Local Government Unit

Power and Function

Sources of Power
1. 1987 Constitution
2. Local Government Code and special laws
3. Charter of the LGU
Four Categories of Powers Exercised by LGUs
1. Powers expressly granted
2. Powers necessarily implied therefrom
3. Powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for efficient and
effective governance
4. Powers essential to the promotion of the general welfare [Sec. 16,
LGC]
Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, LGUs shall ensure and support
1. Preservation and enrichment of culture
2. Promotion of health and safety
3. Enhancement of the right of the people to a balanced ecology
4. Development of self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities
5. Improvement of public morals
6. Enhancement of economic prosperity and social justice
7. Promotion of full employment among residents
8. Maintenance of peace and order
9. Preservation of the comfort and convenience of its inhabitants [Sec. 16,LGC]
General Welfare Clause
The police power of a municipal
corporation extends to all great public
needs and includes all legislation and
functions of the municipal government. The
drift is towards social welfare legislation
geared towards state policies to provide
adequate social services, the promotion of
general welfare, and social justice [Binay v.
Domingo, G.R. No. 92389 (1991)].
Two Branches of the General Welfare Clause

General legislative power – Authorizes municipal

councils to enact ordinances and make regulations
not repugnant to law and may be necessary to carry
into effect and discharge the powers and duties
conferred upon it by law.

Police power proper – Authorizes the municipality to

enact ordinances as may be proper and necessary
for the health and safety, prosperity, morals, peace,
good order, comfort and convenience of the
municipality and its inhabitants, and for the
protection of their property [Fernando v. St.
Scholastica’s College, G.R. No. 161107 (2013)].
Limitations
a. The General Welfare clause cannot be used to justify an act not authorized by law.
b. The exercise must pass the test of a valid ordinance. [Rural Bank of Makati v.
Municipality of Makati, G.R. No. 150763 (2004)].
SPARK VS. QUEZON CITY [G.R. No. 225442, August 08, 2017]
Facts: Following the campaign of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte to implement a nationwide
curfew for minors, several local governments in Metro Manila started to strictly implement their curfew
ordinances on minors through police operations which were publicly known as part of "Oplan Rody."
Petitioners, spearheaded by the Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK)- an association of
young adults and minors that aims to forward a free and just society, in particular the protection of the
rights and welfare of the youth and minors - filed this present petition, arguing that the Curfew
Ordinances are unconstitutional because they: (a) result in arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement,
and thus, fall under the void for vagueness doctrine; (b) suffer from overbreadth by proscribing or
impairing legitimate activities of minors during curfew hours; (c) deprive minors of the right to liberty
and the right to travel without substantive due process; and (d) deprive parents of their natural and
primary right in rearing the youth without substantive due process.
 addition, petitioners assert that the Manila Ordinance contravenes RA 9344, as amended by RA
10630. Furthermore, petitioners claim that the Manila Ordinance, particularly Section 4 thereof,
contravenes Section 57A of RA 9344, as amended, given that the cited curfew provision imposes on
minors the penalties of imprisonment, reprimand, and admonition. They contend that the imposition of
penalties contravenes RA 9344's express command that no penalty shall be imposed on minors for curfew
violations. Lastly, petitioners submit that there is no compelling State interest to impose curfews contrary
to the parents' prerogative to impose them in the exercise of their natural and primary right in the rearing
of the youth, and that even if a compelling interest exists, less restrictive means are available to achieve the
same. In this regard, they suggest massive street lighting programs, installation of CCTVs (closed-circuit
televisions) in public streets, and regular visible patrols by law enforcers as other viable means of
protecting children and preventing crimes at night. They further opine that the government can impose
more reasonable sanctions, i.e., mandatory parental counseling and education seminars informing the
parents of the reasons behind the curfew, and that imprisonment is too harsh a penalty for parents who
allowed their children to be out during curfew hours
Issue/s: Whether or not the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional. It deprives parents of their natural
and primary right in rearing the youth without substantive due process.

Ruling: Right of Parents to Rear their Children Petitioners are NOT CORRECT that the Curfew
Ordinances are unconstitutional because they deprive parents of their natural and primary right in the
rearing of the youth without substantive due process. In this regard, they assert that this right includes
the right to determine whether minors will be required to go home at a certain time or will be allowed to
stay late outdoors. Given that the right to impose curfews is primarily with parents and not with the
State, the latter's interest in imposing curfews cannot logically be compelling.
Two-Pronged Test for an Ordinance to be Considered a Valid Police Power Measure [Mosqueda v.
Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters Association, Inc., G.R. No. 189185 (2016)]

a. Formal
i. Enacted within the corporate powers of the local government unit, and
ii. Passed according to procedure prescribed by law

b. Substantive
i. It must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
ii. It must be fair, not oppressive;
iii. It must not be partial or discriminatory;
iv. It must not prohibit but may regulate trade
v. It must be general and consistent with public policy
vi. It must not be unreasonable
Illustrations of Valid Exercise of Police Power
● Prescribing zoning and classification of merchandise sold in the public market;
● Condemnation and demolition of buildings found to be in dangerous or ruinous condition;
● Regulation of operation of tricycles;
● Zoning regulations [Patalinghug v. CA, G.R. No. 104786 (1994)];
● Providing burial assistance to the poor [Binay v. Domingo, G.R. No. 92389 (1991)];
● Enforcement of fishery laws within LGU waters [Tano v. Socrates, G.R. No. 110249 (1997)]

Illustrations of Invalid Exercise of Police Power

● Prohibition of operation of night clubs, as it is a lawful trade or pursuit of occupation [Dela Cruz v.
Paras, G.R. No. L-42571-72 (1983)];
● Rescinding of mayor's permits based on arbitrary grounds [Greater Balanga Dev’t Corp. v. Mun. of
Balanga, G.R.No. 83987 (1994)].
● Setting aside 6% of the total area of private memorial type cemetery for charity burial of deceased
persons who are paupers [City Government of Quezon City v. Ericta, G.R. No. L- 34915 (1983)]
Eminent Domain

It is the government's right to appropriate, in the

nature of a compulsory sale to the State, private
property for public use or purpose. Inherently
possessed by the national legislature, the power of
eminent domain may be validly delegated to local
governments, other public entities and public
utilities. [Moday v. CA, G.R. No. 107916 (1993)]
Requisites for the Exercise of Eminent Domain by an LGU

• An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief
executive, on behalf of the local government unit, to exercise the power of eminent domain
or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property;

• The power is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and
the landless;

• There is payment of just compensation based on the fair market value of the property at the
time of taking; and

• A valid and definite offer was previously made to the owner of the property, but the offer was
not accepted [Heirs of Suguitan v. City of Mandaluyong, G.R. No. 135087 (2000)].
Manosca v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106440, January 29, 1996

Fact: Petitioners inherited a piece of land located at P. Burgos Street, Calzada, Taguig.
Metro Manila, with an area of about four hundred ninety-two (492) square meters. When
the parcel was ascertained by the NHI to have been the birthsite of Felix Y. Manalo, the
founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed Resolution No. 1, Series of 1986, pursuant to Section
4  of Presidential Decree No. 260, declaring the land to be a national historical landmark.
The resolution was approved by the Minister of Education, Culture and Sports At the
same time, respondent Republic filed an urgent motion for the issuance of an order to
permit it to take immediate possession of the property. The motion was opposed by
petitioners. After a hearing, the trial court issued an order fixing the provisional market
and assessed values of the property and authorizing the Republic to take over the
property once the required sum would have been deposited with the Municipal Treasurer
of Taguig, Metro Manila.
 Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the main thesis that the intended
expropriation was not for a public purpose and, incidentally, that the act would
constitute an application of public funds, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or
support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity, contrary to the provision of the
Constitution.  Petitioners sought, in the meanwhile, a suspension in the implementation
of the 03rd August 1989 order of the trial court. On 15 February 1990, following the filing
by respondent Republic of its reply to petitioners’ motion seeking the dismissal of the
case, the trial court issued its denial of said motion to dismiss. Five (5) days later, or on 20
February 1990, another order was issued by the trial court, declaring moot and academic
the motion for reconsideration and/or suspension of the order of 03 August 1989 with
the rejection of petitioners’ motion to dismiss. Petitioners’ motion for the
reconsideration of the 20th February 1990 order was likewise denied by the trial court in
its 16th April 1991 order. Petitioners then lodged a petition with the Court of Appeals
which the appellate court dismissed for failure to show any grave abuse of discretion or
lack of jurisdictional competence on the part of the trial court. A motion for the
reconsideration of the decision was denied subsequently by appellate court.
Issue: Whether  the expropriation was not for a public purpose and, incidentally, that
the act would constitute an application of public funds, directly or indirectly, for the
use, benefit, or support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity, contrary to the provision
of Section 29(2), Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution.

Held: No, Public Use. Eminent domain. The constitutional and statutory basis for taking
property by eminent domain. For condemnation purposes, “public use” is one which
confers same benefit or advantage to the public; it is not confined to actual use by public.
It is measured in terms of right of public to use proposed facilities for which
condemnation is sought and, as long as public has right of use, whether exercised by
one or many members of public, a “public advantage” or “public benefit” accrues
sufficient to constitute a public use. The idea that “public use” is strictly limited to clear
cases of “use by the public” has long been discarded.
Jurisdiction
An expropriation suit falls under the
jurisdiction of the RTCs. The subject of an
expropriation suit is the government’s exercise
of eminent domain, a matter that is incapable
of pecuniary estimation [Barangay San Roque v.
Heirs of Pastor, G.R. No. 138896 (2000)].

Inverse Condemnation is a legal concept that entitles property owners to just

compensation if their property is damaged by a public use. Instituted by the
owner of the private property.
Public Use, Purpose, or Welfare
The very foundation of the right to exercise
eminent domain is a genuine necessity and that
necessity must be of a public character. Moreover,
the ascertainment of the necessity must precede or
accompany and not follow, the taking of the land.
Necessity does not mean an absolute, but only a
reasonable or practical necessity, such as would
combine the greatest benefit to the public with the
least inconvenience and expense to the condemning
party and the property owner consistent with such
benefit [Masikip v. City of Pasig, G.R. No. 136349
(2006)].
Just Compensation

"Compensation" means an equivalent for the value

of the land (property) taken. The word "just" is used
to intensify the meaning of the word "compensation;"
to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered
for the property taken shall be real, substantial, full,
and ample.

"Just compensation," therefore, means a fair and

full equivalent for the loss sustained [The City of
Manila v. Estrada, G.R. No. 7749 (1913)].

Just compensation is determined as of the time

of taking [Sec. 19, LGC].
Valid and Definite Offer
The offer must be complete, indicating with
sufficient clearness the kind of contract intended and
definitely stating the essential conditions of the
proposed contract. An offer would require, among
other things, a clear certainty on both the object and
the cause or consideration of the envisioned
contract [Jesus is Lord Christian School Foundation Inc.
v. Municipality of Pasig, G.R. No. 152230 (2005)].
Requisites for the Immediate Entry by the LGU

• Filing of the complaint for expropriation sufficient

in form and substance; AND
• Deposit of an amount equivalent to 15% of the
fair market value of the property to be
expropriated based on the current tax declaration
[Sec. 19, LGC]

Upon compliance with the requisites, the issuance of

a writ of possession becomes ministerial. There is
no need for a hearing for the writ to issue [City of
Iloilo v. Legaspi, G.R. No. 154614 (2004)].
Returning the Property

When private land is expropriated for a particular

public use and that purpose is abandoned, there is
no “implied contract” that the properties will be used
only for the public purpose for which they were
acquired. Property is to be returned only when it is
expropriated with the condition that when said
purpose is ended or abandoned, the former owner
reacquires the property so expropriated, and not
when the expropriation decree gives to the entity a
fee simple which makes the land the expropriator
the absolute owner of the property [Air Transportation
Office v. Gopuco, G.R. No.158563 (2005)].
Socialized Housing [Urban Development and Housing Act, R.A. 7279]

Under the Urban Development and Housing Act,

expropriation by an LGU for purposes of urban land
reform and socialized housing shall occur only as a
last resort. It must be shown by the LGU that other
methods of acquisition (community mortgage, land
swapping, land assembly or consolidation, land
banking, donation to the Government, joint venture
agreements, and negotiated purchase) have been
exhausted [Sec. 10].
If all the other methods have been exhausted and
expropriation to continue, the LGU shall acquire
lands for socialized housing in the following order:
a. Government lands
b. Alienable lands of the public domain
c. Unregistered or abandoned and idle lands
d. Lands within Areas for Priority Development
e. Unacquired BLISS sites
f. Private lands [Sec. 9]
Furthermore, lands of small-property
owners are exempt from expropriation for
purposes of socialized housing. “Small-
property owners” are defined by two
elements:
a. They are owners of real property which
consists of residential lands with an area
of not more than 300 sq. meters in highly
urbanized cities, and 800 sq. meters in
other urban cities; and
b. They do not own real property other
than the same [Sec. 3(q)].
Taxing Power
Sec. 5, Art. X, 1987 Constitution. – Each local
government unit shall have the power to create its
own sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees,
and charges subject to such guidelines and
limitations as the Congress may provide, consistent
with the basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes,
fees, and charges shall accrue exclusively to the
local governments.
Fundamental Principles on Taxation by an LGU

1. Taxation shall be uniform;

2. Taxes, fees, and charges:
a. Shall be equitable and based as far as
practicable on the taxpayer’s ability to pay;
b. Shall be levied and collected only for a public
purpose;
c. Shall not be unjust, excessive, oppressive, or
confiscatory; and
d. Shall not be contrary to law, public policy,
national economic policy, or in restraint of
trade;
3. Collection shall in no case be left to any private
person;
4. Revenue shall inure solely to the benefit of the
levying LGU, unless otherwise specified; and

5. Each LGU shall, as far as practicable, evolve a

progressive system of taxation [Sec. 130, LGC]
Withdrawal of Local Tax Exemption Privileges

Unless otherwise provided in the LGC, tax

exemptions or incentives granted to, or enjoyed by all
persons, whether natural or juridical, including
government-owned or - controlled corporations were
withdrawn upon the effectivity of the LGC [Sec. 193,
LGC].

Tax exemption privileges of the following were not

withdrawn by the LGC:
1. Local water districts;
2. Cooperatives duly registered under R.A. No. 6938;
3. Non-stock and non-profit hospitals; and
4. Educational institutions [Sec. 193 and 234, LGC].
Exemptions from Real Property Tax
The following are exempted from payment of the
real property tax:
1. Real property owned by the Republic of the
Philippines or any of its political subdivisions
EXCEPT when the beneficial use thereof has been
granted, for consideration or otherwise, to a taxable
person;

2. Charitable institutions, churches, parsonages or

convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, nonprofit or
religious cemeteries and all lands, buildings, and
improvements actually, directly, and exclusively used
for religious, charitable, or educational purposes
3. All machineries and equipment that are actually,
directly and exclusively used by local water districts
and government-owned or –controlled corporations
engaged in the supply and distribution of water
and/or generation and transmission of electric
power;

4. All real property owned by duly registered

cooperatives as provided for under R.A. No. 6938;
and

5. Machinery and equipment used for pollution

control and environmental protection [Sec. 234,
LGC].
Other Limitations on Taxing Powers of LGUs

Taxes Already Imposed by the National Government

Generally, LGUs cannot impose taxes that are

already imposed by the National Government (e.g.
income tax, documentary stamp tax, estate tax,
customs duties, excise taxes under the NIRC, VAT)
[See Sec. 133, LGC].
Persons Exempted from LGU’s taxing power LGUs
cannot impose taxes, fees, and charges on

1. Countryside and barangay business enterprises;

2. Cooperatives duly registered under the

Cooperative Code; and

3. The National Government, its agencies and

instrumentalities, and local government units [Sec.
133(n) to (o), LGC].
 An instrumentality of the State or National
Government is exempt from local taxation. [Sec.
133(o), LGC] Hence, the Manila International Airport
Authority, being such an instrumentality and not
being a GOCC, is exempt from local taxation [MIAA
v. CA, G.R. No. 155650 (2006)].

However, GOCCs are [generally] not exempt

from local taxation [MIAA v. CA, supra]