MUMBAI TERROR ATTACK

26/11
Contents

Part 1 INTRODUCTION

Part 2 PLACES OF ATTACK

Part 3 MEDIA COVERAGE

Terrorism
"Terrorism is the deliberate killing of innocent people,
at random, to spread fear through a whole population
and force the hand of its political leaders"

-Michael Walzer
(U.S American Political Philosopher)
 Introduction to the Attack
The 2008 Mumbai attacks (also referred to as 26/11) were a group of terrorist
attacks that took place in November 2008, when 10 members of Lashkar-e-Taibaan
Islamic terrorist organisation based in Pakistan, carried out a series of 12
coordinated shooting and bombing attacks lasting four days across Mumbai. The
attacks, which drew widespread global condemnation, began on Wednesday, 26
November and lasted until Saturday, 29 November 2008. 164 people died and
308 were wounded.
 PATHLINEE
 10- man team chartered the MV Alpha cargo ship out of Karachi (506m from
Mumbai)

 To avoid detection by Indian coast guard, hijacked a fishing trawler

 Inflatable rafts carried teams to Indian gateway.

 Here, four teams split off.

Eight of the attacks occurred in South Mumbai:
 at Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus,

 the Oberoi Trident,

 the Taj Palace & Tower,

 Leopold Cafe, Cama Hospital,

 the Nariman House Jewish community centre,

 the Metro Cinema, and

 in a lane behind the Times of India building and

 St. Xavier's College.

 TIMELINE : the attack lasted for four days

NOVEMBER 26
The 10 Lashkar terrorists arrive
in Mumbai from Karachi on
speedboats
NOVEMBER 27
Army soldiers and Marine com-
mandos surround the hostage
sites--the Taj, Trident and Nariman
House. The elite NSG, deployed to
storm the sites, launch Operation
NOVEMBER 28 Black Tornado.

Commandos finish the opera-

tion at the Trident, as well as
Nariman House. NOVEMBER 29
The attacks come to an end
with the NSG securing the Taj.
 NSG raid (Operation Black Tornado)
 During the attacks, both hotels were surrounded by Rapid Action Force personnel and Marine
Commandos (MARCOS) and National Security Guards (NSG) commandos. Security forces stormed both
hotels

 All nine attackers were killed by the morning of 29 November.

 Major Sandeep Unnikrishnan of the NSG was killed during the rescue of Commando Sunil Yadav, who was
hit in the leg by a bullet during the rescue operations at Taj.

 The final operation at the Taj Palace hotel was completed by the NSG commandos at 08:00 on 29 No-
vember, killing three attackers and resulting in the conclusion of the attacks.

 They rescued 300 people from The Taj Mahal Hotel

 THE MARTYRS

NSG COMMANDO
ATS CHIEF MAJOR SANDEEP ENCOUNTER SPEA- ASI TUKARAM
HEMANT KARKARE UNNIKRISHNAN CIALIST VIJAY SLASKAR OMBLE
 THE ATTACKERS

 Bada Abdul Rehaman

 Abu Ali
 Abu Soheb Rehaman
 Fahad Ullah
 Chota Abdul
 Isamal Khan
 Nasir
 Ajmal Kasav
 Babar Imran
 EFFECTS OF THE ATTACKS
 In the aftermath of the 2008 Mumbai attacks, there were multiple and far-ranging event
that were observed. Besides the immediate impact on the victims and their families,

 The attacks caused widespread anger among the Indian public, and condemnations from
countries throughout the world. The immediate impact was felt on Maharashtra state,
and throughout urban India

 Citizens gather outside the Taj Mahal palace and tower hotel demanding the
government action.

 The project of Taj Reconstruction took 21 months to asses and restore damage, and cost
more than $38 million in repairs, an amount which the hotel says it more than lost in-
business while closed down for reconstruction.
EVIDENCES OF TERRORISRT BEING FROM PAKISTAN
 severall key weaknesses of the country
intelligence failure gaps in coastal
surveillance

poor stratigic commu- 1 2 inadequate target

nication & info. man- 8 3 hardening
agement.

limitation of municipal 7 4 incomplete execution

fires and emergency 6 5 of response protocols
services

inadequate counterterror- response time

ism training and equipment problems
for local police
Indian local &national body reaction...
 Criticism of politicians and resignations

Indians criticised their political leaders after the attacks, saying their bickering and
ineptness was at least partly responsible.

 Criticism of the rescue operation

The NSG commandos based in Mehram Nagar, Palam Airport, Delhitook 10 hours to
reach the terrorists.

 Demand for self-defense

The war on Mumbai has left the corporate sector of India angry; vulnerable sectors
want to be armed.
 International support...
 Australia - Australia had sent a team of Federal Police to Mumbai. A group of seven officers have
arrived to study the terror attack and the modus operandi used by the terrorists. Israel Israel had
offered a forty-strong team of special operation forces and assistance in investigations.

 Malaysia - Malaysian authorities had investigated reports related to Malaysian-issued credit cards
found in the belongings of the terrorists involved in the Mumbai attacks.

 United Kingdom - United Kingdom had sent 15 forensic experts from the intelligence services to
Mumbai to help with the investigations on the attacks on India's financial capital.

 US President of the United States George W. Bush told Prime Minister Manmohan Singh that
American agencies will "throw their weight" behind India's investigation into the Mumbai terror
attacks and demonstrate a "shared commitment" to combat terrorism.
.

Improvement in security arrengments after the

attack
 Force One, Maharashtra's "elite security force designed on the lines of the
National Security Guard
(NSG)" has been commissioned.

 Arms purchase has increased in India

 The Navy is also beefing up on infrastructure to protect India

 Manpower is also being increased.

The government have strengthen the following...
 Border Security Force

 Central Industrial Security Force

 Central Reserve Police Force

 National Security Guards

 Special Protection Group

 State police

 Metropolitan police State Armed Police Forces

Implications of media during 26/11
 Police Forces
 Negative:-

1) The media coverage of National Security Guard commandos gave

the terrorists a window into their combat strategies:-

 It has been said that journalists are terrorists’ best friends, because they are will-
ing to give terrorist operations maximum exposure.
 It simply means that violence is news, whereas peace and harmony are not.
 The terrorists need the media, and the media find in terrorism all the ingredients
of an exciting story.
.
2) Theatre of terror:-
 Some media scholars call terrorist incidents as “theatre of terror” where
media provides the stage in which the actors – perpetrators and victims – per-
form to enthral the audience.

 According to Gabriel Weimann: “While the terrorists may write the scripts
and perform the drama, the “theatre of terror” only becomes possible when
the media provide the stage and access to a worldwide audience. Terrorism is
aimed at people watching, not the actual victims”
 Positive:-
1) Journalists as essential workers:-

 It’s a vital job, and not an easy one.

 Journalists, no doubt, have to tread a fine line to balance public demands with ethical
considerations.

 It’s important to remember that during terror events, journalists also risk their lives to bring
in news.

 They are very much a part of the ecosystem of essential workers in a terror attack.

 They too have to react quickly and respond to emergency situations around them.

 Their job is to bring truth to the public which includes accurately describing what is
happening, helping curb fears and panic, supporting the public to make informed decisions,
built resilience and help the recovery from the tragic events.
PRESENTED BY : KULWINDER KAUR ,
KANAK KARIHALOO,
Police Forces
SHWETA KACHROO

THANK YOU