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Import substitution, however, soon lost steam and, during 1960–1970, GDP growth slowed to an
annual average of 4.9%. The Philippines adhered to import substitution well into the 1970s and the first
half of the 1980s, long after the four Asian NIEs had shifted to export-led industrialization.
Multi-lateral agencies like the UN and the OECD have already taken steps to harmonize its ODA
development policies and procedures. DAC Donor Countries’ policies and procedures has not been
harmonized with the development policies and procedures of the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) of
the United Nations (UN) and the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) of the World Bank (WB). The degree of
harmonization of development policy and procedures among ODA Donor Countries can be described as
follows:
There is a degree of harmonization of development policies and procedures between DAC Donor
Countries but no harmonization of procedures even between DAC Donor Countries and Recipient
Countries.
There is little information about the harmonization of development policies amongst the other Non-DAC
Donor Countries.
There are variations in development policies and procedures between Multilateral and Donor Countries
which does not promote partnership and project ownership by Recipient Countries. This dilutes the
effectiveness of ODA in meeting the objectives of the MDG and the PRS.
The Rome Declaration is an effort by the DAC Donor Countries to harmonize the delivery of ODA in
accordance with Recipient Country priorities and around Recipient Countries’ project administration
systems. (Rome Declaration on Harmonization, High-Level Forum on Harmonization, February 25,
2003, Rome, Italy)
Non_DAC Donor Coutries like the Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC) Block does not comply with ODA
Tied Loan Covenants and have not complied with harmonizing its ODA administration policy with MDG or
the PRS.
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Primary Areas of ODA Donors Bilateral and Multilateral (2003)
Lack of a coherent industrial policy and rational matching of Non-Market Driven Projects for ODA
Tied Loan Financing. This is an area that has been overlooked because of the controversy it
generates. Since 1972, Philippine economic managers followed a program that largely mimicked
the Washington Consensus and did not allow for strategic intervention on the part of the
government.
Low investments in infrastructure – According to World Bank estimates, a middle income country in
East Asia will need to spend at least 5 percent of GDP on infrastructure to promote development,
attract investments and reduce production costs in the next 10 years. Infrastructure expenditures in
the Philippines is only accounts for 2.8 percent of GDP. The lack of infrastructure program is largely
related to the fragile fiscal situation of the government.
High Transaction Costs – Transaction costs refer to market-related infrastructure, facilities and
services needed to conduct business. It also includes costs in acquiring information and exchanging
information in transactions and contract enforcement. It has been argued that the relatively poor
performance of Philippine export may be explained by high transaction costs in the country rather
than market access issues.
Gaps in the implementation of good governance reforms in corrupt institutions continues to erode
the potential for growth of the Philippines.
The developing country debt crisis marked a dramatic watershed in ODA Tied Loan financing as it
brought home reality that ODA Tied Loans have accumulated into unsustainable debt thus
questioning the use of loans to finance development. Moreover, it also suggested that development
institutions had indulged in “defensive lending” by using ODA Tied Loans to finance the repayment
of earlier loans thus feeding spiraling debt (Cohen, Daniel, Jacquet, Pierre and Reisen, Helmut;
Beyond “Grants versus Loans”: How to use ODA and debt for development; AFD/EUDN
international conference, Paris, Dec. 15 2005
what it sees fit as necessary to defend a Population, total 1.8 billion 1.9 billion 668.9 million 752.6 million 75.8 million 83.1million
Population growth (annual %) 0.9 0.9 2.6 2.3 2 1.7
developing nation. Ec o no my Ec o no my
GDP (current US$) 1.7 trillion 3.0 trillion 341.7 billion 630.8 billion 75.9 billion 98.4 billion
GDP growth (annual %) 7.6 9 3.5 5.7 6 5
Freed from threatening Russian forces to GDP per capita (current US$) 944.44 1,578.95 510.84 838.16 1,001.32 1,184.12
South China Sea and increasing its Foreign direct investment, net 45.1billion 96.9 billion 6.8 billion 16.6 billion 2.2 billion 1.1billion
demanding a free hand in East Asia from Long-term debt (DOD, current 418.7 billion 400.2 billion 172.7 billion 176.7 billion 50.8 billion 54.7 billion
US$)
other powers in South East Asia. Total debt service (% of 11.4 6.1 11.4 8.8 14.3 16.7
exports of goods, services
and income)
Official development 8.6 billion 9.5 billion 13.2 billion 32.6 billion 575.2 million 561.8 million
China’s foreign policy motives in Afraica: assistance and official aid
(current US$)
Oil, commercial outlet for Chinese goods Workers' remittances and 16.7 billion 45.0 billion 4.6 billion 8.8 billion 6.2 billion 13.6 billion
IMF Debt & Reserve Related 24.63% 13.34% 50.54% 28.01% 66.93% 55.59%
Indicator of External Vulnerability
(50% limit debt to GDP ratio)
As of June 2007 , Japan’s total ODA commitment amounted to $3.2 billion, followed by the ADB at $1.98
billion and the World Bank at $1.7 billion.
For infrastructure projects alone, Beijing and Manila have signed $1.11 billion in loan accords involving
many big-ticket priority projects of the Arroyo administration.
The projects include the $35-million Banaoang Pump Irrigation Project of the National Irrigation
Administration in 2002, the $27.6-million General Santos Fish Port Complex Expansion Project of the
Department of Agriculture, and the $50-million Non-Intrusive Container Inspection Project Phase 1 of the
Bureau of Customs.
The Chinese government also provided $400-million financing for the $503.05-million NorthRail Project
Phase 1 from Caloocan to Malolos, Bulacan; and a separate $500-million loan for the $573.66- million
NorthRail’s Phase 2 from Malolos to Clark.
Also included in the $2.21 billion are the controversial $329.48-million National Broadband Network Project,
the $474-million Cyber Education Project, the $910-million Laiban Dam Project, the$260-million Philippine
National Railway’s Main Line South Railway Project Phase 1 from Calamba to Lucena, the $118.77-million
Angat Water Utilization and Aqueduct Improvement Project of Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage
System, the $57.56-million funding shortfall of the NorthRail Project Phase 1 Section 2 from Malolos to
Clark, and the $63.67-million Mass Housing Program of the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating
Council.
Review of
North Luzon Railways Corporation’s Project
North Luzon Railways 1997 proposal (Spanish North Luzon Railways 2005 proposal (China
Railways Group and Construcciones y Auxiliar National Machinery Group now known as Sinomach)
Ferrocarriles)
The components of the project are: The components of the project are:
Phase I - 102-kilometer rail line between Caloocan and Clark Phase I - 80-kilometer rail line between Caloocan and Clark
International Airport (McArthur Corridor) International Airport (McArthur Corridor)
Phase II – Caloocan to Bonifacio Global City Phase II - Caloocan to Fort Bonifacio (EDSA Corridor)
Phase III – Clark to Poro Point in San Fernando, La Union Phase III - Clark to Subic Freeport Zone;
Phase IV - Clark to Poro Point in San Fernando, La Union
The initial phase of the North Rail Project entails the
upgrading of the line from the existing Caloocan Station to The initial phase of the Northrail Project entails the
the Clark International Airport. reconstruction and upgrading of the line from the existing
Caloocan Station to the Clark International Airport.
This was born out of a plan to reactivate rail service to the
North to develop the Clark Special Economic Zone (CSEZ) This was born out of a plan to reactivate rail service to the
as Asia Pacific's regional transshipment logistics hub. North to develop the CSEZ as Asia Pacific's regional
transshipment logistics hub.
Phase I is further divided into two sections: Section 1 from
Caloocan to Malolos and Section 2 from Malolos to DMIA.
North Luzon Railways 1997 proposal (Spanish North Luzon Railways 2005 proposal (China
Railways Group and Construcciones y Auxiliar National Machinery Group now known as Sinomach)
Ferrocarriles)
The Project entails the following features and estimates: The Project entails the following features and estimates:
North Luzon Railways 1997 proposal (Spanish North Luzon Railways 2005 proposal (China
Railways Group and Construcciones y Auxiliar National Machinery Group now known as Sinomach)
Ferrocarriles)
A high speed rail is needs to ensure the operational viability A commuter line serving the McArthur Traffic Corridor
of the 25 million passenger a Clark International Airport (Joint
Foreign Chambers of the Philippines)
The total cost of the project is $2.0 billion from Fort Bonifacio The total project cost is US$ 2.0 billion from Fort Bonifacio to
to Clark (105km). Clark (130 km).
Phase1 cost from Caloocan to Clark is US$ 530 million Phase 1a cost of the project is $503 million from Caloocan to
(100 km) Malolos (50km)
$2.0 billion million project cost will be funded by the $421 million will be funded by the Export-Import Bank of
US$ 500 billion Obuchi Fund with a 0.75% interest rate per China with a 3.0 % interest rate per annum, 20 year
annum, 25 year repayment and a ten-year grace period repayment and a five-year grace period.
$82 million will be funded by the Philippine Government as $82 million will be funded by the Philippine Government as
counterpart fund and will be used for right-of-way counterpart fund and will be used for right-of-way
acquisition and relocation; among others. acquisition and relocation; among others.
Spanish Railways Group and Construcciones y The North Rail Supply Agreement (NRSA) between the North
Auxiliar Ferrocarriles proposal will be procured Luzon Railways Corporation (NLRC) & the Sinomach and the
under the ODA and GPRA Laws Bilateral Country Loan Agreement (BCLA) between the
Philippine Government and Chinese Exim Bank was
represented as a Treaty or an Executive Agreement and
therefore exempt from bidding under the Government
Procurement Reform Act (RA 9184).
The projects related to High Speed rail projects includes: The projects related to Sinomach’s engineering construction
Hong Kong Airport High Speed Rail Link and supervisory work includes:
350 Kph Spanish High-Speed Train (AVE) for the Madrid- Tianjin Television Tower
Seville line.
MEGA Steel Plant in Malaysia
RENFE Shuttle Service Trains, which run at 250/270 Km/h
on intermediate sections of the same line. Hue Huks Cement Co., Ltd. in Vietnam
CAF designs, develops and produces 250 Km/h Self- 300T Gantry Crane Installed at the Xiamen Shipyard
Propelled Variable Gauge Trains with BRAVA trucks. Steel Structural Welding (80,000 Capacity Stadium in
This type of train allows better use of rail infrastructures,
enabling trains to run on both 1.435m international gauge Shanghai)
tracks and 1.668m Spanish gauge tracks, thereby achieving Steel Structural Project of Bangkok SV Garden in Thailand
greater service capillarity and versatility. Installation of Oil Tanks of Baiyun Airport in Guangzhou
Modernization Project of the Great Hall of People
Others products includes Regional trains, Commuter trains,
Kabirwala Power Station in Pakistan
Metro Train, Streetcar/LRT and Locomotives are providing
service in Europe, North America, South America and Asia Zhejiang People’s Hall
Hangzhou International Building (2nd Phase)
Concession agreements in Metro De Seville and Valle De Capital Time Square Plaza in Beijing
Mexico Suburban Rail System Food Preparation Center, Shanghai Pudong International
Airport
Services includes Turnkey, project financing, leasing,
Office Building of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
refurbishment, guarantee and maintenance
Review of the
National Broadband Network (NBN) Project
Build Operate and Transfer National Broadband Overseas Development Assistance National
Network Proposal of Amsterdam Holding Inc. Broadband Network Proposal of Zhong Xing
(AHI) Telecommunications Equipment Company Limited
(ZTE)
Build Operate and Transfer National Broadband Overseas Development Assistance National
Network Proposal of Amsterdam Holding Inc. (AHI) Broadband Network Proposal of Zhong Xing
Telecommunications Equipment Company Limited
(ZTE)
Amsterdam Holding Inc (AHI) will provide coverage for all Total Project Cost US$329M
urban areas and give government a by 25 percent discount 3000 Base Station
for broadband services compared to the rates offered by 300 WIMAX Backbone Station
private telcos.
30 IPMPLS Nodes
25,844 CPEs with IAD/VOIP Terminals
Total Project Cost US$240M
1 IDC & NOC with back up
87 Base Stations
Managed Services & Trainings
500 Cell Sites
bandwidth of 622 Mb/s
Note: Government will buy its own cellphone from AHI or
other vendors
ZTE initially proposed 30% coverage of the Philippines and
Arescom Satellite National Broadband Network will provide a then revised to provide 100% of the 6 th class municipalities or
Nationwide coverage barangays or 25,000 barangays and government agencies
Project Cost Overrun due to liberal provisions for variation orders can be calculated through World Bank study:
1. Public sector projects has a 50% to 70 % time overrun and 20% to 50% cost overrun
2. Private sector has incorporated a 5% to 10% transaction cost in total project cost.
(Klien, M, So, J, Shin B; Worldbank Viewpoint; 1996)
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National Broadband Network Operating Comparison
Build Operate and Transfer National Broadband Overseas Development Assistance National
Network Proposal of Amsterdam Holding Inc. (AHI) Broadband Network Proposal of Zhong Xing
Telecommunications Equipment Company Limited
(ZTE)
Amesterdam Holding Inc (AHI) National Broadband ZTE National Broadband Network total project cost
Network total project cost is US$ 242.0 million. is US$ 325.0 million
Government’s Operating Cost will be only P 3 billion Government’s Operating Cost with ZTE proposal
a year with AHI proposal based on 25% discount on NBN amortization cost: Less than P1 billion a year
take & pay basis for services used. Operation, maintenance, and upgrading: P1 billion
a year, using current Telecommunications Office
Arescom Satellite National Broadband Network total budget — hence, no additional cost
project cost is US$ 135.0 million Savings over 25 years: P20 billion in first five
years, P60 billion in next 20 years
Financial obligation of the government will include Even more, in fact, since current telecom costs will
debt payment and operating expenses. rise when more government agencies get connected
Build Operate and Transfer National Broadband Overseas Development Assistance National
Network Proposal of Amsterdam Holding Inc. (AHI) Broadband Network Proposal of Zhong Xing
Telecommunications Equipment Company Limited
(ZTE)
Amesterdam Holding Inc (AHI) National Broadband Total project cost is US$ 325.0 million will be
Network total project cost is US$ 242.0 million with funded by the Chinese Exim Bank with a 3.0 %
no government counterpart fund.
interest rate per annum, 20 year repayment and a
five-year grace period.
Arescom Satellite National Broadband Network total
project cost is US$ 135.0 million with a US EXIM
soft loan with a 6.0% interest rate per annum and 20
year repayment.
Itshould be established along a build-operate- A treaty, as defined by the Vienna Convention on the Law of
transfer or such similar undertaking using private Treaties, is an international agreement concluded between
funding; States in written form and governed by international law.
There should be no government subsidies;
There should be no “take or pay” conditionalities NBN-SESRA provides that it be read and construed in
and instead a “pay for use” facility; accordance with Philippine laws. However, the Bilateral Loan
And it should result in a substantial reduction of Country Agreement (BCLA) has not been finalized therefore
government telecommunications expenses. it does constitute a treaty of an executive agreement.
AHI proposal will be procured under the Build, ZTE proposal will be procured under the legal
Operate and Transfer law framework of a Treaty and executive Privilege.
Arescom
A Free proposal
sample background will be procured under
from www.awesomebackgrounds.com the ODA
Slide 32 © 2003 By Default!
Multilateral Agencies and DAC member ODA Tied Loan Countries can apply soft diplomacy on
Recipient Countries to comply with good governance practice in the implementation of project in the
meeting MDG and PRS covenants. DAC Member ODA Tied Loan made up 95% of ODA Tied Loans
globally.
World Trade Organization should impose trade sanctions against predatory Tied ODA Loans that does
not comply with DAC-OECD rules and regulation.
Multilateral Agencies should link good governance practice to forgiveness of ODA Tied Loans to
Recipient Countries
DAC Member ODA Tied Loan Donor Countries should promote sustainable ODA Debt Levels
Strengthen Link between DAC Member ODA Tied Loan Donor Countries with ASEAN Regional Forum to
resolve political issues regarding the development of the Spratly Islands.
Harmonize Industrial Development Policy National and the Washington Consensus policy formulation
frameworks and strengthen linkage in listing projects for ODA Tied Loan Financing.
The End
National Economic Development Authority (NEDA)’s Commission on Audit (COA) 2006 Report on Sectoral
Annual ODA Portfolio Review Performance
Audit Report on Public Debt
Project Administration Issues Project Policy Issues
Political instability, insecure national leadership, and NEDA needs to monitor the implementation and
questions about the legitimacy of the government have effectiveness of its recommendation to address perennial
characterized Philippine governance the past years. problems that delays the implementation of foreign funded
projects.
These has resulted in frequent “changes in heads of
agencies/ management” which “impacts on the NEDA’s evaluation and monitoring focused only on on-
implementation of ODA projects.” going projects leaving no opportunity to assess the
condition of completed projects and their impact and
The results are “delays in award of contracts, because of sustainability. The success or failure of these projects to
repeated reviews of contracts for due diligence, or in certain attain their objectives could guide NEDA in their evaluation
cases, even changes in project design.” of newly proposed projects similarly situated.
a. additional civil works (changes in scope/ variation orders/ ODA Projects were approved without adequate evaluation thus
supplemental agreements); risks in project implementation were not addressed before the
b. increase in right-of way land acquisition/ resettlement projects were started such as:
costs;
c. increase in unit cost of labor, materials and equipment; a. Project implementation were either delayed or loans totally
d. high bids (bids above Approved Budget for the cancelled due to unpreparedness of implementing
Contract/Approved Agency Estimate); agencies
e. currency exchange rate movement; b. unresolved right-of-way (ROW) problems,
f. claims for price escalation.” c. lack of funds or incomplete facilities after incurring
substantial amount of project expenditures including
World Bank study showed that commitment fees, thus, wasting limited government
1. public sector projects has a 50% to 70 % resources.
time overrun and 20% to 50% cost d. Evaluation failed to cover adequacy of planning and
overrun project designs to ensure that projects would be
2. Private sector has incorporated a 5% to completed, operational and could be properly maintained.
10% transaction cost in total project cost.
(Klien, M, So, J, Shin B; Worldbank Viewpoint; 1996) There are projects funded from previous loans with
substantial balances that are already being rehabilitated
using funds from other foreign loans.
National Economic Development Authority (NEDA)’s Commission on Audit (COA) 2004 Report on Sectoral
Annual ODA Portfolio Review Performance Audit Report on Public Debt
Myth number 1—DOTC officials say it’s the best deal the President Arroyo herself clarified that the bulk of those
government could ever have. It will save the government communications expenses by government are accounted for
bureaucracy close to P4 billion in government expenses on by mobile- phone calls, and government officials are going to
communications, including landline calls, cellular-phone calls continue using the facilities of the telcos.
and Internet connections.
The fact is that the DOTC’s technical working group has
always proposed a single backbone for both the NBN and
CEP and has opposed satellite-based technology.
Myth number 2—The NBN will address the “digital divide.” In truth, the NBN won’t address the digital divide. The
This is Neda’s line, a dig at the private telcos, which officials backbone the NBN is going to build will be used solely by
say make money by concentrating their operations in the government agencies, including about 50 percent of the
major cities but neglect the countryside. Neda officials say barangay halls.
the NBN is a perfect foil to this trend.
Yes, barangay halls, but not the barangay residents!
Residents in remote barangays will have to wait for the
rollout of private telecoms before they can even fantasize
about flying in the ethereal realm of the digital world.
Myth number 3—The government needs a dedicated state- The truth is that government has been using private networks
owned and controlled Intranet and separate backbone for for its e-mail and other communications needs since time
“national security” reasons. The government, DOTC officials immemorial, but “security issues” was never a problem. It has
say—and echoed by Neda—has to own and control that never been a problem during the time of President Fidel V.
backbone so that neither a snoop nor a malevolent hacker Ramos, a former general who probably appreciates “national
could do mayhem. security” more than anybody else in the DOTC. Besides, if
“national security” were an issue here, then wouldn’t it be
riskier to entrust government’s information to a foreign state?
Unless they’re saying a foreign government is trusted more
than the Filipino private sector.
In our midst today are huge multinationals owning sensitive intellectual property, including patents and
trade secrets worth billions of dollars greater than the Philippine GDP. Yet these MNCs never felt
compelled to build their own separate fiber-optic backbone. Imagine a situation where everybody lays
down fiber-optic cables for “security reasons.” Wouldn’t that be the ultimate “spaghetti sa ibaba,”
underneath our soil and the seas?
But private firms do have their own private and secure network, not by having their own separate
physical backbone, but by buying capacities from existing privately run backbones—PLDT and
Telecphil. For instance, it’s not uncommon for these huge firms to use Telecphil facilities for their
Philippine operations while connecting to the PLDT backbone for their fiber-optic link to their
headquarters in the US. And security has never been an issue because there are a thousand and one
ways of securing them.
If there’s one agency that should be crazy about having a “secure network,” it should be the
Department of Interior and the Local Government (DILG). The truth, according to sources from Neda, is
that the DILG was never enthusiastic about the project, and this is why Arescom’s proposal, initially
offered to the DILG, went nowhere. According to Neda sources, DILG officials thought the backbone
was not their priority, thus giving DOTC officials the opportunity to disregard Arescom and endorse
ZTE to the Neda Investment Coordination Committee.