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The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations

Author(s): J. David Singer
Reviewed work(s):
Source: World Politics, Vol. 14, No. 1, The International System: Theoretical Essays (Oct.,
1961), pp. 77-92
Published by: Cambridge University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2009557 .
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 THE LEVEL-OF-ANALYSIS PROBLEM
IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
By J. DAVID SINGER

TN anyareaof scholarly inquiry, thereare alwaysseveralwaysin

1 whichthephenomena understudymaybe sorted and arranged for
purposesofsystemic analysis.
Whether in thephysicalorsocialsciences,
theobserver maychooseto focusuponthepartsor uponthewhole,
uponthecomponents oruponthesystem. He may,forexample, choose
between theflowers orthegarden, therocksorthequarry, thetreesor
theforest,thehousesor theneighborhood, thecarsor thetrafficjam,
thedelinquents orthegang,thelegislators andso on.1
orthelegislative,
Whether he selectsthemicro-or macro-level of analysisis ostensibly
a merematter of methodological or conceptual convenience. Yet the
choiceoftenturnsout to be quitedifficult, and maywell becomea
centralissuewithinthe disciplineconcerned. The complexity and
significanceof theselevel-of-analysis decisionsare readilysuggested
by the long-standing controversies betweensocial psychology and
sociology,personality-orientedand culture-oriented anthropology, or
micro-andmacro-economics, to mention buta few.In thevernacular
of generalsystems theory, theobserver is alwaysconfronted witha
system,itssub-systems, and theirrespective environments, and while
he maychooseas hissystem anycluster ofphenomena fromthemost
minuteorganism totheuniverse itself,suchchoicecannotbe merely a
function of whimor caprice,habitor familiarity.2 The responsible
scholarmustbe prepared to evaluatetherelative utility-conceptual
and methodological-of thevariousalternatives open to him,and to
appraisethe manifoldimplications of the level of analysisfinally
So itiswithinternational
selected. relations.
But whereastheprosand cons of the variouspossiblelevelsof
havebeendebatedexhaustively
analysis in manyofthesocialsciences,
theissuehas scarcely beenraisedamongstudents of our emerging
1 As KurtLewinobservedin his classiccontribution to thesocialsciences:"The first
prerequisite
of a successful in any scienceis a definite
observation understandingabout
what size of unit one is going to observeat a given time."Field Theoryin Social
Science, New York, I95I, P. I57.
2For a usefulintroductory
statement on the definitional
and taxonomicproblems
in a generalsystemsapproach,see the papersby Ludwig von Bertalanffy,
"General
SystemTheory,"and KennethBoulding,"GeneralSystemTheory:The Skeletonof
Science,"in Societyfor the Advancementof General SystemsTheory, General
Systems,Ann Arbor,Mich.,I956, I, partI.
78 THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

discipline.3
Suchtranquillity maybe seenbysomeas a reassuring indi-
cationthattheissueis notgermane to ourfield,and byothersas evi-
dencethatit has alreadybeenresolved, butthiswriter perceives the
quietudewitha measureof concern.He is quitepersuadedof its
relevanceand certain thatit has yetto be resolved. Rather,it is con-
tendedthattheissuehas beenignoredbyscholars stillsteepedin the
intuitive
and artistictraditionof thehumanities or enmeshed in the
webof"practical" policy.We have,in ourtextsandelsewhere, roamed
up anddowntheladderoforganizational complexitywithremarkable
abandon,focusing uponthetotalsystem, internationalorganizations,
regions,
coalitions,
extra-national
associations, nations,
domesticpressure
groups,socialclasses, andindividuals
elites, as theneedsofthemoment
Andthough
required. mostofus havetendedtosettle uponthenation
as ourmostcomfortable restingplace,we haveretained ourpropensity
forverticaldrift,failingto appreciate thevalueof a stablepointof
focus.4
Whether thislackofconcern is a functionoftherelativeinfancy
ofthedisciplineorthenature oftheintellectual traditions
fromwhence
it springs,
it neverthelessremainsa significant
variablein the general
sluggishness whichcharacterizesthedevelopment oftheoryin thestudy
of relationsamongnations.It is thepurposeof thispaperto raisethe
issue,articulatethe alternatives,
and examinethe theoreticalimplica-
tionsand consequencesof two of themorewidelyemployedlevelsof
analysis:the internationalsystemand the nationalsub-systems.

I. THE REQUIREMENTS OF AN ANALYTICAL MODEL

Priorto an examinationof the theoretical implicationsof the level

of analysisor orientation employedin our model,it mightbe worth-
while to discussthe uses to whichany such model mightbe put,and
therequirements whichsuchusesmightexpectof it.
Obviously,we would demandthatit offera highlyaccuratedescrip-
tionofthephenomenaunderconsideration. Thereforetheschememust
presentas completeand undistorted a pictureofthesephenomenaas is
possible;it mustcorrelatewithobjectiverealityand coincidewithour
empiricalreferents to the highestpossibledegree.Yet we know that
3An important pioneering attemptto deal withsomeof theimplications ofone'slevel
of analysis,however,is KennethN. Waltz,Man, theState,and War,New York,I959.
But Waltz restricts
himselfto a considerationof theseimplications as theyimpingeon
thequestionof thecausesof war. See also thiswriter'sreviewof Waltz, "International
Conflict:ThreeLevelsof Analysis,"WorldPolitics,xii (April i960), pp. 453-6i.
4Even duringthe debatebetween"realism"and "idealism"the analyticalimplica-
tionsof the variouslevelsof analysisreceivedonlythe scantiestattention;ratherthe
emphasisseemsto have been at the two extremes of pragmaticpolicyand speculative
metaphysics.
 THE LEVEL-OF-ANALYSIS PROBLEM 79
suchaccurate representation of a complexand wide-ranging bodyof
phenomena is extremely difficult.
Perhapsa usefulillustration maybe
borrowed fromcartography; theoblatespheroid whichtheplanetearth
mostclosely represents isnottransferable tothetwo-dimensional surface
of a map withoutsome distortion. Thus, the Mercator projection
exaggerates distance and distorts direction at an increasing rateas we
movenorthor southfromtheequator, whilethepolargnomonic pro-
jectionsuffersfrom thesesamedebilities aswemovetoward theequator.
Neither offers therefore a whollyaccurate presentation,yeteachis true
enoughto reality to be quiteusefulforcertainspecific purposes. The
samesortoftolerance is necessary in evaluating anyanalytical model
forthestudy ofinternational relations; ifwe mustsacrifice totalrepre-
sentationalaccuracy, theproblem is to decidewheredistortion is least
dysfunctional and wheresuchaccuracy is absolutely essential.
Thesedecisions are,in turn,a function ofthesecondrequirement of
anysuchmodel-a capacityto explainthe relationships amongthe
phenomena underinvestigation. Hereourconcern is notso muchwith
accuracyofdescription as withvalidity ofexplanation. Ourmodelmust
havesuchanalytical capabilitiesas to treatthecausalrelationships in
a fashionwhichis notonlyvalidandthorough, butparsimonious; this
latterrequirement is oftenoverlooked, yetitsimplications forresearch
strategyare notinconsequential.5 It shouldbe asserted herethatthe
primary purposeof theoryis to explain,and whendescriptive and
explanatory requirements are in conflict, thelatteroughtto be given
evenat thecostofsomerepresentational
priority, inaccuracy.
Finally,we may legitimately demandthatany analytical model
offerthepromise ofreliable prediction. In mentioning thisrequirement
last,thereis no implication thatit is themostdemanding or difficult
ofthethree.Despitethepopularbelieftothecontrary, prediction de-
mandslessof one'smodelthandoesexplanation or evendescription.
For example, anyinformed laymancan predictthatpressure on the
5For example,one criticof the decision-making model formulated by RichardC.
Snyder,H. W. Bruck,and BurtonSapin,in Decision-Making as an Approachto the
Studyof International Politics(Princeton,N.J.,I954), pointsout thatno singlere-
searchercould deal withall the variablesin thatmodel and expectto completemore
thana veryfewcomparative studiesin his lifetime.
See HerbertMcClosky,"Concerning
Strategies fora Scienceof International Politics,"WorldPolitics,viii (JanuaryI956),
pp. 28I-95. In defense,however,one mightcall attention to the relativeease with
whichmanyof Snyder'scategories could be collapsedintomoreinclusiveones,as was
apparently done in the subsequentcase study(see note ii below). Perhapsa more
tellingcriticismofthemonograph is McClosky'scommentthat"Untila greatermeasure
of theory is introduced intotheproposaland therelationsamongvariablesare specified
moreconcretely, it is likelyto remainlittlemore thana setting-out of categoriesand,
like any taxonomy, fairlylimitedin its utility"(p. 29I).
80 THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

acceleratorofa slowlymovingcar will increaseitsspeed; thatmoreor

less of the moon will be visibletonightthan last night; or that the
normalhumanwill flinchwhen confronted withan impendingblow.
Thesepredictions do notrequirea particularlyelegantor sophisticated
model of the universe,but theirexplanationdemandsfar more than
mostof us carryaroundin our minds.Likewise,we can predictwith
impressive reliability
thatanynationwill respondto military attackin
kind,but a description and understanding of the processesand factors
leadingto such a responseare considerably more elusive,despitethe
grosssimplicity of theactsthemselves.
Having articulatedratherbriefly the requirements of an adequate
analyticalmodel,we mightturnnow to a consideration of thewaysin
whichone's choiceofanalyticalfocusimpingesupon sucha modeland
affectsitsdescriptive, and predictive
explanatory, adequacy.

II. THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM AS LEVEL OF ANALYSIS

Beginningwith the systemiclevel of analysis,we findin the total

international systema partiallyfamiliarand highlypromisingpoint
offocus.Firstofall, itis themostcomprehensive of thelevelsavailable,
encompassing the totalityof interactions whichtake place withinthe
systemand itsenvironment. By focusingon the system, we are enabled
to studythe patternsof interaction which the systemreveals,and to
generalizeabout such phenomenaas the creationand dissolutionof
coalitions,thefrequency and durationof specificpowerconfigurations,
modifications in its stability,
its responsivenessto changesin formal
politicalinstitutions,and thenormsand folklorewhichit manifests as
a societalsystem.In otherwords,thesystemic levelof analysis,and only
thislevel,permitsus to examineinternational relationsin the whole,
with a comprehensiveness thatis of necessitylost when our focusis
shiftedto a lower,and more partial,level. For descriptive purposes,
then,itoffersbothadvantagesand disadvantages; theformerflowfrom
itscomprehensiveness, and thelatterfromthenecessary dearthofdetail.
As to explanatory the
capability, system-oriented model poses some
genuine difficulties. In the firstplace, it tends to lead the observer
into a positionwhichexaggeratesthe impactof the systemupon the
nationalactorsand, conversely, discountsthe impactof the actorson
the system.This is, of course,by no meansinevitable;one could con-
ceivablylookupon thesystemas a ratherpassiveenvironment in which
dynamicstatesact out theirrelationships ratherthanas a socio-political
entitywith a dynamicof its own. But thereis a naturaltendencyto
endowthatupon whichwe focusour attention withsomewhatgreater
 THE LEVEL-OF-ANALYSIS PROBLEM 81
potentialthanit mightnormally be expectedto have.Thus,we tend
to move,in a system-oriented model,away fromnotionsimplying
muchnationalautonomy and independence of choiceand towarda
moredeterministic orientation.
Secondly, thisparticularlevelof analysisalmostinevitablyrequires
thatwe postulate a highdegreeof uniformity in theforeignpolicy
operationalcodesofournationalactors.Bydefinition, we allowlittle
roomfordivergence in thebehavior ofourpartswhenwe focusupon
thewhole.It is no coincidencethatourmostprominent theoretician-
and oneof theveryfewtextwriters focusingupontheinternational
system-should "assumethat[all] statesmen thinkand act in terms
ofinterestdefinedas power."6 If thissingle-minded behavior
be inter-
pretedliterally
and narrowly, we havea simplistic imagecomparable
to economic manor sexualman,and ifit be defined broadly,we are
no betteroffthanthepsychologist whosehumanmodelpursues"self-
realization"
or "maximization of gain";all suchgrossmodelssuffer
fromthesamefatalweakness as theutilitarian's
"pleasure-pain"
prin-
ciple.Just
as individualsdiffer
widelyinwhattheydeemtobe pleasure
and pain, or gain and loss, nationsmay differwidelyin what they
considerto be the nationalinterest,and we end up havingto break
down and refinethelargercategory.Moreover,ProfessorMorgenthau
findshimselfcompelledto go stillfurtherand disavowthe relevance
of bothmotivesand ideologicalpreferences in nationalbehavior,and
theserepresent two of the more usefuldimensionsin differentiating
among the severalnationsin our international system.By eschewing
anyempiricalconcernwiththedomesticand internalvariations within
the separatenations,the system-orientedapproachtendsto producea
sortof "black box" or "billiardball" conceptof the nationalactors.7
By discounting-ordenying-the differences among nations,or by
6 Hans J. Morgenthau, PoliticsAmongNations,3rd ed., New York, i960, pp. 5-7.
Obviously,his model does not precludethe use of power as a dimensionfor the
differentiation of nations.
7 The "blackbox" figurecomesfromsomeof thesimplerversions of S-R psychology,
in whichthe observermore or less ignoreswhat goes on withinthe individualand
concentrates upon the correlationbetweenstimulusand response;theseare viewed
as empirically verifiable,
whereascognition, and othermentalprocesseshave
perception,
to be imputedto the individualwitha heavyrelianceon theseassumed"intervening
variables."The "billiardball" figureseemsto carrythe same sortof connotation, and
is bestemployed byArnoldWolfersin "The Actorsin International Politics"in William
T. R. Fox, ed., TheoreticalAspectsof International Relations,Notre Dame, Ind.,
I959, pp. 83-i06. See also, in thiscontext,
RichardC. Snyder,"International Relations
Theory-Continued,"World Politics,xiii (Januaryi96i), pp. 300-I2; and J.David
Singer,"TheorizingAboutTheoryin International Politics,"Journalof Conflict
Resolu-
tion,iv (Decemberi960), pp. 431-42. Both are reviewarticlesdealingwith the Fox
anthology.
82 THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
positing of observing
thenear-impossibility manyof thesedifferences
atworkwithin oneconcludes
them,8 witha highlyhomogenized image
ofournationsin theinternational system.Andthoughthismaybe an
inadequatefoundation uponwhichto base anycausalstatements, it
offersa reasonably adequatebasisforcorrelative statements. More
it permits
specifically, us to observeand measurecorrelationsbetween
certain whichseemto impingeuponthenationand
forcesor stimuli
the behaviorpatterns whichare the apparentconsequence of these
stimuli.But one muststressthe limitations impliedin the word
"apparent";whatis thought tobe theconsequence ofa givenstimulus
mayonlybe a coincidence or artifact, the
and untilone investigates
majorelements in the causal link-no matterhow persuasive the
deductivelogic-onemayspeakonlyofcorrelation, notofconsequence.
Moreover, by avoidingthe multitudinous pitfallsof intra-nation
one emergeswitha singularlymanageablemodel,requir-
observation,
ingas itdoeslittleofthemethodological sophistication oronerousem-
piricismcalledforwhenoneprobesbeneath thebehavioral externalities
oftheactor.Finally, as hasalreadybeensuggested in theintroduction,
thesystemic orientation shouldproveto be reasonably as
satisfactory
a basisforprediction,evenif suchprediction is to extendbeyondthe
ofthesystem
characteristics andattempt anticipatory statementsregard-
ing theactorsthemselves; thisassumes,of course,thattheactorsare
characterizedand theirbehaviorpredictedin relatively grossand
generalterms.
These,then,aresomeofthemoresignificant implications ofa model
whichfocuses upontheinternational as
system a whole.Let us turn
the nationalstate
now to the morefamiliarof our two orientations,
itself.
III. THE NATIONAL STATE AS LEVEL OF ANALYSIS
The otherlevelof analysisto be considered in thispaperis the
nationalstate-ourprimary actorin international This is
relations.
focusamongWesternstudents,
clearlythetraditional and is theone
whichdominates almostall ofthetextsemployed in English-speaking
collegesand universities.
Itsmostobviousadvantage significant
is thatitpermits differentiation
amongouractorsin theinternational system.Becauseit doesnotre-
quiretheattribution
ofgreatsimilarity tothenational itencour-
actors,
8Morgenthau observes,forexample,thatit is "futile"to searchformotivesbecause
theyare "themostillusiveofpsychological
data,distortedas theyare,frequentlybeyond
by the interests
recognition, and emotionsof actorand observeralike" (op.cit.,p. 6).
 THE LEVEL-OF-ANALYSIS PROBLEM 83
ages the observer to examinethemin greaterdetail.The favorable
resultsof suchintensive analysiscannotbe overlooked, as it is only
whentheactorsarestudiedin somedepththatwe are ableto make
reallyvalidgeneralizationsof a comparative nature.And thoughthe
systemic modeldoesnotnecessarily preclude comparisonand contrast
amongthenationalsub-systems, it usuallyeventuatesin rathergross
comparisons basedon relatively crudedimensions and characteristics.
On theotherhand,thereis no assurance thatthenation-oriented ap-
proachwillproducea sophisticated modelforthecomparative study
offoreign policy;withperhaps theexception oftheHaas andWhiting
study,9
noneofourmajortextsmakesa serious andsuccessful effortto
describeandexplainnationalbehavior in terms ofmostof thesignifi-
cantvariables by whichsuchbehaviormightbe comparatively ana-
lyzed.Butthiswouldseemtobe a function, notofthelevelofanalysis
employed, but of our generalunfamiliarity with the othersocial
sciences(in whichcomparison is a majorpreoccupation) and of the
retardedstateofcomparative government andpolitics,a fieldin which
mostinternational relations
specialistsare likelyto have had some
experience.
Butjustas thenation-as-actor
focuspermits us toavoidtheinaccurate
homogenization whichoftenflowsfromthesystemic focus,italsomay
leadus intotheoppositetypeofdistortion-a markedexaggeration of
thedifferencesamongoursub-systemic actors.
Whileit is evidentthat
neitheroftheseextremesis conducivetothedevelopment ofa sophisti-
catedcomparison of foreignpolicies,
and suchcomparison requiresa
balancedpreoccupationwithbothsimilarity anddifference,thedanger
seemstobe greatest
whenwe succumb to thetendencytooverdifferen-
tiate;comparisonand contrastcan proceedonlyfromobserved uni-
formities.'0
Oneoftheadditional liabilities
whichflowin turnfromthepressure
to overdifferentiate
is thatof Ptolemaicparochialism.Thus,in over-
emphasizing the differencesamongthe manynationalstates,the
observer
is pronetoattributemanyofwhathe conceives to be virtues
tohisownnationand thevicesto others, especially
theadversariesof
themoment. Thatthisethnocentrism is by no meansan idlefearis
borneoutbyperusalofthemajorinternational relations
textspublished
9ErnstB. Haas and Allen S. Whiting,Dynamicsof International Relations,New
York,1956.
10A frequent by-product of thistendencyto overdifferentiate
is whatWaltz calls the
"second-image fallacy,"in which one explainsthe peacefulor bellicosenatureof a
nation'sforeignpolicyexclusively in termsof its domesticeconomic,political,or social
characteristics
(op.cit., chs.4 and 5).
84 THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
in the UnitedStatessincei945. Not onlyis the worldoftenperceived
throughtheprismof theAmericannationalinterest, but an inordinate
degreeofattention (if notspleen) is directedtowardtheSovietUnion;
it would hardlybe amissto observethatmostof thesemightqualify
equallywell as studiesin Americanforeignpolicy.The scientific inade-
quaciesof thissortof "we-they" orientation hardlyrequireelaboration,
yet theyremaina potentdanger in any utilizationof the national
actormodel.
Anothersignificant implicationofthesub-systemic orientation is that
it is onlywithinitsparticular framework thatwe can expectanyuseful
applicationof thedecision-making approach.1" Not all of us, of course,
willfinditsinapplicability a majorloss; considering thecriticism which
has been leveledat the decision-making approach,and the failureof
mostof us to attemptitsapplication,one mightconcludethatit is no
lossat all. Buttheimportant thingto notehereis thata system-oriented
modelwould notoffera hospitableframework forsucha detailedand
comparative approachto thestudyof international relations, no matter
what our appraisalof the decision-making approachmightbe.
Anotherand perhapsmoresubtleimplicationof selectingthenation
as our focusor level of analysisis thatit raisesthe entirequestionof
goals,motivation, and purposein nationalpolicy.'2Thoughit maywell
be a peculiarity of the Westernphilosophicaltradition,we seem to
exhibit,when confronted with the need to explainindividualor col-
lectivebehavior,a strongproclivity fora goal-seekingapproach.The
questionof whethernationalbehavioris purposiveor not seems to
requirediscussion in twodistinct(butnotalwaysexclusive)dimensions.
Firstly,thereis the moreobviousissueof whetherthosewho act on
behalfof thenationin formulating and executingforeignpolicycon-
sciouslypursueratherconcretegoals.And it would be difficult to deny,
forexample,thattheserole-fulfilling individualsenvisagecertainspe-
cificoutcomeswhich theyhope to realize by pursuinga particular
1"Its mostwell-knownand successful statement is foundin Snyderet al., op.cit.
Much of thismodel is utilizedin the textwhich Snyderwrotewith Edgar S. Fur-
niss,Jr.,AmericanForeignPolicy:Formulation, and Programs,New York,
Principles,
I954. A morespecific application
is foundin Snyderand GlennD. Paige, "The United
States Decision to Resist Aggressionin Korea: The Applicationof an Analytical
Scheme,"Administrative ScienceQuarterly, iii (DecemberI958), pp. 34i-78. For those
interestedin this approach,very usefulis Paul Wassermanand Fred S. Silander,
Decision-Mating: An AnnotatedBibliography, Ithaca,N.Y., 1958.
12 And if thedecision-makingversionof thismodelis employed, theissueis unavoid-
able. See the discussionof motivationin Snyder,Bruck,and Sapin,op.cit., pp. 92-I17;
note that25 of the 49 pages on "The Major Determinants of Action"are devotedto
motives.
 THE LEVEL-OF-ANALYSIS PROBLEM 85
strategy.In this sense,then,nationsmay be said to be goal-seeking
organismswhichexhibitpurposivebehavior.
However,purposiveness may be viewed in a somewhatdifferent
light,by askingwhetherit is not merelyan intellectual construct that
man imputesto himselfby reasonof his vain addictionto thefree-will
doctrineas he searchesforcharacteristics
whichdistinguish him from
physicalmatterand the lower animals.And having attributedthis
consciousgoal-pursuing behaviorto himselfas an individual,it maybe
arguedthatman thenproceedsto projectthisattributeto the social
organizations of whichhe is a member.The questionwould seem to
distilldownto whetherman and his societiespursuegoals of theirown
choosingor are moved towardthose imposedupon themby forces
whichareprimarily beyondtheircontrol.13Anotherway of statingthe
dilemmawould be to ask whetherwe are concernedwith the ends
whichmen and nationsstriveforor the ends towardwhich theyare
impelledby the past and presentcharacteristics of theirsocial and
physicalmilieu.Obviously,we areusingtheterms"ends,""goals,"and
"purpose"in two ratherdistinctways; one refersto thosewhich are
consciouslyenvisagedand more or less rationallypursued,and the
othertothoseofwhichtheactorhas littleknowledgebuttowardwhich
he is nevertheless
propelled.
Taking a middlegroundin whatis essentially a specificcase of the
freewill vs. determinism debate,one can agree that nationsmove
towardoutcomesof whichtheyhave littleknowledgeand overwhich
theyhave less control,but thattheynevertheless do prefer,and there-
foreselect,particularoutcomesand attemptto realize themby con-
sciousformulation of strategies.
Also involvedin the goal-seekingproblemwhen we employthe
nation-orientedmodelis thequestionof how and why certainnations
pursuespecificsortsof goals. While the questionmay be ignoredin
thesystem-oriented model or resolvedby attributing identicalgoals to
all nationalactors,the nation-as-actor
approachdemandsthatwe in-
vestigatetheprocessesbywhichnationalgoals are selected,theinternal
and externalfactorsthatimpingeon thoseprocesses,and the institu-
tionalframework fromwhichtheyemerge.It is worthyof note that
despitethe strongpredilection forthe nation-oriented model in most
13
A highlysuggestive,but moreabstracttreatment of thisteleologicalquestionis in
TalcottParsons,The Structure of Social Action,2nd ed., Glencoe,Ill., I949, especially
in his analysisof Durkheimand Weber.It is interestingto notethatforParsonsan act
implies,interalia, "a futurestateof affairstowardwhich the processof action is
oriented,"and he therefore commentsthat "in this sense and this sense only,the
schemaof actionis inherently teleological"(p. 44).
86 THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
of our texts,empiricalor evendeductiveanalysesof theseprocessesare
conspicuously few.'4Again, one mightattributetheselacunae to the
methodologicaland conceptualinadequaciesof the graduatetraining
which international relationsspecialiststraditionallyreceive.'5But in
any event,goals and motivations are bothdependentand independent
variables,and if we intendto explain a nation'sforeignpolicy,we
cannotsettleforthemerepostulation of thesegoals; we are compelled
to go back a step and inquireinto theirgenesisand the processby
which theybecomethe crucialvariablesthattheyseem to be in the
behaviorofnations.
There is still anotherdilemma involvedin our selectionof the
nation-as-actormodel,and thatconcernsthe phenomenological issue:
do we examineour actor'sbehaviorin termsof the objectivefactors
whichallegedlyinfluence thatbehavior,or do we do so in termsof the
actor'sperceptionof these"objectivefactors"?Though thesetwo ap-
proachesarenotcompletely exclusiveofone another, theyproceedfrom
greatlydifferent and oftenincompatibleassumptions,and produce
markedlydivergent modelsof nationalbehavior.'6
The firstof theseassumptions concernsthebroadquestionof social
causation.One view holds thatindividualsand groupsrespondin a
quasi-deterministicfashionto the realitiesof physicalenvironment,
theactsor powerofotherindividualsor groups,and similar"objective"
and "real" forcesor stimuli.An oppositeview holds thatindividuals
and groupsarenotinfluenced in theirbehaviorbysuchobjectiveforces,
but by the fashionin whichtheseforcesare perceivedand evaluated,
howeverdistorted orincomplete suchperceptions maybe. For adherents
of thisposition,the onlyrealityis thephenomenal-thatwhichis dis-
cernedby thehumansenses;forcesthatare not discerneddo not exist
14 Among the
exceptions are Haas and Whiting,op.cit.,chs. 2 and 3; and some of
thechapters in RoyC. Macridis,ed.,ForeignPolicyin WorldPolitics,EnglewoodCliffs,
N.J.,I958, especially thaton WestGermany byKarl Deutschand Lewis Edinger.
15 As earlyas I934, EdithE. Warenotedthat". . . thestudy ofinternational
relationsis
no longerentirelya subjectfor politicalscienceor law, but thateconomics,history,
sociology, geography-allthesocialsciences-arecalledupon to contribute towardsthe
understanding . . . of theinternational
system." See The StudyofInternationalRelations
in the UnitedStates,New York, 1934, p. 172. For some contemporary suggestions,see
Karl Deutsch,"The Place of BehavioralSciencesin GraduateTrainingin International
Relations,"BehavioralScience,III (July1958), pp. 278-84; and J.David Singer, "The
Relevanceof the BehavioralSciencesto the Studyof International Relations,"ibid.,VI
(Octoberi96i), pp. 324-35.
16The fatherof phenomenological philosophyis generallyacknowledgedto be
EdmundHusserl(i859-I938), authorofIdeas: GeneralIntroduction to PurePhenomen-
ology,New York,1931, trans.byW. R. BoyceGibson;theoriginalwas publishedin 1913
underthetitleIdeen zu einerreinenPhdnomenologie und Phdnomenologischen Philo-
sophie.Application of thisapproachto socialpsychologyhas comeprimarily throughthe
workof Koffkaand Lewin.
 THE LEVEL-OF-ANALYSIS PROBLEM 87
forthatactor,
andthosethatdo existdo soonlyin thefashion inwhich
theyareperceived. to accepttheposition
Thoughit is difficult thatan
by suchforcesas climate,
a group,or a nationis affected
individual,
distance,
ora neighbor'sphysical
poweronlyinsofar as theyarerecog-
nized and appraised,one mustconcedethatperceptions will certainly
affectthemannerin whichsuchforcesare respondedto. As has often
beenpointedout,an individualwill fall to the groundwhen he steps
outofa tenth-story windowregardless ofhisperception of gravitational
forces,but on the otherhand such perceptionis a major factorin
whether or nothe stepsoutofthewindowin thefirstplace."7The point
hereis thatif we embracea phenomenological view of causation,we
willtendto utilizea phenomenological modelforexplanatory purposes.
The second assumptionwhich bears on one's predilectionfor the
phenomenologicalapproach is more restricted, and is primarilya
methodological one. Thus, it may be arguedthat any descriptionof
nationalbehaviorin a given international situationwould be highly
incompletewere it to ignorethe link betweenthe externalforcesat
workupon thenationand itsgeneralforeignpolicybehavior.Further-
more,if our concernextendsbeyondthe mere description of "what
happens"to therealmof explanation, it could be contendedthatsuch
omissionof the cognitiveand the perceptuallinkagewould be onto-
logicallydisastrous.How, it mightbe asked,can one speakof "causes"
ofa nation'spolicieswhenone has ignoredthemediabywhichexternal
conditionsand factorsare translatedinto a policydecision?We may
observecorrelations betweenall sortsof forcesin the international
systemand the behaviorof nations,but theircausal relationship must
remainstrictly deductiveand hypothetical in the absenceof empirical
investigation into the causal chain which allegedlylinks the two.
Therefore, evenif we are satisfiedwiththe less-than-complete descrip-
tivecapabilitiesof a non-phenomenological model,we are stilldrawn
to it ifwe are to make anyprogressin explanation.
The contrary view would hold thatthe above argumentproceeds
froman erroneouscomprehension of the natureof explanationin
socialscience.One is by no meansrequiredto traceeveryperception,
transmission, and receiptbetweenstimulusand responseor inputand
outputin ordertoexplainthebehaviorofthenationor anyotherhuman
group.Furthermore, who is to saythatempiricalobservation-subject
17 This
issuehas beenraisedfromtimeto timein all of thesocialsciences,
but foran
excellentdiscussionof it in termsof the presentproblem,see Harold and Margaret
Sprout,Man-MilieuRelationship Hypothesesin the Contextof International Politics,
Princeton University,
Centerof International
Studies,1956,pp. 63-71.
88 THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
as it is to a hostof errors-isanybetter a basisof explanation than
informed deduction, inference,or analogy?Isn'tan explanation which
flowslogicallyfroma coherent theoretical modeljust as reliableas
onebasedupona misleading and elusivebodyofdata,mostof which
is susceptible to analysis onlyby techniques and concepts foreign to
politicalscienceandhistory?
This leads,in turn,to thethirdof thepremises relevant to one's
standon thephenomenological issue:arethedimensions and charac-
teristicsofthepolicy-makers' phenomenal fieldempirically discernible?
Or, moreaccurately, evenif we are convinced thattheirperceptions
andbeliefs constitute a crucialvariable in theexplanation of a nation's
foreignpolicy,can theybe observedin an accurateand systematic
fashion ?18 Furthermore, arewe notrequired bythephenomenological
modelto go beyonda classification and description of suchvariables,
and be drawnintothetangledwebofrelationships outofwhichthey
emerge?If we believethatthesephenomenal variables are systemati-
callyobservable, areexplainable, and canbe fitted intoourexplanation
ofa nation's behavior intheinternational system, thenthereisa further
tendency to embrace thephenomenological approach. If not,or ifwe
are convinced thatthegathering of suchdatais inefficient or uneco-
nomical, we willtendtoshyclearofit.
The fourth issuein thephenomenological disputeconcerns thevery
nature ofthenationas an actorin international relations.Whoorwhat
is it thatwe study?Is it a distinct socialentitywithwell-defined
boundaries-aunityuntoitself?Or is it an agglomeration of indi-
viduals,institutions, customs, and procedures? It shouldbe quite
evident thatthosewhoviewthenationor thestateas an integral social
unitcouldnotattachmuchutility to thephenomenological approach,
particularly iftheyarepronetoconcretize orreify theabstraction. Such
abstractions are incapableof perception, cognition, or anticipation
(unless,of course, thereification goesso faras to anthropomorphize
and assignto the abstraction suchattributes as will,mind,or per-
sonality). On theotherhand,ifthenationor stateis seenas a group
of individuals operating withinan institutional framework, thenit
makesperfect senseto focuson thephenomenal fieldof thoseindi-
vidualswhoparticipate in thepolicy-making process.In otherwords,
peoplearecapableofexperiences, images, andexpectations, whileinsti-
18This is anotherof the criticisms leveledat the decision-makingapproachwhich,
almostby definition, seemscompelledto adopt some formof the phenomenological
model.For a comprehensive treatmentof the elementsinvolvedin humanperception,
see Karl Zeneret al., eds., "Inter-relationships
BetweenPerceptionand Personality:
A
Symposium,"Journalof Personality,xviii (1949), pp. I-266.
 THE LEVEL-OF-ANALYSIS PROBLEM 89
tutional arenot,exceptin themetaphorical
abstractions sense.Thus,if
our actorcannotevenhavea phenomenal field,thereis littlepoint
in employing a phenomenological approach.19
These,then,aresomeofthequestions aroundwhichthephenomeno-
logicalissuewouldseemto revolve. Thoseof us who thinkof social
forcesas operative
regardlessoftheactor'sawareness, whobelievethat
explanation neednotincludeall of thestepsin a causalchain,who
aredubiousofthepracticality of gathering phenomenal data,or who
visualizethenationas a distinct
entityapartfromitsindividual mem-
bers,will tendto rejectthephenomenological approach.20 Logically,
onlythosewho disagreewitheach of the abovefourassumptions
wouldbecompelled toadopttheapproach. Disagreement withanyone
wouldbe sufficientgrounds forso doing.
The aboverepresent someof themoresignificant implicationsand
fascinatingproblemsraisedbytheadoption ofoursecondmodel.They
seemto indicatethatthissub-systemic orientationis likelyto produce
richerdescription
andmoresatisfactory (fromtheempiricist's pointof
view)explanationofinternationalrelations,
though itspredictivepower
wouldappearno greater thanthesystemic orientation. Butthedescrip-
tiveand explanatory advantages are achievedonlyat the priceof
considerablemethodological complexity.
IV. CONCLUSION
Havingdiscussed someofthedescriptive, explanatory,
andpredictive
capabilities
of thesetwo possiblelevelsof analysis,
it mightnow be
usefultoassesstherelative
utility
ofthetwoandattempt somegeneral
statement as to theirprospective
contributionsto greatertheoretical
growth in thestudyofinternationalrelations.
In termsof description,we findthatthesystemic levelproducesa
morecomprehensive and totalpictureof international
relationsthan
doesthenational orsub-systemic
level.On theotherhand,theatomized
andlesscoherent imageproduced bythelowerlevelofanalysis is some-
whatbalancedby itsricherdetail,greater depth,and moreintensive
portrayal.21
As to explanation,thereseemslittledoubtthatthesub-
19Manyof theseissuesare raisedin the ongoingdebateover "methodological indi-
vidualism,"and are discussedcogentlyin ErnestNagel, The Structure of Science,New
York,i96i, pp. 535-46.
20 Parenthetically,
holdersof thesespecificviewsshouldalso be lessinclinedto adopt
thenationalor sub-systemicmodelin thefirstplace.
21In a reviewarticledealingwith two of the more recentand provocative efforts
towardtheory(MortonA. Kaplan,Systemand Processin International Politics,New
York, 1957, and GeorgeLiska, International Equilibrium,Cambridge,Mass., 1957),
CharlesP. Kindleberger adds a further-if
notaltogether persuasive-argument in favor
90 THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
systemic or actororientation is considerably morefruitful, permitting
as it doesa morethorough investigation of the processes by which
foreign policies
aremade.Herewe areenabledtogo beyond thelimita-
tionsimposed bythesystemic levelandtoreplacemerecorrelation with
themoresignificant causation. Andinterms ofprediction,bothorienta-
tionsseemto offera similardegreeof promise. Here theissueis a
function ofwhatwe seekto predict. Thusthepolicy-maker willtend
toprefer predictionsaboutthewayin whichnationx or y willreact
to a contemplated moveon his own nation'spart,whilethe scholar
willprobably prefereithergeneralized predictions regarding thebe-
haviorofa givenclassof nationsor thoseregarding thesystem itself.
Does thissummary add up toan overriding caseforone or another
of thetwomodels?It wouldseemnot.For a staggering varietyof
reasons thescholarmaybe moreinterested inonelevelthananother at
anygiventimeandwillundoubtedly shift hisorientation accordingto
hisresearch needs.So theproblem is reallynotoneof deciding which
levelis mostvaluabletothediscipline as a wholeandthendemanding
thatit be adheredto fromnow untoeternity.22 Rather,it is one of
realizing thatthereis thispreliminary conceptual issueandthatitmust
be temporarily resolved priorto anygivenresearch undertaking. And
it mustalsobe stressed thatwe havedealthereonlywithtwoof the
morecommonorientations, and thatmanyothersare availableand
perhapsevenmorefruitful potentially thaneitherof thoseselected
here.Moreover, the international systemgivesmanyindications of
prospective change,anditmaywellbe thatexisting institutional
forms
willtakeon newcharacteristics or thatnewoneswill appearto take
theirplace.As a matter offact,if incapacity to perform itsfunctions
leadstothetransformation ordecayofan institution, we mayexpecta
steadydeterioration and evenultimate disappearance of thenational
stateas a significant
actorin theworldpoliticalsystem.
However,evenif thecaseforone or another of thepossiblelevels
ofanalysis cannotbe madewithanycertainty, one mustnevertheless
maintain a continuing awareness as to theiruse.We mayutilizeone
levelhereandanother there, butwe cannotafford to shiftourorienta-
tioninthemidstofa study. Andwhenwe do in factmakean original
of thelower,sub-systemic levelof analysis:"The totalsystemis infinitelycomplexwith
everything interacting.One can discussit intelligently,therefore,only bit by bit."
"ScientificInternationalPolitics,"WorldPolitics,xi (Octoberi958), p. 86.
22 It shouldalso be keptin mind thatone could conceivably developa theoretical
model whichsuccessfully embracesbothof theselevelsof analysiswithoutsacrificing
conceptual clarityand internalconsistency.
In thiswriter'sview,suchhas notbeendone
to date,thoughKaplan's Systemand Processin International Politicsseemsto come
fairlyclose.
 THE LEVEL-OF-ANALYSIS PROBLEM 91
selectionor replaceonewithanother at appropriate times, we mustdo
so witha fullawareness ofthedescriptive, explanatory, andpredictive
implications ofsuchchoice.
A finalpointremains to be discussed. Despitethislengthy exegesis,
onemightstillbe proneto inquirewhether thisis notmerely a sterile
exerciseinverbalgymnastics. What,itmightbe asked,is thedifference
betweenthetwolevelsof analysisif the empirical referents remain
essentiallythesame?Or,toputit another way,is thereanydifference
betweeninternational relationsand comparative foreign policy?Per-
hapsa fewillustrations willilluminate thesubtlebutimportant differ-
enceswhichemerge whenone'slevelofanalysis One
shifts. might, for
example, postulate thatwhentheinternational system is characterized
bypoliticalconflict betweentwoof itsmostpowerful actors, thereis
a strongtendency forthesystem tobipolarize.Thisisa systemic-oriented
proposition. A sub-systemic proposition, dealingwiththesamegeneral
empirical referents, wouldstatethatwhena powerful actorfindsitself
in politicalconflictwithanother ofapproximate parity, it willtendto
exertpressure onitsweakerneighbors tojoinitscoalition. Eachproposi-
tion,assuming it is true,is theoretically usefulby itself, but each is
verifiedby a different intellectualoperation. Moreover-andthisis
thecrucialthingfortheoretical development-one couldnotadd these
twokindsof statements together to achievea cumulative growthof
empirical generalizations.
To illustratefurther, one could,at thesystemic level,postulate that
whenthedistribution of powerin theinternational system is highly
diffused,itis morestablethanwhenthediscernible clusteringofwell-
definedcoalitions occurs.And at thesub-systemic or nationallevel,
thesameempirical phenomena wouldproducethissortofproposition:
whena nation'sdecision-makers findit difficult to categorize other
nationsreadilyas friendor foe,theytendto behavetowardall in a
moreuniform and moderate fashion. Now, takingthesetwo setsof
propositions, how muchcumulative usefulness wouldarisefromat-
tempting to mergeand codify thesystemic proposition fromthefirst
illustration
withthesub-systemic proposition fromthesecond,or vice
versa?Representing differentlevelsofanalysis andcouchedin different
frames ofreference, theywoulddefytheoretical integration; one may
wellbe a corollary of theother,buttheyare notimmediately com-
binable.A priortranslation fromonelevelto another musttakeplace.
This,itis submitted, is quitecrucialforthetheoretical development
ofourdiscipline. Withall ofthecurrent emphasis ontheneedformore
empirical anddata-gathering research as a prerequisiteto theory-build-
92 THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
ing,onefindslittleconcern withtherelationship amongtheseseparate
and discrete data-gathering Even if we wereto declarea
activities.
moratorium on deductiveandspeculative researchforthenextdecade,
and all ofus weretolabordiligently in thevineyardsofhistorical
and
contemporary data,thestateof international relationstheorywould
probably be no moreadvancedat thattimethanitis now,unlesssuch
empirical activity
becomesfarmoresystematic. And "systematic" is
usedheretoindicate thecumulative growth ofinductive anddeductive
generalizationsintoan impressive arrayof statements conceptually
relatedtooneanother andflowing fromsomecommon frame ofrefer-
ence.Whatthatframeof reference shouldbe, or will be, cannotbe
saidwithmuchcertainty, butit doesseemclearthatit mustexist.As
longas weevadesomeofthesecruciala priori decisions,
ourempiricism
willamountto littlemorethanan ever-growing potpourriofdiscrete,
disparate,non-comparable,andisolatedbitsofinformation orextremely
low-levelgeneralizations.
And,as such,theywillmakelittlecontribu-
tionto thegrowth of a theoryofinternationalrelations.