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  • Caspar Schwarz-Schilling - Time in PoS Ethereum

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    The document discusses implications of replacing random block times in proof-of-work networks like Ethereum with deterministic block times in proof-of-stake networks. Specifically, it notes that while deterministic times allow for better load balancing, proposers who are guaranteed to produce blocks may be able to abuse their monopoly power. It proposes ideas to incentivize proposers to produce blocks in a timely manner to address this issue, such as scaling rewards based on the number of same-slot votes a block receives. The document invites applications to the Robust Incentives Group to help design mechanisms to balance these tradeoffs around determinism and incentives in proof-of-stake networks.

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    The document discusses implications of replacing random block times in proof-of-work networks like Ethereum with deterministic block times in proof-of-stake networks. Specifically, it notes that while deterministic times allow for better load balancing, proposers who are guaranteed to produce blocks may be able to abuse their monopoly power. It proposes ideas to incentivize proposers to produce blocks in a timely manner to address this issue, such as scaling rewards based on the number of same-slot votes a block receives. The document invites applications to the Robust Incentives Group to help design mechanisms to balance these tradeoffs around determinism and incentives in proof-of-stake networks.

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    31 views21 pages

    Caspar Schwarz-Schilling - Time in PoS Ethereum

    Uploaded by

    isnull
    The document discusses implications of replacing random block times in proof-of-work networks like Ethereum with deterministic block times in proof-of-stake networks. Specifically, it notes that while deterministic times allow for better load balancing, proposers who are guaranteed to produce blocks may be able to abuse their monopoly power. It proposes ideas to incentivize proposers to produce blocks in a timely manner to address this issue, such as scaling rewards based on the number of same-slot votes a block receives. The document invites applications to the Robust Incentives Group to help design mechanisms to balance these tradeoffs around determinism and incentives in proof-of-stake networks.

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    of 21

    Time in Ethereum

    Implications of replacing our dear friend Poisson

    Caspar Schwarz-Schilling
    Robust Incentives Group (RIG), Ethereum Foundation
    wtf is time ?! *

    * next question please…


    Time in Ethereum
    Where does the deterministic nature of
    time in PoS Ethereum come from?
    exogenous randomness : random block time ::

    on-chain pseudo-randomness : deterministic time


    Time in PoW vs. Time in PoS
    Guess when Ethereum
    merged …
    Implications of deterministic time
    better load balancing !
    But proposers can abuse their
    guaranteed monopoly power
    Progression of a slot
    Fork choice rule: LMD GHOST-ish
    But proposers can abuse their
    guaranteed monopoly power
    Block receival time: 0s-4s into slot (“on time”-ish)
    Block receival time: >4s into slot (“late”)
    Proposer monopoly… wat do?
    Fork choice fun TODAY: proposer boost
    Fork choice fun TOMORROW: (block, slot)-voting
    Idea: Incentivizing timeliness explicitly

    Today: Block proposers are rewarded in proportion to the profitability of attestations they
    include in their block.

    Idea: Scale the proposer’s reward by the share of same-slot committee votes that the
    block receives and are included in the subsequent block.
    load stability, good.
    guaranteed monopoly, bad.
    Thank you!
    Strong research background?
    Mechanism design expert?
    Want to help us make sense of it?
    Apply to the RIG now!

    Caspar Schwarz-Schilling
    Robust Incentives Group (RIG), Ethereum Foundation
    caspar@ethereum.org

    @casparschwa

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