Social

Movements
and Political
Landscapes in
Modern Kenya
Social movements in Kenya as in
other countries of Africa have
varied with changes in periods in
history.

Four major periods have

animated social movements in
processes of especially political
and economic and social change.
 First phase
In the 1950s and 1960s, when Africans were engaged in mass movements
to secure self-rule and political independence, it was widely understood
that nationalist political movements were not generally coherent and
unified forces, whose goal was simply ‘political’ independence.
The anti-colonial struggle was against a form of power which
constituted itself in specific economic, social and cultural ways.
This period was marked by a complex interaction between overtly
‘nationalist’ parties and a diverse set of political or social movements,
which generally supported the general project for ‘independence’ but
invested it with a range of different meanings and aspirations, social,
economic and cultural.
Second phase
The initial post-colonial period, from the early 1960s
until around the mid to late 1970s, saw the emergence
of a post-independence state dominated by a
centralised ruling party, which tended to view the
autonomous social movements that had played an
important role in mobilising anti-colonial discontent as a
threat to or distraction from the central project of
national-developmentalism dominated by the post-
colonial state.
In this second phase, social movement articulation of
‘particular’ grievances or aspirations was negatively
counterposed by nationalist rulers to the monopoly they
claimed over the articulation of ‘national’ interests.
Developmental self-initiative by local social movements
tended to be stifled by state initiatives for and control
over rural initiatives such as cooperatives.
Independent worker and peasant unions were similarly
repressed and/or incorporated into party-state structures,
severely undermining their capacity for self-representation.
 Third phase
With the onset of the debt crisis, the reduction of sovereignty and
the initial imposition of structural adjustment policies, state
hegemony was severely weakened and/or exposed during a third
phase of social movement activism.
The 1977 revolt in Egypt against the government's decision to raise
food and petrol prices under the auspices of the IMF was a trigger
for the first wave of anti-structural adjustment protests -a major
popular response to the onset of the continent's economic crisis,
and a rejection of attempts by both national governments and
the international financial institutions to make the urban poor
pay the price of a crisis entirely outside their control.
the partial retreat of the state as a result of the external
imposition of early structural adjustment opened up some
space for new autonomous forms of organization, many
of which avoided direct political questions and sought
instead local solutions to growing economic and social
concerns.
Although such initiatives were unavoidably political,
party-states were often more willing to tolerate limited
social movement initiatives which might alleviate
problems they were unable to address.
 Fourth phase
this arrived with the onset of the pro-democracy movements of the early
1990s, in which social movements again played an important role.
Diverse and longstanding socio-economic and political grievances combined, in
the context of the fall of communism in Eastern Europe, in a moment when
radical political change suddenly became possible across the continent.
The transition to multi-party democracy achieved in so many countries was
not simply an ‘elite transition’; it involved mass protest movements and the
mobilization of particular organizations, particularly trade unions and
church bodies.
However, like their anti-colonial predecessors, the unity displayed by pro-
democracy movements in ousting dictatorial regimes commonly masked
profound divisions regarding the outcomes they wished to see from this
process of democratization.
The substantial decline in state capacity and the redirection of
external funding to NGOs strengthened some existing social
movements with credible grassroots linkages, but
simultaneously led to a proliferation of new NGOs, many of
which owed their initial existence solely to the availability of
donor funding and which were thereby accountable
externally rather than to those they claimed to speak for or
represent.
Since the early 1990s, Western and African NGOs have
played an important part in promoting a liberal
‘participatory’ agenda which has the potential to undermine
popular opposition to aspects of economic liberalization and
other policies promoted by the West.
In the 1990s and 2000s, popular struggles that have erupted
as a consequence of neoliberal reforms and structural
adjustment have often manifested themselves as liberal
movements for ‘democracy’ and ‘human rights’.
In this context, there is a danger that social movements
seeking to alleviate the effects of economic liberalization
pursue their grievances via more formal political or
constitutional reform, rather than a deepening of democratic
culture and practice that enables strengthened popular
scrutiny and (ultimately) control of the socio-economic
situation.
Many African social movements are dependent for funding on
Western agencies, both governments and INGOs, think-tanks
and civil society organizations (many of which are themselves
funded by Western states).
In certain circumstances, Western powers and the IFIs regard
limited forms of social movement mobilization or protest as a
way to undermine particularly ‘intransigent’ governments
that have failed to successfully implement programs of liberal
reform.
This should not be reduced to or interpreted as an argument that
sees all ‘protest movements’ as manipulated by Western powers,
but rather as a call for the critical analysis of the influences upon
movements engaged in processes of political change.
Social movements in Kenya in the transition to
democracy
Since Kenya’s independence in 1963, the development of democracy
and public participation has had mixed results.
Kenya adopted a Westminster style of democracy with multi-party
institutions and a federal system of government.
There was a devolution structure of government, popularly known as
majimbo, under which the country had seven autonomous regions, some
of whose boundaries were coterminous with ethnic settlement patterns.
Some of the numerically large groups have a region to themselves and
therefore some regions are identifiable with ethnic groups.
Each regional government was responsible for setting and implementing a
broad range of policies.
There were several political parties, the main ones being the
Kenya African National Union (KANU) and the Kenya African
Democratic Union (KADU).
KANU’s membership included some of the large ethnic groups,
the Kikuyu and the Luo, while KADU coalesced the
numerically smaller ethnic communities, many of which feared
domination by large groups after independence.
The first government dismantled this set-up after independence.
The ruling party, KANU, made it difficult for the regional
governments to operate.
The main opposition, KADU, joined KANU to form one party
and govern with them.
The government also introduced a series of constitutional
amendments that centralized power in the presidency.
These changes significantly constrained democratic participation.
The government became increasingly intolerant of dissent.
In 1966, some critics within government resigned their positions to
form a new political party – the Kenya People’s Union (KPU).
Keen to consolidate power without rivalry, the government banned the
opposition in 1969 giving the then ruling party, KANU, unchecked
dominance.
More amendments to the constitution to centralize power in the executive
followed.
In 1982, Parliament changed the constitution to make Kenya a one-
party state.
The country remained as such until 1991 when pressure, through
people’s struggles for democratic change, compelled the government
to repeal this constitutional provision and provide for a return of multi-
party democracy.
The return of multi-party democracy in 1991 led to the expansion
of space for the enjoyment of civil and political freedoms. It
generally enhanced the space for participatory democracy.
The state loosened its grip on political space and allowed for the
proliferation of political groups, including opposition political
parties and human rights organizations.
But these gains were not effectively consolidated.
The state paralyzed the opposition political parties by preventing
them from operating in certain areas the government considered
to be the strongholds of the ruling party.
In other instances, the government would deny the opposition the
license to hold political meetings.
Thus, in spite of multi-party democracy, the ruling party
(KANU) and its leader, President Daniel Arap Moi,
continued to constrain the new space through repressive
measures.
The 1992 and 1997 elections, in particular, were marred by
serious political violence at the hands of militia organized
by the ruling party.
Through legal and extra-legal means, the government
weakened the opposition political parties and obstructed
the making of a new constitution.
This enabled Moi and KANU to win both the 1992 and
the 1997 general elections.
In 2002, the opposition parties formed an alliance, the
National Alliance Rainbow Coalition (NARC), to compete
against KANU in the December 2002 elections.
They were aware that in the absence of comprehensive
constitutional reforms, the ruling party would have
advantages over the opposition and thus retain power.
The alliance campaigned on a platform of comprehensive
reforms and a promise to deepen democracy and they won
the December 2002 general election.
 Ethnicity and corruption
Ethnicity and corruption constitute the two major internal
stumbling blocks to a national regeneration project.
The two, like twins, are linked in a complex web that
guarantees their mutual reproduction and continued existence.
If ethnicity is grounded in mobilizing political support based
on kinship ties similar to language, culture and social origin -
corruption is subverting established public institutions in
furtherance of personal objectives and in pursuit of private
gain.
Unlike corruption which is criminalized, ethnicity is acceptable not
only in everyday life in terms of one’s association with his/her
kinship group but more so in politics as a support network.
Political mobilization via ethnicity creates a rewarding system that
promotes mediocrity and even sanctions corruption. Kinship
connection can also serve as an insurance against possible
prosecution in case of corruption charges.