History of European Integration

1945-1979

Peter Bursens

2021 -2022

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 Integration versus functioning of the EU

History of European Integration:

Questions: - what is the degree of integration?
- why do sovereign states integrate?
Theory: - theories from International Relations / European
integration
(functionalism, liberal intergovernmentalism, …)

Functioning of the European Union / EU as a political system

Questions: - how does EU decision-making work?
- who determines policy contents?
Theory: - theories from comparative politics
(institutionalism, policy networks, multi-level
governance, …)

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 1945-1957: first steps towards integration
federalists vs. intergovernmentalists

• The ‘European Movement’: plea for a Federal Europe

1923: Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi: ‘Pan Europea’
1929: Aristide Briand: League of Nations speech
1944: Altiero Spinelli: ‘Draft Declaration of the European
Resistance’
Jean Monnet: key player of the European federalists
• The competing intergovernmental perspective
1946: Winston Churchill: ‘Zurich speech’
• The ‘European Congress’ in The Hague (1948): victory of the
intergovernmentalist view on European integration
1949: Council of Europe: limited output, except in the field of
Human Rights (European Declaration HR, European Court of HR),

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 1945-1957: first steps towards integration
US Involvement

• Post WW II: devastating situation in Western Europe motivates the

US to get involved:
Economic restoration through the Marshall Plan
Organisation of European Cooperation and Development (OECD)

Start of the Cold War brings US military presence in

Western Europe
Greece – 1947; NATO - 1949

• The Marshall Plan opens the issue of German rehabilitation: how to

reconcile the recovery of the German economy with the economic
development and military security of France?

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 1945-1957: first steps towards integration
France and Jean Monnet

• France reluctantly sees the uncontrolled economic recovery of Germany.

• Jean Monnet (a top civil servant) persuades Robert Schuman (the French
Minister of Foreign Affairs) to radically change the French position towards
becoming a supporter of the creation of a supranational organisation to
manage the economic sectors of coal and steel.
• Monnet’s idea was that the integration of the coal and steel sectors would
eventually lead to the integration of the whole economy
(cf. spill-over logic of the functional perspective)
• Shuman’s proposal is supported by Adenauer (BRD) en Acheson / Truman
(US)

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 1945-1957: first steps towards integration
The Schuman Declaration and the ECSC

• Schuman-Declaration (9 May 1950): proposal to establish a supranational

organisation comprising France and Germany and an invitation to the
Benelux and Italy to join the initiative.
The UK was not invited, because France feared that a British rejection of the
supranational nature would endanger the integration process.
April 1951: signing of the Treaty of Paris establishing the European Coal and
Steel Community (ECSC).
Augustus 1952: foundation of the ECSC
• Structure and policy of the ECSC:
Creation of a High Authority, a Court of Justice, a Council of Ministers
and a Common Assembly
creation of a common market for coal and steel and common control
over production, price-setting and competition

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 1945-1957: first steps towards integration
Failed attempt to establish a European Defence Community

• Pleven-plan (1950) a European Defence Community (EDC) aiming to

remilitarise West-Germany under control of other West European states
• Negotiations between the 6 member states of the ECSC (1951-1952)
• May 1952: signing of the EDC Treaty
• Failed ratification of the EDC Treaty in the French Assemblée (1954), under
pressure of Charles De Gaulle.

• Alternative and successful attempt to remilitarise: West-Germany (BRD)

becomes NATO-member in 1955.

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 1945-1957: first steps towards integration
foundation of EEC and EURATOM

• Monnet’s spill-over logic adds a new sector to the integration: atomic

energy.
• Messina 1955: ECSC Foreign Affairs Ministers commission a report of Paul
Henri Spaak discussing further steps in the integration process
• Venice 1956: ‘Report Spaak’ proposes to establish two new
organisations: (one for atomic energy and one for a common market):
start of an Intergovernmental Conference (IGC)
• All ECSC member states support the idea, although France initially
rejects the common market idea (reasons: overseas territories,
agriculture, national industries)

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 1945-1957: first steps towards integration
foundation of EEC and EURATOM

• Negotiations among the 6 ECSC member states lead to:

The Treaties of Rome (1957)
the EURATOM-Treaty
the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (EEC)

• Ratification of both treaties in 1957

• New institutions effective in 1958
The High Authority becomes the European Commission
more competencies for the Council of Ministers
The Common Assembly and the Court of Justice remain
unchanged
Brussels becomes the ‘Capital of Europe’

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 1958-1969: De Gaulle dominates European politics
De Gaulle’s European policy

• 1958: start of France’s ‘Fifth Republic’, Charles De Gaulle becomes

president of France
• De Gaulle was a supporter of economic integration:
devaluation and economic reform prepare France for the European
customs union, thus making the customs union possible
plea for a Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) to support and co-
finance the reform of the French agriculture sector
• UK’s reaction to the establishment of EURATOM and EEC: the foundation of
the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in 1960
Members: UK, Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Finland

• Strengthening of the German – French Axis, based upon the excellent

personal relationship between Konrad Adenauer and Charles De Gaulle
French-German Friendship Treaty (‘Elysée-Treaty’, 1963)

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 1958-1969: De Gaulle dominates European politics
De Gaulle’s European policy

• De Gaulle aims to incorporate supranational economic integration in a

broader intergovernmental political and military cooperation
Ultimate aim: to establish a ‘European Europe’, starring France as the
undisputed political leader

• Fouchet-plan (1960 - 1962): proposal to establish intergovernmental

cooperation in the field of foreign and defence policies.
German support: German – French axis, opportunity for rehabilitation
Rejected by the other EEC member states: too intergovernmental

Charles De Gaulle - cartoon

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 1958-1969: De Gaulle dominates European politics
Evolution of the EEC
• Elaboration of the EEC institutional structure:
European Commission: Hallstein becomes first president, development of
the administration
Council of Ministers: secretariat based in Brussels, establishment of the
COREPER
Court of Justice: start of influential case-law
Common Assembly: first plenary meetings

• Development of the EEC’s policy content:

Customs Union: abolishment of internal tariffs, common external tariff
External Policies: GATT-negotiations, Yaoundé-convention
Competition, Transport, Energy, Social Affairs: very slow progress
CAP: progress thanks to a common understanding between the European
Commission and Charles De Gaulle

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 1958-1969: De Gaulle dominates European politics
The ‘Empty Chair’ crisis

• Dispute between the European Commission and France with respect to

the financing of the Common Agriculture Policy:
• The proposal of the European Commission:
‘Own resources’ for the EEC
More powers for the European Commission and the Common
Assembly at the expense of the member states
Majority Voting to replace unanimity
• Unacceptable for France: too much loss of sovereignty
• France leaves the negotiations and refuses to participate in the meetings of
the Council of Ministers: the ‘empty chair’ crisis (1965).
• Other member states refuse to give in

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 1958-1969: De Gaulle dominates European politics
The ‘Empty Chair’ crisis

• France eventually shows up again (1966) and accepts a compromise:

interim financing of the CAP
postponement of the ‘own resources’ issue
the ‘Luxembourg Compromise’ (‘agreement to disagree’)
Voting by qualified majority becomes possible. However, unanimity can
be invoked whenever a member state perceives its national vital
interests are at stake.

• Result: EEC can get back to work, but intergovernmentalism is reinforced

The intergovernmental method becomes even more crucial
Decision-making procedures are slowed down

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 1958-1969: De Gaulle dominates European politics
The ‘Luxembourg Compromise’

1. ‘When issues very important to one or more member countries are at

stake, the members of the Council will try, within a reasonable time, to
reach solutions which can be adopted by all members of the Council, while
respecting their mutual interests, and those of the Community.’
2. ‘The French delegation considers that, when very important issues are at
stake, discussions must be continued until unanimous agreement is
reached.’
3. The six delegations note that there is a divergence of views on what
should be done in the event of a failure to reach complete agreement.’
4. However, they consider that this divergence does not prevent the
Community’s work being resumed in accordance with the normal
procedure.’

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 1958-1969: De Gaulle dominates European politics
the UK’s membership application

• The UK applies a first time for EEC membership in 1961

Commonwealth and EFTA show worse economic figures than
EEC
UK is deeply divided with respect to EC membership
Prime Minister Macmillan was an Atlanticist and received
President Kennedy’s support for EC membership application

• Very difficult negotiations

De Gaulle distrusted the UK-US ties
discussions with respect to agriculture, Commonwealth and
EFTA
Nassau-agreement between UK and US: US missiles in the UK

• De Gaulle vetoes British membership in 1963 UK accession - cartoon

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 1958-1969: De Gaulle dominates European politics
the UK’s membership application

• The UK applies a second time for EC membership in 1967

EFTA is still performing economically worse than the EC
still deep divisions within the UK with respect to EC membership

• De Gaulle reacts much faster and declares that the UK is politically and
economically not ready for EC membership

• May ’68 revolt forces De Gaulle to resign in 1969

• the EEC slowly recovers from years of stagnation
Fusion Treaty (1965): EEC plus ECSC = European Community
(EC)
Successful negotiations of the GATT’s Kennedy-round

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 1969-1979: from Euro-optimism to Euro-pessimism
new ‘relance’ in The Hague

• German Prime Minister Willy Brandt makes Germany more politically

assertive (‘Ostpolitik’). Germany starts performing very well economically.
Brandt supports British EC accession.
• President Pompidou balances between the inheritance of De Gaulle and the
aim to give France a more central position in the European debate. France
starts performing less well economically. Pompidou becomes a supporter of
British EC accession to ensure an antidote for German economic hegemony.

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 1969-1979: from Euro-optimism to Euro-pessimism
new ‘relance’ in The Hague

• The Summit of The Hague (1969) brings optimism

Completion of the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) (financing)
Foreign Policy Cooperation (Davignon)
Monetary Policy Cooperation (Werner)
British accession negotiations as from 1970

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 1969-1979: from Euro-optimism to Euro-pessimism
results of ‘The Hague’

• Own resources for the EC: all import tariffs and maximum 1% of VAT revenues
! no consideration of the net payer status of future member UK !
• European Parliament receives limited powers over the budget

• Report Davignon (1970): European Political Cooperation (EPC), outside the

existing EC institutional structure
• Report Werner (1970): ambitious plan to establish an Economic and Monetary
Union (EMU) within 10 years.

• Take-off of new accession negotiations

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 1969-1979: from Euro-optimism to Euro-pessimism
first enlargement
• UK
Heath applies for EC membership in 1970
Still deeply divided political elites within the UK
Negotiations (1970-1971)
mainly discuss agricultural and financial issues
French referendum accepts UK accession in 1972
UK ratification of the accession treaty in 1972
• Norway
Referendum rejects accession (53.5% against): agriculture, fisheries, oil
• Denmark
Referendum accepts accession (63% in favour), but much scepticism
• Ireland
Referendum accepts accession (83% in favour), start of a success story
• UK, Ireland and Denmark become EC member states in 1973

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 1969-1979: from Euro-optimism to Euro-pessimism
economic and political crisis

• End of the Bretton Woods agreements (1971) brings Europe in a

recession and increases the necessity for European monetary coordination:
creation of the currency ‘snake’ (1972) and a call for an EMU (1972)
• Oil crisis (1973) worsens the economic crisis, making forecasts to
establish a common monetary and energy policy very gloomy
• EC – US tension: oil crisis and Israeli - Arab conflict
• French – German tensions: Ostpolitik
• British – German tensions: European Fund for Regional Development
(EFRD)
• Pompidou, Heath, Brandt disappear, Giscard d’Estaing, Schmidt and
Wilson rise to power

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 1969-1979: from Euro-optimism to Euro-pessimism
British re-negotiations’

• Prime Minister Wilson (Labour) wants to renegotiate the conditions of British

membership
• Giscard opposes, Schmidt supports the demand
• The UK seeks to renegotiate more issues (CAP, Commonwealth relations)
• Paris Summit (1974)
Agreement with respect to the EFRD
European Commission is asked to investigate a UK correction mechanism
• Dublin Summit (1975): agreement with respect to the mechanism
• UK Referendum accepts the Dublin compromise

• Political consequence:
the UK becomes an ‘awkward’ partner

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 1969-1979: from Euro-optimism to Euro-pessimism
French - German axis

• Excellent personal relationship between Schmidt en Giscard d’Estaing

• Mutual agreement to institutionalise EC Summits: birth of the European
Council / direct EP-elections as compromise).

• European Council meetings don’t succeed in revitalising the EC

EMU-plans frozen (1975)
European Commission is not functioning well
slow and difficult decision-making within the Council of Ministers
rejection of the Tindemans-report (1976) and the ‘Three Wise
Men’ report

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 Example multiple choice question

Why could one say that the Schuman Plan should NOT have been named that

way?

Because it was largely inspired by Spinelli's and Rossi's manifesto that called for a

'European Federation'

Because it clearly reflected Mitrany's ideas on functionalism

Because Schuman, although he presented the plan, did not support the plan

Because it was drawn up by a planning committee headed by Jean Monnet

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 Example multiple choice question

Why could one say that the Schuman Plan should NOT have been named that

way?

Because it was largely inspired by Spinelli's and Rossi's manifesto that called for a

'European Federation'

Because it clearly reflected Mitrany's ideas on functionalism

Because Schuman, although he presented the plan, did not support the plan

Because it was drawn up by a planning committee headed by Jean Monnet

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