Tentative schedule for

Environment and Safety

Week 11-12
• HAZOP
• LOPA
• FMECA
Week 13-16
• REACH, COMAH, ALARP
• Waste and wastewater treatment
1
Regarding CW (details/strategies
are there in CW presentation)
• Get the PFD of PET process
• Describe it
• Then take a unit operation/process (for e.g.,
what happens if tank overflows) 
• do your HAZOP and/or other safety topic
on that.
• That is your research.

2
 Chemical Process Safety
(from Crowl and Louver)

Hazard Identification

For an outstanding safety program we need to

prevent the existence of hazards in the first
place. This requires a hazard identification
method. 3
 Learning Objectives

• Define terms related to hazard identification and risk

assessment.
• Describe the hazard identification and risk
assessment procedure.
• Identify the various methods available for hazard
identification / evaluation and risk assessment.
• Describe several commonly used methods for
hazard identification / evaluation
• HAZOP discussion in detail

4
 Introduction
Why? To identify hazards so that they can be
eliminated or controlled.
How? Using a number of available
procedures.

5
 Procedure in Simple Terms
1. What are the hazards?
2. What can go wrong and how?
3. How bad could it be?
4. How often could it happen?
5. What is the risk?
6. How do we control and manage this risk?

6
Hazards
Identification

This is a flowchart of the overall

risk assessment procedure. It
Hazards
includes hazard identification.
Evaluation

Major Steps in Procedure

Risk
Analysis

Risk
Assessment
Scenario-Based Methods: Use predictive and analytical
methods to define the incident scenarios.

*Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) study: A careful

review of a process to identify deviations from the
design or operational intent that can lead to undesired
consequences.
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA): Tabulates
failure modes of equipment and their effects on a
system or process.

8
Scenario-Based Methods: Use predictive and analytical
methods to define the incident scenarios.

What-if analysis: A brainstorming approach to ask

questions or voice concerns about possible undesired
events.
What-if /checklist analysis: Combines what-if analysis
with a checklist.
Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA): A very rigorous
approach using source models, dispersion models,
and effect models to calculate risk estimates for every
possible scenario.

9
Scenario-Based Methods: Use predictive and analytical
methods to define the incident scenarios.

*Layer of protection analysis (LOPA): A simplified

form of quantitative risk analysis using order-of-
magnitude categories for initiating event frequency,
consequence severity, and likelihood of failure of
independent protection layers (IPL). LOPA
determines the adequacy of safeguards in the
context of hazard evaluations.

10
 Factors that Influence the Selection of a Method

1. Motivation for the study, i.e. regulatory

requirements, company policy.
2. Type of results needed, i.e. list of hazards,
potential accident situations.
3. Type of information available to perform the study,
i.e. availability, quality and current status of
information.
4. Characteristics of the analysis problem, i.e. type of
process, complexity, nature of hazards.
5. Perceived risks associated with the process, i.e.
amount and nature of the risks.
6. Resource availability, i.e. availability of
knowledgeable personnel, target completion date,
financial resources. 11
 Hazard and Operability Studies
(HAZOP)
• Can identify hazards due to fixed equipment and
procedures.
• Is a huge effort.
• Provides a controlled mechanism to consider the
things that can go wrong (DEVIATIONS AND THE
CONSEQUENCES).
• Customized for each company.
• Improves process performance, quality, etc.

12
HAZOP is probably the most popular method in
the chemical industry. Some companies apply
it to everything. They have found enormous
benefit from this – way beyond the safety
aspects. This includes increased product
quality, less down time, better process
operability, and more confident employees.

13
 Origin of HAZOP
• HAZOP were initially 'invented' by ICI in the United
Kingdom, but the technique only started to be more widely
used within the chemical process industry after the
Flixborough disaster in1974
• This chemical plant explosion killed twenty eight people
and injured scores of others
• Through the general exchange of ideas and personnel, the
system was then adopted by the petroleum industry, which
has a similar potential for major disasters.
• This was then followed by the food and water industries,
where the hazard potential is as great, but of a different
nature, the concerns being more to do with contamination
rather than explosions or chemical releases.
 Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP)

• HAZOP review done by a team of 5 to 10 people.

• Team leader must be trained.
• Procedure can generate 1000s of combinations.
• Need a method to keep track of issues considered.
• Need a management system to track action items.
• Procedure can take several months.
• Max. activity: about 2/3 meetings per week, 2-3
hours.

15
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N29Bw_hbXfY

16
17
 HAZOP (Terminologies)
Node: A location on a process diagram at which process
parameters are investigated for deviations. Node
examples are:
A pipeline transferring material between two units
A specific tank or vessel
Design intent: Defines how the system is expected to
operate at the nodes. It provides a point of reference for
developing deviations.
Parameter: A characteristic of the process that describes
it physically, chemically, or in terms of what is
happening:
Specific parameters: flow, temperature, pressure, etc.
General parameters: addition, reaction, maintenance,
relief, etc. 18
 HAZOP (Terminologies)
Guidewords: See Table.
Deviations: These irregularities are discovered by
systematically applying the guidewords to each
parameter at each node (e.g., more + temperature =
higher temperature).
Causes: The reasons why deviations may occur. Causes
can be equipment failure, human error, or external
events.
Consequences: Documented as impacts resulting from
the loss event.

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 HAZOP (Terminologies)
Recommendations: Suggested actions to prevent or
mitigate the consequence of deviations, or to obtain
further information.
Safeguards: The systems in place that reduce the
probability of the deviation occurring or mitigate the
severity of the consequences.

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 HAZOP
Starting from design all the way through construction
and operation , HAZOP identifies operability , hazard
to human health and the environment .
It is comprehensive PHA for all product life stages .
Nodes and relative key words are given to each
process stage .
On each node potential causes and consequences of
hazard are identified , including equipment failure ,
human error, engineering , administrative and
external events .
Severity and occurrence likelihood ranking are
estimated using matrix analysis where numerical
valves are assigned to each potential hazard .
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 HAZOP Guidewords

No Other than
More Sooner than Batch
Less Later than
As Well as Where else
Part of
Reverse

22
 HAZOP Guidewords
Guide Meaning Comments
words
no, not, The complete No part of the design intention is
none negation of the achieved, but nothing else happens.
intention

more, Quantitative Applies to quantities such as flow rate

higher, increase and temperature and to activities such
greater as heating and reaction.

less, lower Quantitative Applies to quantities such as flow rate

decrease and temperature and to activities such
as heating and reaction.
as well as Qualitative All the design and operating intentions
increase are achieved along with some
additional activity, such as
contamination of process streams.
part of Qualitative Only some of the design intentions are
decrease achieved; some are not.
23
Guide Meaning Comments
words
reverse The logical Most applicable to activities such as
opposite flow or chemical reaction. Also
applicable to substances—for
example, poison instead of antidote.

other than Complete No part of the original intention is

substitution achieved; the original intention is
replaced by something else.

sooner than Too early or in the Applies to process steps or actions.

wrong order

later than Too late or in the Applies to process steps or actions.

wrong order

where else In additional Applies to process locations, or

locations locations in operating procedures.
 
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 HAZOP Process Parameters
Temperature Start
Pressure Stop
Flow Power
Level Component
Concentration
Agitation
Reaction
25
 Guideword / Parameter Combinations

Some combinations of guidewords and process

parameters do not make sense for specific equipment
pieces.
Examples: No temperature
Reverse temperature
No viscosity
Reverse pressure

26
 HAZOP Procedure - 1
1. Begin with a detailed flow sheet.
2. Divide flow sheet into sections, i.e. reactor, storage.
3. Choose a study node, i.e. line, vessel, pump,
operating instruction.
4. Describe its design intent.
5. Select a process parameter.
6. Apply a guide word to the process parameter.
7. If the deviation is applicable, determine possible
causes.
27
 HAZOP Procedure - 2
8. Evaluate consequences of the deviation.
9. Recommend action: what? who?
when?
10. Record all information.
11. Repeat 5 to 10 for a new guide word.
12. Repeat 4 to 11 for a new process parameter.
13. Repeat 2 to 12 for a new study node.
14. Repeat 1 to 13 for a new flow sheet section.

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HAZOP Example

Coffee grounds

Coffee filter
Water
Coffee
container
Power
Study Nodes

Select water as a study node.

Apply process parameter of flow.
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 HAZOP Example
Param. Dev. Cause Consequence Action

Flow No 1. No water No coffee Check water

2. Plugged spout “ Clean spout
3. No power “ Check power
4. Basket plugged “ Clean basket
More Too much water Pot overflows Check level
Less Not enough water Pot not filled Check level

30
31
32
 HAZOP Summary
Advantages: Meets regulatory requirements
Plant operates better
Less down time
Product quality improved
Employees are happier
Disadvantages: Time, people and effort
Information management problem

33
 References

• Bahr, N. (2014). System Safety Engineering and Risk Assessment (2nd ed.).
CRC Press.
• Hyatt, Nigel. (2003). Guidelines for Process Hazards Analysis (PHA,
HAZOP), Hazards Identification, and Risk Analysis. Place of publication not
identified: C R C Press LLC.
• Kletz, T. (1999). Hazop and hazan: Identifying and assessing process industry
hazards (4th ed.). Rugby: Institution of Chemical Engineers.
• Nolan, D. (2015). Safety and security review for the process industries :
Application of HAZOP, PHA and What-If and SVA reviews (4th ed.).
Waltham, Massachusetts: Gulf Professional Publishing.
• Daniel A. Crowl (Author), Joseph F. Louvar (Author)
Chemical Process Safety: Fundamentals with Applications. Prentice Hall
International Series in Physical and Chemical Engineering) (4th ed)

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Questions?

35
Process Example Hazard Typical Hazard Evaluation or Risk
Phase Identification/Evaluation Objectives Analysis Method
Research -Identify chemical reactions or Inherent safety review
and chemical incompatibilities that Relative ranking
development could cause runaway reactions, Preliminary hazard analysis
fires, explosions, or toxic gas
releases.
-Identify process safety data needs
for future analysis.
Conceptual -Select process technology based Inherent safety What-if
design on inherent safety. review What-if/
-Identify other opportunities for Checklist analysis checklist
inherent safety. Relative ranking Inherent
-Compare the hazards between Preliminary safety review
potential plant sites. hazard analysis LOPA
Pilot plant -Identify ways for hazardous Checklist analysis FMEA
materials to be released to the Preliminary Fault tree
environment. hazard analysis Event tree
-Identify ways a catalyst can be What-if Cause–
deactivated. What-if/checklist consequence
-Identify potentially hazardous HAZOP analysis
operator interfaces. LOPA
Bow-tie
36
Process Example Hazard Typical Hazard Evaluation or
Phase Identification/Evaluation Objectives Risk Analysis Method
Detailed -Identify ways for a flammable mixture Inherent safety FMEA
engineering to form inside process equipment. review Fault tree
-Identify how a reportable spill might Checklist Event tree
occur. analysis Cause–
-Identify which process control Preliminary consequence
malfunctions will cause runaway hazard analysis
reactions. analysis QRA
-Identify ways to reduce hazardous What-if LOPA
material inventories. What-if/ Bow-tie
-Evaluate whether designed checklist
safeguards are adequate to control HAZOP
process risks to required levels.
Construction -Identify error likely situations in the Safety review
and startup startup and operating procedures. Checklist analysis
-Verify that all issues from previous What-if
hazard evaluations were resolved What-if/checklist
satisfactorily and that no new issues
were introduced.
-Identify hazards that adjacent units
may create for construction and
maintenance workers.
37
Process Example Hazard Typical Hazard Evaluation or
Phase Identification/Evaluation Objectives Risk Analysis Method
Routine -Identify hazards associated with Inherent FMEA
operation operating procedures. safety review Fault tree
-Identify ways an overpressure Safety review Event tree
transient might occur. Checklist Cause–
-Update previous hazard evaluations to analysis consequence
account for operational experience. What-if analysis
-Identify hazards associated with out- What- QRA
of-service equipment. if/checklist LOPA
-Ensure that maintenance is done on HAZOP
time and safely. Bow-tie
Process -Identify whether changing the  
modificatio feedstock composition will create any All methods
n or plant new hazards or worsen existing ones.
expansion -Identify hazards associated with new
equipment.
Decommis -Identify how demolition work will affect Safety What-if
sioning adjacent units. review What-if/checklist
-Identify any fire, explosion, or toxic Checklist
hazards associated with any residues analysis
left in the unit after shutdown.

38
Process Phase Example Hazard Typical Hazard Evaluation or
Identification/Evaluation Objectives Risk Analysis Method
Incident As required. What-if Event tree
investigation HAZOP Cause–
FMEA consequence
Fault tree analysis
Bow-tie QRA
 

39