Government Response to the Muslim Insurgency in Mindanao

The GRP policy positions in addressing the armed

conflict in Mindanao
1. Pacification position – seeks a cessation of
hostilities and demobilization of the insurgent
force while making concessions as possible.
• it may be accompanied by attempts to improve
the military position in order to pressure towards
cessation of hostilities and demobilization with
concessions;
2. Victory position – seeks the immediate end of
armed conflicts and the defeat of insurgents.
.
3. Institutional position – advocates the adoption and
implementation of policies necessary to achieve
sustainable, long-term peace and the articulation
of institutions to implement and consolidate these
policies
Note: The government’s responses to the armed
conflict were a compromise between civilian and
military interpretations and perceptions of armed
threats and how best to respond to them.
• The balance between the use of military force
(right hand) and socioeconomic and political
measures (left hand) to address the root causes of
the insurgency is dependent upon:
a. the overall political, economic, social, and
environmental context, the strategic situation on the
ground,
b. the personality and policy preferences of political and
military leaders
Government counter secessionist efforts
Marcos administration
1. Military Action The Government's initial response to
the insurgency in Mindanao was to put more troops
into the troubled area.
Phases of the Military Operation
1.1. consolidation of existing forces and build-up of
troops and resources
1.2. offensive phase aimed at the destruction of rebel
forces which involved :
a. Securing bases for future operation
b. Consolidation of areas not under rebel control
c. Strengthening of the CHDF -This was to enable the
people to secure their respective communities and free
AFP units for operations against the main rebel forces.
1.3. reestablishment of civil authority which involved:
a. appointment of local officials,
b. reintroduction of government agencies,
c. reopening of schools, and
d. strengthening of police forces
1.4. reconstruction and rehabilitation phase
1.5. reconciliation phase -An intensive psychological operations
directed towards the people to forget the hatred, animosity and
bitterness caused by the conflict will be conducted by the
government.
2. Diplomatic Offensive – Because of
• the escalating cost of military operation against the rebels and
• the possibility of sanctions by the Middle East countries that
controlled its oil supply
diplomatic offensive was launched aimed at closing the flow of foreign
support to the Muslim rebels which involved:
• establishing friendly relations with Islamic countries
• supporting the Arab cause in the United Nations to persuade Israel
to withdraw from occupied Arab territories
• getting the support of Indonesia in presenting its case to the OIC
Foreign Ministers Conference in Kuala Lumpur that led
the conferees to agree that secession is not the solution to the
'Muslim problem' in the Mindanao.
3. Socioeconomic development
a. extending to them as much economic aid as possible, to wit:
• building more roads and irrigation systems
• revising Amanah Bank operations to conform with the Islamic
concept of banking ( no interest and partnership principle
• Removing the restrictions on the barter trade with Borneo
• Major portions of loans secured from the World Bank, the Asian
Development Bank and other United Nations organizations were
invested in infrastructure and socioeconomic projects in
Mindanao
• Creating the Southern Philippines Development Authority (SPDA)
b. promoting their cultural heritage and attending to their
educational and social needs
• Establishment of the Institute of Islamic Studies at UP Diliman
• Proclamation of Muslim holidays for the region
• Codification of Muslim personal laws and establishment of sharia
courts
4. Moves to Discredit the MNLF
• The government claimed that the MNLF does not represent the
sentiments of the Filipino Muslims
• a conference in Marawi City sponsored by the 'Federation of the
Royal Houses of Mindanao and Sulu' placed on record its
unanimous vote of confidence in President Marcos' leadership
• convince MNLF members to surrender by giving them amnesty
and incentives ranging from cash grants, logging concessions and
scholarships to military commissions and placements in the
government at the municipal or regional assembly level
5. Peace Negotiation - leading to the signing of the Tripoli
Agreement
2. Corazon Aquino Administration
Adopted the policy of reconciliation leading her:
• To release political prisoner from the CPP-NPA
• Resume negotiation with the MNLF leading to signing of the
Jeddah Accord (Jan 4, 1987)
proposed to grant autonomy to all of Mindanao and the island
provinces of Tawi-Tawi, Basilan, Sulu and Palawan "subject to
democratic processes.“
• Despite breakdown of the talks, the Government pursued to
form an autonomous region in Mindanao
• To help Congress draft an organic act, the Mindanao Regional
Consultative Commission (MRCC) was organized
Passage of the Organic Act of 1989 -creating the four Muslim-
dominated provinces of Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Maguindanao and Lanao
del Sur composed the new Autonomous Region of Muslim
Mindanao (ARMM).
FIDEL RAMOS administration
He tried to reach out to the rebel groups
To spearhead the peace effort of the president, he created the
National Unification Commission (NUC)
He proclaimed certain provinces of Mindanao as Special Zone
of Peace and Development(SZOPAD) consisting of the following:
(a) The provinces of Basilan, Cotabato, Davao del Sur, Lanao del
Norte, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Palawan, Sarangani, Sultan
Kudarat, Sulu, South Cotabato, Tawi-Tawi Zamboanga del Norte,
and Zamboanga del Sur; and
(b) The cities of Cotabato, Dapitan, Dipolog, General Santos,
Iligan, Marawi, Pagadian, Puerto Princesa, and Zamboanga.
The above areas shall be provided with the following
development efforts:
(a) Provision for basic services in the depressed areas of the ZOPAD,
such as water, electricity, educational facilities, socialized housing, and
health and sanitation, among others;
(b) Provision for adequate infrastructure facilities to support the
development requirements within the ZOPAD and enhance linkages
with areas outside of it;
(c) Promotion of investments and trade, both domestic and
international, to generate employment and create opportunities for
economic development;
(d) Provision for entrepreneurial development support, livelihood
assistance, and credit facilities so that those in the ZOPAD, especially
the vulnerable sectors such as women, farmers and fisher folk,
unemployed, urban and rural poor, among others, shall have greater
control over their economic destinies; and
(e) Provision for capability-building assistance for local communities
and organizations, especially women's groups, to take full advantage
of development programs and projects in the ZOPAD.
Development efforts in the ZOPAD shall be carried out
through the following:
a. Institutional Mechanisms such as
a.a. Southern Philippines Council for Peace and
Development (SPCPD)
a.b. Cabinet Officer for Regional Development (CORD)
system,
a.c. area-specific development task forces,
a.d. regional development councils system,
a.e. Southern Philippines Development Authority, and
a.f. other institutional mechanisms which may be
established; and
b. Existing development programs, such as but not limited to
b.a. the BIMP-East ASEAN Growth Area,
b.b. Social Reform Agenda localization programs,
b.c. flagship projects, and
b.d. Presidential Council for Countryside Development
(PCCD) programs for priority provinces.
The Southern Philippines Council for Peace and
Development (SPCPD) - to coordinate and promote the
economic and social growth and development of the ZOPAD
Specifically:
(a) To take charge in promoting, monitoring, and
coordinating the improvement of peace and order in the
ZOPAD;
(b) To focus on peace and development efforts more
particularly in the depressed areas of the ZOPAD and
cause the implementation of peace and
development projects;
(c) To provide support to local government units as
necessary;
(d) To exercise such other powers and functions
necessary for the effective implementation of its
mandate as may be delegated by the President;
(e) To cause the creation of such offices or
instrumentalities as shall be necessary for the
effective and efficient administration of the affairs of
the areas
Role of SPCPD with respect to development concerns
(a) Promote, coordinate, and monitor development efforts in the
ZOPAD, including the encouragement of domestic and foreign
investments, subject to existing laws, especially from the Organization
of Islamic Conference and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations;
(b) Network with government and other development institutions to
generate resources and economic opportunities for the ZOPAD; and
(c) Coordinate for the Office of the President with concerned
departments and local government units in the promotion and the
implementation of the programs and projects of the following
agencies, namely: the Southern Philippines Development Authority
(SPDA), the Office of Muslim Affairs (OMA), and the Office of
Southern Cultural Communities (OSCC), only insofar as their
respective offices or projects located in the ZOPAD are concerned;
and the Basilan Development Task Force, the Central Mindanao
Development Task Force the Sulu Development Planning Task Group.
Role of SPCPD with respect to Peace and Order Concerns
(a) Monitor the implementation of peace and order and public safety
measures in the area;
(b) Hold consultative meetings and disseminate vital information
pertaining to peace and order in the area;
(c) Conduct advocacy and public information to drive to enhance public
support for law and order in the area;
(d) Keep itself informed of peace and order programs and situation
obtaining in the area, through coordination with military and police
forces, and request such police or military forces to address specific
contingencies in accordance with law, provided however, that the
control and supervision of the police and the military forces shall
remain and continue to be vested in their respective chains of
command under existing laws; and
(e) Submit reports and make recommendations to the President on
matters pertaining to peace and order in the ZOPAD, in coordination
with the Consultative Assembly.
The Estrada Administration
Policy on the MILF – All-out-war
Battle for Camp Abubakar then capture of Camp Abubakar
The Arroyo Administration
Signing of the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral
Domain – Bangsamoro Juridical Entity between GRP and
MILF. (Not implemented because it was declared
unconstitutional
The Pnoy Administration
Negotiation for the passage of the BBL . The passage of the
BBL was suspended because of the Mamasapano encounter.
Prepare for LEUTS next meeting