Why ask the question “What is Science?”?

The impact and

importance of
modern science.
In many public debates,
some notion of science
is presupposed.

Different disciplines have

different approaches and
standards. Perspectives
Science plays an from “within” can lead to
influential role as an restricted views of
institution in modern science.
society. That role
needs justification.
The Object of the Question “What is Science?”

Science vs. Wissenschaft

 Possible Answers

• List of examples

• A description

• A definition
o sharp vs. vague
o by method

• Diachronic vs. ahistorical answers

 Follow-up questions 1st session

• Is it possible to answer the question at all?

• Re: Justification of the question: Isn‘t there a value to

science itself, without referring to its function in modern
society?

• Who is the answer for? And who is posing the question

and when/where?

• How to influence science?

• Is our method of answering the question also science?

Hoyningen-Huene 2013, p. 5
 What is philosophy of science?

social
Phil. sci. analyzes the epistemic practices of science
technical

• Explaining things
• Describing things
• Predicting things
• Formulating theories/models/hypotheses
• Justifying/confirming/refuting theories/models/hypotheses

General philosophy of science takes a general perspective on these topics.

The philosophies of the special sciences focus on specific disciplines (physics,

biology, chemistry, climate science etc.)
 Warning

Everything to be discussed is controversial!

The one monster called SCIENCE that
speaks with a single voice is a paste
job constructed by propagandists,
reductionists and educators.

Paul Feyerabend,
The Tyranny of Science
Philosophy of science is about as
useful to scientists as ornithology
is to birds.

Attributed to
Richard Feynman
 Follow-up questions 2nd session

• A scientific approach would imply that some

philosophers are right while others wrong, is this really
true?

• Could a possible answer to the general question “What

is Science?” be that science is the process of using a
systematic and transparent approach in order to
produce justifiable knowledge claims?
Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914)
• American logician, mathematician,
philosopher
• Many contributions to logic, mathematics
(e.g. Peirce Operator NAND/NOR, truth
tables)
• ... and philosophy (e.g. pragmatisim,
methodology of science)

Historical Context
• Early 19th century: Emergence of the historical sciences/natural history (see Bowler & Morus,
ch. 5&6).
• In the second half of the 19th century: extensive debate among philosophers and
methodologists of science about the methodology of the inductive sciences as well as the
nature and validity of inductive inferences in general.
• See the Mill-Wheewell controversy.
• This debate was tightly linked to developments in the sciences at the time.
• Peirce‘s Deduction, Induction, and Hypothesis makes an important systematic contribution to
this debate.

Deduction
All the beans in this bag are white
These beans are from this bag
-------------------------------------------------
These beans are white
Properties:
- The truth of the premises
warrants the truth of the
conclusion.
- In a deductively valid argument, it
is impossible that the premises
are true and the conclusion is
false.
- Logically necessary
- Not ampliative (“analytic”)
- A deductive argument is called
„sound“ if its premises happen to
be true.
Types of Inferences
Induction
These beans are white
These beans are from this bag
-------------------------------------------------
All the beans in this bag are white
Properties:
- The truth of the premises does
not warrant the truth of the
conclusion.
- It is possible that the premises
are true and the conclusion is
false.
- Not necessary
- Ampliative (”synthetic”)
C. S. Peirce, Deduction, Induction, Hypothesis (1878)
Abduction
(Peirce: „Hypothesis“)
All the beans in this bag are white
These beans are white
-------------------------------------------------
These beans are from this bag
Properties:
- The truth of the premises does
not warrant the truth of the
conclusion.
- It is possible that the premises
are true and the conclusion is
false.
- Not necessary
- Ampliative (”synthetic”)
- The conclusion „explains“ the
premises.
- Inference to the best explanation
 Follow-up questions 3rd session
• As we heard right at the end, problems are coming: We
have to discuss and oppose different hypotheses against
each other in science. So based on what methods can we
distinguish between these hypotheses?

• Might inductive reasoning be becoming more important

nowadays due to large amounts of available data (including
new forms of data from e.g. social media or sensors) that
can be analyzed by scientists using computer algorithms in
an explorative way?

• Shouldn’t inductive inference lead to hypotheses? Or in

other words: If we state that something is true in all cases,
shouldn’t we try to find a reason for it?
 Hume on Causality

„Here is a billiard-ball lying on the table, and another ball moving towards it with rapidity. They strike; and
the ball, which was formerly at rest, now acquires a motion. This is as perfect an instance of the relation of
cause and effect as any which we know, either by sensation or by reflection. Let us therefore examine it.
’Tis evident, that the two balls touched one another before the motion was communicated, and that there
was no interval betwixt the shock and the motion. Contiguity in time and place is therefore a requisite
circumstance to the operation of all causes. ’Tis evident likewise, that the motion, which was the cause, is
prior to the motion, which was the effect. Priority in time, is therefore another requisite circumstance in
every cause. But this is not all. Let us try any other balls of the same kind in a like situation, and we shall
always find, that the impulse of the one produces motion in the other. Here therefore is a third
circumstance, viz., that is a constant conjunction betwixt the cause and effect. Every object like the cause,
produces always some object like the effect. Beyond these three circumstances of contiguity, priority, and
constant conjunction, I can discover nothing in this cause. The first ball is in motion; touches the second;
immediately the second is in motion: and when I try the experiment with the same or like balls, in the
same or like circumstances, I find that upon the motion and touch of the one ball, motion always follows
in the other. In whatever shape I turn this matter, and however I examine it, I can find nothing farther.“

(An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Abstract of a Treatise of Human Nature)

 David Hume and the Problem of Induction

• Reasoning that goes beyond past and

present is based on cause and effect

• The relation of causality:

1) constant conjunction
2) contiguity
3) priority in time (of the cause)
4) NO necessary connection!!!!

David Hume The Problem of Induction:

1711–1776 How can inferences from the past/present
to the future (or from observed instances to
unobserved instances) be justified?
 Hume‘s Skeptical Solution

„All inferences from experience, therefore, are effects of custom,

not of reasoning. Custom, then, is the great guide of human life. It
is that principle alone which renders our experience useful to us,
and makes us expect, for the future, a similar train of events with
those which have appeared in the past. Without the influence of
custom, we should be entirely ignorant of every matter of fact
beyond what is immediately present to the memory and senses.“

(An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, V.1)

 Follow-up questions 4th session
• To me it's not clear why Hume thinks there is no
law(necessity) behind the moving balls? Isn't it possible to
derive equations and explanation at atomic level to explain
hitting balls dynamics? He didn't because at that time there
were no such atomic/physics knowledge or because there
is a more fundamental problem I'm missing?

• If scientific thinking is based on inductive inferences, which

is in turn based on the assumption of uniformity of nature,
which is in essence merely a habit/belief we have as
humans, where does the boundary between scientific fact
and unfounded belief lie?
The starting point of modern philosophy
of science: The Vienna Cirlce

Moritz Schlick
Rudolf Carnap
Victor Kraft
Hans Hahn

Otto Neurath
Herbert Feigl
Friedrich Waismann
Philipp Frank
 The scientific world view of the Vienna Circle:
Two main features

Empiricism: „[T]here is knowledge only from experience, which rests on what is

immediately given. This sets the limits for the content of legitimate science.“

Logical Analysis & Reductionism: „The aim of scientific effort is to reach the
goal, unified science, by applying logical analysis to the empirical material. Since
the meaning of every statement of science must be statable by reduction to a
statement about the given, likewise the meaning of any concept, whatever
branch of science it may belong to, must be statable by step-wise reduction to
other concepts, down to the concepts of the lowest level which refer directly to
the given.“
 The scientific world view:
The verificationist criterion of meaning

“The criterion which we use to test the genuineness of apparent statements of fact is the
criterion of verifiability. We say that a sentence is factually significant to any given person,
if, and only if, he knows how to verify the proposition which it purports to express — that is,
if he knows what observations would lead him, under certain conditions, to accept the
proposition as being true, or reject it as being false.” Ayer, Language, Truth, Logic (1936).

„4.024 Einen Satz verstehen, heißt, wissen was der Fall ist, wenn er wahr ist.
(Man kann ihn also verstehen, ohne zu wissen, ob er wahr ist.) [...]“
Wittgenstein, Tractatus logico-philosophicus, 1922.

„Es ist der erste Schritt jeglichen Philosophierens und das Fundament jeder Reflexion,
einzusehen, daß es schlechterdings unmöglich ist, den Sinn irgendeiner Behauptung anders
anzugeben als dadurch, daß man den Tatbestand beschreibt, der vorliegen muß, wenn die
Behauptung wahr sein soll.” Schlick, Positivismus und Realismus, 1932
 The scientific world view:
Further programmatic features

• unified science

• anti-metaphysics

• rejection of synthetic statements a priori

• liberalism & socialism

Karl Popper’s (Dis)solution of the Problem of Induction in
The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1934)

Karl R. Popper
1902–1964
 Ch. 1: A SURVEY OF SOME FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS
The Problem of Induction Popper’s Method of Deductive Testing

Induction „It should be noticed Prerequisite:

that a positive elimination of psychologism.
• An inference that „passes from singular
decision canstatements Distinction
only temporarily support between
the the psychology of
(sometimes also called ‘particular’
theory, statements), knowledge
for subsequent negative (context of discovery) and logic of
decisions
such as accounts of the results
mayofalways
observations or
overthrow knowledge
it. So long(context
as of justification).
experiments, to universal statements, such as
theory withstands detailed and severe
hypotheses or theories“ (p. 3f.) Principle: „From a new idea, put up tentatively,
tests and is not superseded and notby another
yet justified in any way—an
The Problem of Induction theory in the course of scientific progress,
anticipation, a hypothesis, a theoretical
we may
• „ The question whether inductive say thatare
inferences it has ‘proved
system, its
or mettle’
what you will—conclusions are
or that[…].“
justified, or under what conditions it (p.3)
is ‘corroborated’ by past
drawn by means of logical deduction.” (p. 9)
experience “ (p. 10)
The Principle of Induction 4 lines of theory testing:
• A principle that would allow us to justify inductive 1.Logical comparison of conclusion
inferences. „Nothing resembling inductive logic (consistency)
appears in the procedure here
• Examples: Hume‘s uniformity
outlined. of nature.
I never assume that we can2.Logical
argue fromformthe oftruth
the oftheory (empirical
singular
• The principle of induction has to be a synthetic
statements to the truth of theories. content)
I never assume that by force of
sentence, i.e. ist negaation must be logically 3.Comparison with other theories
possible.
‘verified’ conclusions, theories can 4.Testing
be established as ‘true’, or even
by way of empirical application
• Problem: Theas merelyof‘probable’.
principle (p.only
induction can 10)be  asymmetry between verifiability and
justified inductively. falsifiability!
 infinite regress! - Corroboration (tentative)
• A modification of the principle by reference to the - Falsification (definitive)
probability does not avoid the regress.
 Psychology

O1, O2 ... On Singular (observational)

Statements

All ... General Statement

Every ... (Theory, Model)
Corroboration Falsification

C D
C1, C2 ... Cn Observational Consequences
Logic!
 Follow-up questions 7th session
• Does the radical acknowledgment of Popper lead to an anti-
realist view of the world, since there is not absolute truth
that can be tested for?
• If the “psychology” is not important, couldn’t it be possible
to make up a general statement, that fulfills the formal
conditions of a falsifiable statement like “God exists”, which
is technically not falsifiable, test it and call it science?
• How was poppers view on religion? Since it is hard to refute
a god or different gods by experience?
• Is mathematics Science or metaphysics? I believe that
mathematics is commonly perceived as solid science,
however, according to Popper it should be categorized as
metaphysical because it's all derived from certain axioms,
which can't be falsified.
• Popper is referred to as a critical rationalist. What is
rationalist (i.e., non-empiricist) about his view?
 Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
(1962)

Thomas S. Kuhn
1922–1996
 The Kuhnian Model:
The Three Modes of Scientific Practice
Pre-normal science
“[A] number of distinct views of nature,
each partially derived from, and all roughly
compatible with the dictates of scientific
observation and method.“ (p. 4)
- no consensus
- unstructured
- several competing schools
Scientific revolution
“[T]he community‘s rejection of one time-
honored scientific theory in favor of another
incompatible with it.“ (p. 6)
- replaces an old paradigm with a new,
incommensurable one.
Normal science
“[The] scientific community thinks it has
acquired firm answers to questions like
the following: What are the fundamental
entities of which the universe is
composed? How do these interact with
each other and with the senses? What
questions may legitimately be asked
about such entities and what techniques
employed in seeking solutions?“ (p.4f.)
- defined by a paradigm
- consensus re: fundamental questions
- cumulative
- mature, successful
- to a certain extent dogmatic
 Follow-up questions 8th session

• How can we ensure that during the “scientific revolution”

phase, we don’t accidentally reject the true theory and
welcome a theory that is not logical? How can we ensure
that we do not put so much emphasis on the community. I.e.
some people believe the earth is flat, if this gains huge
popularity it should not replace what we know is logical.
 Paul Feyerabend’s Against Method (1975)

• Born in Vienna

• Studies physics, interest in

philosophical questions

• Member of the Kraft circle

• After his PhD in 1951 assistant of

Popper at the LSE

• Later professor in Bristol, Berkley

and at ETH Zurich Paul K. Feyerabend
1924–1994
 Feyerabend‘s „anything goes“

„ It is clear, then, that the idea of a fixed method, or of a fixed theory of
rationality, rests on too naive a view of man and his social surroundings. To
those who look at the rich material provided by history, and who are not intent
on impoverishing it in order to please their lower instincts, their craving for
intellectual security in the form of clarity, precision, 'objectivity', 'truth', it will
become clear that there is only one principle that can be defended under all
circumstances and in all stages of human development. It is the principle:
anything goes.“
(Against Method, Ch. 1)

Finally, lmre Lakatos loved to embarrass serious opponents with jokes and irony
and so I, too, occasionally wrote in a rather ironical vein. An example is the end
of Chapter 1: 'anything goes' is not a 'principle' I hold - I do not think that
'principles' can be used and fruitfully discussed outside the concrete research
situation they are supposed to affect - but the terrified exclamation of a
rationalist who takes a closer look at history.
(Against Method, Preface)
 Follow-up questions 9th session

• Is science in this ‘anarchist‘ view just a form of irrational art?

• If the lesson we learn from a look at history of science is

“anything goes”, what criteria can we use to demarcate
science from non-science?
 The nine dimensions of systematicity theory
descriptions
predictions
Critical
discourse
explanations

Epistemic The defense

connectedness of knowledge
claims
An ideal of
completeness
The main thesis (p. 25) Knowledge
generation
Scientific knowledge differs from other
kinds of knowledge, in particular from
everyday knowledge, primarily by being The
more systematic. presentation
of knowledge
 Systematicity theory’s demarcation criterion (STDC)
1. For a test of whether a given field is pseudoscientific at some time t , we have
to first identify the relevant reference science, i.e., a science with roughly the
same subject matter existing at the same time.

2. Next, we investigate the reference science’s development over some longer

time span until the time t0, perhaps something between five and thirty years.
We record what sort of systematicity increase the reference science exhibits
during this time span. This systematicity increase sets the standard of what is
possible in the respective field regarding scientific progress. The sort and
strength of the systematicity increase may vary greatly, depending on the
specific historical time and the specific reference science.

3. Next, we investigate the development of the putative pseudoscience in the

same time span until t0 . Also here, we record the systematicity increase during
this time span. We then compare the systematicity increase of the reference
science with the systematicity increase of the putative pseudoscience. If the
putative pseudoscience scores substantially worse than the reference science,
then it is indeed a pseudoscience. If the difference in systematicity increase is
only slight, then the putative pseudoscience is a scientific competitor. (p. 204)

Properties of STDC: local, dynamic, comparative

 Follow-up questions 10th session

• How did HH arrive at these nine dimensions? What

“method” was used? How do we know these are the right
dimensions? 

• As “method” is not a sufficient criterion for science, I am still

wondering to what extent it is important in the discussions
of systematicity. I guess that some of the dimensions rely
much on a defined method.

• What if there is no actual science in a field, that can be used

as reference science for it?
 Follow-up questions 11th session

• For HH we need systematicity. But don‘t we need another

factor like complexity for science. Because like in the
presentation, you have big data (high systematicity) &
produce knowledge, but is this science without using any
theory?

See: Chris Anderson‘s 2008 article in WIRED magazine:

https://www.wired.com/2008/06/pb-theory
 Feminist Philosophy of Science

Helen Longino

Sandra Harding

1990 and others!

1986
 Helen Longino’s Science as Social Knowledge (1990)
• Directs attention to external factors in the development of knowledge by
showing how social values play a role in scientific research.
• Constitutive vs. contextual values
constitutive: the source of rules determining what constitutes acceptable
scientific practice (truth, accuracy, simplicity, predictability, breadth…)
contextual: belong to the social and cultural environment in which science is
done.
→ The classic ideal of value-freedom holds that science should be free from
contextual values. But: The distinction cannot be easily maintained!
“I will argue not only that scientific practices and content on the one hand and social
needs and values on the other are in dynamic interaction, but that the logical
cognitive structures of scientific inquiry require such interactions.” (p. 5)
• Consequences for the standards of truth and rationality:
“I will argue that there are standards of rational acceptability that are independent of
particular interests and values but that satisfaction of these standards by a theory or
hypothesis does not guarantee that the theory or hypothesis in question is value- or
interest-free. […] Similarly, I will argue, the development of knowledge is a
necessarily social rather than individual activity, and it is the social character of
scientific knowledge that both protects it from and renders it vulnerable to social and
political interests and values.” (p. 12)
 Sandra Harding’s Standpoint Epistemology
• Feminist reflections, and feminist standpoint epistemology in particular,
challenge the dominant philosophy of science.
• Strong focus on the social character of science: “[C]ommunities and not
primarily individuals produce knowledge.” (p. 65)

“In societies where scientific rationality and objectivity are claimed to be highly
valued by dominant groups, marginalized peoples and those who listen attentively to
them will point out that from the perspective of marginal lives, the dominant
accounts are less than maximally objective. Knowledge claims are always socially
situated, and the failure by dominant groups critically and systematically to
interrogate their advantaged social situation and the effect of such advantages on
their beliefs leaves their social situation a scientifically and epistemologically
disadvantaged one for generating knowledge. Moreover, these accounts end up
legitimating exploitative "practical politics" even when those who produce them
have good intentions.” (p. 54)

“Standpoint theories argue for ‘starting off thought’ from the lives of marginalized
peoples; beginning in those determinate, objective locations in any social order will
generate illuminating critical questions that do not arise in thought that begins from
dominant group lives. Starting off research from women's lives will generate less
partial and distorted accounts not only of women's lives but also of men's lives and
of the whole social order.” (p. 56)
 The idea of “strong objectivity”

• The subject and object of knowledge are not significantly different in kind. The
social forces that shape the subjects also shape the objects of knowledge.

“Strong objectivity requires that the subject of knowledge be placed on the same
critical, causal plane as the objects of knowledge. […] Culturewide (or nearly
culturewide) beliefs function as evidence at every stage in scientific inquiry: in the
selection of problems, the formation of hypotheses, the design of research (including
the organization of research communities), the collection of data, the interpretation
and sorting of data, decisions about when to stop research, the way results
of research are reported, and so on.” (p. 69)

“The notion of objectivity has valuable political and intellectual histories; as it is

transformed into ‘strong objectivity’ by the logic of standpoint epistemologies, it
retains central features of the older conception. In particular, might should not make
right in the realm of knowledge production any more than in matters of ethics.” (p.
72)