Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Chap 013
Chap 013
Investment Centers
and Transfer Pricing
McGraw-Hill/Irwin Copyright © 2009 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved.
Learning
Objective
1
McGraw-Hill/Irwin Copyright © 2009 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved.
Delegation of Decision Making
(Decentralization)
T op Decision Making
is pushed down.
M a na ge m e nt
M id d le M id d le
M a na ge m e nt M a na ge m e nt
S u p erv is or S u p erv is or S u p e rv is or S u p e rv is or
Advantages
Allows organization Uses specialized
to respond more knowledge and
quickly to events. skills of managers.
13-4
Decentralization
Challenge
Goal Congruence:
Managers of the subunits
make decisions that achieve
top-management goals.
13-5
Learning
Objective
2
McGraw-Hill/Irwin Copyright © 2009 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved.
Measuring Performance
in Investment Centers
Investment Center
managers make
decisions that
affect both profit
and invested
capital. Corporate Headquarters
13-7
Return on Investment (ROI)
Income
ROI =
Invested Capital
Sales Capital
Margin Turnover
13-8
Return on Investment (ROI)
Income $ 30,000
Sales Revenue $ 500,000
Invested Capital $ 200,000
13-9
Return on Investment (ROI)
$30,000 $500,000
ROI = ×
$500,000 $200,000
13-10
Economic Value Added
Economic value added tells us how much
shareholder wealth is being created.
13-11
Economic Value Added
Investment center’s after-tax operating income
– Investment charge
= Economic Value Added
( )
Investment Investment Weighted
center’s – center’s average
total assets current liabilities cost of capital
( ) ( )
After-tax Market Cost of Market
cost of value equity value
debt of debt capital of equity
Market Market
value value
of debt of equity
13-12
Economic Value Added
The Atlantic Division of Suncoast Food Centers reported
the following results for the most recent period:
13-13
Economic Value Added
13-14
Economic Value Added
Atlantic's pretax income $ 6,750,000
Atlantic's total assets 45,000,000
Atlantic's current liabilities 600,000
13-15
Learning
Objective
3
McGraw-Hill/Irwin Copyright © 2009 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved.
Improving R0I
Decrease
Expenses
Increase Lower
Sales Invested
Prices Capital
13-18
Return on Investment (ROI)
$42,000 $600,000
ROI = ×
$600,000 $200,000
13-19
ROI - A Major Drawback
• As division manager at Winston, Inc., your
compensation package includes a salary plus
bonus based on your division’s ROI -- the higher
your ROI, the bigger your bonus.
• The company requires an ROI of 15% on all new
investments -- your division has been producing an
ROI of 30%.
• You have an opportunity to invest in a new project
that will produce an ROI of 25%.
As division manager would you
invest in this project?
13-20
Residual Income
Investment center profit
– Investment charge
= Residual income
Investment capital
× Imputed interest rate
= Investment charge
Investment center’s
minimum required
rate of return
13-21
Residual Income
13-22
Residual Income
Investment center profit = $25,000
– Investment charge = 20,000
= Residual income = $ 5,000
Investment center’s
minimum required
rate of return
13-23
Learning
Objective
4
McGraw-Hill/Irwin Copyright © 2009 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved.
Residual Income
• As a manager at
Flower Co., would you
invest the $100,000 if
you were evaluated
using residual income?
• Would your decision
be different if you were
evaluated using ROI?
13-25
Residual Income
Residual income encourages managers to
make profitable investments that would
be rejected by managers using ROI.
13-26
Learning
Objective
5
McGraw-Hill/Irwin Copyright © 2009 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved.
Issues: Measuring Investment
Capital
Three issues must be considered before we
can properly measure the investment capital:
What assets should be included?
1. Total assets.
2. Total productive assets.
3. Total assets less current liabilities.
4. Only the assets controllable by the manager
being evaluated.
13-28
Measuring Investment Capital
The Second Issue
13-29
Gross or Net Book Value
• GrizzlyCo is considering an investment that is
projected to produce operating profits of $25,000
before depreciation for the next three years.
• At the beginning of the first year GrizzlyCo will invest
$100,000 in an asset that has a ten-year life and no
salvage value. Straight-line depreciation is used.
• GrizzlyCo calculates ROI based on end-of-year asset
values.
Let’s calculate ROI using both the
gross and net book values.
13-30
Gross or Net Book Value
Profits Gross Net
before Depreciation Operating Book Book
Year Depreciation Expense Profits Value Value
1 $ 25,000 $ 10,000 $ 15,000 $ 100,000 $ 90,000
2 25,000 10,000 15,000 100,000 80,000
3 25,000 10,000 15,000 100,000 70,000
13-31
Gross or Net Book Value
Net Gross
Operating Net Book Book
Year Profits Value ROI Value ROI
1 $ 15,000 $ 90,000 16.67% $ 100,000 15.00%
2 15,000 80,000 18.75% 100,000 15.00%
3 15,000 70,000 21.43% 100,000 15.00%
13-34
Other Issues in Segment
Performance Evaluation
• Short-run performance measures versus
long-run performance measures.
• Importance of nonfinancial information.
– Market position.
– Product leadership.
– Productivity.
– Employee attitudes.
13-35
Measuring Performance in
Nonprofit Organizations
13-36
Transfer Pricing
McGraw-Hill/Irwin Copyright © 2009 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved.
Transfer Pricing
A higher transfer
price for batteries
means . . .
13-40
General-Transfer-Pricing Rule
13-41
Scenario I: No Excess Capacity
• The Battery Division makes a standard 12-volt
battery.
Production capacity 300,000 units
Selling price per battery $40 (to outsiders)
Variable costs per battery $18
Fixed costs per battery $7 (at 300,000 units)
• The Battery division is currently selling 300,000
batteries to outsiders at $40. The Auto Division can
use 100,000 of these batteries in its X-7 model.
$22 Contribution
Transfer $18 variable
price = cost per battery + lost if outside
sales given up
Transfer
price = $40 per battery
13-43
Scenario I: No Excess Capacity
Transfer Transfer
will not $40 will
occur. transfer occur.
price
13-44
Scenario I: No Excess Capacity
General Rule
13-45
Scenario II: Excess Capacity
• The Battery Division makes a standard 12-volt battery.
Production capacity 300,000 units
Selling price per battery $40 (to outsiders)
Variable costs per battery $18
Fixed costs per battery $7 (at 300,000 units)
• The Battery division is currently selling 150,000
batteries to outsiders at $40. The Auto Division can
use 100,000 of these batteries in its X-7 model. It can
purchase them for $38 from an outside supplier.
Transfer
price = $18 per battery
13-47
Scenario II: Excess Capacity
General Rule
$18 $39
transfer transfer
price price
13-49
Learning
Objective
7
McGraw-Hill/Irwin Copyright © 2009 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved.
Setting Transfer Prices
The value placed on transfer goods is
used to make it possible to transfer goods
between divisions while allowing them to
retain their autonomy.
13-51
Goal Congruence
Conflicts may arise between the company’s
interests and an individual manager’s interests
when transfer-price-based performance
measures are used.
13-52
Setting Transfer Prices
Conflicts may be resolved by . . .
13-53
Setting Transfer Prices
Top management may become swamped
with pricing disputes causing division
managers to lose autonomy.
You really
don’t have any Now, here is what the two
choice!
of you are going to do.
Ij
pa ust
y w
th $6 on
at 5 ’t
p a f or
rt !
13-54
Centrally Established
Transfer Prices
As a general rule, a market price-based
transfer pricing policy contains the
following guidelines . . .
1. The transfer price is usually set at a
discount from the cost to acquire the item
on the open market.
2. The selling division may elect to transfer or
to continue to sell to the outside.
13-55
Negotiating the Transfer Price
A system where transfer prices are arrived at
through negotiation between managers of
buying and selling divisions.
Much management
time is used in the
negotiation process. Negotiated price may not
be in the best interest of
overall company operations.
13-56
Cost-Based Transfer Prices
13-57
An International Perspective
13-58
Learning
Objective
8
McGraw-Hill/Irwin Copyright © 2009 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved.
Behavioral Issues:
Risk Aversion and Incentives
The design of a managerial performance
evaluation system using financial performance
measures involves a trade-off between:
Risks imposed on the
Incentives for the manager because
manager to act in financial performance
the organization’s
And measures are only
interests. partially controlled
by the manager.
13-60
Goal Congruence and
Internal Control Systems
A well-designed internal control system
includes a set of procedures to prevent
these major lapses in responsible behavior:
– Fraud.
– Corruption.
– Financial Misrepresentation.
– Unauthorized Action.
13-61
End of Chapter 13
Let’s transfer some of your
capital to me so that my rate
of return will be higher!
13-62