https://www.youtube.com/watch?

v=C561PCq5E1g / (Local link)

 Chemical
Plant incident: Reactor temperature runaway, Explosion at T2 Laboratories Thermodynamic
Electrical &
Electromagnetic
Mechanical
1. Brief description of incident: Biological
Ergonomic
Health & Physical
Environmental

2. Hazards involved:

3. Failures in hazard controls:

4. Lesson learnt:
T2 Laboratories Accident – Brief description
Before After

• At 1:33pm, 19 December 2007 a powerful explosion at T2 Laboratories in

Jacksonville, Florida killed 4 employees, injured 32 (4 employees and 28 members of
the public) and destroyed the facility.
• A runaway exothermic reaction in the production of methylcyclopentadienyl
manganese tricarbonyl (MCMT) (fuel octane booster) due to cooling loss led to the
explosion equivalent to 1400 pounds of TNT.

4
 T2 Laboratories Accident http://www.csb.gov/investigations/detail.aspx?SID=8

1. On December 19, 2007, an explosion at T2 Laboratories, Inc., killed four, injured 32, and destroyed
multiple businesses.
2. The explosion was due to a runaway exothermic reaction that occurred in a chemical batch reactor
during the production of methylcyclopentadienyl manganese tricarbonyl (MCMT).
3. The runaway reaction occurred during the first, metalation, MCMT process step.
4. A desired exothermic reaction in the metalation step ran away due to a cooling system failure, leading to
a second (undesired) exothermic reaction.
5. The reactor cooling system lacked design redundancy and was susceptible to single-point failure. No
emergency source of cooling existed.
6. The T2 owner/chemical engineer designed the pressure relief system for normal operating conditions,
and it was unable to relieve the second exothermic reaction.
7. The T2 owners were likely unaware of the second exothermic reaction that occurred in the batch recipe
at high temperatures.
8. Neither of the T2 owners had prior reactive chemistry experience.
9. Most baccalaureate chemical engineering curricula in the U.S. do not specifically address reactive
hazard recognition or management.
Schematic of Reactor
CAUSES OF ACCIDENT

1. T2 did not recognize runaway reaction hazard

with the MCMT it was producing despite earlier
indications.

2 . Cooling system was susceptible to single-

point failures due to lack of design redundancy.

3. MCMT reactor relief system was incapable of

relieving the pressure from the runaway
reaction.

6
Runaway Reactions
Metalation Reaction

Reaction of Sodium and Diglyme Solvent

+ Na ?

New Test Cell Burst Test Cell 7

Operating regimes for exothermic chemical reactors.

8
Modeling Needs
Why Simulate the Reactor?

1. Determine cooling requirements

2. Determine conditions that lead to runaway

conditions, such as increasing batch size,
change in cooling water temperature, etc.
(so-called parametric sensitivity)

3. Size the pressure relief valve and bursting

disk pressure

4. Develop a training tool

9
Elements for Model

1. Unsteady Material Balance

2. Unsteady Energy Balance

3. Reaction Rates including

temperature dependence (must come
from the lab)

4. Simulation of the model equations

10
Multiple Protection Layers
• Basic process control system (BPCS) is augmented with two
levels of alarms and operator supervision or intervention.
• An alarm indicates that a measurement has exceeded its
specified limits and may require operator action.
Chapter 10
• Safety interlock system (SIS) is also referred to as a safety
instrumented system or as an emergency shutdown (ESD)
system.
• The SIS automatically takes corrective action when the
process and BPCS layers are unable to handle an emergency,
e.g., the SIS could automatically turn off the reactant pumps
after a high temperature alarm occurs for a chemical reactor.
• Rupture discs and relief valves provide physical protection by
venting a gas or vapor if over-pressurization occurs (also flares
for combustibles).

12
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jg7mLSG-Yws&t=6s / (Local link)
 Chemical
Plant incident: Dust explosion at Imperial Sugar Thermodynamic
Electrical &
Electromagnetic
Mechanical
1. Brief description of incident: Biological
Ergonomic
Health & Physical
Environmental

2. Hazards involved:

3. Failures in hazard controls:

4. Lesson learnt:
Background information and chronology
• The Imperial Sugar Company began operations in 1917
• One of the largest sugar refining and packaging facilities in the US.
• Granulated sugar was stored in silos
• Conveyed to packing buildings where it was packaged for distribution.
• Sugar spilled onto floor throughout the work area
• Particles that became airborne
• Dust collection system was undersized and disrepair
• conveyor was enclosed with stainless steel panels
• The dust accumulated until to explosive concentrations inside the enclosure.
• Dust in the building was ignited by advancing fire balls.
• No power to much the interior lighting.
• 8 workers died at the scene, 6 more died later at regional burn center. Dozens of others were
injured.
Root causes and circumstances

1. Inadequate equipment

2. Not appropriate housekeeping of the factory

3. Overheated bearing

4. First dust explosion

5. Inadequate emergency evacuation plan

Accident Biography
Hazard Recovery
Threats Barriers Top Event Consequences
Measures
Accumulation of
Worker 14 killed and
combustible
training 42 injured
sugar dust
people

Human Housekeeping Fire alarm

incompetence measures

Asset damage
Equipment
Combustible Static electricity Sugar
grounding
sugar dust Dust Evacuation
Explosion
High Equipment
temperature of venting Environmental
equipment
damage
Fire
Equipment
Spark ignition suppression
isolation

Flame Spark Reputation

propagation detection damage
Actions Taken:
• Another sugar refinery, situated in Louisiana was closed after six weeks since Port
Wentworth accident. Occupational safety and health administration fined Imperial Company
1 $36000 for safety legislation violations (Chapman, Dan. 2008).

• Cleanup and demolition of the refinery parts, that were impossible to salvage, planned. The
decision of rebuilding was taken on April 18, 2008. The demolition procedure of sugar silos
started on June 24, 2008 with a wrecking ball (Chapman, Dan. 2008). By summer of 2009,
2 replacement of packaging buildings and new sugar silos were planned to be completed (“Ga.
sugar refinery demolishing blasted silos”).

• In a period of month, occupational safety and health administration sent a letter to 30000
employees working in similar facilities, informing of the dust explosion, fearing their
unawareness. Also, OSHA later introduced Combustible Dust Explosion and Fire Prevention
3 Act of 2008, which aim was to introduce regulations and to reduce the risk of dust explosions
(Testimonial record, 2008).
Lessons Learned
 Control combustible dust accumulation quantity
 Improvement of training of operating personnel
 Emergency planning should be well-organized
 Improvement of communication between different agencies
and workers
 Own safety standards should be applied