HUMAN

RIGHTS
CASE
DIGEST
 #1.
White Light Corporation v. City of
Manila, 576 SCRA 416 (2009)
FACTS:
Mayor Alfredo Lim signed into law Manila City Ordinance No.
7774 entitled, “An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission
Rates and Wash-up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging
Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of
Manila” (the Ordinance)
FACTS:
As a result, the Malate Tourist and Development Corporation
(MTDC) filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order (TRO)
impleading defendant City of Manila and praying that the
Ordinance be declared invalid and unconstitutional
FACTS:
White Light Corporation, et al. also filed a Motion to Intervene on
the ground that the Ordinance directly affects their business
interest as operators of drive-in hotels and motels of Manila
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) ordered the City to desist from the
enforcement of the Ordinance
The City maintains that it is empowered to regulate the
establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants,
beer houses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses
and other similar establishments under Section 458 (4) (iv) of the
Local Government Code
ISSUE:
Whether or not the assailed
Ordinance of the City of Manila is a
valid exercise of police power .
RULING:
No, the Supreme Court reversed the Decision of the Court
of Appeals (CA) and reinstated the Decision of RTC
Manila, Branch 9 upholding that the Ordinance is
unconstitutional.
RULING
:
Under the Constitution, no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law. Liberty, as guaranteed by the Constitution, was defined by Justice Malcolm to include "the
right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude”. To consider the exercise
of police power as valid, it must appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished
from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights and the means must be
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private
rights. It must also be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less
intrusive of private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between the
purposes of the measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise
of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be
permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.
RULING:
In this case, although the objective of the Ordinance is to minimize, if not
eliminate, the use of the covered establishments for illicit sex,
prostitution, drug use and other similar activities, which certainly fall
within the ambit of the police power of the State, other legitimate
activities would also be impaired. Similarly, the behavior which the
Ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited and could be
diminished by simply applying existing laws.

Hence, the exercise of police power through the assailed Ordinance is

considered an arbitrary intrusion into private rights and is deemed
unconstitutional and invalid.
#2.
Government Service Insurance System v.
Montesclaros, 434 SCRA 441 (2004)
FACTS:
Nicolas Montesclaros (“Nicolas”)
married Milagros Orbiso
(“Milagros”) on 10 July 1983.
Nicolas was a 72-year old widower
when he married Milagros who was
then 43 years old.
FACTS:
On 4 January 1985, Nicolas filed with the
Government Service Insurance System
(“GSIS”) an application for retirement
benefits effective 18 February 1985 under
Presidential Decree No. 1146 or the Revised
Government Service Insurance Act of 1977
(“PD 1146”). In his retirement application,
Nicolas designated his wife Milagros as his
sole beneficiary.
FACTS:
On 31 January 1986, GSIS approved
Nicolas’ application for retirement
“effective 17 February 1984,” granting a
lump sum payment of annuity for the
first five years and a monthly annuity
thereafter. -Nicolas died on 22 April
1992.
FACTS:
Milagros filed with GSIS a claim for
survivorship pension under PD 1146. On 8
June 1992, GSIS denied the claim because
under Section 18 of PD 1146, the
surviving spouse has no right to
survivorship pension if the surviving
spouse contracted the marriage with the
pensioner within three years before the
pensioner qualified for the pension.
FACTS:
According to GSIS, Nicolas wed Milagros
on 10 July 1983, less than one year from
his date of retirement on “17 February
1984.”

Supposed purpose of the proviso: to

prevent “deathbed marriages” contracted
for monetary gain.
FACTS:
Milagros then filed with the RTC a special
civil action for declaratory relief
questioning the validity of Section 18 of
PD 1146 disqualifying her from receiving
survivorship pension. After due
proceedings, the RTC ruled that Milagros
was eligible for survivorship pension.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 18 of
PD 1146 is constitutional.
RULING:
A. Due Process
Under Section 5 of PD 1146, it is mandatory for the government
employee to pay monthly contributions. Considering the
mandatory salary deductions from the government employee, the
government pensions do not constitute mere gratuity but form part
of compensation. In a pension plan where employee participation
is mandatory, the prevailing view is that employees have
contractual or vested rights in the pension where the pension is part
of the terms of employment. x x x x
RULING:
Thus, where the employee retires and meets the eligibility
requirements, he acquires a vested right to benefits that is
protected by the due process clause. Retirees enjoy a
protected property interest whenever they acquire a right to
immediate payment under pre-existing law. Thus, a
pensioner acquires a vested right to benefits that have
become due as provided under the terms of the public
employees’ pension statute.
RULING:
No law can deprive such person of his pension rights without due
process of law, that is, without notice and opportunity to be heard.
In addition to retirement and disability benefits, PD 1146 also
provides for benefits to survivors of deceased government
employees and pensioners.
RULING:
Under PD 1146, the dependent spouse is one of the
beneficiaries of survivorship benefits. A widow’s right to
receive pension following the demise of her husband is also
part of the husband’s contractual compensation. x x x x The
proviso is unduly oppressive in outrightly denying a
dependent spouse’s claim for survivorship pension if the
dependent spouse contracted marriage to the pensioner
within the three-year prohibited period.
RULING:
There is outright confiscation of benefits due the surviving spouse
without giving the surviving spouse an opportunity to be heard.
The proviso undermines the purpose of PD 1146, which is to
assure comprehensive and integrated social security and insurance
benefits to government employees and their dependents in the
event of sickness, disability, death, and retirement of the
government employees.
RULING
:
B. Equal Protection Clause
The proviso discriminates against the dependent spouse who contracts marriage to the pensioner within
three years before the pensioner qualified for the pension. Under the proviso, even if the dependent
spouse married the pensioner more than three years before the pensioner’s death, the dependent spouse
would still not receive survivorship pension if the marriage took place within three years before the
pensioner qualified for pension. The object of the prohibition is vague. There is no reasonable connection
between the means employed and the purpose intended. The law itself does not provide any reason or
purpose for such a prohibition. If the purpose of the proviso is to prevent “deathbed marriages,” then we
do not see why the proviso reckons the three-year prohibition from the date the pensioner qualified for
pension and not from the date the pensioner died. The classification does not rest on substantial
distinctions. Worse, the classification lumps all those marriages contracted within three years before the
pensioner qualified for pension as having been contracted primarily for financial convenience to avail of
pension benefits.
# 14 Kyllo v. United States, 533
U.S. 27 (2001)
FACTS:
A U.S. Department of the Interior agent suspected that Danny Kyllo was growing
marijuana in his home. Because indoor marijuana growth requires the use of
high intensity heat lamps, the agent used a thermal imager device to detect the
amount of heat coming from Kyllo’s home. The thermal scan of Kyllo’s home
took only a few minutes and was conducted by the agent from a car across the
street. The thermal scan revealed that more heat was emanating from Kyllo’s
residence than from the other two residences in the triplex in which Kyllo lived.
FACTS:

Based on the thermal scan, tips from informants, and

utility bills, the agent obtained a warrant to search Kyllo’s
residence. The search ultimately revealed that Kyllo was
running a marijuana growing operation in his residence.
Procedural History:
 The District Court denied Kyllo’s motion to suppress the evidence seized from
his home, and Kyllo then entered a conditional guilty plea.

 The Ninth Circuit ultimately affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress. The
Ninth Circuit reasoned that Kyllo had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the
heat emitted from his home, and the thermal scan did not expose any intimate
details of Kyllo’s life.

 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Issue and Holding:

Does the use of a thermal scanning device from a public

street, in order to detect the amount of heat coming from a
home, constitute a “search” under the Fourth Amendment?
Yes.
 Judgment:
The decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals is
reversed and remanded.
Rule of Law or Legal Principle
Applied:
The use of sense-enhancing technology to learn information
about the interior of someone’s home that could not otherwise
have been obtained without physical intrusion into a
constitutionally protected area is a “search” for purposes of the
Fourth Amendment.
Reasoning:

 The issue here is the extent to which changes in technology will impact what we as a society deem to be a
reasonable expectation of privacy. It is important not to let police technology erode the privacy guaranteed by
the Fourth Amendment.

 The fact that the thermal scanner in this case is not in general public use is important. The thermal scanner
allowed police to learn information about what may have been occurring in a person’s home that they would not
have learned using their own five senses. Therefore, use of the thermal scanner is a Fourth Amendment
“search.”

 The fact that the thermal scan did not reveal private activities occurring in private areas does not take the
thermal scan outside the protections of the Fourth Amendment. Protecting the sanctity of the home was never
tied to the quality or quantity of the information obtained.

 The case should be remanded so the court can consider whether there was sufficient probable cause for the
warrant without the thermal scan information.
Concurring and Dissenting Opinions:
Dissenting Opinion (Stevens):

There is an important difference between “through-the-wall” surveillance,

and “off-the-wall” surveillance. “Through-the-wall surveillance” is clearly a
search under the Fourth Amendment. This case, however, is an example of
“off-the-wall” surveillance. Here, the thermal scanner obtained only
information that can be observed from the exterior of the home, which did not
infringe on any constitutionally protected interest in privacy.
Significance:

Kyllo v. United States is an important decision because it

confronts the issue of whether the Fourth Amendment can
serve as a protector of privacy in a world where technology
becomes increasingly intrusive on our private lives.
Case Summary of Kyllo v. United States:
 Federal agents used a thermal imaging device outside of Kyllo’s home, suspecting that Kyllo was growing
marijuana in his home, which requires use of heat lamps.

 The device indicated that more heat was emanating from Kyllo’s residence than from neighboring
residences. Using the heat information in conjunction with other facts, the agents obtained a warrant to
search Kyllo’s residence. They discovered that Kyllo was, in fact, growing marijuana in his home.

 Kyllo moved to suppress the evidence seized from his home before his trial. The District Court denied the
motion.

 The Ninth Circuit ultimately affirmed the denial.

 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that the use of a device that enhanced normal perception to
detect heat coming from inside a home was a “search” under the Fourth Amendment, and it was unlawful
here because it was conducted without a warrant.
#15. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S.
400 (2012)
FACT
S: Antoine Jones was arrested on Oct. 24, 2005, for drug possession after police
attached a tracker to Jones's Jeep -- without judicial approval -- and used it to follow
him for a month. A jury found Jones not guilty on all charges save for conspiracy, on
which point jurors hung. District prosecutors, upset at the loss, re-filed a single count
of conspiracy against Jones and his business partner, Lawrence Maynard. Jones
owned the "Levels" nightclub in the District of Columbia. Jones and Maynard were
then convicted, but a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit ruled that the Supreme Court specifically stated in a 1983 case regarding the
use of a beeper to track a suspect that the decision could not be used to justify 24-hour
surveillance without a warrant.
FACTS:
• Washington, D.C. nightclub owner Antoine Jones (defendant) was suspected by the FBI of being
involved in a large-scale drug trafficking operation.

• As part of a joint task-force operation with the police, FBI agents applied for a warrant that would allow
them to place a Global Positioning System (GPS) tracking device on Jones's vehicle in an effort to track
his movements.

• A federal district court issued the warrant but required the agents to place the device on Jones's vehicle
within 10 days of issuance of the warrant and while the vehicle was physically located in the District of
Columbia.

• On the eleventh day, and while the vehicle was parked in a lot in Maryland, agents placed the GPS
device on the vehicle's undercarriage.

• For 28 days, the Government used the device to track Jones's movements and collected more than 2,000
pages of data.
FACTS:
• Jones was indicted on multiple counts of drug-related offenses.

• Prior to trial, defense counsel filed a motion to suppress the information the Government
obtained from the GPS device.

• The district court granted the motion in part and suppressed only the data obtained while
the vehicle was parked in a garage adjoining Jones's residence.

• Jones was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment.

• The court of appeals reversed and held the warrantless use of the GPS device violated the
Fourth Amendment the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review.
ISSUE:

Did the warrantless use of a tracking device on Jones's

vehicle to monitor its movements on public streets violate
Jones' Fourth Amendment rights?
RESULT:

Yes. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court. The
Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court, and held that the
installation of a GPS tracking device on Jones' vehicle, without a warrant,
constituted an unlawful search under the Fourth Amendment. The Court
rejected the government's argument that there is no reasonable expectation
of privacy in a person's movement on public thoroughfares and
emphasized that the Fourth Amendment provided some protection for
trespass onto personal property.
RESULT:

Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a concurring opinion, agreeing that

the government had obtained information by usurping Jones' property
and by invading his privacy. However, she further reasoned that the
Fourth Amendment was not only concerned with trespasses onto
property. She stated that a Fourth Amendment search occurs whenever
the government violates a subjective expectation of privacy that society
recognizes as reasonable, which is particularly important in an era where
physical intrusion is unnecessary to many forms of surveillance.
RESULT:

Justice Samuel Alito concurred in the judgment but criticized the

framing of the question in terms of trespass to property. He believed that
such a construction of the problem strained the language of the Fourth
Amendment and that it would be better to analyze the case by
determining whether the Government violated Jones' reasonable
expectations of privacy.
16. Pollo v. Constantino-David, 659
SCRA 198 (2011)
FACTS:
 Respondent CSC Chair Constantino-David received an anonymous letter complaint alleging of
an anomaly taking place in the Regional Office of the CSC. The respondent then formed a team
and issued a memo directing the team “to back up all the files in the computers found in the
Mamamayan Muna (PALD) and Legal divisions.”

 Several diskettes containing the back-up files sourced from the hard disk of PALD and LSD
computers were turned over to Chairperson David. The contents of the diskettes were examined
by the CSC’s Office for Legal Affairs (OLA). It was found that most of the files in the 17
diskettes containing files copied from the computer assigned to and being used by the petitioner,
numbering about 40 to 42 documents, were draft pleadings or lettersin connection with
administrative cases in the CSC and other tribunals. On the basis of this finding, Chairperson
David issued the Show-Cause Order, requiring the petitioner, who had gone on extended leave,
to submit his explanation or counter-affidavit within five days from notice.

 In his Comment, petitioner denied the accusations against him and accused the CSC Officials of
“fishing expedition” when they unlawfully copied and printed personal files in his computer.
FACTS:
 He was charged of violating R.A. No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees). He assailed the formal charge and filed an Omnibus Motion ((For
Reconsideration, to Dismiss and/or to Defer) assailing the formal charge as without basis having
proceeded from an illegal search which is beyond the authority of the CSC Chairman, such
power pertaining solely to the court.

 The CSC denied the omnibus motion and treated the motion as the petitioner’s answer to the
charge. In view of the absence of petitioner and his counsel, and upon the motion of the
prosecution, petitioner was deemed to have waived his right to the formal investigation which
then proceeded ex parte.

 The petitioner was dismissed from service. He filed a petition to the CA which was dismissed by
the latter on the ground that it found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondents.
He filed a motion for reconsideration which was further denied by the appellate court. Hence,
this petition.
ISSUE:

WON the search conducted by the CSC on the

computer of the petitioner constituted an illegal
search and was a violation of his constitutional right
to privacy.
RULING:

The search conducted on his office computer

and the copying of his personal files was lawful
and did not violate his constitutional right
RATIO DECIDENDI:
 In this case, the Court had the chance to present the cases illustrative of the issue raised by the
petitioner.

 Katz v. United States 389 U.S. 437 (1967), the US Supreme Court held that the act of FBI agents
in electronically recording a conversation made by petitioner in an enclosed public telephone
booth violated his right to privacy and constituted a “search and seizure”. Because the
petitioner had a reasonable expectation of privacy in using the enclosed booth to make a
personal telephone call, the protection of the Fourth Amendment extends to such area. Moreso,
the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan noted that the existence of privacy right under prior
decisions involved a two-fold requirement: first, that a person has exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy; and second, that the expectation be one that society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable (objective).

 Mancusi v. DeForte 392 U.S. 364, 88 S.Ct. 2120, 20 L.Ed2d 1154 (1968),thus “recognized that
employees may have a reasonable expectation of privacy against intrusions by police.”
RATIO DECIDENDI:
 O’Connor v. Ortega 480 U.S. 709 (1987), the Court categorically declared that “[I]individuals
do not lose Fourth Amendment rights merely because they work for the government instead of
a private employer.” In O’Connor the Court recognized that “special needs” authorize
warrantless searches involving public employees for work-related reasons. The Court thus laid
down a balancing test under which government interests are weighed against the employee’s
reasonable expectation of privacy. This reasonableness test implicates neither probable cause
nor the warrant requirement, which are related to law enforcement.

 Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs Board G.R. Nos. 157870, 158633 and
161658, November 3, 2008, 570 SCRA 410, 427, (citing Ople v. Torres, G.R. No. 127685,
July 23, 1998, 293 SCRA 141, 169), recognized the fact that there may be such legitimate
intrusion of privacy in the workplace.

 The Court ruled that the petitioner did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
office and computer files.
RATIO DECIDENDI:

 As to the second point of inquiry, the Court answered in the affirmative. The search
authorized by the CSC Chair, the copying of the contents of the hard drive on petitioner’s
computer reasonable in its inception and scope.

 The Court noted that unlike in the case of Anonymous Letter-Complaint against Atty.
Miguel Morales, Clerk of Court, Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila A.M. Nos. P-08-2519
and P-08-2520, November 19, 2008, 571 SCRA 361, the case at bar involves the computer
from which the personal files of the petitioner were retrieved is a government-issued
computer, hence government property the use of which the CSC has absolute right to
regulate and monitor.
17. Lucas v. Lucas, 650 SCRA 667
(2011)
FACTS:

Petitioner, Jesse Lucas filed a Petition to Establish Filiation with a Motion

for the Submission of Parties to DNA Testing before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC). Jesse alleged that he is the son of his mother Elsie who got acquainted
with respondent, Jesus S. Lucas in Manila. He also submitted documents
which include (a) petitioner’s certificate of live birth; (b) petitioner’s baptismal
certificate; (c) petitioner’s college diploma, showing that he graduated from
Saint Louis University in Baguio City with a degree in Psychology; (d) his
Certificate of Graduation from the same school; (e) Certificate of Recognition
from the University of the Philippines, College of Music; and (f) clippings of
several articles from different newspapers about petitioner, as a musical
prodigy.
FACTS:
 Jesus learned of this and he filed a Special Appearance and Comment manifesting that
the petition was adversarial in nature and therefore summons should be served on him.
Meanwhile, Jesse filed a Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case which the RTC
found to be sufficient in form and hence set the case for hearing. Jesus filed a Motion for
Reconsideration arguing that DNA testing cannot be had on the basis of a mere
allegation pointing to him as Jesse’s father.

 Acting on Jesus’ Motion for Reconsideration, the RTC dismissed the case and held that
Jesse failed to establish compliance with the four procedural aspects for a paternity
action enumerated in the case of Herrera v. Alba namely, a prima facie case, affirmative
defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative
father and the child.
FACTS:

This prompted Jesse to file a Motion for Reconsideration which the RTC
granted. A new hearing was scheduled where the RTC held that ruling on the
grounds relied upon by Jesse for filing the instant petition is premature
considering that a full-blown trial has not yet taken place. Jesus filed a Motion
for Reconsideration which was denied by the RTC. He then filed a petition for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA ruled in favour of Jesus, it
noted that Jesse failed to show that the four significant aspects of a traditional
paternity action had been met and held that DNA testing should not be allowed
when the petitioner has failed to establish a prima facie case.
ISSUES:

 Was the service of summons jurisdictional?

 Whether prima facie showing is necessary before a court can

issue a DNA testing order
RULING:
On the First Issue:
 The answer to this question depends on the nature of petitioner’s action, that is, whether it is an action in
personam, in rem, or quasi in rem.

 An action in personam is lodged against a person based on personal liability; an action in rem is directed
against the thing itself instead of the person; while an action quasi in rem names a person as defendant, but
its object is to subject that person’s interest in a property to a corresponding lien or obligation. A petition
directed against the “thing” itself or the res, which concerns the status of a person, like a petition for
adoption, annulment of marriage, or correction of entries in the birth certificate, is an action in rem.

 In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the court to validly
try and decide the case. In a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court, provided that the latter has jurisdiction over the res.
Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (a) by the seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it
is brought into actual custody of the law, or (b) as a result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which
the power of the court is recognized and made effective.
RULING:
On the First Issue:
 The herein petition to establish illegitimate filiation is an action in rem. By the simple filing of the petition to
establish illegitimate filiation before the RTC, which undoubtedly had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
petition, the latter thereby acquired jurisdiction over the case. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially
through publication. Publication is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its object to bar
indefinitely all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort to the right sought to be established.
Through publication, all interested parties are deemed notified of the petition.

 If at all, service of summons or notice is made to the defendant, it is not for the purpose of vesting the court with
jurisdiction, but merely for satisfying the due process requirements. This is but proper in order to afford the
person concerned the opportunity to protect his interest if he so chooses. Hence, failure to serve summons will not
deprive the court of its jurisdiction to try and decide the case. In such a case, the lack of summons may be
excused where it is determined that the adverse party had, in fact, the opportunity to file his opposition, as in this
case. We find that the due process requirement with respect to respondent has been satisfied, considering that he
has participated in the proceedings in this case and he has the opportunity to file his opposition to the petition to
establish filiation.
On the Second Issue:

 Yes, but it is not yet time to discuss the lack of a prima facie case vis-à-vis the motion for
DNA testing since no evidence has, as yet, been presented by petitioner.

 Misapplication of Herrera v. Alba by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals. The
statement in Herrera v. Alba that there are four significant procedural aspects in a traditional
paternity case which parties have to face has been widely misunderstood and misapplied in
this case. A party is confronted by these so-called procedural aspects during trial, when the
parties have presented their respective evidence. They are matters of evidence that cannot be
determined at this initial stage of the proceedings, when only the petition to establish filiation
has been filed. The CA’s observation that petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case is
herefore misplaced. A prima facie case is built by a party’s evidence and not by mere
allegations in the initiatory pleading.
On the Second Issue:
Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence merely provides for conditions that are aimed to
safeguard the accuracy and integrity of the DNA testing. It states that the appropriate court may,
at any time, either motu proprio or on application of any person, who has a legal interest in the
matter in litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and notice to
the parties upon a showing of the following: (a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the
case;(b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing now
requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to DNA testing, but the results may require
confirmation for good reasons; (c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique; (d)
The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new information that is relevant to the
proper resolution of the case; and (e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may
consider as potentially affecting the accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing. This Rule shall not
preclude a DNA testing, without need of a prior court order, at the behest of any party, including
law enforcement agencies, before a suit or proceeding is commenced. This does not mean,
however, that a DNA testing order will be issued as a matter of right if, during the hearing, the
said conditions are established.
On the Second Issue:
In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there must be a show cause hearing
wherein the applicant must first present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case or a reasonable
possibility of paternity or “good cause” for the holding of the test. In these states, a court order for blood
testing is considered a “search,” which, under their Constitutions (as in ours), must be preceded by a finding
of probable cause in order to be valid. Hence, the requirement of a prima facie case, or reasonable possibility,
was imposed in civil actions as a counterpart of a finding of probable cause. Courts in various jurisdictions
have differed regarding the kind of procedures which are required, but those jurisdictions have almost
universally found that a preliminary showing must be made before a court can constitutionally order
compulsory blood testing in paternity cases. We agree, and find that, as a preliminary matter, before the court
may issue an order for compulsory blood testing, the moving party must show that there is a reasonable
possibility of paternity. As explained hereafter, in cases in which paternity is contested and a party to the
action refuses to voluntarily undergo a blood test, a show cause hearing must be held in which the court can
determine whether there is sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case which warrants issuance of a
court order for blood testing The same condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect
the putative father from mere harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the
petitioner must present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.”
 Thank You for
Listening
Calaguas, Jhon Kelvin M.
Canlapan, John Robert C.
Manlutac, Aeiou C.
Nacu, Joshua A.
Pangilinan Michael T.
Punzalan, Francese Nicole B.