BTSSIGFC Competency 1

Basic Training for Ships Subject
to IGF Code (Seafarers that have

completed Basic Gas Tanker
Familiarization Training)
Competence 1: Contribute to
the safe operations of a ship
subject to the IGF Code
EMTI ©
Contents
 Competence 1: Contribute to the safe operations
of a ship subject to the IGF Code
● Design and operational characteristics of ships subject to the

IGF Code
● Basic knowledge of ships subject to the IGF Code, their fuel
systems and fuel storage systems
● Basic knowledge of fuels and fuel storage systems'
operations on board ships subject to the IGF Code
● Knowledge and understanding of safety requirements and
safety management on board ships subject to the IGF Code
Ethiopian Maritime Training Institute
EMTI © 2
Competence 1: Contribute to
the safe operations of a ship

Ethiopian Maritime Training Institute 3
Design and operational
characteristics of ships subject to
the IGF Code
 The IMO Maritime safety committee adopted related
amendments to the International Convention on
Standards of Training, Certification and Watch-
keeping for Seafarers (STCW), and STCW code, to
include new mandatory minimum requirements for the
training and qualification of masters, officers, ratings
and other personnel on ships subject to the IGF code.
The STCW amendments also had an entry force date
of 1 January 2017, in line with the SOLAS
amendments related to the IGF code.
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 The amendments to SOLAS chapter II-1
(Construction – Structure, Subdivision and stability,
machinery and electrical installations), include
amendments to Part F Alternative design, and
arrangements, to provide a methodology for alternate
design and arrangements for machinery, electrical
installations and low-flashpoint fuel storage and
distribution systems; and a new Part G Ships using
low-flashpoint fuels, to add new regulations to require
ships constructed after the expected date of entry into
force of 1 January 2017 to comply with the
requirements of the IGF code, together with related
amendments to chapter II-2 and Appendix
(Certificates).
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Design and operational
characteristics of ships
 Introduction
 Approximately 10% of the world’s fuel oil consumption
is from the bunker fuel or heavy fuel oil (HFO) for the
deep sea, ocean going freighters. In order to restrict
the emissions, stricter norms have been formulated
and made mandatory for the ship owners to comply
with in a number of restricted sea zones which will
expand further as time goes.
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 Due to increasingly stricter environmental regulations
limiting air pollution from ships, together with the
commitment and ambition from IMO to reduce GHG
emissions from shipping, the use of LNG, methanol,
ethane, LPG, hydrogen, ammonia and other gases or
low-flashpoint fuels, in place of conventional residual
or distillate marine fuels, is expected to become more
widely adopted in the future.
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LNG as Fuel: the core benefits:
1. 100% less Sox;
2. 85% less Nox;
3. 30% less CO₂;
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 There are only three options left for the ship
owners/operators based on the commercial
considerations:
1. Operate as it is, on heavy fuel, avoiding restricted
zones if the ship is oil;
2. Only install a scrubber unit for exhaust polishing and
run the remaining life of the ship;
3. Modify the ship and change over the engine system to
run on duel fuel;
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Changing to LNG as the marine
fuel
 In a broader sense, changing to LNG fuel does not
involve a major change in the basic configuration or
propulsion plant design of commercial ships. The ship
and engine room will basically still look the same,
except for a few unusual looking tanks and a few
specially coloured pipes and boxes in the engine
room.
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 Industry can adapt to this new fuel, just like it did
when going from wood to coal to distillate fuel to
heavy fuel oil over the course of the past 150years.
However, more so than with previous fuels, the
storage and handling issues of LNG are complex,
involving as they do a fuel which is highly flammable
in its gaseous state and it stored at cryogenic
temperatures.
 These characteristics mean, more planning and
engineering are needed from designers and owners in
the construction and operation of LNG fuelled vessels
than was needed for oil fuelled vessels.
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 The major design considerations for a natural gas
fuelled ship are fundamentally different from a diesel
fuelled vessel. Naval architects must consider LNG
design requirements early in the process because
these requirements drive the arrangement and
stability of a vessel more so than more traditional
designs.
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 Specific hazards unique to natural gas and LNG use
on board ships require special attention by ship
designers to ensure safe operation. The particular
design requirements early in the process because
these requirement to conduct a risk assessment,
machinery space safety concepts, the role of
hazardous area classification, and fuel containment
and distribution requirements.
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 It is important to note that the term LNG as fuel only
refers to the storage of natural gas, and not its state
when consumed. Natural gas is heated and returned
to its gaseous state before being injected into an
engine. Injecting natural gas in its liquid state into a
combustion chamber would result in enormous
thermal variations and present significant design
challenges to any manufacturer. Though natural gas
has an extremely low flashpoint (-306.4⁰F / -188⁰C)
compared to diesel fuel (>120⁰F / 49⁰C), the auto-
ignition temperature of diesel is significantly lower,
410⁰F/210⁰C compared to 1076⁰F/580⁰C, for LNG.
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 The compression ratios required to achieve the auto-
ignition temperature of natural gas are exceedingly
high, and typically pure gas engines require the use of
a spark plug to ignite the fuel. Most natural gas
engines on the market are duel-fuel engines using a
small amount of diesel to ignite the gas when
compressed. This duel fuel technology has eased the
transition to natural gas by providing flexibility as
systems are commissioned. The use of duel fuel
engines has also benefitted from the ability to switch
fuels rather then shut down engines in the event of a
leak or abnormal condition in the natural gas supply
system.
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 There is much to learn when considering the use of
LNG as ship’s fuel, particularly those related to LNG
fuel storage. Engine selection, bunkering,
maintenance, operation, and training also need to be
considered and each adds to complexity of the switch
to LNG fuel. Any owner looking to make a successful
switch to LNG should be prepared to learn about
them all. Based on today’s fast pace of adoption of
LNG as a fuel, it seems many owners are saying the
hard work and complexity are worth the effort to
obtain the benefits from a clean burning, low coast
fuel like LNG.
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 Many who have not decided to take the full plunge to
LNG are still hedging their bets by building their new
vessels to be “LNG ready”, meaning they are
designed and built to easily make the switch in the
future.
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 Types of ships, trade patterns and suitability
1. LNG use may not be feasible for some ship types;

2. Best for short range ships on fixed routes so bunker
supply can be arranged tank size is practical;
3. Tramp ships with long voyages and uncertain routes
are not suitable for LNG fuel, in the near future;
4. Some high powered ships may not have available
space for the required storage tanks;
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 LNG fuel is more suitable for some ships types
than others and most suitable for the following
ship types:
1. Ships with a set route and short range (4000Nm or
less) – storage tank capacity is not overly large and
fixed bunkering port can be established
2. Ferries
3. Coastal ships and tugs
4. Ships that operate mostly within an ECA – low
emission are required;
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5. Ships without high fuel consumption rates – required
storage capacity is practical and bunkering time &
frequency is not high;
6. Ships that trade where a source of LNG is available;
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 Ship intended for cross ocean passages designed to
use LNG in ECA only need a means to effectively
utilize BOG when mid-ocean and heavy fuel as the
primary fuel.
 DNV rules for classification of ships part 6, chapter 13
“Gas Fuelled Engine Installations” have certain
requirements for design arrangement of bunkering
system. This is for the ships that use LNG as fuel.
Rules for classification of ships Part 5, chapter 5
“Liquefied Gas Carrier” will be applicable for a bunker
ship. But, as of now, the bunkering operation is not
covered by DNV class rules.
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 Major impacts on ship design and operation
1. Requires special, expensive propulsion machinery
with gas/duel fuel capability and storage tanks;
2. Best when provided with a backup diesel fuel option
to ensure fuel availability;
3. Hazardous compartment and passages monitoring
and guarded against gas leakage with extensive
arrangements;
4. Requires complex fuel system or fuel preparations
with added safety measures;
5. Require special crew training and higher maintenance
costs;
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 Primary Hazards of LNG as fuel and mitigation by
ship design
 The primary hazards to personnel are flammability,
frostbite and asphyxiation. LNG is stored as a
cryogenic liquid, which requires using appropriate
materials and safety precautions to contain and
handle the fluid in piping systems and storage tanks.
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 A cryogenic liquid is defined as one that has a boiling
point at atmospheric pressure below -240⁰F/-151⁰C.
The boiling point of LNG at atmospheric pressure is -
258.7⁰F/-162⁰C, which requires piping and
containment systems to be insulated to protect
personnel and maintain the temperature of the fluid.
Contact with a cryogenic fluid is a serious hazard to
personnel. Even short period of contact can cause
third degree frostbite.
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 This is also a hazard to ship hull and support
structures, as the typical mild steel used in the
construction of ships will undergo a ductile to brittle
transition at low temperatures resulting in cracking. All
components on an LNG piping system must be
designed for the lowest temperatures to which they
may be exposed. In addition to the minimum design
temperature, piping systems carrying cryogenic fluids
are required to complete stress analysis accounting
for the weight of the pipes, acceleration loads, internal
pressure, and loads induced by the supporting
structure of the ship, typically accomplished by a finite
element analysis.
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 The design requirements and testing for piping
systems mitigate the risk of a leak from piping and
connections. Where piping connections are flanged or
threaded, they must be provided with drip trays, which
are typically made of stainless steel. Another potential
leak source is the bunker station, which must be
located on an open deck, and have a drip tray
underneath. Vessels are required to protect
surrounding hull or deck structures from a leakage of
fuel.
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 The most common method employed is a water
curtain system flowing over the drip tray and
discharging over the side of the vessel. The water
curtain quickly moves any spilled LNG away from the
vessel, while also vaporizing the LNG by heating it
above its critical temperature. Natural gas disperses
away from the vessel because it is lighter than air,
preventing a localized flammable connection from
forming. A few areas are specially called out as
requiring drip trays to protect the ship from exposure
to cryogenic temperatures, but when conducting a risk
assessment, designers should be diligent on
identifying potential sources of leaks.
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Risk assessment
 The IGF code and the CG-ENG policy letter both
require a risk assessment to be conducted specified
to the vessel and its operations. A single risk
assessment is acceptable for a fleet of vessels built to
the same design. The coast guard has not issued
regulations for the use of natural gas as fuel. Instead,
the policy letter provides alternative design standards
that ensure a vessel using natural gas as fuel
provides a level of safety equivalent to that of a vessel
using diesel.
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 The unique component of the risk assessment
required by the IGF Code and the CG-ENG Policy
Letter is that it must be submitted and approved by
the coast guard prior to beginning plan approval.
Once approved, the mitigating safety measures are
treated as requirements for the design of up by
creating a custom set of requirements for each vessel
unique to its design and operation. It is important to
note that specific deviations from regulations or
special considerations must be considered in the risk
assessment, including the location of the storage
tanks and a request for a higher loading limit of the
LNG storage tanks.
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 If there is a change that a design may change and
require special consideration, this should be analysed
in the risk assessment to avoid the need for a new
risk assessment.
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 In identifying hazards to include in the risk
assessment, the IGF code specifically calls out areas
that must be addressed, including drip tray size and
fuel containment. Additionally, standard failure modes,
including leaks, equipment failures, and collision,
should be considered in addition to any deviations
from the requirements, and any characteristics of the
vessel that make it unique. The risk assessment must
follow an industry standard technique.
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 Typically this is conducted by a recognised
classification society. The international association of
classification societies publishes the guidance on risk
assessment techniques and scope in its
recommendation Risk assessment as required by the
IGF Code, (IACS, 2016).
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Handling Risk
 A risk analysis will help identify possible risks and
consider the safety mitigating measures that may
need to be implemented during design and
operational procedures. The IGF code and class
require specific areas of ship design to be risk
assessed as shown in table.
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 In addition to the design of the vessel, the operations
associated with bunkering the vessel may need to be
further assessed for risk based on the specific
operation concept and the stakeholders. Handling risk
is a shared responsibility amongst all stakeholders.
Typically, the shipowner/operator will take the lead in
developing risk and safety studies as they are in
control of the vessel operations and procedures, with
the added exception of operation specific knowledge
combined with access to LNG safety and technical
expertise from the earlier concept development
phase.
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 Once the initial studies have been completed, ship
operators have to ensure that the resulting mitigations
and safety measures that reduce the risk of LNG fuel
and bunkering operations into the acceptable range
are fully implemented. A key element of consistent
implementation to reduce risk to as low as reasonably
practical (ALARP) level relies on the capability of
persons in charge of bunkering to recognize on-
scene, site and condition specific risks to the LNG fuel
vessel or bunkering operation and take effective
measures to eliminate or reduce it, including
cancelling, postponing or halting the operation.
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Ship Procedures
 During the initial design stage of the project it is
essential to establish a comprehensive and detailed
concept of operations. This should include
participation of all identified stakeholders and parties
that may have input to or be impacted by operation of
the gas fuelled ship. Detailed operation concept
development is to account for actual and practical
performance of all activities related to using LNG as
marine fuel.
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 Shipboard procedures must incorporate the risk
control and safety measures already required within
their company and ship safety management system
under the ISM code. This requires effective
understanding of the hazards that LNG fuel presents,
the necessary precautions, ship and equipment
design and the operating parameters of the
containment and fuel gas supply system.
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 Specific operational challenges arise around
managing the LNG fuel supply onboard – port call
scheduling and voyage management may become
more challenging depending on the ship’s service.
Point to point or return to base operations are more
easily managed than a ship in global trading on spot
charters. Vessel masters and chief engineer may
have to adjust speed/power or otherwise manage fuel
consumption and BOG generation for pressure
control/reduction to accommodate schedule
bunkering’s, slow speed passages in port and idle
time alongside or at anchor.
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Simultaneous operations
 Charters will need to be conscious of available
fuelling infrastructure when issuing voyage orders.
Scheduling bunkering operations for before or after
cargo operations will be necessary unless a
Simultaneous operations (SIMOPS) study shows an
acceptable risk level permitting both operation at
once. Some ports or terminals may not permit LNG
bunkering within the port or restrict it to certain
locations that may require the ship to shift to receive
bunkers.
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 The specific operating procedures need of all the
safety measures and recommendations from the risk
and safety studies that were performed as part of IGF
code, class and administration compliance, this would
include SIMOPS evaluations and any other risk
studies done for specific locations by the bunker
supplier.
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Protection of tanks from damage
 Introduction: The goal of the IGF code is to provide for
safe and environmentally friendly design, construction
and operation of ships and in particular their
installations of systems for propulsion machinery,
auxiliary power generation machinery and/or other
purpose machinery using gas or low-flashpoint fuel as
fuel.
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 Main factors to be considered during design of a
ship subject to the IGF code as:
1. Protection of the fuel storage tank and fuel pipework
from damage through collisions with other vessels or
by dropped objects;
2. Redundancy of fuel systems to ensure that the vessel
can continue to navigate if one system has a
shutdown due to a leakage or failure;
3. Minimization of any hazards provided by the use of
gas as fuel;
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 Safety systems that provide a safe shut-down of
hazardous systems and in worst case scenarios,
removal of their inventories to prevent the built-up of
potentially flammable atmospheres.
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 LNG becomes highly flammable natural gas when
exposed to ambient temperatures (such as from a
leak or from damage) so LNG storage tanks are
required to be away from the side and bottom of the
ship to minimise potential damage from collisions and
groundings. The requirements for LNG fuel storage
tanks are more severe than for LNG cargo tanks on
LNG carriers because of the concern that cargo ships
using LNG fuel will not get the special attention that
LNG carriers do, and thus will be as prone to
collisions and groundings as any other ship.
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 The tanks to be installed indoor must follows the
following rules:
 Maximum air pressure 10 bar;
 Be located within B/5 or 11.5m from the hull;
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 Have B/15 distance or 2m from the bottom. In ships
not carrying passengers, the tanks can be placed
closer to the edge of the decks. This depends on the
volume of the tank and ranged from 0.8-2.0 m but
never less than 800mm.
 The US Coast guard does not allow the approach of
territorial waters by vessels with tanks under
accommodation spaces and single hull vessels
carrying transport tube for natural gas or liquefied
gas.
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 According to the existing IMO resolution
(MSC285(86)) for LNG fuelled vessels and the IGF
code (International code of safety for ships using
cases or other low flash point fuels), LNG storage
tanks need to be away from the hull as shown in the
figure by Beam/5 for the side clearance and Beam/15
for the bottom clearance (and a double bottom is
necessary).
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 However, the IGF code is to allow the creative naval
architect to expand the space available for LNG
storage tanks (the hatched area in the figure) upto the
minimum allowed distance of 0.8-2.0m from the side,
depend on tank volume, by using probability based
damaged stability analysis. This is one area where
ship designers can directly aid the owner in getting
more fuel in the same space on board.
 Besides limiting tank width, the IGF code also limits
the overall length of LNG tanks to 12% to 18% of the
ship’s length for cargo vessels.
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LNG Fuel Tank Location and
Bunkering Operations
 LNG Fuel Tank Location
 Of the two possibilities, above or below beck, the
above deck location is less complex and less
expensive.
 The below deck location requires zoned separation
from other spaces, explosion proof appliance,
dedicated ventilation systems and in general, more
controls.
 LNG tank storage cannot be placed where MDO can
be stored (wing tanks, DB’s) and thus the volume
requirements are many times that of storing MDO.
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 On the other hand, above deck locations, well away
from the vessels roll and pitch centers, invite greater
sloshing and possibly structural weight in the
installation.
 It is generally thought that LNG fuel tanks should be
located inside of B/5 to prevent tank damage in the
event of collision. The location in the length of the
vessel could be impacted by cargo considerations as
discussed later.
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Tank fill location
 While somewhat dependent on the tank location, the
bottom fill location incurs less energy in filling and has
the advantage of cooling the stored LNG with the
incoming (probably cooler) filling stream, thereby
reducing the amount of gas generated.
 The top fill location in preferable if there is any remote
chance that the fill line could be impacted by any
external force.
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 The choice in filling location with respect to the
bunkering station and the lines in between should be
such that there is absolute certainty that the line can
be completely drained either back to the bunkering
station, or to the LNG storage tank. Remember that a
gallon of trapped liquid LNG will result in 600gallon of
vapour.
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The shape of the LNG fuel tank
 For reasons of sloshing, the most desirable shape of
an LNG tank is a sphere. Next comes to a cylinder
with semi spherical ends and last, a prismatic shape.
Incredible arrays of manufactured LNG fuel tanks
exist, as with all design, other constrains may force
the decision on shape.
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The orientation of LNG fuel tanks
 Again, primarily for sloshing, the LNG fuel tank should
be orientated to minimise sloshing. Cylindrical tanks
generally should be orientated fore and aft.
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Bunkering
 Temperature of bunkers and pressure control are
two issues of concern.
 The colder the LNG from LNG supplier the better it is
for GFS. This means there is more time to manage
pressure control in the tanks. If the bunker vessel
supplies warmer LNG, this might result in handling
increased boil off/pressure which may lead to an
increase in fuel consumption just to handle pressure.
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 Linked to temperature, an additional concern is
understanding, if the LNG gas carriers/bunker vessels
“vapour return system” has been evaluated for
conducting vapour balancing in a compatibility
study/assessment with the gas fuelled vessel. Vapour
balancing design compatibility between supplier and
receiver is to be verified. As we look at large bunker
tanks, an owners needs to consider what happens
during the cool down of the bunker prior to full rate
loading and how to handle the associated flash gas
that will be generated.
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 If this is not considered, then this will impact the
duration of the bunkering operation evolution, which in
result may impact on the expected operating profile.
In addition to verifying the vapour balancing design
compatibility between supplier and receiver, there
could be challenges with documenting custody
transfers. In addition to measuring quantities of LNG
supplied to the gas fuelled ship (GFS), the amount of
vapour returned may need to be measured. Credits
for gas vapour return need to be included into the
overall price during custody transfer. Other areas
such as bunker station location and bunker vessel
compatibility are to be considered.
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 The bunkering station probably cannot be placed
inside of B/5 and may be in violated of existing rules.
The station and the filling line to the LNG storage tank
must be shown to be free of gas at the completion of
bunkering.
 While Nitrogen and inert gas has been used to “blow
out” LNG fill lines, it will not work unless the line is
100% full of liquid and a full piston effect results. The
inerting gas can blow by, leaving LNG in the line.
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 The height of the vessel’s LNG fuel tank, above the
fuelling truck, may be more than the truck’s pumping
capacity can accommodate and thus, an interim
pumping station may be required. It is thought that a
purpose-built LNG bunkering barge or shore facility
would have sufficient pump capacity.
 The bunkering station must have a sizable drip tray
installed beneath the manifold manufactured from a
cryogenic material. Additionally, it is recommended
that this tray, if filled, drain over the side through a
cryogenic line that takes the spilled liquid down to the
surface of the water. This line should not be run within
the structure of the vessel.
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 To prevent berthing damage, it will be necessary that
this line swing out of the way during docking and be
adjustable for draft charges.
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 Bunkering operation and cargo transfer – LNG
fuel tank location
 LNG carriers, under COTP rules, are not allowed to
load stores, spares or carry out any other operation
once LNG cargo has started to be discharged to the
shore facility. The LNG carrier is immediately
grounded, after berthing, with a metered reading of
the potential between the discharge facility and the
LNG carrier established and logged. Only then are the
discharge lines hooked up. It is therefore suggested
that USCG will have an interest in bunkering
operations with regard to the cargo operations of an
LNG fuelled vessel.
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 If a RO/RO, for instance, has a bunkering and fill line
arrangement that passes through the overhead of a
RO/RO deck, it may be that cargo operations will
have prohibited in that area while LNG bunkering is
taking place.
 If a containership had deck mounted LNG tanks
forward of an aft accommodation house, it could be
that all cargo operations forward of the house would
have to be stopped while LNG bunkering, whereas, if
the tanks were deck mounted aft of the house, only
aft hatch cargo operations would have to be stopped.
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Vessel operation and LNG
properties affecting design
 Impact of operational profiles and routes on
vessel design
 Most vessels are designed based on a defined
operating profile. Hull form has also typically been
significant influencer. For LNG fuelled ships, the
design of the LNG fuel containment system needs to
consider both the optimal operating profile while the
vessel is in transit and the undesirable conditions
such as when the vessel stops, loads, awaits orders
etc.
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 For example, a sample Aframax tanker in the Euroean
section spends 30% of its time idle with no mail
propulsion power with an average speed of only 10
knots compare to design speed of 14.5knots. A very
large ore carrier/bulk carriers often spends about 3
weeks in port waiting to load and abut another 3
weeks in a designation port waiting to discharge.
Along with operating profiles, designs are to consider
the dynamic characteristics of LNG fuel properties
and that the associated fuel containment system can
cope with these extended periods with low rates of
gas consumption.
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 This change in thinking may mean that the first fuel
system proposed may not be one that is best suited to
everyday operations. The designed is to be flexible
enough and well suited to meet normal trading
patterns. In-depth, voyage and vessel operations
profile analysis is required to established likely
parameters and guide system design and equipment
specifications (for example, matching tank maximum
allowable relief valve setting of a storage tank
(MARVS) to meet likely fuel supply saturated
pressure).
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Sloshing
 LNG is carried at cryogenic temperature and any
spillage onto steel structure will fracture the structure.
As an illustration, a foreign LNG carrier, discharging in
the US, has previous problems with low spots in LNG
piping and condensation. To make sure the lines were
dry; the crew would open small ¾ inch drain lines in
the LNG transfer piping, prior to entering the
discharge terminal, and blow nitrogen through the
empty lines. In order to maximise LNG tank capacity,
while keeping the deck height low, the vessel was
constructed with the deck plating against the LNG
tank insulation with the transverse and longitudinal
stiffeners above the deck plating, forming an egg
create structure.
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 One drain was inadvertently left open and upon the
start of discharge, the ¾ inch stream spewed out for
about 3 minutes, before it could be secured. For a 30
feet radius from the drain, the deck plating and
stiffeners were fractured, requiring replacement of all
of the affected deck structure.
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 LNG is carried in single or double walled cryogenic
tanks and as a light liquid (GS.G. = 0.44), it’s density
and viscosity properties make it susceptible to
sloshing. All liquids slosh in tanks at sea to some
extent, however, the degree of slosh in LNG tanks in
greater than most other liquids in that baffles are not
installed in LNG tanks. Sloshing imparts energy to the
stored LNG.
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 Imparting energy to any liquid may cause a slight rise
in liquid temperature; however, in LNG such a rise
can lead to the formation of more the stored LNG than
might be desired. A poorly configured rectangular
storage tank, mounted well above the roll and pitch
center of a research vessel, could provide more gas
than the vessel can use.
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 The excess gas can be vented at sea. However, in
the age of saving every BTU possible, venting non-
usable gas is not economic. Excess gas can be re-
liquefied, however, in small quantities the energy
expanded approaches the energy saved. Small
reliquefaction plants exist, but they are quite
expensive (20 tpd units costs about $2m)
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Vessel operation
 The time a vessel spends at sea and in port is
important in any design, however it takes on an added
dimension in the LNG fuelled vessel, USCG LNG
carrier COTP regulations do not allow LNG carriers to
vent in port, so it is presumed LNG fuelled vessels will
also not be allowed to vent in port. There are many
different configurations of LNG containment tanks,
some with much better insulation properties than
others.
EMTI © 77
 Claim from the manufacturer of those tank structures
must be carefully reviewed to make sure the designer
and manufacturer are speaking on the same terms.
All containment systems have some “boil off” where
increase temperature of the stored LNG causes some
vaporisation of the stored liquid.
 This starts as a very cold gas layer just above the
stored liquid LNG, however, very small temperature
increases can rise the pressure in this gas layer to the
point the gas must be removed for use, or
automatically vented.
EMTI © 78
 Containment systems vary considerably with regards
to the internal pressure the tank can accommodate.
When a manufacturer indicates his tank will hold
LNG, without venting, for 2 weeks at moderate
ambient temperatures, the manufacturer assumes the
tank is at atmospheric pressure when the period
starts, if your vessel has just returned from a rough
crossing the LNG tanks might not be at ambient
pressure on arrival, unless they are vented =,
releasing gas you have paid for.
EMTI © 79
 If the LNG tanks are low on arrival and are filled
during port time, the filling operation will add some
energy to the LNG, forming gas. Unless the filling tank
(truck, barge or shore tank) can take back all the gas
formed in fuelling, the internal pressure in the vessel’s
LNG storage tank will rise.
EMTI © 80
Consumers in the Machinery
spaces
 Recognizing that any assumed mission profile can
change and that LNG storage tank pressure may
force venting, the design of machinery should be such
that there is always an LNG gas consumer available
to reduce LNG storage pressure or that reliquefaction
can take place as explained above.
EMTI © 81
Shipyard visits and drydocking
 LNG carriers, in the US, must arrive at shipyard for a
dry-docking, or major work, in the gas free condition.
This requires the LNG carrier to stay at sea for a few
days burning up any remaining gas and then inerting
the LNG cargo tanks. It would seem reasonable to
assume the same criterion would apply to LNG fuelled
vessels, thus some management of LNG fuel amount
is necessary when scheduling out of service time.
Additional out of service time has to be factored in to
get the LNG fuel tanks in an empty and intered
condition.
EMTI © 82
Venting
 Every LNG tank installation must have a ventilation
arrangement where the exit of the vent is at least 10m
from any possible ignition source. This is usually
accomplished by fitting a mast type vent above, or
near, the storage tank. Often leads from filling line
over pressurization relief valves are led to this mast.
Unless the vent mast can drain readily back to the
LNG storage tank, the liquid dumped in the base of
the mast will vaporize often pistoning remaining liquid
to the top.
EMTI © 83
Other design challenges
 Beyond the major decision points for tank locations,
their dimensions, insulations, fuel system and piping
layout, material selection, there are additional design
challenges that may be considered by the ship
designers in the risk assessment process.
EMTI © 84
Pump or compressor room
classification
 Pump or compressor rooms are defined in the IGF
code as “fuel preparation rooms”, and classified as
zone 1 hazardous locations. This is a departure from
the requirements in CG=521 policy letter 01-12 dated
April 19, 2012, which classified natural gas pump or
compressor rooms and associated ventilation inlet or
outlets to the strictest requirements. The Policy
letter’s classification was established in order to
bridge the gap between US regulations and the IMO
Interim guidelines.
EMTI © 85
 This presented a design challenge given the limited
electrical equipment protections allowed in cargo
pump and compressor rooms under 46 CFR 111/105-
31 (f); intrinsically safe equipment, explosion proof
lighting fixtures, and cables supplying intrinsically safe
equipment in the cargo handling room. With the
release of CG-521 policy letter 01-12 ch.1 in 2017,
the hazardous area requirements for fuel preparation
rooms were harmonized with established international
standards.
EMTI © 86
Vent mast
 Hazardous area classifications also impact personnel
protection. For example, the outlet of an LNG storage
tank relief vent is required to be located 6m or a
distance equal to a third of the beam (B/3) of the
vessel above the working deck, whichever is higher.
This requirement aims to protect personnel from
exposure to hazardous vapours in the unlikely event
of unintended gas release. It should be noted that the
vent mast height could be limited to a lower value as
long as the arrangement demonstrates an equivalent
level of safety to the requirements as stated.
EMTI © 87
 Consideration can be given based in the vessel’s tank
release mass flow rate, pressure, and temperature;
length of the tank relief vent pipe run and fluid velocity
calculated at the vent outlet.
EMTI © 88
Electrical equipment certifications
 All electrical equipment located within the hazardous
area must be protected and certified by an
independent testing laboratory recognised by the
coast guard as required in CG-521 policy letter 01-12.
Certification the European union’s (EU) ATEX
Directive (94/9/EC) is not acceptable. Although similar
to accepted standards, the ATEX directive allows for
self-certification of equipment and test methods that
are not harmonized with acceptance standards. It
should be noted that certification under the ATEX
directive does not limit equipment from also having
certification under standards accepted in CG-521
policy letter 01-12 ch-1.
EMTI © 89
Welding of cryogenically robust
materials
 A major consideration for designers is the specific
materials required for cryogenic temperatures.
Examples of such materials can be found in the IGF
code (7.4), which calls out the specific requirements
for the percentage of alloying elements in the steel.
The alloying elements required for steel exposed to
cryogenic temperatures reduce the weldability of the
steel. The reduce weldability and requirements for
double wall piping present challenges in fabrication,
compared to the mild steels typically used in
shipbuilding.
EMTI © 90
 A complex LNG fuel system inherently requires strong
welds throughout the piping, which can be especially
difficult to achieve in double walled piping in gas safe
machinery spaces. Typically, 304L or 316L austenitic
stainless steel, which is suitable for the -258.7 F boil
off temperature of LNG (Holloway & Marchall, 2005).
The overall quality of the weld depends on the type of
filler materials used, the skill of the welder, and the
welding equipment settings. In austenitic steels,
achieving welds that maintain high toughness
characteristics while still guaranteeing sufficient hot
cracking and weld defect resistance requires low
delta-ferrite (FN) levels while not exceeding a
minimum threshold, usually in the 3-8 FN range.
EMTI © 91
 Carefully controlling consumable selection (i.e.
chemical composition) and welding procedures (i.e.
torch arc length) can improve overall weld quality. Not
accounting for this can result in lower quality welds,
significant rework, and delays during construction.
EMTI © 92
Hydrostatic vs. Pneumatic
Process testing
 Pressure testing methodology of the fuel piping is
another challenge to consider. Hydrostatic or
pneumatic pressure testing is typically used to comply
with section 16.7.1 of the IGF code, both of which
have advantages and disadvantages that should be
addressed by shipbuilders.
 Hydrostatic testing uses a liquid medium and is
considered safer than pneumatic testing.
EMTI © 93
 Unfortunately, all excess water from testing must be
removed from all piping prior to system cool down.
Failure to do so can result in the formation of
hydrates, a combination of water and chemical
constituents that closely resembles ice. Accumulation
of hydrates can cause obstruction of fuel piping,
blockage of valves, and pressure drops that can lead
to equipment damage. The additional time needed to
ensure all piping is clear of water after hydrostatic
testing to prevent formation of hydrates can be
difficult if under tight construction and delivery
schedules and should be noted when planning piping
test schedules.
EMTI © 94
 Pneumatic testing with an inert gas medium such as
nitrogen can be accomplished much more quickly, but
is potentially more dangerous due to the increase
build-up of stored potential energy in the compressed
gas, especially at higher pressures.
EMTI © 95
 Failure to take proper precautions can result in
catastrophic brittle failure and explosive
decompression of piping. More robust safety
procedures and testing precautions must be taken to
ensure personnel and equipment are protected and
requires additional oversight and coast guard
approval prior to conducting this type of testing.
EMTI © 96
Conclusion
 Designing a vessel using LNG as fuel involves
different safety requirements than a traditional diesel
fuelled ship. The classification of spaces as
hazardous areas will limit the equipment that can be
placed in those spaces. The selection of a machinery
spaces concept is a critical design decision that will
determine the number of engine rooms required, and
the piping requirements in engine rooms. Finally, the
selection of a fuel containment system and boil off
gas management system will determine where fuel
can be placed in a vessel, and based on the tank
design, the percentage of the space that will be
allocated for fuel storage.
EMTI © 97
 A risk assessment will address all of these design
decisions, and ensure that any gaps in regulations are
covered. The key success in designing an LNG
fuelled vessel is an understanding of the applicable
design standards provided in regulations and coast
guard policies and a detailed project proposal that
focuses on the design decision outlined in this
document.
EMTI © 98
Learning from existing LNGF
vessels
 LNG fuel vessel ordering has grown steadily but the
vessel types are changing to include large container
vessels, tankers and bulk carrier. These vessel types
and sizes will bring with them some new challenges
which will need to be addressed, both at the design
and operational stages.
 Bunker tanks are now much bigger which brings high
boil off rates. Maintenance of tank pressure for
intending operating profile needs to be carefully
evaluated, larger sizes also correspond to greater
surface are to cool down during loading thus having
more flash gas.
EMTI © 99
 The time between bunkering operations for large
vessels will in weeks whereas for the small vessels it
was a few days. This results in warmer tanks when
loaded and thereby increased flash gas.
 Location of the GFS bunkering station is to be close
to the fuel containment system. This results in less
lines to cool down and lowers associated heat ingress
during loading.
 Many LNG vessel designs have large Type C
containment tanks with outer surfaces exposed on
deck. As these tanks are exposed to radiant heat from
the sun, changes in ambient temperature affect the
temperatures and pressures within the LNG tanks.
EMTI © 100
 Rolling motions will increase sloshing. Sloshing
collapses the pressure within the fuel containment
system as an initial effect. Ultimately sloshing
increases the rate of heat ingress thereby increasing
rate of pressure build up in the tank.
EMTI © 101
1.2 Basic knowledge of ships
subject to the IGF Code, their fuel
systems and fuel storage systems

 Basic knowledge of ships, their fuel systems and
fuel storage systems
 Ship subject to the IGF code:
 The IMO has adopted a mandatory safety code for
ships using gases or other low-flashpoint fuels. The
International code safety for ships using Gases or
other Low-flashpoint fuels (IGF Code) provides
mandatory an International Standard for ships, other
than vessels covered by IGC code, operating with gas
or low flashpoint liquids as fuel.
EMTI © 103
 The code provides mandatory criteria for the
arrangement and installation of machinery, equipment
and systems for vessel operating with gas or low-
flashpoint liquids as fuel to minimize the risk to the
ship. Its crew and the environment. It contains
mandatory provisions for using low-flashpoint fuels.
Focusing initially on LNG. But the other fuels such as
the LPG, Ammonia and Hydrogen are following and
shall all be covered under the IGF Code.
EMTI © 104
General arrangement of fuel
storage systems on board ships
 Fuel storage tanks, reference IGF Code, chapter 5
and 6
 All fuel storage tanks should be provided with a
pressure relief system appropriate to the design of the
fuel containment system and the fuel being carried.
Fuel storage hold spaces, inter-barrier spaces, tank
connection spaces and tank cofferdams, which may
be subjected to pressures beyond their design
capabilities, should also be provided with a suitable
pressure relief system. Pressure control systems
specified in 6.9 should be independent of pressure
relief system.
EMTI © 105
 Fuel storage tanks which may be subject to external
pressure above their design pressure should be fitted
with vacuum protection systems.
 Fuel storage tanks should be protected against
mechanical damage.
 Fuel storage tanks and or equipment located on open
deck should be located to ensure sufficient natural
ventilation, so as to prevent accumulation of escaped
gas.
EMTI © 106
 Pipe connections to the fuel storage tank should be
mounted above the highest liquid level in the tanks,
except for fuel storage tanks of type C. connections
below the highest liquid level may however also be
accepted for other tank types after special
consideration by the Administration.
EMTI © 107
 If liquefied gas fuel storage tanks are located on open
deck the ship steel should be protected from potential
leakages from tank connections and other sources of
leakage by use of drip trays. The material is to have a
design temperature corresponding to the temperature
of the fuel carried at atmospheric pressure. The
normal operation pressure of the tanks should be
taken into consideration for protecting the steel
structure of the ship.
EMTI © 108
EMTI © 109
EMTI © 110
 The DNV GL predicts another 1000 ships or more, will
changeover from conventional heavy fuel to LNG fuel
by the year 2021. practically all types of ships are
changing over, in particular for the new vessels of
tankers, passenger ferries and RO-Ros are large
numbers and also the many number of harbour craft
and tug boats.
EMTI © 111
 The following diagrams show the variety of ships
(large to small: passenger ships to tug boats using
LNG as fuel). That are using LNG as fuel. The basic
arrangement is for one or two bunker tanks, either on
deck or at the lower hold level, connected with a fuel
processing unit before going to the ship’s engines.
LNG can be burnt at low pressure in 4-stroke high
speed or medium speed engines, but needs to be
raised to a higher pressures for slow speed diesels.
EMTI © 112
EMTI © 113
EMTI © 114
Container ship
EMTI © 115
EMTI © 116
EMTI © 117
EMTI © 118
Gas fuel engines
 The shipping industry worldwide, has been impacted
by a several factors and in the deep-sea trade the
ability of using alternative fuels by commercial
shipping have several challenges. Primarily among
those are,
 Change of trade pattern. The proportion of short-term
contracts and spot cargoes have increased
substantially since 2000. So, this change requires a
more flexible and efficient propulsion system to
accommodate various operating profiles, including
slow steaming.
EMTI © 119
 Upgrading of emission regulation. The Nox emission
limits and the Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI)
are getting more and more stringent. In order to
comply with the stricter regulation, the propulsion
plant has to improve its emission performance and
fuel efficiency.
 Improvement on insulation technology. The boil off
rate is significantly reduced due to the improvement in
LNG tank insulation. This results in the insufficient
BOG to fuel the propulsion plant and leads to the
development of alternative more fuel-efficient
propulsion systems.
EMTI © 120
 Thus, while the economic sense of being able to use
LNG fuel for all types of ships are getting popular, the
large ships face more hurdles in accommodating LNG
fuel tanks and systems and managing the boil-off
gases, while being restricted by the non-availability of
LNG refuelling facilities in many ports. We shall study
the Internal Combustion engines and their various
applications as we progress. The big picture seems to
be turning to focus on alternative fuels, especially
fuels, especially the LNG and the use of large slow
speed diesel for the ocean going freighters.
EMTI © 121
Internal combustion engines
 Internal combustion engine (ICE) is well-known
technology, used in automotive, off-road and marine
applications for more than 100years. Marine engines
are typically categorized in
a) Slow speed engines, operating at maximum 300
RPM, but typically 80-140RPM . These are 2-stroke
engines used for propulsion in large vessels.
b) Medium speed engines, operating in the range of
300-900 RPM. They are normally 4-stroke engines,
used for propulsion in smaller vessels (including high
speed vessel), and for auxiliary purposes.
EMTI © 122
 Marine diesel engines power most of the commercial
shipping fleet today, the main exception being LNG
carriers equipped with steam turbines. Shortly after
the first duel fuel engine was introduced on LNG
carriers in 2006, the ICE become the preferred
solution also for LNG carriers. Already since 2000,
duel fuel and pure gas ICE have been introduced for
propulsion and auxiliary power also for other ships
than LNG-carriers – ships of various sizes and
operating profiles, ranging from small ferries and
offshore supply vessels to large cruise ships, oil
tankers and container vessels.
EMTI © 123
 The 2-stroke engines are offered in Diesel cycle (high
pressure) or Otto cycle (low pressure), with the diesel
cycle offering higher efficiency and the Otto cycle
having the advantage of lower capital coasts and
compliance with Nox Tier III standards without use of
EGR or SCR in gas mode. The 4-stroke gas engines
are Otto cycle and complaint with Nox Tiel III. The use
of LNG as a fuel in ICEs also offer elimination of Sox
emissions, and significant reduction of particular
matter.
EMTI © 124
LNG technology options and
properties
EMTI © 125
Combustion of LNG
 Both marine slow speed 2-stroke engine
manufacturers, MAN energy solutions and Winterhur
Gas & Diesel, offer duel-fuel internal combustion
engines. However, each manufacturer has selected a
completely different combustion process for when the
engine operates in gas mode. The two different gas
mode combustion concepts are low pressure (LP) gas
engines using the Otto cycle and high pressure (HP)
gas engines using the Diesel cycle.
EMTI © 126
 The WinGD LP DF engines (X-DF) utilize the Otto
process in gas mode and the conventional Diesel
process when in oil mode. The MAN HP DF engines
(ME-GI) use the Diesel combustion process in both oil
and gas modes. For both concepts, the gas is ignited
by a pilot injection of liquid fuel from the conventional
fuel injection system, or a dedicated pilot fuel system,
the point during the combustion cycle where the gas
is injected dedicates the required gas supply
pressure.
EMTI © 127
 The WinGD X-DF is designed to operate at a gas
supply pressure of up to 13bar, and the high pressure
MAN ME-GI uses gas delivery by a direct injection
system at approximately 300bar. The two different
designs lead to different combustion concepts, Otto
cycle for the X-DF and Diesel cycle for the ME-GI,
and therefore have different performance and
emissions characteristics. A recent announcement by
MAN involved the development of their low-pressure
DF engine, ME-GA.
EMTI © 128
 The similarities are limited to, the pilot fuel oil
quantities required to start the gas combustion
process, the minimum engine load that the engine
can achieve when operating in Gas mode, and the
fact that both concepts are Sox complaint when using
sulphur compliant fuel for the pilot fuel.
EMTI © 129
Wartsila 4 stroke medium speed
diesel
 When using a pressure built up concept the whole
tank will be brought up to the pressure required by the
engines. The PBU raises the pressure by vaporizing a
small portion of LNG every time the pressure in the
tank gets to low. The pressurized LNG is pushed
through the vaporizer to the engines. This design is
the simplest and cheapest to build which however,
has the drawback that if no fuel is consumed, the
pressure in the tank rapidly reached its maximum set
pressure (MARVS). Because blowing off gas usually
not acceptable it is necessary to start the engine(s) to
maintain the pressure in the tank at a pre-defined
level.
EMTI © 130
EMTI © 131
EMTI © 132
EMTI © 133
LNGPac from Wartsila
 Wartsila LNGPac is a complete fuel gas handling
system for LNG fuelled ships and includes the
bunkering station, LNG tank and related process
equipment as well as the control and monitoring
system. The LNG fuel system can be offered as a
standalone product, as well as a part of a complete
propulsion system. Since 2000, Wartsila LNGPac was
in operation in 18 vessels, with 5 years being the
oldest installation, Altogether, 70 orders had been
received for this system.
EMTI © 134
 The LNGPac is specified has been specified with
various types of ships. These include product tankers,
cruse vessels, offshore vessels, roll or/roll off ferries,
feeder container vessels, LPG carrier and passenger
ferries. One notable example is the “Viking Grace”
ferry operating between Turku, Finland and
Stockholm, Sweden. This is the largest passenger
vessel in the world operating on LNG fuel. It is
equipped with two 200m3 Wartsila LNGPac systems,
including a Wartsila patented solution that utilises the
latent heat from the LNG evaporator process for the
vessel’s HVAC system (air condition). The system
provides significant energy savings for the whole ship
by increasing its total efficiency.
EMTI © 135
EMTI © 136
1. Tank room – space with equipment to gasify LNG
located in vicinity of or attached to LNG tanks
2. Double wall piping – recommend double wall piping.
With space between inner and outer pipes vented to
atmosphere it allows LNG pipes to run through
machinery spaces without creating hazardous areas.
3. Redundant LNG fuel supply – recommend two supply
pipes from tanks to the engine for greater reliability
4. Gas valve units – self contained units, one for each
engine, fitted in engine room – contain gas flow
control and shutdown equipment
5. Vent raiser mast – height is “Beam/3” above weather
deck, hazardous outlet
EMTI © 137
EMTI © 138
2 stroke diesels – High and
Low Pressures MAN B&W
engines: High pressure 2
stroke slow speed diesel:

Schematic Main Machinery of AME-GI Propulsion Plant (High-Pressure Gas)
EMTI © 140
1.3 Basic knowledge of fuels and
fuel storage systems' operations
on board ships subject to the IGF
Code

 LNG Fuel Tank Location and Bunkering
Operations
 LNG Fuel Tank Location
 Of the two possibilities, above or below beck, the
above deck location is less complex and less
expensive.
 The below deck location requires zoned separation
from other spaces, explosion proof appliance,
dedicated ventilation systems and in general, more
controls.
EMTI © 142
 LNG tank storage cannot be placed where MDO can
be stored (wing tanks, DB’s) and thus the volume
requirements are many times that of storing MDO.
 On the other hand, above deck locations, well away
from the vessels roll and pitch centers, invite greater
sloshing and possibly structural weight in the
installation.
 It is generally thought that LNG fuel tanks should be
located inside of B/5 to prevent tank damage in the
event of collision. The location in the length of the
vessel could be impacted by cargo considerations as
discussed later.
EMTI © 143
Tank fill location
 While somewhat dependent on the tank location, the
bottom fill location incurs less energy in filling and has
the advantage of cooling the stored LNG with the
incoming (probably cooler) filling stream, thereby
reducing the amount of gas generated.
EMTI © 144
 The top fill location in preferable if there is any remote
chance that the fill line could be impacted by any
external force.
 The choice in filling location with respect to the

bunkering station and the lines in between should be
such that there is absolute certainty that the line can
be completely drained either back to the bunkering
station, or to the LNG storage tank. Remember that a
gallon of trapped liquid LNG will result in 600gallon of
vapour.
EMTI © 145
The shape of the LNG fuel tank
 For reasons of sloshing, the most desirable shape of
an LNG tank is a sphere. Next comes to a cylinder
with semi spherical ends and last, a prismatic shape.
Incredible arrays of manufactured LNG fuel tanks
exist, as with all design, other constrains may force
the decision on shape.
EMTI © 146
The orientation of LNG fuel tanks
 Again, primarily for sloshing, the LNG fuel tank should
be orientated to minimise sloshing. Cylindrical tanks
generally should be orientated fore and aft.
EMTI © 147
Bunkering
 Temperature of bunkers and pressure control are
two issues of concern.
 The colder the LNG from LNG supplier the better it is
for GFS. This means there is more time to manage
pressure control in the tanks. If the bunker vessel
supplies warmer LNG, this might result in handling
increased boil off/pressure which may lead to an
increase in fuel consumption just to handle pressure.
EMTI © 148
 Linked to temperature, an additional concern is
understanding if the LNG gas carriers/bunker vessels
“vapour return system” has been evaluated for
conducting vapour balancing in a compatibility
study/assessment with the gas fuelled vessel. Vapour
balancing design compatibility between supplier and
receiver is to be verified. As we look at large bunker
tanks, an owners needs to consider what happens
during the cool down of the bunker prior to full rate
loading and how to handle the associated flash gas
that will be generated.
EMTI © 149
 If this is not considered, then this will impact the
duration of the bunkering operation evolution, which in
result may impact on the expected operating profile.
In addition to verifying the vapour balancing design
compatibility between supplier and receiver, there
could be challenges with documenting custody
transfers. In addition to measuring quantities of LNG
supplied to the gas fuelled ship (GFS), the amount of
vapour returned may need to be measured. Credits
for gas vapour return need to be included into the
overall price during custody transfer. Other areas
such as bunker station location and bunker vessel
compatibility are to be considered.
EMTI © 150
 The bunkering station probably cannot be placed
inside of B/5 and may be in violated of existing rules.
The station and the filling line to the LNG storage tank
must be shown to be free of gas at the completion of
bunkering.
 While Nitrogen and inert gas has been used to “blow
out” LNG fill lines, it will not work unless the line is
100% full of liquid and a full piston effect results. The
inerting gas can blow by, leaving LNG in the line.
EMTI © 151
 The height of the vessel’s LNG fuel tank, above the
fuelling truck, may be more than the truck’s pumping
capacity can accommodate and thus, an interim
pumping station may be required. It is thought that a
purpose-built LNG bunkering barge or shore facility
would have sufficient pump capacity.
EMTI © 152
 The bunkering station must have a sizable drip tray
installed beneath the manifold manufactured from a
cryogenic material. Additionally, it is recommended
that this tray, if filled, drain over the side through a
cryogenic line that takes the spilled liquid down to the
surface of the water. This line should not be run within
the structure of the vessel.
 To prevent berthing damage, it will be necessary that
this line swing out of the way during docking and be
adjustable for draft charges.
EMTI © 153
Bunkering operation and cargo
transfer – LNG fuel tank location
 LNG carriers, under COTP rules, are not allowed to
load stores, spares or carry out any other operation
once LNG cargo has started to be discharged to the
shore facility. The LNG carrier is immediately
grounded, after berthing, with a metered reading of
the potential between the discharge facility and the
LNG carrier established and logged. Only then are the
discharge lines hooked up. It is therefore suggested
that USCG will have an interest in bunkering
operations with regard to the cargo operations of an
LNG fuelled vessel.
EMTI © 154
 If a RO/RO, for instance, has a bunkering and fill line
arrangement that passes through the overhead of a
RO/RO deck, it may be that cargo operations will
have prohibited in that area while LNG bunkering is
taking place.
 If a containership had deck mounted LNG tanks
forward of an aft accommodation house, it could be
that all cargo operations forward of the house would
have to be stopped while LNG bunkering, whereas, if
the tanks were deck mounted aft of the house, only
aft hatch cargo operations would have to be stopped.
EMTI © 155
1.4 Knowledge and understanding
of safety requirements and safety
management on board ships

Safety requirements and safety
management on board
 Introduction
 We need to recognize the safety requirements in
handling LNG fuel toward preventing gas leaks or
spills and the safety management systems and
preparations that are undertaken onboard, in way of
ship design, ship operation and crew preparedness
achievable by training and safety drills. There are
many preventive measures starting with regulations,
industry guidelines and practices and ship and system
designed based on risk analysis and risk
management for manufacturing, equipment
installation and safe ship operation by following the
onboard safety management system procedures.
EMTI © 157
IMO Regulatory Regime for Gas-
fuelled Ships
 Amendments to the International Convention for the
safety of life at sea (SOLAS) require new ships using
gases or other low-flashpoint fuels to comply with the
requirements of the International Code of Safety for
Ships using gases or other low flashpoint fuels (IGF
Code), which contains mandatory provisions for the
arrangement, installation, control and monitoring of
machinery, equipment and systems using low-
flashpoint fuels, focusing initially on liquefied natural
gas (LNG).
EMTI © 158
 Gas and other low-flashpoint fuels are cleaner for the
atmosphere as they emit extremely low levels of air
pollutants, such as Sulphur oxides and particulates.
But these fuels pose their own safety challenges,
which need to be effectively managed.
 The IGF Code aims to minimize the risk to ships, their
crews and the environment, given the nature of fuels
involved. This takes care of the Plant and Process
Safety.
EMTI © 159
 Several amendments also entered into force at the
same time. Amendments to the International
Convention on Standards of Training, Certification
and Watchkeeping for seafarers (STCW) including
new mandatory minimum requirements for the training
and qualifications of masters, officers, ratings and
other personnel on ships subject to the IGF code.
STCW certificates must be issued, renewed and
revalidated in accordance with the provisions of the
2010 Manila Amendments. There requirements will be
enforced as of July 1, 2007. The training is required to
take care of the people safety.
EMTI © 160
Dangers of LNG
 Liquefied natural gas has approximately 600 times the
energy density of natural gas at atmospheric
conditions. LNG is typically stored at a pressure
between 1 and 4 bar, whereby the equilibrium
temperatures are approximately -160C to 155C.
 In order to minimise the risks related to both property
and life, it is vital that the material used for the LNG
system has been certified for cryogenic temperatures
and that the system has built in pressure relief
functionality.
EMTI © 161
 When designing the vessel, deciding where to place
the LNG fuel tank and processing equipment, as well
as how to arrange the ventilation ducts and pressure
relief masts, and LNG/gas piping in general, must be
well thought through. Access to hazardous areas
must be arranged in a safe manner and great effort
must be put into developing a complete and
consistent safety philosophy from the beginning of
any vessel design.
EMTI © 162
 The risk is in LNG leaks and spill, majorly during the
bunkering operations and also during ship operations,
when not following safe procedures as directed by the
shipboard safety management system (SMS) manual
and possibility due to human/crew error.
 LNG itself poses little danger as long as it is
contained within storage tanks, piping, and equipment
designed for use at LNG cryogenic conditions.
However, vapours resulting from LNG as a result of
an uncontrolled release can be hazardous, within the
LNG vapours flammability range and if in contact with
a source if ignition.
EMTI © 163
 Accidental spills and leaks can cause
asphyxiation, material failure and spread of fire
and explosion.
EMTI © 164
 Safety of operation: IGF Code/SOLAS
Requirements
 Every ship covered under the IGF Code must carry a
copy of the IGF Code on board. Electronic version is
acceptable to the Administration.
 Each ship must be provided with suitable emergency
procedures, covering all aspects of the fuel handling
systems. In addition, emergency procedures shall be
provided for the emergency shutdown (ESD) of any
equipment that has the potential to become
hazardous under certain abnormal conditions.
EMTI © 165
 Each ship must be provided with a suitably detailed
fuel handling manual, to ensure that trained personnel
can safely operate the fuel bunkering, storage and
transfer systems. This manual must be a part of the
vessel’s Safety Management Systems (SMS) and
must include at least the following:
EMTI © 166
 tank pressure, transfer rates, filling limits and
sloshing limitations;
1. Operation of inert gas systems;
2. Fire fighting and emergency procedures, including the
operation and maintenance of fire fighting systems
and the use of extinguishing agents;
3. Specific fuel properties and special equipment
needed for safe handling of the particular fuel;
4. Fixed and portable gas detection operation and
maintenance of equipment;
5. Emergency shut down and emergency release
systems, where fitted;
6. Crew training Ethiopian Maritime Training Institute
EMTI © 167
 The administration requires all applicable seafarers
serving on board ships subjected to the IGF Code to
have a valid Certificate of Proficiency that relates to
the IGF training appropriate to their assigned
shipboard duties. IGF training should satisfy the
requirements of STCW Code A-V/3.
EMTI © 168
Bunkering
 A proforma bunkering safety checklist, a copy of
which is to be reviewed, completed, and signed
during each bunkering operation;
 A description of the procedural actions to be taken in
an emergency situation, such as leakage, fire or
potential fuel stratification resulting in rollover.
EMTI © 169
 Before any bunkering operations, the Master or his
designated representative and the representative of
the bunkering source must:
1. Agree in writing to the transfer procedure, including
cooling down and if necessary, gassing up, the
maximum transfer rate at all stages and volume to be
transferred;
2. Agree in writing action to be taken in an emergency;
and
3. Complete and sign the bunkering safety checklist;
EMTI © 170
 Upon completion of bunkering operations, the ship
person in charge (PIC) must receive and sign a
Bunker Delivery Note for the fuel delivered containing
at least the information specified in the form
completed and signed by the bunkering source PIC.
EMTI © 171
Bunker safety
EMTI © 172
 Liquefied natural gas (LNG) bunkering is a particular
type of operation where LNG fuel is transferred from a
given distribution source to an LNG fueled ship. It
involves the participation of different stakeholders,
from the shipside, LNG supplier, ports, safety
personnel and administrations.
 Bunkering standards: ISO technical specification for
supply of LNG as fuel to ships
EMTI © 173
 ISO 20519:2017 was produced at the request of the
International Maritime Organization (IMO), the
European Commission and the Baltic and
International Maritime Council (BIMCO).
1. Hardware: liquid and vapour transfer systems;
2. Operational procedures;
3. Requirement for the LNG provide an LNG bunker
delivery note;
4. Training and qualifications of personnel involved;
5. Requirements for LNG facilities to meet applicable
ISO standards and local codes;
EMTI © 174
Safety management
 The safety philosophy must combine the design and
operation of the entire system – from gas bunkering to
consumers – and include everything from shut-down
functionality to crew awareness and training.
 Risk mitigation systems must be in place to reduce
the possibility of occupational hazards and to ensure
protection of surrounding communities and the natural
environment. Risk analysis and risk management is
an essential part of ship design under the IGF Code
and well supported by the Classification society rules
from design to delivery including safe vessel
operations.
EMTI © 175
 The classification society, DNV-GL has developed a
framework for minimizing any risk associated with
building gas fuelled vessels. By reviewing concepts
and actual designs against a set of safety criteria
included in the rules, DNV-GL takes a vessel from the
drawing table into operation in a safe and sustainable
manner. A similar approach is taken by the ABS and
other Class societies under the auspices of the IACS.
EMTI © 176
Risk Management process
EMTI © 177
Risk Analysis Matrix
EMTI © 178
Barriers – swiss cheese model
EMTI © 179
Safety Considerations from the
design and operations phase
 Fuel system
 Machinery space configuration;
 Tank placement;
 Tank and piping requirements;
 Gas Detection
 System certification;
 Hazardous Locations
 Classification of danger zones/areas;
 Electrical equipment specification;
EMTI © 180
 Fire Protection
 Installed fire-fighting system;
 Fire detection system;
EMTI © 181
 Continuing development of national/international
standards
 Bunkering, training, risk assessment policies;
 IMO IGF Code, ISO Bunkering Standard for LNG
Fuel, NFPA 52 Vehicular Gaseous Fuel System –
Marine Chapter;
EMTI © 182
 System issues associated with:
 Maintenance and repair, drydock, hot work, salvage
and emergency response the bunkering manifold
area;
1. Manifold strength and layout;
2. ESD system;
3. Break away connectors;
4. Couplers and connectors for hose and hard arm;
EMTI © 183
 Best practice on
1. Hazardous areas (for EX equipment);
2. Determining safety distances for both deterministic
and probabilistic methods;
3. Advice on security zones;
 Investigating hazards and operating procedures to
salvage a gas fuelled ship that
1. Is floating with LNG in storage;
2. Is particularly submerged;
3. Has sunk;
EMTI © 184
Elements of safety
 Safety in the LNG industry is ensured by four
elements that provide multiple layers of protection
both for the safety of LNG industry workers and the
safety of communities that surround LNG facilities.
Additionally, these critical safety conditions are all
integrated with a combination of industry standards
and regulatory compliance.
EMTI © 185
EMTI © 186
 Primary Containment is the first and most important
requirement for containing the LNG product. This first
layer of protection involves the use of appropriate
materials for LNG facilities as well as proper
engineering design of storage tanks onshore and on
LNG fuelled ships and elsewhere
 Secondary containment ensures that if leaks or spills
occur at the onshore LNG facility, the LNG can be
fully contained and isolated from the public.
EMTI © 187
 Safeguard systems: In the third layer of protection,
the goal is to minimise the release of LNG and
mitigate the effects of release. For this level of safety
protection, LNG operations use systems such as gas,
liquid and fire detection to rapidly identify any breach
in containment and remote and automatic shut off
systems to minimize leaks and spills in the case of
failures. Operational systems (procedures, training
and emergency response) also help prevent/mitigate
hazards. Regular maintenance of these systems in
vital to ensure their reliability. LNG operations use
technologies such as high-level alarms and multiple
break-up safety systems, which include Emergency
Shutdown (ESD) systems.
EMTI © 188
 ESD systems can identify problems and shut off
operations in the event certain specified fault
conditions or equipment failures occur and which are
designed to prevent or limit significantly the amount of
LNG and LNG vapour that could be released. Fire
and gas detection and firefighting systems all
combine to limit effects if there is a release. The LNG
facility or ship operator then acts by establishing
necessary operating procedures, training, emergency
response systems and regular maintenance to protect
people, property and environment from any release.

EMTI © 189
 Separation Distance: LNG facility designs are
required by regulation to maintain separation
distances to separate land-based facilities from
communities and other public areas. Safety zones are
also required around LNG ships and LNG fuelling
vessels.
 Industry Standards/Regulatory Compliance. No
systems are complete without appropriate operating
and maintenance procedures being in place and with
insurance that these are adhered to and that the
relevant personnel are appropriately trained.
EMTI © 190
 Organizations such as: the IACS group of
Classification Societies, the Society of International
Gas Tanker and Terminal Operators (SIGTTO), Gas
Processors Association (GPA) and National Fire
Protection Association (NFPA) produce guidance
which results from industry best practices.
 Industry standards are written to guide industry and
also to enable public officials to more efficiently
evaluate safety, security and environmental impacts
of LNG facilities and industry activities. Regulatory
compliance should ensure transparency and
accountability in the public domain.
EMTI © 191
 The IGF Code – the Gas fuelled ships come under
IMO/SOLAS.STCW and are followed by all the
member maritime nations, represented by the US
Coastguard in the US waters that implements local
laws based on local needs and to follow IMO/SOLAS
regulations.
EMTI © 192
Safety challenges, mitigation and
emergency response
 Introduction
 Gas is set to become the second largest source of
energy by 2025, with renewables and natural gas
accounting for 85% of energy growth and its potential
has not been lost on maritime.
 LNG-fuelled ships have higher safety risks than
ordinary cargo ships, due to its special properties,
pool fire, vapour clouds, rollover and several other
types of hazards and navigation safety of LNG ships,
particularly LNG fuelling and berthing appears to be
particularly important.
EMTI © 193
Risk Analysis by “formal safety
assessment (FSA)”
 FSA includes five formal assessment procedures,
namely, hazard identification, risk assessment, risk
control schemes, expense and benefit assessment
and decision making suggestions.
1. Hazard Identification. As the initial step of the FSA, it
aims to identify all possible hazards, in the defined
assessment system project and then make a
corresponding list according to different hazard levels,
so as to further analysis primary hazards;
EMTI © 194
2. Risk Assessment. Based on the determination of the
existence and objective distribution of risks, various
factors that affect the risk degrees are analysis and
sorted to find high and key risk factors. Moreover the
relationship between accident occurrence and
consequences is discussed so that the existing
standards or regulations can revised, some new
standards or regulation can be made, and the
occurrence of risks can be reduced.
EMTI © 195
3. Risk Control Option. Based on hazard identification
and risk assessment results, some targeted measures
for risk reduction are proposed, and then specific and
feasible risk control schemes are introduced,
including the formulation and revision of some
standards and regulations.
EMTI © 196
EMTI © 197
Targeted Risks for LNG fuelled
ships
 Navigation Accidents mainly include striking a reef or
jetty structure, and collisions of ships. Anchorage for
berthing and unberthing operations in the anchorage
area are busy, and many problems such as human
factors, ships, environment and management exist,
the collisions between ships and contact damage
accidents may occur during navigation in this area.
EMTI © 198
 The emission of the boil off gas (BOG) is the main risk
of fire hazards of LNG fuelled ships. Ships generally
wait a long time when queuing up before a lock or a
restricted channel. Because of a continuous hot
weather, the pressure in the LNG storage tank
increases, the pressure relief valve is opened, and
then the BOGs of the LNG are discharged from the
permeability pipe, which can cause a fire accident
when exposed to an fire accidents. Fire accidents in
he engine and living quarters of LNG ships are likely
to result in failure of insulating layers of LNG tanks,
causing fires or explosions and thereby damages to
the exposed crew.
EMTI © 199
 The causes of accidents during refuelling operations
mainly include leakage in the flanged joints of fuelling
and air returning pipelines, dangers in the ground
lines and fixed lines connecting LNG tank trucks,
rupture of LNG flexible hoses, failure of LNG fuelling
arm, incorrect temperatures in the fuelling tank and
injecting tank and failure or absence of quick
disconnection devices in emergency circumstances.
Analysis results on LNG leakage of LNG storage
tanks mainly include storage tank leakage, pipeline
leakage, and the leakage from some accessories
such as valves.
EMTI © 200
EMTI © 201
Analysing the risk of LNG carrier
operation – Erik Vanem
EMTI © 202
EMTI © 203
Methods to reduce risk
1. Permit & JHA system;
2. Guidance procedures for nearly all operation;
3. Training both on board and ashore;
4. Take full use of every near miss;
EMTI © 204
Permit & JHA system
EMTI © 205
Safety by designs
 Design considerations for the receiving ship
 The safety and technology considerations of
integration of the LNG as fuel in a convention ship
requires shipyards, owners and designers involved to
understand the challenges and what considerations
need to be made to ensure safety at every stage.
 In order to be able to design, build and operate an
LNG fuelled ship, one needs to know how to integrate
the associated LNG sub-systems, including the fuel
containment systems, ventilation and piping
arrangements.
EMTI © 206
1. LNG assessment analysis and risk assessment
studies;
2. Optimization LNG bunkering on the ship;
EMTI © 207
 Boil off gas (BOG) Management: firstly, natural gas is
cooled to cryogenic temperatures to create the LNG,
so it has a very low temperature compared to
traditional fuels and its volume/energy ratio is about
1.6 times. The liquefied gas is stored in insulated
tanks, keeping it in a liquid state. However, the heat
ingress from the tank’s surroundings will increase the
temperature inside the tank, causing the liquid to
evaporate, generate boil off gas (BOG).
EMTI © 208
 This BOG needs to be managed to prevent fuel tanks
becoming over pressurised which can lead to gas
venting. If heat ingress into LNG fuel tanks is not
controlled, venting of harmful gas can occur, causing
a health and safety risk to crew and the surrounding
area.
 There are ways of handling BOG such as managing
LNG bunkering operations, burning the BOG or
finding other ways of sub-cooling the fuel through a
facility on board the ship.
EMTI © 209
 For efficient LNG bunkering, both ships should be
side by side and should be as close as possible to
each other. This reduces the piping arrangement
lengths and improves hose handling, ultimately
reducing the time it takes to complete the bunkering
operation, considering the time required for interting
and cooling the bunkering lines connecting and
disconnecting operations.
 Additionally, minimizing the distance between the
bunkering station and the LNG fuel tanks should be
considered, as this will also reduce the risk of
cryogenic leakage.
EMTI © 210
 Incompatibility can be minimized by reviewing the
geometric dimension and bunkering arrangements of
the two ships, preventing possible movement
interference between them, which can delay the
bunkering operation.
EMTI © 211
Main challenges for larger ships
fuelled by LNG
 Maximizing Cargo space: for larger ships, such as
Ultra Large Container Ships (ULCS), consideration
should be made to optimize fuel capacity and
minimize loss if cargo space.
 A simple way of doing this is to locate the LNG
storage fuel tank underneath the accommodation
space onboard the ship. The additional safety
considerations of this arrangement to the crew can be
carefully managed by installing containment systems
around the LNG and the surrounding area of the
tanks; thus, in the event of a leak, the crew are
protected by the containment system.
EMTI © 212
 Containment Systems Consideration: there are
different containment system available – one such
example is the membrane technology, which is
designed to contain LNG cargo at cryogenic
temperatures (i.e. -160C). It consists of a small layer
of membrane supported through insulation by the
adjacent hull structure.
 Alternatively, an independent self-supporting prismatic
tank can be used. With both such containment
systems it is possible to maximise the ship hull
volumetric efficiency and fit practically the entire fuel
tank beneath the main deck without any significant
reduction of the cargo space.
EMTI © 213
 Both systems are provided with a secondary
containment system to prevent cryogenic risk to the
ship structure. To ensure safety, the fuel tank is
separated from the cargo spaces by using a
cofferdam.
 Bunkering/Refuelling: LNG is transferred from the
bunkering vessel to the ships fuel tank, which is
located underneath the accommodation. Crew
accommodation onboard ULCSs tend to be fitted on
the forward section of the ship where the side shell
lines are not parallel.
EMTI © 214
 The receiving and bunkering ships need to be
positioned within the parallel body to improve
compatibility. If the fuel tank is located at the front of
the ship, and the ULCS bunkering station is located
aft, the bunkering pipes will be longer and therefore
LNG will have to flow through the pipes along the
ship.
 To prevent hazards, pipes need to be double layered
and ventilated to have sufficient flexibility to
accommodate ship movements and possible thermal
stress. Flexibility hoses can be used to compensate
for the ship movements during bunkering operations
to prevent the pipes breaking.
EMTI © 215
 For Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCC), the LNG fuel
tank can be located above the main deck, so cargo
capacity is not affected furthermore to ensure
sufficient endurance of the ship, the tank capacity
should be in the order of 7000 cubic meters and will
require at least two large tanks positioned on deck.
 Structural detailed consideration and adequate
appraisal of stability and visibility issues are needed
as a result of having such large tanks on deck.
EMTI © 216
 Designers can also evaluate the possibility of placing
the LNG fuel tank under the deck within the cargo
area of the VLCC, using membrane or prismatic
containment technologies, with minimum impact on
the ship’s cargo capacity.
EMTI © 217
 Explanation of what area boundaries should be
shielded by A-60 class divisions
 Any boundary of accommodation spaces, service
spaces, control stations, escape routes and
machinery spaces, facing fuel tanks on open deck,
should be shielded by A-60 class divisions. The A-60
class divisions should extend up to the underside of
the deck of the navigation bridge, and any boundaries
above that including navigation bridge windows,
should have A-0 class divisions.
EMTI © 218
 In addition, fuel tanks should be segregated from
cargo in accordance with the requirements of the
International Maritime Dangerous Goods (IMDG)
Code where the fuel tanks re regarded as bulk
packaging. For the purposes of the stowage and
segregation requirements of the IMDG Code, a fuel
tank on the open deck should be considered a class
2.1 package.
EMTI © 219
 The space containing fuel containment system should
be separated from the machinery spaces of category
A or other rooms with high fire risks. The separation
should be done by a cofferdam of at least 900 mm
with insulation of A-60 class. When determining the
insulation of the space containing fuel containment
system from other spaces with lower fire risks, the
fuel containment system should be considered as a
machinery space of category A, in accordance with
SOLAS Regulation II-2/9.
EMTI © 220
 The boundary between spaces containing fuel
containment systems should be either a cofferdam of
at least 900 mm or A-60 class division. For type C
tanks, the fuel storage hold space may be considered
as a cofferdam.
 The bunkering station should be separated by A-60
class divisions towards machinery spaces of category
A, accommodation, control stations and high fire risk
spaces, except for spaces such as tanks, voids,
auxiliary machinery spaces of little or no fire risk,
sanitary and similar spaces where the insulation
standard may be reduced to class A-0.
EMTI © 221
 If an ESD protected machinery space is separated by
a single boundary the boundary should be of A-60
class division.
EMTI © 222
Safety management during
bunkering
1. General: Each Master is at all times responsible for
the bunker operation and should not allow safety
issues to be influenced by the actions of others. Each
Master is to ensure that correct procedures are
followed and that internationally accepted safety
standards are maintained and that the ship design is
according to approved rules & regulations.
EMTI © 223
2. EX-Zone: The bunkering areas on both ships are to
be an EX-classified and restricted area during
bunkering. Only authorized personnel is allowed in
there areas during bunkering. Inside the EX-Zone all
electrical equipment requires increased safety level
and the electric energy should be too low to avoid
ignition of LNG vapour. The size of the EX-Zone shall
be according to class rules for gas dangerous space
and 10m horizontally on each side of the receiving
ship bunker station.
3. ESD-System: Each ship is to have an independent
Emergency Shut-Down system for a quick and safe
shut-down in case of emergency.
EMTI © 224
4. Checklist: Each ship is to have internal checklists for
before and after bunkering. For bunker operation
there shall be common checklist which is to be filled
out and signed by responsible operators on both
ships before any operation is commenced.
5. Written Instructions: There shall be written detailed
instructions for the bunkering process on both ships
with regards to normal procedures, as well as the
responsibility and actions to be made in case of
malfunction or emergency. The instructions are to be
quickly available at all times and all personnel
involved in bunkering operations are to be familiar
with the content and location of the instructions.
EMTI © 225
 The instructions should cover the following areas:
a) Normal procedures, duties of crew involved;
b) Loss of communication or control system (ESD);
c) Loss of power;
d) Safe break-away of ship in case of fire;
e) Handling of cryogenic products including use of
personal protection equipment, ice formation and
awareness of sharp edges;
f) Waves and weather conditions;
EMTI © 226
 6. Warning signs: There should be warning and
instruction signs posted around hazardous area on
both ships. The signs must be placed in order to be
clearly visible and according to an accepted guideline
for placement of warning signs. The warning signs are
to cover the risks of handling cryogenic liquid, fire and
safety issues and show restricted areas.
EMTI © 227
 7. Safety during bunker: The following considerations
to be taken into account in order to enhance safety:
a) Smoking and Naked Light: Regulations regarding
smoking and use of naked light should be strictly
enforced. Warning signs and notices shall be delayed
and smoking rooms are to be designated and clearly
marked.
b) Earth on switchboard: The main switchboard on the
bunker ship and the control panel on the receiving
ship are earth indicator lights to indicate faulty circuits.
EMTI © 228
c) Electrical current and Electrostatic Charge in Bunker
Hose: To prevent the occurrence of arcing between
the ships the manifolds on both ships are to be
earthed, all hoses are to be electrically continuous
and each hose string shall be fitted with an insulating
flange on the bunker ship manifold.
EMTI © 229
 Electrical Arcing: Other places (besides hose
connections) where arcing can occur are:
a. Mooring lines (should be insulated)
b. Ladders or gang ways between the ships (should be
insulated)
c. Crane wire runners and hooks (careful operation)
d. Bare wires and chains for fender support (should be
insulated)
EMTI © 230
 Radio and communication equipment: The ships main
radio transmissions may cause electrical response in
insulated parts of some ship fittings arcing such as
mast stays and this can cause arcing across deck
fittings. Radio aerials should be earthed but can
induce arcing if restricted during the process. The
equipment is not to be used if there is possibility of
flammable gas in the vicinity of the antennas.
EMTI © 231
 Satellite communication equipment normally operates
at low power levels and is considered to be a low
ignition hazard. The equipment is not to be used if
there is a possibility for flammable gas in the vicinity
of the antenna.
 VHF and UHF communications are low voltage
operated and are considered to be safe to use. Hand
held VHF or UHF radios are to be intrinsically safe
(EX-class).
EMTI © 232
 Radar(s): The radar equipment is not intrinsically safe
and can create potentially hazardous power densities,
especially since the bunker ship normally is smaller
and the radar will sweep across the receiving ship hull
at close range. The radar on the bunker ship is to be
turned off after the mooring sequence and not
switched on before the unmooring sequence and not
switched on before the unmooring sequence starts,
unless required by special demand.
 Electrical storms: No operation is to be suspended
and all systems secured until it is considered safe to
resume operation.
EMTI © 233
 Fire-fighting Equipment: Foam and water monitors on
the bunker ship to be pointed towards the bunker
manifolds in use and the bunker station fire system
should be activated on the receiving ship.
EMTI © 234
 Safety zone: Since the receiving ship normally is
larger than the bunker ship is it important to have a
safety zone above the bunker station during
bunkering. The extent of the safety zone should be 10
meters on each side of the bunker station manifold.
EMTI © 235
 The safety zone shall be clearly marked and have the
following restrictions:
1. No authorized persons to be able to access open
deck areas directly above the bunker area;
2. Warning signs to be posted around the area, no
equipment movements within the safety zone;
3. Access doors to be locked and only to be opened by
trained and authorised personnel;
4. No maintenance work in the area during bunkering;
5. Ventilation inlets in the area to be closed during
bunkering;
EMTI © 236
 Gas accumulation: Transfer operation shall be
suspended if there is fuel vapour leaking around
manifolds on either ship. Operation is not to be
resumed until leakage is identified and stopped and
all gas has dispersed which is monitored by gas
detectors at both ships bunker station.
 Maintenance: Key components in both ships systems
are to be identified with emphasis on safety to avoid
leakage and ignition sources in and around the
bunker areas. These components should have a
maintenance and replacement schedule where
inspections and actions are documented and stored
on board.
EMTI © 237
LNG Tank Safety Valves
 The system includes valves regarded as ordinary
safety valves as well as so called thermal relief
valves. The tanks main safety valves are designed to
meet requirements for a LNG tank. Thermal relief
valves are designed to meet capacities in a trapped
volume in pipes. A safety valve exhausts/vents to a
vent mast.
 To secure that not both safety valves to the LNG
tanks are out of operation at the same time, the safety
valve system incorporates an “interlock system”. The
interlock system consists of lockable valves and a set
of keys that permits only one of the safety valves on
each tank to be closed.
EMTI © 238
LNG Vent Mast
 There will be the possibility to divert gas from different
parts of the system to the atmosphere through a vent
mast. The LNG tanks safety valves will also exhaust
to this vent mast, as well as the nitrogen used for
purging.
EMTI © 239
LNG Control Systems
 The LNG system will be governed by the ship’s IAS
computer system. The IAS receives signals from
instruments belonging to the system and after
evaluating these signals the IAS performs activities
depending on which “mode” of operation is chosen.
The pressure of the tanks is governed automatically.
EMTI © 240
ESD Philosophy
 In case of a hazardous situation, concerned systems
will be shut down by an “ESD” Emergency Shut Down
system. The objective is to eliminate ignition sources
to reduce the risk for an explosion in case of gas
leakage during the bunkering process. Uncontrolled
cold LNG flow can cause personnel and structure
damaged.
EMTI © 241
 Abnormal situation on the following parameters can
initiate an ESD shutdown:
1. Pressure
2. Flow
3. Temperature
4. Loss of instrument pressure
5. Loss of electricity
6. Pump failure
7. Gas detection
EMTI © 242
8. Fire detection
9. Ventilation
10. Out of range receiving ship and bunker ship
drift/displacement
11. Manually initiated shutdown
EMTI © 243
 Gas systems are controlled and monitored by the
ships Integrated Automation Systems.
 These systems can generally be monitored and
controlled independently at the bridge and engine
control room.
 There is also an independent ESD panel. At the
bunker station on the receiving ship there is an
emergency stop button.
 The receiving ship and bunker ship have their own
independent ESD philosophy that initiates ESD
shutdowns in addition to what is initiated by the
transfer interface.
EMTI © 244
 To be noted is that generally there are no gas
detectors in the bunker station area effective during
bunkering. A water curtain covering the bunkering
area is used to mitigate damages in case of LNG
leakage. This includes a spray bar connected to the
vessel’s fire main and cover the critical piping/valve
path within the bunkering station.
EMTI © 245
ESD Activations
 Activation of the ESD system includes stopping of the
pumps on the bunker ship and closing of the bunker
valves on both ships. ESD actuators are to be located
at strategic locations around the bunker area to
provide a quick shutdown in case of emergency.
 The bunker ship should preferably provide an
emergency stop to the receiving ship in order for both
ships to be able to stop the pumps. The pipe system
is to be designed to handle quick closing of valves
(bypass to avoid dangerous pressure surges). Each
ship’s fire system should be linked to the ESD
system.
EMTI © 246
Training Requirements
 To ensure safety onboard and in the ports where
ships operating with low flashpoint fuels call, SOLAS
and the STCW Code have been amended to require
additional training. The code mandates minimum
requirements for training and qualifications for
masters, officers, ratings and other personnel on
ships subject to the IGF Code. The STCW
amendments also had an entry into force date of 1
January 2017, in line with the SOLAS amendments
related to the IGF Code.
EMTI © 247
IGF training should satisfy the
requirements specified in STCW
Code A-V/3.2.
 IGF Basic Training
 Seafarers responsible for designed safety duties
associated with the care, use or emergency response
to the fuel on board ships subject to the IGF Code
shall hold a certificate in basic training for service on
ships subject to IGF Code. Every candidate for
certification in basic training for service on ships
subject to the IGF Code shall:
EMTI © 248
 Have successfully completed the approved basic
training required by regulation V/3, paragraph 5, in
accordance with their capacity, duties and
responsibilities as set out in STCW Code table A-V/3-
1; and
 Be required to provide evidence that the required
standard of competence has been achieved in
accordance with the methods and the criteria for
evaluating competence tabulated in columns 3 and 4
of STCW Code table A-V/3-1.
EMTI © 249
IGF Advance Training
 Masters, engineer officers and all personnel with
immediate responsibility for the care and use of fuels
and fuel systems on ship subject to the IGF Code
should hold a certificate in advanced training for
service on ships subject to the IGF Code. Emergency
response duties as referred to within basic training
above, are not included in the operations associated
with the Advanced training for service on ships
subject to the IGF Code.
EMTI © 250
 Every candidate for certification in advanced
training for service on ships subject to the IGF
Code shall:
1. Have successfully completed the approved advanced
training required by regulation V/3, paragraph 7 in
accordance with their capacity, duties and
responsibilities as set out in STCW Code table A-V/3-
2; and
EMTI © 251
2. Provide evidence that the required standard of
competence has been achieved in accordance with
the methods and the criteria for evaluating
competence tabulated in columns 3 and 4 of SCTW
code table A-V/3-2; or have received appropriate
training and certification according to the requirement
for service on liquefied gas tankers as set out STCW
code regulation V/3, paragraph 8.
EMTI © 252
 Service Requirements: Completion of at least 1 month
of approved seagoing service on board a ship subject
to the IGF code plus.
 Experience Requirements: Completion of a minimum
of 3 bunkering operations on board a ship subject to
the IGF Code (Two of the bunkering operations may
be replaced by approved simulator training on
bunkering operations)
EMTI © 253
Training Requirement Exemptions
 If an administration considers a ship’s size (typically
less than 500 gross tonnage, except for passenger
ships) and the length or character of its voyage are
such to render the application of the full training
requirements unreasonable or impracticable, it may
exempt the seafarers on such a ship or class of ships
from some of the requirements, bearing in mind the
safety of people on board, the ship and property along
with the protection of the marine environment.
EMTI © 254
 Recognition of the personnel in accordance with
the regulation V/1-2 for IGF Code
 Basic training for cargo operations on liquefied
gas tankers COP holders
 Maters, officers and rating qualified with basic training
certificate of proficiency (COP) for service on board
liquefied gas tankers in accordance with the
regulation V/1-2 are considered as having met the
requirements for basic training for service on ships
subject to the IGF Code.
EMTI © 255
 Advanced training for cargo operations on
liquefied gas tankers COP holders
 Seafarers holding the certificate of proficiency (COP)
in advanced training for cargo operations on liquefied
gas tankers are considered as having met the
requirements for advanced training for service on
ships subject to the IGF code, provided specific
seagoing service and experience requirements are
met.
EMTI © 256
 Service: Completion of seagoing service of 3 months
in the previous 5 years on board – ship subject to the
IGF code: tankers carrying as cargo, fuels covered by
the IGF Code; or ships using gases or low flashpoint
fuel as fuel.
 Plus participated in conducting 3 cargo operations on
board a liquefied gas tanker; or completion of a
minimum of 3 bunkering operations on a ship subject
to the IGF Code (Two of the bunkering operations
may be replaced by approved simulator training on
bunkering operations).
EMTI © 257
Important notes
 Ships subject to the IGF Code: New ships subject to
IGF Code are ships using low-flashpoint fuels for
which the building contract is placed.
 Existing ships: Ships using traditional requirement for
personnel on board these ships to be qualified with
certification in accordance with regulation V/3.
EMTI © 258
EMTI © 259
EMTI © 260
LNG Bunkering Training – US
Regulation
 USCG Policy letter 01-15, Guidelines for Liquefied
Natural Gas Fuel Transfer Operations and Training of
Personnel on Vessels Using Natural Gas as Fuel
EMTI © 261
 Training Requirements:
 All mariners must complete ship specific
familiarization and basic training before assuming
duties and responsibilities (46 CFR 15.405)
 Basic training for mariners responsible for designated
safety duties
 Advanced training for Masters, Engineer Officers and
all persons with immediate responsibility for care and
use of fuel
 Current holders of tankerman PIC LG and tankerman
assistance LG meet the qualification requirements
(with 3 months service in last 5 years plus company
and vessel specific training)
EMTI © 262
STCW Equivalence for LNGC
Service
 Crew Competence & Training
 To meet gas fuelled ship basic per STCW
Regulation A-V/3-6:
 Meet STCW Chapter A-V, Reg 2 and 5 (Tankerman
assistant LG (Basic))
 3 months seagoing service on LNGC --- OR—
 Approved basic training
 Qualified and certified
EMTI © 263
 --- OR ---
 Meet STCW Chapter A-V Reg 4 and 5 (Tankerman
LG (Advanced))
 Meet LNGC basic training requirements
 3 months LNGC seagoing service or approved 1
month on board training
 Qualified and certified
 To meet IGF Code Advanced per STCW Regulation
A-V/3-8:
EMTI © 264
 Be “qualified and certified” for Tankerman LG Basic
(meet Reg 2) ----- plus---
 Gas fuelled ship specifiec familiarisation
 One month approved gas fuelled ship seagoing
service with minimum 3 bunkering operations OR
 3 cargo transfers and 3 months seagoing service in
the previous 5 years
EMTI © 265
On board training programs
1. STCW Section B-V/3 Guidance for seagoing service:
2. Experience appropriate to their duties….
3. Practical “hands on experience” related to seafarer
employment
4. Under the supervision of qualified and experienced
personnel
5. On board a ship for which the certificate is required
6. Specialized equipment for safe transfer and handling
is brought into operation
EMTI © 266
7. General on board training principles for all ship types
8. Trainee should have no other duties
9. Managed and coordinated by the ship manager
10. Identify a “shipboard training officer” and “company
training officer”
11. Training record book for documentation of completed
tasks and exercises
12. Program should replicate/demonstrate all aspects
related to the trainees expected duties and
responsibilities
EMTI © 267
Drills and Emergency Exercises
 Shall be conducted at regular intervals. Such gas
related exercises could include for example:
 Tabletop exercise: review of fuelling procedures
based in the ISM approved company operations
procedures manual; responses to identified
hazardous contingences; tests of equipment intended
for contingency response; and reviews that assigned
seafarers are trained to perform assigned duties
during fuelling and contingency response.
 Low flashpoint fuel related exercises must be
incorporated into periodical drills required by SOLAS.
The response and safety system for hazards and
accident control shall be received and tested.
EMTI © 268
Crew Training for the LNG Fuelled
Ships
EMTI © 269
 The specialized training requirements for LNG fuelled
ships may vary from smaller crafts engaged in local
waters to larger vessels that operates on regional and
deep sea international trades. The focus is to make all
crew on board the hazards of handling LNG as a
propulsion fuel on board and its exacting bunkering
procedures. Any leakage of LNG as gas or liquid
could create personal injury, asphyxiation (death from
lack of oxygen), material failure and catastrophic fire
and explosions.
EMTI © 270
 Against these, the risk eliminating factors hinges on
sophisticated ship system design, continuous
monitoring of key parameters while the vessel is
under way and in port and a safety shutdown system
that will minimize the hazard conditions. The risk of
LNG leakage is maximum when bunkering of LNG
takes place from a external source. Thus, apart from
the study and regular safety drills for on board ship
operation, the major part of the training must focus on
the bunkering procedures that involves the pipeline
systems and the procedures and communication
protocols with the shore side bunkering personnel.
EMTI © 271
 The International code of safety for ships using gases
or other low flash point fuels (IGF Code) includes
training requirements for certain personnel engaged
on ships using gases or other low flahpoint gases or
other low flash point fuels. The IGF code and the
supporting amendments to the STCW convention and
code entered into force using gases or other low
flashpoint fuels.
EMTI © 272
 The IGF code and the supporting amendments to the
STCW convention and code entered into force on
January 1 2017. Prior to that, on February 19, 2015,
the coast guard issued Policy Letter CG-OES 01-15
guidelines for liquefied natural gas fuel transfers
operations and training of personnel on vessels using
natural gas as fuel as an interim measures to address
the training requirements of the STCW amendments.
While the IGF code is no in mandatory operation, the
training requirement remains as per the policy letter
from the coastguard dated Feb 2015 and is similar to
the one recommended by the IGF Code.
EMTI © 273
LNG Bunkering Operations
Training Recommendations
 National Training Standards
 Based on the findings from the review of current
regulations and guidelines, adoption and
implementation of portions of the IMO, STCW, and
LNG bunkering RP DNV GL into the current
regulatory regime is highly recommended. These
documents contain useful content for safe LNG
bunkering operations training could potentially close
the identified training gaps. Training for LNG
bunkering operations (equipment, interfaces, and
operations) includes normal operations, maintenance
and testing culture amongst the personnel involved
with the LNG bunkering operations.
EMTI © 274
 Key factors that are thoroughly covered in the existing
regulations and guidelines consist of familiarization &
basic training, vessel specific training and
competency documentation. These key factors should
be the starting basic for conducting and receiving the
highest quality LNG bunkering operations training.
Further to this baseline, the additional key factors
including PIC, Crew Categorization, Regular Drills,
Refresher Course, Training Program Re-evaluation,
Training Program Approved by Authorities and
Human Factors should be considered and
implemented into the current regulatory regime.
EMTI © 275
 There is a need for selected individuals to complete
advanced training to recognize and respond to MAFs.
 International cooperation activities should be
considered within the LNG crew training
requirements. This would ensure there is a common
alignment amongst LNG crew across international
boundaries.
EMTI © 276
National training approved
scheme
 As training is a key factor in ensuing that LNG
bunkering remains a safe and secure operation, it is
suggested that there is a national training approval
authority that can uphold a high level of expertise and
knowledge. For example this could be done by the
local COTP through guidance from a designated
organization, such as the National Association of
State Fire Marshals (NASFM) NFPA, or the USCG.
This would ensure that common standards exist for a
uniform training scheme in the US.
EMTI © 277
Human factor and organizational
tasks
 As human and operational factors have been
identified as important contributors to several recent
MAEs, the design and operation of LNG bunkering
facilities need to consider these factors. Similarly,
training in these aspects is important and should be
included in relevant curricula. Some examples include
ergonomics, stress and fatigue management,
incentive schemes, normalization of deviance,
interfaces and clear roles and responsibilities.
EMTI © 278
Training program re-evaluations
 Regulations and guidelines should include the
requirements for re-evaluation of training programs on
a regular basis or after significant changes in order to
ensure the training curricula meets updated
requirements for LNG bunkering operations. This
approach could be adopted into the existing
continuous improvement programs (e.g., safety
management system) of the facility and/or vessel.
 The need for training program changes could include
inputs from a Captain of the port, NASFM, NFPA,
USCG or relevant international organizations.
EMTI © 279
Continual refresher courses
 Regulations and guidelines should include the
requirement for completing refresher courses,
especially if the personnel have been inactive within
LNG bunkering operations for a defined period of
time. This approach will ensure personnel
competence for safe conduct of LNG bunkering
operations.
EMTI © 280
Bunkering training
 All personnel involved in LNG bunkering operations
shall be adequately trained. Such training shall be
appropriate for the purpose and a record of training
shall be maintained.
 Training shall be structures in accordance with written
programs, including such methods and media of
delivery, procedures, assessment and course material
as are necessary to achieve the required standard of
competence.
EMTI © 281
 Training schemes should be independently verified at
least every five years to secure that they fulfil the
requirements set out below/ training according to
other, recognized, standards may be taken equivalent
to those outlines here as long as they fulfil the
minimum requirements below.
 Training shall be conducted by persons appropriately
qualified and experienced.
EMTI © 282
 Training for all personnel involved in the bunker
operation shall as minimum cover.
● Properties and hazards of LNG relevant to the LNG
bunkering operations
● Potential effects of mixing LNG with different properties
● Risk reducing measures
● International or national regulations and guidelines regarding
LNG fuel transfer operations
● First aid specific to frostbite and asphyxiation
● Safe operation of LNG fuel transfer equipment
EMTI © 283
 Procedures to be followed during normal LNG
bunkering operations
● Pre transfer procedures, tests and checks;
● Safe operation procedure;
● Checks and procedures during LNG bunkering operations;
● Safe disconnection procedure;
● LNG fuel quality and properties confirmation;
● Management of operations other than LNG fuel transfer that
can occur simultaneously with that transfer;
● Routine maintenance and testing procedure;
● All other procedures applied for the specific operations;
EMTI © 284
 Understanding of non-standard operations and
emergencies during LNG bunkering operations
● Immediate action to be taken in response to emergency
situations that can occur during LNG fuel transfer;
● Operations including liquid/or vapour leakage, fire, or
emergency breakaway;
EMTI © 285
 Understanding of non standard operations and
emergencies during LNG bunkering operations
● Immediate action to be taken in response to emergency
situations that can occur during LNG fuel transfer;
● Operations including liquid and/or vapour leakage, fire, or
emergency breakaway;
● Management of vapour and/or liquid leaks to minimize risk to
personnel and assets due to cryogenic temperatures and
flammable atmospheres;
EMTI © 286
Documentation
 The purpose of the documentation, is to display a sold
proof that both the vessel (either LNG bunker or LNG
receiver) and the bunkering operation procedure,
have been designed, constructed and operated
according to International and National Rules &
Regulations, as well as with relevant Classification
Society requirements.
EMTI © 287
 The Documentation can be organized in six
categories:
● Design, construction and commissioning documentation of
bunker vessels and LNG ready ships;
● Operational documentation of LNG bunkering, covering all
aspects previously analysed;
● Maintenance documentation of all equipment involved in the
LNG bunkering process;
● Emergency response documentation, covering all aspects
previously analysed;
● Training documentation, covering all aspects previously
analysed;
EMTI © 288
 LNG cargo documentation, covering the commercial
details of the delivery cargo, like quantity, time and
place, duration of bunker, financial data.
EMTI © 289
Retention of documentation
 All technical, engineering, operational, maintenance
and training documentation shall be prepared and
retained for the life of the bunkering vessel or the
LNG ready vessel, or longer as appropriate.
 Other documentation, such as business transactional
documents, is to be retained for a period determined
by the operators of the LNG supply company and
receiving ship.
 Bunkering notes shall be kept for 3 years as a
minimum.
EMTI © 290
Precautions to prevent hazards on
a ship
 Specific learning objectives
 After going through this topic, student should be able
to.
 Understand the concept of the human body and
health issues;
 Know the hazards from liquefied gas;
 Understand hazards from reactivity of cargoes,
corrosion; Flammability and explosion;
 Describe the risk management procedures needed on
a LNG fuelled ship;
EMTI © 291
 Know the process of reporting relevant information in
case of spill on board;
 Know the spill containment of brittle fracture
EMTI © 292
Introduction
 Natural gas, primarily composed of methane (CH4), is
a non toxic flammable gas. LNG is created by cooling
gas to a temperature below its boiling point of about -
162C (-260F). This liquefaction process reduces the
volume of the gas by a factor of 600, making it a
much more efficient state for storage and transport.
LNG is a cryogenic liquid that, if released from its
storage or transfer equipment, presents uniquie
hazards to nearby people and property when
compared with traditional fuel oil.
EMTI © 293
 The primary hazards are:
 Serious injuries to personnel in the immediate area if
they come in contact with cryogenic liquids. Skin
contact with LNG results in effects similar to thermal
burns and with exposure to sensitive areas, such as
eyes, tissue can be damaged on contact. Prolonged
contact with skin can result in frostbite and prolonged
breathing of very cold air can damage lung tissue.
EMTI © 294
 Brittle fracture damage to steel structures exposed to
cryogenic temperatures. If LNG comes into contact
with normal shipbuilding steels, the extremely cold
temperature makes the steel brittle, potentially
resulting in cracking of deck surfaces or affecting
other metal equipment.
EMTI © 295
 Formation of a flammable vapour cloud. As a liquid,
LNG will neither burn nor explode; however, if
released from bunkering equipment, it will form a
vapour cloud as the LNG boils at ambient
temperatures. To result in a fire or explosion, the
vapour cloud must be in the flammable range, which
for methane is between 5.3% and 14% by volume in
air, and there must be an ignition source present.
EMTI © 296
 There are a number of factors affecting the
consequences potential of an LNG release, including:
the surface it is released on and although LNG
vapours can explode (i.e. create large overpressure) if
ignited within a confined spaces, such as a ship, there
is no evidence suggesting that LNG is explosive when
ignited in unconfined open areas.
EMTI © 297
 Asphyxiation. If the concentration of methane is high
enough in the air, there is a potential for asphyxiation
hazard for personnel in the immediate area,
particularly if the release occurs in confined spaces.
EMTI © 298
 Boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion (BLEVE).
When liquefied natural gas storage tanks on the ship
are heated or exposed to external flame for a long
time, the integrity of spherical tanks will gradually
decrease. When the integrity decreases to a certain
extent, the sphere will burst, resulting sudden
pressure reduction and liquefied natural gas
vaporises and burn rapidly, resulting in boiling liquid
expanding vapour explosion (BLEVE) accident. The
energy of steam explosion is derives from two sides.
EMTI © 299
 On one hand liquefied natural gas spherical tank is a
high pressure container. Its sudden burst can release
tremendous energy and produce shock waves. On
the other hand intense burning of liquefied petroleum
gas can release enormous heat, resulting in a huge
fireball and strong thermal radiation.
EMTI © 300
 Using a BLEVE quantitative evaluation model, it can
be drawn that, when exposed to the fireball radiation
after 15s and within 1400 meters, 4593 feet from the
LNG ship, more than 50% of the people would die;
within 1600 meters or 5249 feet more than 50% would
be second degree burn; within 2300 meters or 7546
feet more than 50% would be first degree burn. That
is to say that the consequences of BLEVE are very
serious, which can cause enormous damage and
casualties.
EMTI © 301
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Basic Training for Ships Subject

to IGF Code (Seafarers that have

● Design and operational characteristics of ships subject to the

Ethiopian Maritime Training Institute

Ethiopian Maritime Training Institute

Ethiopian Maritime Training Institute

Ethiopian Maritime Training Institute

Ethiopian Maritime Training Institute

Ethiopian Maritime Training Institute

Ethiopian Maritime Training Institute

Ethiopian Maritime Training Institute

Ethiopian Maritime Training Institute

Ethiopian Maritime Training Institute

Ethiopian Maritime Training Institute

Ethiopian Maritime Training Institute

Ethiopian Maritime Training Institute

Ethiopian Maritime Training Institute

1. LNG use may not be feasible for some ship types;

Ethiopian Maritime Training Institute

Ethiopian Maritime Training Institute

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