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TOPIC: EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY

Group: Nguyễn Thị Diễm Quỳnh

Nguyễn Văn Thương
Nguyễn Ngọc Sơn
INTRODUCTION

 Is  an application of the mathematical theory of games to biological contexts

 The theory of evolution has benefited from the interaction of ecology with economics.
 It merges population ecology with game theory.
 Game theory originally addressed problems of decision makers with different interests (for
instance, competing for a market). The ‘players’ have to choose between strategies whose
payoff depends on their rivals’ strategies.
 The ‘players’ are members of a population, all competing for a larger share of descendants.
 What is analysed in game theory is similar to what happens in population ecology.
HAWKS AND DOVES GAME

 Intraspecific fights provide a first example of changes in a population that are dependent on the
frequency of a trait.
 Hawk: Initiate aggressive behavior, and do not stop until injured or until one’s opponent backs
down.
Dove: Retreat immediately if one’s opponent initiates aggressive behavior.
• Whenever two players both initiate aggressive behavior, conflict eventually results and both are equally
likely to be injured.
• The conflict reduces the individual fitness of the injured party by some constant value C
• When a Hawk meets a Dove, the Dove immediately retreats and the Hawk obtains the resource.
• When two Doves meet the resource is shared equally between them.
If most contestants are doves, the hawk morph will spread; but if most contestants are hawks, so a
conflict will lead with probability ½ to injury.
 V is the gain in fitness resulting from winning the contest, and C is the cost in
fitness due to an injury.

The payoff matrix for the hawk–dove game

If the two both choose Hawk strategy, the game will end up with a win-lose situation.
The winner gets the payment of V-C (value minus cost) and the loser win nothing. Each part has a 50% chance to win and another 50% to lose. If Hawk vs Dove, Hawk
will win V for certain while the Dove will get zero. In a Dove vs Dove situation, they will go 50-50.
THE PRISONER’S DILEMMA
 In population biology, application of the prisoner’s dilemma: avoid larger individuals and
attack smaller individuals. The value or quality of the benefit also influences strategies.
From an evolutionary standpoint, the reward for competitive behavior must outweigh the
risk and cost of competition. Thus, low quality resources are unlikely to drive intense
combat. However, the higher the quality or importance of the benefit, the more intense the
competition will be.
REPEATED INTERACTIONS

 called the iterated prisoner’s dilemma.  Repeated games capture the idea that a player will
have to take into account the impact of his or her current action on the future actions of
other players; this impact is sometimes called his or her reputation. 
 Tit-for-fat: ăn miếng trả miếng
 A tit-for-tat player cooperates in the first round and from then on always repeats whatever
the co-player did in the previous round.
 Other models based on evolutionary games have been used to analyze the emergence of
moral systems, of division of labor or even of proto-languages in primitive societies. In
particular, it has been shown that highly diverse social norms can be stably sustained by
punishment; in many cases, deviating behavior (for instance, the refusal to punish
dissenters) cannot spread. In this sense, evolutionary game theory returns to some basic
topics of classical game theory
POPULATION DYMAMICS
 Population dynamics is the type of mathematics used to model and study the size and age
composition of populations as dynamical systems.
 Simplified population models usually start with four key variables including : death, birth,
immigration, and emigration.

 The field of population ecology often uses data

on life history and matrix algebra to develop
projection matrices on fecundity and
survivorship. This information is used for
managing wildlife stocks and setting harvest
quotas.
LONG-TERM EVOLUTION
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