Chapter 10,11&12

Thinking, Fast and Slow

Part II. Heuristics 启发式 and Biases

Chapter 10: The Law of Small Numbers

Key points in this chapter are very much related with system 1, which tries to take
statistics and make causalities out of them. These causalities can be sometimes seen
as random events, although its definition does not lead to any explanation, a
collection of random events sometimes occur as a pattern. When trying to find
patterns between events extreme results can be found more often in small samples,
but they cannot be interpreted as causal. 本章的关键点与系统 1 有很大关系，它试
图把统计数字和因果关系做出来。这些因果关系有时可以被看作是随机事件，
尽管它的定义并不导致任何解释，随机事件的集合有时会作为一个模式出现。
当试图寻找事件之间的模式时，在小样本中可以更多地发现极端的结果，但它
们不能被解释为因果关系
The Law of Small Numbers
For research, the phenomenon of sampling variation is not a curiosity, but an obstacle. When picking small
samples sometimes we can say that “luck” is what acts. The risk of error is also a possible outcome, being
estimated using a sample procedure. Although the main problem here is that psychologists do not use
calculations to estimate a sample size, but they use their JUDGMENT, sometimes flawed.  As an example,
one researcher pointed out that psychologists often chose so small samples that they are exposed to a 50%
risk of failing.
Kahneman himself also experienced having so small samples that results didn’t make any sense. He
actually developed a questionnaire that described realistic research situations and asked researchers to talk
about sample sizes. He discovered that a majority of them did not really pay attention to sample size. 对于
研究来说，抽样变化的现象不是一种好奇心，而是一种障碍。在挑选小样本时，有时我们可以说
" 运气 " 是起作用的。误差的风险也是一种可能的结果，是用抽样程序来估计的。虽然这里的主要
问题是，心理学家并不使用计算来估计样本量，而是使用他们的判断，有时是有缺陷的。  作为一
个例子，一位研究人员指出，心理学家经常选择如此小的样本，以至于他们面临 50% 的失败风
险。卡尼曼自己也经历过有如此小的样本，结果没有任何意义。他实际上开发了一份描述现实研究
情况的问卷，要求研究人员谈论样本大小。他发现，他们中的大多数人并没有真正注意到样本大
小。

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A Bias of Confidence over doubt

Unless a messages immediately negated, possible associations that it evoked will spread
as having that message as TRUE. We tend to believe rather than to doubt, which is more
work for us. We are also predisposed to exaggerate consistency and coherence of what we
see (halo effect). This will produce a representation of reality that makes a lot of sense for
us. 除非一个信息被立即否定，否则它所唤起的可能的联想将被传播为该信息是真
实的。我们倾向于相信而不是怀疑，这对我们来说是更多的工作。我们还倾向于夸
大我们所看到的事物的一致性和连贯性（光环效应）。这将产生一个对我们来说很
有意义的现实表象。

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Cause and Chance
When doing associations we have to look for causes too. A usual causal thinking leads us to make mistakes when
evaluating the randomness of real random events.  Random events produce sequences that can convince people
about the non-randomness of the event, finding patterns.
In basketball for example there is the idea of “hot hand”. There is not such a thing. Of course some players are
more accurate than others, but when making sequences of success and missed shots everything is found to be
random, and sometimes we tend to perceive causality in this randomness. The hot hand is a cognitive illusion.
If we follow intuition we are more likely to misclassify a random event as systematic or causal, we don’t want to
believe that much of what we see is random. Statistics can produce observations that classify events as causal, and
when relating them to chance it has been discovered that these explanations are wrong.

在做联想时，我们也要寻找原因。通常的因果思维导致我们在评价真实随机事件的随机性时犯错。  随机事件
产生的序列可以使人们相信事件的非随机性，找到模式。例如，在篮球运动中，有 " 热手 " 的概念。其实并没
有这样的事情。当然，有些球员比其他球员更准确，但当做出成功和失误的序列时，一切都被发现是随机的，
有时我们倾向于在这种随机性中感知因果关系。热手是一种认知上的错觉。
如果我们遵循直觉，我们更有可能将一个随机事件错误地归类为系统性或因果性，我们不愿意相信我们看到的
很多东西是随机的。统计学可以产生将事件归类为因果的观察结果，当将其与机会联系起来时，人们发现这些
解释是错误的。

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• System 1 is inept when faced with statistical facts, which change the probability of outcomes but do
not cause them to happen.
• Extreme outcomes, both high and low, are most likely to be found in small than in large samples.
• Even statistical experts pay insufficient attention to sample size, and have poor intuitions of
sampling effects.
• System 2 is capable of doubt, but sustaining doubt is harder work than sliding into certainty.
• System 1 runs ahead of the facts and constructs a rich image based on scraps of evidence, causing
us to exaggerate the consistency and coherence of what we see.
• The associative machine seeks causes. But instead of focusing on how the event came to be, the
statistical view relates it to what could have happened instead.
• We do not expect to see regularity produced by a random process. When we detect what appears to
be a rule, we quickly reject the idea that the process is truly random.
• We pay more attention to the content of messages than to information about their reliability.
Consequently we view the world in a simpler and more coherent way than the data justify.

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* 系统 1 在面对统计事实时是无能的，它改变了结果的概率，但并不导致它们发生。
* 极端的结果，包括高的和低的，最有可能在小样本中发现，而不是在大样本中。
* 即使是统计专家也没有充分注意到样本大小，对抽样效应的直觉很差。
* 系统 2 是能够怀疑的，但维持怀疑比滑向确定性更难。
* 系统 1 跑在事实前面，根据零碎的证据构建丰富的形象，导致我们夸大了我们所看到的一致性和连
贯性。
* 联想机寻求原因。但统计学的观点不是关注事件是如何发生的，而是把它与可能发生的事情联系
起来。
* 我们不期望看到随机过程所产生的规律性。当我们发现似乎是一个规则时，我们很快就会拒绝这
个过程是真正随机的想法。
* 我们更关注信息的内容，而不是有关其可靠性的信息。因此，我们以一种比数据更简单、更连贯
的方式看待世界。

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Chapter 11. Anchors
Anchoring effect is when people consider a value for an unknown quantity before even estimating
that quantity. These estimates then stay close to the number people considered, thus, the image of an
anchor. We can find two different types of anchors:
• Adjustment (operation of System 2): start from an anchoring number, assess whether it is too high
or too low, and gradually adjust your estimate by mentally “moving” from the anchor.
• Priming (automatic manifestation of System 1): evoke compatible evidence.
Anchors are threatening; you are always aware of the anchor and even pay attention to it, but you do
not know how it guides and constrains thinking.
锚定效应是指人们在估计一个未知的数量之前，就已经考虑了这个数量的数值。然后这些估计
值就会与人们所考虑的数字保持接近，因此，就有了锚的形象。我们可以找到两种不同类型的
锚。
调整（系统 2 的操作）：从一个锚定的数字开始，评估它是否太高或太低，并通过在心理上
" 移动 " 锚定的数字来逐渐调整你的估计。
引发（系统 1 的自动表现）：唤起相容的证据。
锚是有威胁性的；你总是意识到锚，甚至注意到它，但你不知道它是如何指导和制约思维的。
• An anchoring effect occurs when people consider a particular value for an unknown quantity
before estimating that quantity.
• Adjusting your estimate away from the anchor is an effortful activity. Insufficient adjustment,
where we accept the anchor, is a sign of a weak or lazy System 2.
• Anchoring is also a priming effect, which selectively evokes compatible evidence. This is the
automatic operation of System 1.
• The anchoring index is 100% for people who adopt the anchor as an estimate, and zero for
people who are able to ignore the anchor altogether.
• Anchors that are obviously random can be just as effective as potentially informative anchors.
• When negotiating, don't make an outrageous counteroffer to an outrageous proposal, but make
a scene and make it clear that you won't continue with that number on the table.
• To resist anchoring effects, search your memory for arguments against the anchor. This negates
the biased recruitment of thoughts that produces these effects.
• System 2 is susceptible to the biasing effect of some anchors that makes some information
easier to retrieve. It has control over or knowledge of the effect.

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* 当人们在估计一个未知的数量之前，考虑到该数量的一个特定值时，就会出现锚定效应。
* 调整你的估计值，使之远离锚点是一项努力的活动。调整不足，即我们接受锚定，是一个薄弱或
懒惰系统 2 的标志。
* 锚定也是一种激发效应，它有选择地唤起相容的证据。这是系统 1 的自动操作。
* 锚定指数对于采用锚定物作为估计的人来说是 100% ，而对于能够完全忽略锚定物的人来说是 0 。
* 锚定显然是随机的，可以和潜在的信息锚定一样有效。
* 谈判时，不要对一个离谱的提议提出一个离谱的还价，而是要闹一闹，明确表示你不会继续用这
个数字来谈判。
* 为了抵制锚定效应，在你的记忆中搜索反对锚定的论据。这就否定了产生这些效应的有偏见的思
想招募。
* 系统 2 很容易受到一些锚的偏向性影响，使一些信息更容易被检索到。它对这种效应有控制权或
知情权。

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Chapter 12.The Science of Availability
Availability heuristics is when people are asked to retrieve instances from
memory and it is easy and fluent to do so, the category will be judged to be
large.  If you can retrieve information easily for example about movie starts
are divorces, you will form a bias about the size of the group of movie stars
who have been divorced.

People tend to be guided by system 1, more susceptible to availability bias

than those who use system 2, more engaged and showing a higher vigilance
to facts.

可用性启发法是指当人们被要求从记忆中检索实例，并且很容易和流畅地这样做时，该类
别将被判断为是大的。  如果你能很容易地检索到信息，例如关于电影开始是离婚的，你
就会对离婚过的电影明星群体的大小形成偏见。

人们倾向于在系统 1 的指导下，比那些使用系统 2 的人更容易受到可得性偏见的影响，他

们更加投入，对事实表现出更高的警惕性。
• The availability heuristic replaces estimating the size of a category or frequency of an event with the
ease with which instances come to mind.
• Salient events, dramatic events, and personal experiences versus experiences by others bias the ease with
which instances come to mind.
• This explains why everyone in a group may feel as though he or she does more than his or her fair share.
• By asking people to provide more instances of a given behavior, you increase their struggle, and
consequently they conclude that they don't adopt that behavior.
• Judgment is influenced more by the ease of retrieval than the number of instances retrieved. Increasing
the number of requested instances therefore weakens judgment.
• When you provide a spurious reason for the difficulty of retrieving a large number of instances,
judgment is again strengthened. The surprise is eliminated.
• People who are personally involved in the judgment are more likely to consider the number of instances
and less likely to go by fluency.
• Fluency of instances is a System 1 heuristic, which is replaced by a focus on content when System 2
engages.
• Merely reminding people of a time when they had power increases their apparent trust in their own
intuition.

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• 可得性启发式取代了对某一类别的规模或某一事件的频率的估计，而以实例出现在脑海中的难易
程度为依据。
• 突出的事件、戏剧性的事件和个人经历与其他人的经历相比，更容易让人联想到一些事例。
• 这就解释了为什么一个团体中的每个人都会觉得他或她所做的比他或她应得的多。
• 通过要求人们提供一个特定行为的更多实例，你增加了他们的挣扎，因此他们得出结论说他们没
有采取这种行为。
• 判断力更多地受到检索的难易程度的影响，而不是检索的实例的数量。因此，增加要求的实例的
数量会削弱判断力。
• 当你为检索大量实例的困难提供一个虚假的理由时，判断力又会得到加强。惊喜被消除了。
• 亲自参与判断的人更有可能考虑实例的数量，而不太可能去考虑流畅性。
• 实例的流畅性是系统 1 的启发式，当系统 2 参与时，它就被对内容的关注所取代。
• 仅仅提醒人们他们有权力的时候，就会增加他们对自己直觉的明显信任。

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