JURISDICTION OF CIVIL

COURTS

1
OVERVIEW OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Number of suit. Only

Office objections- Rejection or
after clearing the
Plaint filing- Duplicate (Order IV Plaintiff within 7 days acceptance of plaint.
office objections the
Rule 1) to make necessary (Order 7 Rule 11 for
suit will be registered.
corrections. rejection)
(Order IV Rule 1(2)).

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OVERVIEW OF CIVIL PROCEDURE CONTINUED...

Process fees to be paid

by plaintiff- within 7
Order of issue of summon (Order days. Consequences Summons served upon
Defendant appears
V Rule 9) for not paying: Order defendants
VII Rule 11 and Order
IX Rule 2

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OVERVIEW OF CIVIL PROCEDURE CONTINUED...

First Hearing:
i. Examine Pleadings
Written statement- within 30 days which may Whether case fit for ADR?
extend to 90 days. (Order VIII Rule 1) ii. Admission and denial (Section 89)
iii. Examine parties (Order
XIV)

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OVERVIEW OF CIVIL PROCEDURE CONTINUED...

Settlement of issues: Parties at variance Judgment (Order XX and

Trial
(Order XIV) Section 2(9)

5
OVERVIEW OF CIVIL PROCEDURE CONTINUED...

If the order is reversed then

Execution (Order XXI and Section 36-74) Appeal (Section 96-109)
restitution (Section 144)

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INTRODUCTION

 The fundamental principles of English law is that wherever there is right, there is remedy (ubi jus ibi remedium)
has been adopted by the Indian legal system also. Right and remedy are two sides of the same coin, and they
cannot be separated from each other.
 Accordingly, a litigant having a grievance of a civil nature has a right to institute a civil suit in a competent civil
court unless its cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred by any statute.
 The term “jurisdiction” has not been defined in the Code. The word is derived from Latin terms “juris” and
“dicto” which means “I speak by the law”. Jurisdiction means the power or authority of a court of law to hear and
determine a cause or matter.
 “Jurisdiction is the authority of the judicial officer to entertain, deal with and decide the lis before him.”
 “A civil court has jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature.”
 “Consent can neither confer nor take away jurisdiction.”
 “Exclusion of jurisdiction of court should not be readily inferred.” 7
INTRODUCTION CONTINUED...

 In Official Trustee v. Sachindra Nath, AIR 1969 SC 823: (1969) 3 SCR 92, after referring to various decisions, the
Supreme Court observed:

“...before a court can be held to have jurisdiction to decide a particular matter, it must not only have jurisdiction to try
the suit brought but also the authority to pass the orders sought for it.”
 It is well-settled that consent cannot confer nor take away jurisdiction of a court. Therefore, a decree passed by a court
without jurisdiction is a coram non judice.
 In the case of Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan, AIR 1954 SC 340: (1955) 1 SCR 117, the Supreme Court observed:

“It is a fundamental principle well-established that a decree passed by a court without jurisdiction is a nullity and that
its invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of
execution and even in collateral proceedings. A defect of jurisdiction strikes at the very authority of the Court to pass
any decree and such a defect cannot be cured even by consent of parties.”
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BASIS TO DETERMINE JURISDICTION
 The jurisdiction of a court should normally be decided on the basis of the case put forward by the plaintiff in his
plaint and not by the defendant in his written statement nor on the basis of ultimate findings arrived by the court.
 Case study: Bank of Baroda v. Moti Bhai, (1985) 1 SCC 475: The plaintiff bank lent a certain amount to the
defendant in the usual course of its commercial business. By way of collateral security, however, it obtained a
hypothecation bond and a deed of mortgage from the defendant under the Tenancy Act conferring exclusive
jurisdiction on the revenue court. When the suit was filed in the civil court for the recovery of amount, it was
contended by the defendant that the civil court had no jurisdiction to try the suit.
 The Supreme Court observed that the business of the bank was to lend money. If only by way of collateral security
the bank obtains a hypothecation bond or a deed of mortgage, the provisions of the Tenancy Act cannot be attracted.
 Primarily and basically, the suit filed by the bank was for the recovery of the amount due to it by the defendant on
the basis of the promissory note executed by the defendant. The main relief sought by the bank was that the suit
should be decreed for repayment of amount. The civil court, therefore, had the jurisdiction to entertain the suit filed
by the bank.
 On the question of jurisdiction, one must always have regard to the substance of the matter and not the form of the 9

suit.
TYPES OF JURISDICTION

Different types of courts are empowered to decide different

1. Subject-matter Jurisdiction- Section 9 types of suits.

The Code provides that a court will have jurisdiction only

2. Pecuniary Jurisdiction- Section 3,6,15 over those suits the amount or value of the subject-matter
does not exceed the pecuniary limits of its jurisdiction.

Territorial Jurisdiction: Section 16-20 Every court has its own local or territorial jurisdiction beyond
3.
which it cannot exercise its jurisdiction.

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OTHER TYPES OF JURISDICTION

4. Civil and Criminal Jurisdiction: Civil Jurisdiction is that which concerns and deals with disputes of a ‘civil
nature’. Criminal jurisdiction on the other hand relates to crimes and punishes offenders.
5. Original and Appellate Jurisdiction: Original jurisdiction is jurisdiction inherent in or conferred upon, a court
of first instance. In exercise of that jurisdiction, a court of first instance decides suits, petitions, or applications.
Appellate jurisdiction is the power or authority conferred upon a superior court to re-hear by way of appeal,
revision, etc., of causes which have been tried and decided by the courts of original jurisdiction.
 Munsiffs Courts, Courts of Civil Judges, Small Cause Courts are having original jurisdiction. While District
Courts and High Courts have original as well as appellate jurisdiction.

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SECTION 9: GATEWAY OF CPC: SUBJECT- MATTER JURISDICTION
 9. Courts to try all civil suits unless barred.—The Courts shall (subject to the provisions herein contained) have
jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or
impliedly barred.

Restrictions

“subject to the “either expressly or

provisions herein impliedly barred”
contained”

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WHAT IS A SUIT OF CIVIL NATURE?

 [Explanation I].—A suit in which the right to property or to an office is contested is a suit of a civil nature,
notwithstanding that such right may depend entirely on the decision of questions as to religious rites or
ceremonies.
 [Explanation I].—For the purposes of this section, it is immaterial whether or not any fees are attached to the
office referred to in Explanation I or whether or not such office is attached to a particular place.]
 The word ‘civil’ has not been defined in the Code. A suit is of a civil nature if the principal question therein
relates to the determination of a civil right and enforcement thereof. It is not the status of the parties to the suit but
the subject-matter of it which determines whether or not the suit if of civil nature.

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HORIL VS KESHAV & ANR (2012)5 SCC 525
 Facts: The appellant filed a suit (No. 43 of 1980) in the court of Munsif, Karwi (Banda) seeking a declaration that the
decree passed by the Assistant Collector, Class-I, in a suit under sections 176, 178 and 182 of the U.P. Zamindari
Abolition & Land Reforms Act was fraudulent, inoperative and not binding upon him.
 According to the appellant, the defendants had instituted the suit before the Assistant Collector in which his father namely
Chunkai was made as one of the opposite party. In that suit, a compromise petition was filed on October 7, 1971, with the
fake signature of Chunkai and on that basis a compromise decree finally came to be passed on April 25, 1979.
 It is the case of the appellant that no notice of the suit was ever served upon his father Chunkai. He never appeared in the
proceeding and was not even aware of it. He did not sign any compromise petition and his alleged signature on the
compromise petition dated October 7, 1971, was faked. He had died much earlier and was not even alive in 1979 when
the decree was passed.
 The appellant, accordingly, sought a declaration that the decree dated April 25, 1979, passed by the Assistant Collector,
Class-I, Karwi, may be cancelled or it may be declared as void ab initio, inoperative and not binding upon him.
 Issue: The defendants (respondents 1 and 2 before this Court) filed a written statement in which they questioned the
maintainability of the suit as well. 
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 It was contended on their behalf that as the suit related to agricultural lands it was beyond the jurisdiction and
competence of the civil court and it could only be tried by the revenue authorities.
HORIL VS KESHAV & ANR (2012)5 SCC 525 CONTINUED...

 Different stages of proceedings: The Munsif by his order dated October 1, 1985 upheld the defendants' objection
and held that the suit was not maintainable before a civil court.
 Against the order passed by the Munsif, the appellant preferred an appeal which was allowed by the judgment and
order dated April 14, 1987 passed by the Additional District Judge, Karwi, (Banda). The Additional District Judge
rightly pointed out that the suit filed by the appellant was based on the allegation that the decree passed by the
Assistant Collector was based on a fraudulent compromise petition and it did not involve any adjudication of
rights or interests in the agricultural lands. Hence, the suit was maintainable before a civil court.
 When the matter came before the Munsif on remand, the defendants once again objected to the maintainability of
the suit, this time raising the contention that it was barred under the provisions of Order XXIII Rule 3-A of the
Code of Civil Procedure. The Munsif by his order dated January 7, 1988 dismissed the objection and found and
held that the suit was maintainable.
 Against the orders passed by the Munsif and the District Judge, the defendants preferred a writ petition before the
High Court and the High Court, as noted above, allowed the writ petition holding that the suit was not
15
maintainable.
HORIL VS KESHAV & ANR (2012)5 SCC 525 CONTINUED...

 Compromise decree and Order XXIII Rule 3-A: It is true that a compromise forming the basis of the decree can
only be questioned before the same court that recorded the comprise and a fresh suit for setting aside a
compromise decree is expressly barred under Order XXIII Rule 3-A. It is equally true the expression "not lawful"
used in Rule 3-A of Order XXIII also covers a decree based on a fraudulent compromise hence, a challenge to a
compromise decree on the ground that it was obtained by fraudulent means would also fall under the provisions of
Rule 3-A of Order XXIII.
 In light of the decision in Banwari Lal it would prima facie appear that the High Court was right in holding that
the appellant's suit was hit by the provisions of Order XXIII Rule 3-A and was not maintainable. But the
significant distinguishing feature in this case is that the compromise decree which is alleged to be fraudulent, and
which is sought to be declared as nullity was passed not by a civil court but by a revenue court in a suit under
section 176 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act, 1950

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HORIL VS KESHAV & ANR (2012)5 SCC 525 CONTINUED...

 Decision of the Supreme Court: We are of the view that Revenue courts are neither equipped nor competent to
effectively adjudicate on allegations of fraud that has overtones of criminality and the courts really skilled and
experienced to try such issues are the courts constituted under the Code of Civil Procedure.
 It is also well settled that under section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code, the civil court has inherent jurisdiction to
try all types of civil disputes unless its jurisdiction is barred expressly or by necessary implication, by any
statutory provision and conferred on any other tribunal or authority. We find nothing in Order XXIII Rule 3-A to
bar the institution of a suit before the civil court even in regard to decrees or orders passed in suits and/or
proceedings under different statutes before a court, tribunal or authority of limited and restricted jurisdiction.
 In our view in the facts of the case the provision of Order XXIII shall not act as a bar against the suit filed by the
appellant. We, accordingly, set aside the order of the High Court. 
 As a consequence, the suit will be restored before the Munsif who is directed to accord it priority having regard to
the fact that for the last 31 years it is stuck up on the issue of maintainability. The trial court should try to dispose
of the suit without any delay, and in any case, not later than one year from the date of receipt/production of a copy17
of this order.
SUITS OF CIVIL NATURE/ SUITS NOT OF CIVIL NATURE
 Matrimonial Issues
 Contractual transactions
 Specific relief
 Civil wrongs
 Right to worship
 Right to possession
 Right to burial
 Suits related to partnership
 Suits related to property
 Suits purely related to caste
 Suits related to purely religious rites or ceremonies
 Suits related to elections
 Suits related to politics
 Suits barred by law
 Suits for recovery of voluntary payments
 Suits for upholding mere dignity or honour
 Suits against expulsions from caste etc.
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EXPRESS AND/OR IMPLIED BAR U/S 9
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(I) SUITS EXPRESSLY BARRED

 A suit is said to be expressly barred when it is barred by an enactment for the time being in force. It is open to a
competent legislature to bar jurisdiction of civil courts with respect to a particular class of suits of a civil nature,
provided that in doing so it keeps itself within the field of legislation conferred on it and does not contravene any
provision of the Constitution.
 But every assumption should be made in favour of the jurisdiction of a civil court and the provision of exclusion
of jurisdiction of a court must be strictly construed.
 For example: Matters falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of Revenue Courts or matters dealt with by special
tribunals under the relevant statutes e.g., Industrial Tribunal, Election Tribunal, Rent Tribunal, Cooperative
Tribunal, Income tax Tribunal, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, or by domestic tribunals e.g., Bar Council,
Medical Council are expressly barred from the cognizance of a civil court.

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(II) SUITS IMPLIEDLY BARRED

 A suit is said to be impliedly barred when it is barred by general principles of law.

 Where a specific remedy is given by a statute, it thereby deprives the person who insists upon a remedy of any other
form than that given by the statute. Where an Act creates an obligation and enforces its performance in a specified
manner, that performance cannot be enforced in any other manner.
 Certain suits though of civil nature, are barred from the cognizance of a civil court on the ground of public policy.
 For example: No suit shall lie for recovery of costs incurred in a criminal prosecution or for enforcement of a right
upon a contract hit by Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872; or against any judge for acts done in the course
of his duties.
 Likewise political questions belong to the domain of public administrative law and are outside the jurisdiction of
civil courts.
 A civil court thus has no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon disputes of political nature.

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SECTION: 9 CONTINUED...
 The Supreme Court in the case of Abdul Gafur & Anr vs State Of Uttarkhand & Ors (2008) at para 13 held
that,

“Section 9 of the Code provides that civil court shall have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting
the suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. To put it differently, as per Section 9 of
the Code, in all types of civil disputes, civil courts have inherent jurisdiction unless a part of that jurisdiction is
carved out from such jurisdiction, expressly or by necessary implication by any statutory provision and conferred
on other Tribunal or Authority. Thus, the law confers on every person an inherent right to bring a suit of civil
nature of one's choice, at one's peril, howsoever frivolous the claim may be, unless it is barred by a statute.”
 The Supreme Court in the case of Rajasthan State Road Trpt. Corpn. ... vs Bal Mukund Bairwa (2009) held
that,
 [...Section 9 of the Code is in enforcement of the fundamental principles of law laid down in the maxim Ubi jus Ibi
remedium..... Ex facie, in terms of Section 9 of the Code, civil courts can try all suits, unless bared by statute,
either expressly or by necessary implication.... The civil court, furthermore, being a court of plenary jurisdiction
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has the jurisdiction to determine its jurisdiction..]
DHULABHAI V. STATE OF M.P., AIR 1969 SC 78: (1968) 3 SCR 662

 C. J. Hidayatullah held that despite express or implied bar, the civil

Other courts and tribunals be
like: court has jurisdiction in the following cases:
i. If the remedies provided in that statute is inadequate, then for that
remedy ordinarily civil court will have jurisdiction.
ii. If the statute itself is unconstitutional, then suit can be filed before the
civil court.
iii. If the statute is constitutional but the tribunal has violated the
provisions of the statute or has violated the principles of natural
justice.

Research Question: Read upon this case in

detail from facts to issues and discussion on
Section 9 (to be discussed in the next class) 23
SECTION: 9 CONTINUED...

 It is well-settled that a civil court has inherent

power to decide its own jurisdiction. (Robust Hotels
(P) Ltd. v. EIH Ltd., (2017) I SCC 622: (2017) I
SCC (Civ) 440)
 It is for the party who seeks to oust the jurisdiction
of a civil court to establish it. It is equally settled
that a statute ousting the jurisdiction of a civil court
must be strictly construed.
 In case of a doubt as to the jurisdiction, the court
should lean towards the assumption of the
jurisdiction.
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SECTION: 9 CONTINUED...

 Although as a result of such inquiry it may turn out

that the court has no jurisdiction to entertain the
suit. (Bhatia Coop Housing Society Ltd. v. D. C.
Patel, AIR 1953 SC 16)

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PECUNIARY JURISDICTION
 3. Subordination of Courts.—For the purposes of this Code, the District Court is subordinate to the High
Court, and every Civil Court of a grade inferior to that of a District Court and every Court of Small Causes is
subordinate to the High Court and District Court.

High Court

District Court

Civil Judge Senior Division

Civil Judge Junior Division

Small Causes Court

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PECUNIARY JURISDICTION CONTINUED...

 6. Pecuniary jurisdiction.—Save in so far as is otherwise expressly provided, nothing herein contained shall
operate to give any Court jurisdiction over suits the amount or value of the subject-matter of which exceeds the
pecuniary limits (if any) of its ordinary jurisdiction.

Telangana Civil Courts Act, 1972

 Junior Civil Judge: up to 20 lakhs
 Civil Judge: 20-50 lakhs
 Senior Chief Judge/ additional Chief Judge: More than 50
lakhs
 High Court: Appellate Jurisdiction

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PECUNIARY JURISDICTION CONTINUED...

Research Question: Find out Pecuniary limits

and jurisdiction of respective courts for the
following States: 1. Madhya Pradesh 2.
Chhattisgarh 3. Maharashtra 4. Delhi 5. Uttar
Pradesh 6. Bihar

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PECUNIARY JURISDICTION CONTINUED...

 15. Court in which suits to be instituted.—Every suit shall be instituted in the Court of the lowest grade
competent to try it.

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TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION

Section 20: In all matters Residuary provision

Section 19: Cases of tort and wrong against movable Where the tort is committed and/or
property status of defendant
Section 16: Immovable property and tort against
immovable property

Section 17: Applies in the cases when two courts have Where immovable property is
jurisdiction with respect to one immovable property situated
Section 18: When jurisdiction is uncertain in the case of
immovable property
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SECTION 20. OTHER SUITS TO BE INSTITUTED WHERE
DEFENDANTS RESIDE OR CAUSE OF ACTION ARISES

Subject to the limitations aforesaid, every suit shall be instituted in a Court within the local limits of whose
jurisdiction—
(a) the defendant, or each of the defendants where there are more than one, at the time of the commencement of the
suit, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain; or
(b) any of the defendants, where there are more than one, at the time of the commencement of the suit, actually and
voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain, provided that in such case either the leave of
the Court is given, or the defendants who do not reside, or carry-on business, or personally works for gain, as
aforesaid, acquiesce in such institution; or
(c) The cause of action, wholly or in part, arises.

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SECTION 20: MORE THAN ONE DEFENDANT

 Section 20(b): “Any of the defendant”- If the

 Section 20(a): “Each of defendant”- Common Place
defendants are at different places, then following
where all the defendants are found
conditions need to be fulfilled:
• Suppose there is a suit against A, B and C.
a. Leave of the court or
• A works in Delhi
b. Consent from non- residents
• B resides in Delhi
• A works in Delhi
• C has business in Delhi
• B resides in Ahmedabad
• C has business in Mumbai

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SECTION 20 CONTINUED...

 There is a contract between Krusha and Varun. Krusha breaches the contract. Krusha is a resident of Ahmedabad.
She works for gain in Sonipat and has business in Mumbai. The contract was entered into in Bangalore. It was
supposed to be performed in Chennai. In which Court, Varun can file a suit for damages?
 Varun can file a suit in any of the places. Places of juridical choices.
 A is a tradesman in Calcutta, B carries on business in Delhi. B, by his agent in Calcutta, buys goods of A and
requests A to deliver them to the East Indian Railway Company. A delivers the goods accordingly in Calcutta. A
may sue B for the price of the goods either in Calcutta, where the cause of action has arisen, or in Delhi, where B
carries on business.
 A resides at Simla, B at Calcutta and C at Delhi. A, B and C being together at Benaras, B and C make a joint
promissory note payable on demand, and deliver it to A. A may sue B and C at Benaras, where the cause of action
arose. He may also sue them at Calcutta, where B resides, or at Delhi, where C resides; but in each of these cases,
if the non-resident defendant objects, the suit cannot proceed without the leave of the Court.
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SECTION 20: EXPLANATION

 [Explanation].—A corporation shall be deemed to carry on business at its sole or principal office in [India] or, in
respect of any cause of action arising at any place where it has also a subordinate office, at such place.
 The explanation provides for the place of business for a company or a corporation and it is divided into 3 parts:
(Patel Roadways v. Prasad Trading, 1991)
i. When the corporation has only a sole office: the place of business will be the place where sole office is situated.
ii. Where the corporation has head office and some branch offices: Place of business will be where the head office is
situated.
iii. Where the corporation has head office and branch offices and cause of action arises at any of the branch offices
the place of business will be such branch office.

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PATEL ROADWAYS LIMITED V. PRASAD TRADING COMPANY,
1992 AIR 1514
 Facts: The appellant in both the appeals carried on the business of a carrier and transported goods on hire. It had
its principal office at Bombay and branch offices at various other places.
 The respondent in the first appeal a dealer in cardamom entrusted a consignment of cardamom to the appellant at
its branch office at Bodinayakanur in Tamilnadu to be delivered at Delhi. After the goods had been transported
by the appellant and kept in a godown at Delhi, the same got destroyed and damaged in a fire as a result whereof
the consignee refused to take delivery. The respondent instituted a suit in the sub-court within whose territorial
jurisdiction the branch office of the appellant was situated for damages alleging that the fire was due to the
negligence and carelessness on the part of the staff of the appellant.
 Respondent No. 4 in the second appeal entrusted certain packets of pesticides insured with the second respondent
Insurance Company to the appellant at its branch office at Madras for being carried to Delhi. The respondent
alleged that the goods were delivered at New Delhi in a damaged condition resulting in loss and a suit was
instituted for recovery of the loss in the City Civil Court at Madras.
 In the appeal, it was contended on behalf of the appellant that since the courts at two places namely Madras and
Bombay had jurisdiction in the matter, the jurisdiction of the courts in Madras was ousted by the clause in the
35
contract whereunder the parties had agreed that jurisdiction to decide any dispute under the contract would be only
in the courts at Bombay.
PATEL ROADWAYS LIMITED V. PRASAD TRADING COMPANY,
1992 AIR 1514 CONTINUED...

 On the question: whether in view of the relevant clause in the contract between the parties the courts at Bombay
alone had jurisdiction and the jurisdiction of the courts at Madras where the two suits were instituted was barred.
 HELD: The courts at Bombay in these two cases did not at all have jurisdiction and consequently the agreement
between the parties conferring exclusive jurisdiction on courts at Bombay is of no avail.

“The parties cannot by mutual agreement confer jurisdiction upon such courts which actually does not have
jurisdiction. Such a clause will be void as being violative of Section 23 and Section 28 of Indian Contract Act,
1872.”

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SECTION 16: IMMOVABLE PROPERTY AND TORT AGAINST
IMMOVABLE PROPERTY
16. Suits to be instituted where subject-matter situate.—Subject to the pecuniary or other limitations prescribed by any
law, suits—
(a) for the recovery of immovable property with or without rent or profits,
(b) for the partition of immovable property,
(c) for foreclosure, sale or redemption in the case of a mortgage of or charge upon immovable property,
(d) or the determination of any other right to or interest in immovable property,
(e) for compensation for wrong to immovable property,
(f) for the recovery of movable property actually under distraint or attachment, shall be instituted in the Court within the
local limits of whose jurisdiction the property is situate:
Provided that a suit to obtain relief respecting, or compensation for wrong to, immovable property held by or on behalf
of the defendant may, where the relief sought can be entirely obtained through his personal obedience, be instituted
either in the Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the property is situate, or in the Court within the local limits
of whose jurisdiction the defendant actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain. 37
Explanation.—In this section “property” means property situate in [India].
THE DETERMINATION OF ANY OTHER RIGHT TO OR INTEREST IN
IMMOVABLE PROPERTY

 This part indicates residuary power.

 Any other rights:

a. Easementary rights
b. Lease/ license
c. Specific performance
d. Attachment of immovable property
e. Eviction
f. Lien
g. Life estate

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PERSONAL OBEDIENCE: PROVISO
 Meaning: Decree can be executed by making the judgment debtor personally liable to perform the decree.
 If the decree is executed without doing something on the property then it will be a case of personal obedience. If
the decree is for obtaining compensation for some wrong committed to the immovable property. This is a case of
personal obedience.
 The obedience should be such that defendant can comply with it without going outside the jurisdiction of court
trying the matter. It is only possible if defendant resides, or carries on business or works for personal gain within
the jurisdiction of court trying the matter.
 ‘A’ and ‘B’ entered into an agreement pursuant to which B would sell land situated in Mathura, U.P. to ‘A’. ‘A’
failed to make the payment within the time agreed. Subsequently, ‘B’ terminated the contract and filed a suit in the
Delhi court for declaration for termination of contract and to retain his title to the property. The Court ruled in
favour of ‘B’. ‘A’ appealed against the judgment of the Delhi court, claiming that it does not have the jurisdiction
to decide the case as the land is situated in Mathura, U.P. He contended that the relief pleaded is not an equitable
remedy and cannot be obtained through personal obedience. The option of suing at three additional places is only
available when the relief sought is equitable in nature, the obtainment of which is entirely dependent upon the 39

personal obedience of the defendant.

HARSHAD CHIMANLAL MODI V. DLF UNIVERSAL LTD (2005)

 Krusha and Aditi entered into a contract in Delhi for a construction of a house situated in Gurgaon.
 The contract had an exclusive jurisdiction clause of Delhi courts.
 Krusha breached the contract and Aditi filed a suit before Delhi Court. However, after 8 years, Krusha made an
amendment to written statement and stated that Delhi Court would not have jurisdiction.

i. Whether the question of jurisdiction can be raised at any time?

ii. Whether Delhi court has no jurisdiction?
iii. Whether exclusive jurisdiction clause is void?

40
HARSHAD CHIMANLAL MODI V. DLF UNIVERSAL LTD (2005)
CONTINUED...
 The applicant was the original plaintiff who instituted a suit on the Original Side of the High Court of Delhi for
declaration, for specific performance of agreement, for possession of property and for permanent injunction. The suit
was filed in 1988. Written statement was filed by the defendants- respondents in 1989 contesting the claim of the
plaintiff on merits but without raising any objection as to jurisdiction of the Court. The jurisdiction of the Court was
'admitted'. The suit was then transferred to District Court, Delhi in 1993. In 1997, issues were framed which did not
include issue as to jurisdiction of the Court as it was not disputed by the defendants. After more than eight years of
filing of the written statement, however, an application was filed by the defendants under Order 6, Rule 17 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 seeking an amendment in the written statement by raising an objection as to
jurisdiction of the Court. It was contended that the suit was for recovery of immovable property situated in Gurgaon
District. Under Section 16 of the Code, such a suit for recovery of property could only be instituted within the local
limits of whose jurisdiction the property was situated. Since the property was in Gurgaon, Delhi Court had no
jurisdiction.
 The said application was allowed in spite of objection by the plaintiff. On the basis of the amended written
statement, an additional issue was framed by the trial Court as to the jurisdiction of Delhi Court to entertain and try
the suit. After hearing the parties, the trial Court held that the suit was covered by Clause (d) of the Section 16 of the
Code and Delhi Court had no jurisdiction as the property was situated at Gurgaon. Accordingly, the plaint was 41

ordered to be returned to the plaintiff for presentation to proper Court. The said order was confirmed by the High
Court as well as by this Court.
SECTION 17: SUITS FOR IMMOVABLE PROPERTY SITUATE
WITHIN JURISDICTION OF DIFFERENT COURTS

 What will happen if the property is situated within the jurisdiction of more than one Court?

17. Suits for immovable property situate within jurisdiction of different Courts.—Where a suit is to obtain relief
respecting, or compensation for wrong to, immovable property situate within the jurisdiction of different Courts. the
suit may be instituted in any Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction any portion of the property is
situate.
Provided that, in respect of the value of the subject-matter of the suit, the entire claim is cognizable by such Court.

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SECTION 18: PLACE OF INSTITUTION OF SUIT WHERE LOCAL
LIMITS OF JURISDICTION OF COURTS ARE UNCERTAIN

 18. Place of Institution of suit where local limits of jurisdiction of Courts are uncertain.— (1) Where it is
alleged to be uncertain within the local limits of the jurisdiction of which of two or more Courts any immovable
property is situate, any one of those Courts may, if satisfied that there is ground for the alleged uncertainty, record
a statement to that effect and thereupon proceed to entertain and dispose of any suit relating to that property, and
its decree in the suit shall have the same effect as if the property were situate within the local limits of its
jurisdiction:
 Provided that the suit is one with respect to which the Court is competent as regards the nature and value of the
suit to exercise jurisdiction.

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SECTION 19: SUITS FOR COMPENSATION FOR WRONGS TO
PERSON OR MOVABLES
 19. Suits for compensation for wrongs to person or movables.—Where a suit is for compensation for wrong
done to the person or to movable property, if the wrong was done within the local limits of the jurisdiction of one
Court and the defendant resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain, within the local limits of
the jurisdiction of another Court, the suit may be instituted at the option of the plaintiff in either of the said
Courts.
 Illustrations:

i. A, residing in Delhi, beats B in Calcutta. B may sue A either in Calcutta or in Delhi.

ii. A, residing in Delhi, publishes in Calcutta statements defamatory of B. B may sue A either in Calcutta or in
Delhi.

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OBJECTION AS TO JURISDICTION

21. Objections to jurisdiction. —

(1)No objection as to the place of suing shall be allowed by any Appellate or Revisional Court unless such objection
was taken in the Court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity and in all cases where issues are settled at
or before such settlement, and unless there has been a consequent failure of justice.
(2) No objection as to the competence of a Court with reference to the pecuniary limits of its jurisdiction shall be
allowed by any Appellate or Revisional Court unless such objection was taken in the Court of first instance at the
earliest possible opportunity, and, in all cases where issues are settled, at or before such settlement, and unless there
has been a consequent failure of justice.
(3) No objection as to the competence of the executing Court with reference to the local limits of its jurisdiction shall
be allowed by any Appellate or Revisional Court unless such objection was taken in the executing Court at the
earliest possible opportunity, and unless there has been a consequent failure of justice.

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OBJECTION AS TO JURISDICTION CONTINUED...

 Objection as to local jurisdiction of a court does not stand on the same footing as an objection to the competence
of a court to try the case. Competence of a court to try a case goes to the very root of jurisdiction and where it is
lacking it is a case of inherent lack of jurisdiction. On the other hand, an objection as to the local jurisdiction of a
court can be waived.
 The Supreme Court in Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan AIR 1954 SC 342 observed:

“[W]hen a case had been tried by a court on the merits and judgment rendered, it should not be liable to be
reversed purely on technical grounds, unless it had resulted in failure of justice and the policy of the legislature
has been to treat objection to both territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction as technical and not open to consideration
by appellate court unless there has been a prejudice on merits.
 In 2019, the SC in Om Prakash v. Vishan Dayal (2019) 14 SCC 526 took a similar view.

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 SELF STUDY:
SETH HIRALAL PATNI VS SRI
KALI NATH,  1962 SCR (2) 747

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GENERAL PRINCIPLES ON JURISDICTION
 From various decisions of the Supreme Court, the following general principles relating to jurisdiction of a civil court
emerge:
a. A civil court has jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature unless their cognizance is barred either expressly or impliedly.
b. Consent can neither confer nor take away jurisdiction.
c. A decree passed by court without jurisdiction is nullity and the validity thereof can be challenged at any stage of the
proceedings.
d. Every court has inherent power to decide the question of its own jurisdiction.
e. Jurisdiction of a court depends on the averments made in a plaint and not upon the defence in a written statement.
f. For deciding jurisdiction of a court, the substance of a matter and not its form is important.
g. Every presumption should be made in favour of jurisdiction.
h. A statute ousting jurisdiction of a court must be strictly construed.
i. Burden of proof of exclusion of jurisdiction of a court is on the party who asserts it.
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j. Even where jurisdiction of a civil court is barred, it can still decide whether the provisions of an Act have been complied
with or whether an order was passed dehors the provisions of law.