EMPLOYMENT OF NAVAL

FORCES IN SUPPORT OF
FOREIGN POLICY
By
DR. M. Vego
JMO Department,
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE,
NEWPORT, RI.,
USA
A man-of-war is the best ambassador.

Oliver Cromwell
CHARACTERISTICS OF
NAVAL FORCES
• FLEXIBILITY 
• STAYING POWER
• VERSATILITY 
• SELF-SUFFICIENCY 
• MOBILITY
• PROJECTION ABILITY
• ACCESSIBILITY
CONTROLLABILITY
• SYMBOLISM
• NAVAL FORCES HAVE DIVERSE CAPABILITIES
THAT CAN BE QUICKLY TAILORED TO THE
SITUATION AT HAND.
• THEY CAN BE EMPLOYED IN SUPPORT OF THE
COUNTRY’S DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES IN
PEACETIME AND TIME OF CRISIS
• DEPLOYMENT OF NAVAL FORCES DURING
TIMES OF TENSION OR CRISIS TO BACK UP
DIPLOMACY CAN POSE AN UNSTATED BUT
CLEAR THREAT
• NAVAL FORCES POSSESS INHERENT
FLEXIBILITY WHICH ALLOWS THEM TO CHANGE
THEIR ROLES QUICKLY WITHOUT THE LOSS OF
EFFECTIVENESS OR WITHOUT THE NEED TO
RETURN TO HOME BASES AND RECONFIGURE
FOR THE NEW ROLE
• THEY CAN EXTRICATE THEMSELVES
RELATIVELY EASILY FROM A THREATENING
SITUATION.
• NAVAL FORCES CAN BE DEPLOYED
EITHER FAR AWAY OR CLOSE TO
THE COAST OF THE TARGET
COUNTRY
• THEY CAN APPEAR COMMITTED OR
UNCOMMITTED
• THEY CAN POSE AN IMMEDIATE OR
VAGUE MENACE.
• NAVAL FORCES POSSESS UNIQUE AND
IMPRESSIVE STAYING POWER
• A SINGLE OR GROUP OF WARSHIPS CAN
PERFORM NOT ONLY MILITARY BUT ALSO
NONMILITARY TASKS (POLITICAL, SOCIAL,
HUMANITARIAN, INFORMATIONAL, ETC.)
• NAVAL FORCES ARE LARGELY SELF-
SUFFICIENT BECAUSE THEY DO NOT REQUIRE
EXTENSIVE SUPPORT FROM THE LAND.
• THEY ALSO DO NOT NEED TO RELY
UPON COMPLEX SHORE- BASED IN
THEATER LOGISTICAL SUPPORT
• NAVAL FORCES ARE HIGHLY MOBILE
INSTRUMENT OF NATIONAL POWER
• NAVAL FORCES CAN BE DEPLOYED
QUICKLY AND REMAIN IN THE AREA FOR
EXTENDED PERIODS WITHOUT THE
AGREEMENT OF NEIGHBORING STATES.
• NAVAL FORCES CAN OPERATE
INDEPENDENTLY OF OTHER FORCES TO
MEET SOME UNPREDICTABLE
SITUATIONS IN NEAR OR DISTANT
FUTURE
• THE WARSHIPS CAN CONVERGE TO THE
SCENE OF ACTION FROM NUMEROUS
DIRECTIONS AND THEN THEY CAN BE
QUICKLY DISPERSED.
• NAVAL FORCES CAN BE DEPLOYED
EITHER TEMPORARILY OR
PERMANENTLY IN A CERTAIN
SEA/OCEAN AREA
• THEY CAN POSE A THREAT NOT ONLY
TO THE ENEMY’S FORCES AT SEA OR IN
THE AIR BUT ALSO TO HIS FORCES AND
INSTALLATIONS/FACILITIES IN THE
LITTORAL AREA.
• NAVAL FORCES HAVE A UNIQUE
CAPABILITY TO MOVE FREELY OUTSIDE
THE 12-NAUTICAL MILE TERRITORIAL
WATERS OF THE RIPARIAN STATES
• THEY POSSESS EXTRATERRITORIALITY
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, THAT IS, THEY
ARE EXEMPT FROM LOCAL TERRITORIAL
JURISDICTION.
• NAVAL FORCES ARE HIGHLY
RESPONSIVE TO A POLITICAL
AUTHORITY
• THEY CAN BE EMPLOYED FOR
ESCALATION AND DE-ESCALATION
• NAVAL FORCES CAN BE MOVED
RELATIVELY QUICKLY INTO THE AREA OF
CRISIS OR CONFLICT AND THEN ALSO
QUICKLY WITHDRAWN
 LIMITATIONS OF NAVAL FORCES

• EMPLOYMENT OF NAVAL FORCES HAS ALSO

SOME INHERENT LIMITATIONS
• AMONG OTHER THINGS, THEY ARE GENERALLY
MORE EFFECTIVE IN INFLUENCING BEHAVIOR
OF RATIONAL STATE ACTORS THAN NO-STATE
ACTORS
• THEIR EFFECT IS OFTEN LESS THAN DESIRED
IF THEY ARE MORE OR LESS PERMANENTLY
DEPLOYED IN A CERTAIN SEA/OCEAN AREA
• NAVAL FORCES ARE RELATIVELY
SLOW TO ARRIVE TO THE SCENE
OF ACTION UNLESS THEY ARE
PERMANENTLY DEPLOYED
• THEIR EFFECT IS USUALLY
INDIRECT RATHER THAN DIRECT
• DEPLOYMENT OF ONE’S NAVAL FORCES INTO
THE CRISIS AREA CAN ACTUALLY CAUSE MORE
HOSTILITY NOT LESS
• IT CAN PROVOKE A COUNTER-VEILING FORCE,
ADD UNDESIRED RESPONSIBILITIES, AND
ENCOURAGE UNWANTED EXPECTATIONS.
• NAVAL FORCES CAN RARELY ACHIEVE THE
REQUIRED EFFECT ALONE
• THEY HAVE TO BE USED IN COMBINATION WITH
OTHER INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER.
• DESPITE MANY ADVANTAGES THEY HAVE,
NAVAL FORCES RARELY PRESENT A LOOMING
MENACE THE WAY ONE’S GROUND FORCE
DEPLOYED IN LARGE NUMBER CLOSE TO THE
TARGETED COUNTRY
• NAVAL FORCES ALSO RARELY GENERATE A
NERVE-RACKING DANGER OF AN ALERTED AIR
FORCE WITHIN RANGE.
• FOREIGN DECISION MAKERS ALSO RECOGNIZE
THAT WARSHIPS CAN BE WITHDRAWN AS
EASILY AS ARE DEPLOYED IN THE CRISIS AREAS
• HENCE THEIR COMMITMENT IS NOT AS FIRM AS
ONE COMMITS GROUND FORCE.
• EMPLOYMENT OF ONE’S NAVAL FORCES IN
SUPPORT OF THE COUNTRY’S FOREIGN POLICY
ALSO IMPLY CERTAIN PSYCHOLOGICAL
COMMITMENT THAT IS DIFFICULT TO REVERSE
AT LEAST IN THE SHORT TERM.
NAVAL POWER VS.
NAVAL INFLUENCE
• NAVAL POWER AND NAVAL INFLUENCE ARE
RELATED BUT NOT IDENTICAL THINGS
• ONE’S NAVAL POWER CAN BE MEASURED
BECAUSE FOR MOST PART CONTAINS
PHYSICAL OR TANGIBLE ELEMENTS
• NAVAL INFLUENCE IS LARGELY HARD OR
IMPOSSIBLE TO MEASURE. IT IS A MATTER OF
ONE’S ASSERTIONS, PERCEPTIONS,
PRECONCEPTIONS, AND BIASES.
 NAVAL INFLUENCE IS DIRECTLY
RELATED TO:

• MOTIVATION AND IDENTITY OF THE

OPPONENTS
• THE FACTORS OF SPACE
• THE FACTOR OF TIME
• TYPE OF CONFLICT
• INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT.
NAVAL DIPLOMACY
• NAVAL DIPLOMACY IS THE EMPLOYMENT
OF ONE’S NAVAL FORCES TO FURTHER
FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES BY
INFLUENCING THE THOUGHTS AND
ACTIONS OF FOREIGN DECISION-
MAKERS AND CHANGING THEIR
BEHAVIOR BUT WITHOUT THE USE OF
PHYSICAL FORCE.
• DISTINCTION EXISTS BETWEEN COOPERATIVE
AND COERCIVE NAVAL DIPLOMACY
• COOPERATIVE NAVAL DIPLOMACY CONSISTS
OF GOODWILL PORT VISITS, PROVIDING
HUMANITARIAN AID OR SHOW OF FORCE. THE
AIM IS TO VISIBLY DEMONSTRATE THE
BENEFITS THAT WILL ACCRUE TO THE TARGET
IF HE ACTS FAVORABLY TOWARD THE
DEPLOYING PARTY.
 COOPERATIVE NAVAL DIPLOMACY

• ROUTINE NAVAL PRESENCE

• OPERATIONAL DEPLOYMENTS
• EXERCISES/MANEUVERS
• PORT VISITS
 ROUTINE
 OPERATIONAL
 DIPLOMATIC
• SHOW OF FLAG
• 1957--SOVIET NAVAL VISIT TO LATAKIA,
SYRIA
• OCT 1969- SOVIET NAVAL VISIT TO
THREE SOMALIA’S PORTS
• APR 1973—SOVIET NAVAL VISIT TO UMM
QASR, IRAQ
RUSSIAN NAVAL DETACHMENT AT PORT LA GUAIRA, VENEZUELA
25 NOVEMBER 2008
ADMIRAL CHABANENKO
 NAVAL COERCIVE DIPLOMACY

• NAVAL FORCES ARE ONE OF THE MOST

EFFECTIVE AND FLEXIBLE TOOLS IN APPLYING
NAVAL COERCIVE DIPLOMACY, POPULARLY
CALLED GUNBOAT DIPLOMACY—THE USE OR
THREAT OF LIMITED NAVAL FORCE AIMED AT
SECURING ONE’S ADVANTAGE OR AVERTING
LOSS, EITHER IN FURTHERANCE OF AN
INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE OR AGAINST
FOREIGN NATIONALS WITHIN THE TERRITORY
OR JURISDICTION OF THEIR OWN STATE.
• COERCIVE NAVAL DIPLOMACY
USES THREATS TO PRESENT
KNOWN CONSEQUENCES FOR
NONCOMPLIANCE WHICH ARE
GREATER THAN THE
HYPOTHETICAL COSTS OF
RESISTANCE.
 HISTORICAL EXAMPLES

• JULY 1911-- AGADIR CRISIS– GERMAN

GUNBOAT PANTHER
• 1903- VENEZUELAN CRISIS– US THREAT
OF USING NAVAL FORCE AGAINST
GERMANY/BRITAIN
• 1906– BRITISH THREAT OF USING FORCE
AGAINST TURKEY IN THE SINAI BORDER
DISPUTE WITH EGYPT
• 12-15 MAY 1973– MAYAGUEZ INCIDENT
SS MAYAGUEZ
 SHOW OF FORCE
• SENDING A POWERFUL WARSHIP
OR GROUP OF WARSHIP TO AN
UNSCHEDULED PORT VISIT
• LARGE SCALE NAVAL
MANEUVERS/EXERCISES.
 SHOW OF FORCE
• APR 1946: VISIT OF BB-63 MISSOURI TO
ISTANBUL AND PIRAEUS
• OCT 1967: DEPLOYMENT OF THE SOVIET
AND US NAVAL FORCES IN THE
EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN DURING THE
SIX-DAY WAR
• JAN 1968: DEPLOYMENT OF THREE US
CARRIER GROUPS TO SEA OF JAPAN IN
THE AFTERMATH OF CAPTURE OF AGER-
2 PUEBLO
• APR 1970--SOVIET NAVAL
MANEUVER OKEAN-70
• APR 1975--SOVIET NAVAL
MANEUVER VESNA-75
CONFLICT PREVENTION/ESCALATION
 METHODS
• SENDING A HIGHLY-CAPABLE TASK FORCE TO
IMPRESS THE TARGET COUNTRY
• SENDING ADDITIONAL NAVAL FORCES INTO
THE AREA
• CONDUCTING INTENSIVE RECONNAISSANCE OF
THE CRISIS AREA
• SENDING WARSHIPS TO UNSCHEDULED PORT
VISITS
• TRANSITING THE WATERS IN DIRECT
PROXIMITY TO LAND
• SHOW OF FORCE-- PUBLIC DISPLAY OF
ONE’S NAVAL CAPABILITIES
• DRASTIC INCREASE OR REDUCTION OF
ONE’S COMBAT READINESS
• INTERNATIONAL NAVAL
DEMONSTRATION
• DEC 1971: DEPLOYMENT OF ONE US
CARRIER FORCE TF-74 TO BAY OF
BENGAL DURING THE PEAK OF THE
INDO-PAKISTANI WAR
• OCT 1973: DEPLOYMENT OF THE SOVIET
AND US NAVAL FORCES IN THE
EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN DURING THE
YOM KIPPUR/RAMADAN WAR
• MARCH 1996: CHINESE MISSILE
FIRINGS/EXERCISES OFF TAIWAN’S
COAST.
 NAVAL DEMONSTRATION
• MAY 1913– JOINT NAVAL
DEMONSTRATION (BRITISH,
FRENCH, GERMAN, AUSTRO-
HUNGARIAN, AND ITALIAN SHIPS
AGAINST THE MONTENEGRIN
COAST—SCUTARI CRISIS
CRISIS MANAGEMENT
• CRISIS MANAGEMENT CALLS OFTEN
FOR CONTROLLED CAPABILITY FOR
VIOLENCE OR THREAT OF VIOLENCE
RESIDENT IN THE ONE’S NAVAL FORCES
RANGING FROM BENIGN INFLUENCE TO
PREVENTIVE DEPLOYMENTS IN
SUPPORT OF ACHIEVING THE NATIONAL
POLITICAL OBJECTIVES.
 METHODS
• OPERATIONAL DEPLOYMENTS
• INCREASED LEVEL OF COMBAT READINESS OF
ONE’S NAVAL FORCES
• OPTIMALLY, EACH METHOD SHOULD INCLUDE
SEVERAL DIRECT OR INDIRECT SIGNALS TO BE
CONVEYED TO THE TARGET DECISION
MAKERS, AND TO FRIENDLY AND NEUTRAL
OBSERVERS.
• THEY ARE ALSO COMBINED WITH
ACTIONS AND MEASURE TO
INFLUENCE PUBLIC OPINION AT
HOME, IN THE COUNTRIES
INVOLVED IN A CONFLICT AND
NEUTRAL OBSERVERS.
 PREEMPTIVE DEPLOYMENT

• NAVAL FORCES CAN BE DEPLOYED IN THE

PROXIMITY OF A COUNTRY WHERE HOSTILITIES
THREATEN OR WERE TO BREAK OUT
• SUCH A DEPLOYMENT SHOULD BE
ACCOMPANIED BY A CLEAR WILLINGNESS TO
USE OVERWHELMING FORCE IF NECESSARY
• OTHERWISE, THE PREVENTIVE DEPLOYMENT
OF NAVAL FORCES, REGARDLESS OF THEIR
SIZE AND CAPABILITY, WILL RARELY PRODUCE
THE DESIRED EFFECT.
 HISTORICAL EXAMPLES
• U.S. NAVY AND THE SUEZ WAR OF
1956
• OCT 1962– CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS—
QUARANTINE
• JUNE 1967--U.S. SIXTH FLEET VS.
SOVIET NAVY’S DETACHMENT IN
THE MEDITERRANEAN DURING THE
SIX-DAY WAR
US AIRCRAFT CARRIER IN EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN, JUNE 1967
• SEPT 1970– JORDANIAN CRISIS
• DEC 1971—U.S. AND SOVIET NAVAL
MOVEMENT DURING THE INDO-
PAKISTANI WAR
• U.S. SIXTH FLEET VS. SOVIET FIFTH
ESKADRA DURING THE YOM
KIPPUR/RAMADAN WAR OF
OCTOBER 1973.
QUESTIONS?