabasa has the right to demand for a right of way?

Ruling:
The appealed decision of CA was REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the judgment of the trial court was
correspondingly REINSTATED.
Ratio Decidendi:

A person has a right to the natural use and enjoyment of his own
property, according to his pleasure, for all the purposes to which such
property is usually applied. As a general rule, therefore, there is no cause
of action for acts done by one person upon his own property in a lawful
and proper manner, although such acts incidentally cause damage or an
unavoidable loss to another, as such damage or loss is damnum absque
injuria. When the owner of property makes use thereof in the general
and ordinary manner in which the property is used, such as fencing or
enclosing the same as in this case, nobody can complain of having been
injured, because the inconvenience arising from said use can be
considered as a mere consequence of community life
Bel Air Village Association vs. Dionisio
G.R. No. L-38354 June 30, 1989
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
 
Facts:
 
The Transfer Certificate of Title covering the subject parcel of land issued in the name of Virgilio Dionisio, the petitioner
contains an annotation to the effect that the lot owner becomes an automatic member of Bel-Air Village Association,   the
respondent,  and must abide by such rules and regulations laid down by the Association in the interest of the sanitation, security
and the general welfare of the community.   
 
The  petitioner questioned the collection of the dues on the following grounds:  the questioned assessment is a property tax
outside the corporate power of the association;  the association  has no power to compel the petitioner to pay the assessment for
lack of privity of contract; the questioned assessment should not be enforced for being unreasonable, arbitrary, oppressive,
confiscatory and discriminatory; the respondent association is exercising governmental powers which should not be sanctioned.
 
 
Issue:
 
Whether or not the association can lawfully collect dues?
 
 
Ruling:
 
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit.  
 
Ratio Decidendi:
 
It held that the purchasers of a registered land are bound by the annotations found
at the back of the certificate of title covering the subject parcel of land. The
petitioner’s contention that he has no privity with the respondent association is not
persuasive.  When the petitioner voluntarily bought the subject parcel of land it
was understood that he took the same free of all encumbrances except annotations
at the back of the certificate of title, among them, that he automatically becomes a
member of the respondent association. One of the obligations of a member is to
pay certain amounts for the operation and activities of the association.  

 
The mode of payment as well as the purposes for which the dues are intended
clearly indicates that the dues are not in the concept of a property tax as
claimed by the petitioner.  They are shares in the common expenses for
necessary services.  A property tax is assessed according to the value of the
property but the basis of the sharing in this case is the area of the lot.  The dues
are fees which a member of the respondent association is required in hiring
security guards, cleaning and maintaining streets, streetlights and other
community projects for the benefit of all residents within the Bel-Air
Village.  These expenses are necessary, valid and reasonable for the particular
community involved. 
 
The limitations upon the ownership of the petitioner do not contravene provisions of
laws, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.  The constitutional
proscription than no person can be compelled to be a member of an association
against his will applies only to governmental acts and not to private transactions like
the one in question. 
 
The petitioner cannot legally maintain that he is compelled to be a member of the
association against his will because the limitation is imposed upon his ownership of
property.  If he does not desire to comply with the annotation or lien in question, he
can at any time exercise his inviolable freedom of disposing of the property and free
himself from the burden of becoming a member of the association.
 
South Pachem Development Inc. vs. CA
G.R. No. 126260, December 16, 2004

AZCUNA, J.:
 
Facts:
 
On July 1973, South Pachem Development purchased from Ayala Corporation two
adjoining parcels of land located in Legaspi Village, Makati. The deed restrictions, duly
annotated on the titles, was incorporated in the contract of sale. The deed restrictions
provided, among others, that a buyer or his successor-in interest automatically becomes
a member of the private respondent as an association and enjoined compliance with its
rules and regulations for the security, maintenance, beautification, and general welfare of
the land owners. Assessments collected by the private respondent would constitute a
lien on the subject property.
 
 
In 1984, South Pachem stopped paying its association dues, including the
interest and penalty because it realized that Ayala was not really
performing the services it promised to perform, e.g., collection of garbage
and the maintenance of roads and ensuring the peace and order situation of
the area, which are being undertaken by the city government of Makati. It
claimed that the payment of association fees for forty seven (47) years
amounts to a perpetual imposition upon a member of private respondent
(as an association) which therefore makes it illegal.
 
On June 1988, Ayala filed a complaint against South Pachem in the RTC of Makati for
collection of a sum of money arising from the latter's non-payment of association dues.
 
Issue:
 
Whether the stipulation in the deed restrictions that the buyer of a property shall pay
the association dues for a period of 47 years commencing from the date of purchase
valid?
 
Ruling:
 
The petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

 
Ratio Decidendi:
 
The deed restrictions is a valid agreement freely and voluntarily agreed
upon between the petitioner and private respondent. When an agreement
between the parties has been forged, such contract becomes the law
between the parties and each one is bound to comply therewith.

 
Under the principle of estoppel, petitioner is precluded from denying the validity of the
transaction it had earlier freely and voluntarily entered into with private respondent. It
shall not be allowed to disavow or repudiate a valid agreement at this late stage with
regard to the provisions of the deed restrictions after having paid its association dues
from 1973 to 1984. As the Court of Appeals rightly stated, the petitioner is guilty of
"estoppel by acquiescence."

Petitioner's inaction for the past 11 years effectively forecloses its right to question the
perceived infirmity in an agreement which it had mutually entered into with the private
respondent. In this regard, petitioner's acceptance of the terms of the contract without
any dissent raises the presumption that all the terms therein were brought to its
knowledge and duly agreed upon. It is thus estopped from later denying that it had
assented to the terms.6 In view of its acquiescence, the petitioner is now barred from
challenging the same under the principle that "one who sleeps on his rights shall not be
heard to complain."
 
Cariday Investment Corporation vs. C.A.
G.R. No. 83358 August 2, 1989
Griño-Aquino, J.:
 
Facts:
Cariday is the owner of a residential building in the Forbes Park Subdivision
hence, a member of the Forbes Park Association or FPA. On the back of its
certificate of title is annotated a "Deed of Restrictions" that includes provision
for one residential building per lot and lots may be used only for residential
purposes, and not more than one single- family residential building will be
constructed on one lot.
 
In June 1986, Cariday "repaired" its building.  After inspection of the "repairs,"
the FPA's retained civil engineer reported that "additions or deletions were
made in the existing residence" and in another inspection in May 1987, it was
observed that the building "can be used by more than one family." 
Cariday admitted that its building has the exterior appearance of a single-family
residence but it is designed inside to allow occupancy by two families.
The FPA demanded that corrections be made in the
structure to conform with the restrictions. Without
making the corrections, Cariday leased one portion of
the house to an Englishman who occupied the same
and the other half of the building to Procter and
Gamble’s Executive.
 
However, when Procter and Gamble’s Executive tried to
move in, he was stopped by the security guards on
account that it would not allow Cariday to lease its
house to more than one tenant as this would violate the
rule regarding "one single-family residential
restriction". Because of the alleged "building
violations," the FPA threatened to disconnect the water
service (which it supplies to the residents from its deep-
well pumps) to Cariday's property.
 
Cariday filed a complaint for injunction and
damages. The trial court issued a writ of preliminary
injunction ordering the FPA to desist from cutting-
off the water supply to Cariday’s building, or to
reconnect the service if it has been cut-off, and, to
desist from preventing its tenants' ingress into and
egress from its building. The FPA filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied by the trial court.
 
On appeal, the CA annulled the writ of injunction
and upheld the right of the FPA to prohibit the entry
of additional tenants into Cariday's building and to
disconnect the water service for violation of the
restrictions.
 
Issue:
Is the provision in the Deed of Restrictions on the title of a lot in
the Forbes Park Subdivision which binds the owner to use his lot
"for residential purposes and not more than one single family
residential building will be constructed thereon" tenable?
 
Ruling:
The petition for review was denied.
 
Ratio Decidendi:
The restriction clearly defines not only the type and number of
structures (one residential building) that may be built on each lot,
but also the number of families (a single family) that may use it as
a residence.  Indeed, the restriction of "one x x x residential
building" per lot would have been sufficient, without
incorporating the additional restriction of "a single family," (p.
35, Rollo) if the purpose, as petitioner contends, were only to limit
the type of building but not its use or occupancy.
 
Logic dictates that as the building rules and regulations
of the FPA expressly prohibit the construction of
buildings for multiple occupancy, such as hotels, motels,
and condominiums, that prohibition may not be
circumvented by building a house with the external
appearance of a single-family dwelling but whose interior
is designed for multiple occupany.  It is an elementary
rule of reason that what may not be done directly, may
not also be done indirectly.
However, recognizing Filipino custom and the cohesive
nature of our family ties, the concept of a single-family
dwelling may embrace the extended family which
includes married children who continue to be sheltered in
the family home until they are financially able to establish
homes of their own.  But leasing one's house
in Forbes Park, as the petitioner has done, to two or more
tenant families who are not related to the owner, nor to
each other, would be impermissible under the one-single
family restriction recorded on the title of the property.
 
Thank you