An offer must accepted in order to have a contract.
Acceptance establishes the required vinculum juris between the parties. It is because of acceptance that we can talk of consensus ad idem, or the coincidence of wills, and recall that contracts are enforced partly because there was consensus between the parties. Acceptance is an assent to the terms of the offer. As in the case of an offer this may be indicated, orally, in writing, or by conduct. Nyabienda v AG 2001 (2) BLR 143 is an example of tacit acceptance. Who should accept? If an offer is addressed to a particular person, only that person may accept. Recall however that some offers are addressed to the general public. In such cases any member of the general public may accept: Bloom v American Swiss Watch Co. Also recall from Hersch v Nel that some options give rise to assignable contractual rights. The offer in such cases must indicate explicitly that only the offeree must accept if offeror wishes to prevent cession of rights. Modes of Acceptance If a mode of acceptance is indicated, and the intention of the offeror so suggests, then only that mode must be utilised. In some situations the intention of the offeror may not be to prescribe a mode of acceptance, but to suggest expedition, for eg., a requirement to respond by “return post”. In such a case, more expeditious mode of communication may be utilised, for eg., a fax. An example of a prescribed and mandatory mode of acceptance would a requirement to accept an offer of employment by signing a specified written document: Nindi v The University of Botswana, 2005 (1) BLR 439 Quiescence is not Acquiescence If the mode of acceptance is not indicated, still, there must be some indication or signification of acceptance. The element of consensus requires that at very least something must be done to signal acceptance of the offer. Silence is not acceptance. However, where one has a duty to act, silence, or not doing anything might be deemed sufficient acceptance of the offer. These aspects of mode of acceptance may be of practical relevance to the handling of unsolicited goods. Unambiguous, unequivocal and unqualified acceptance Acceptance must be unambiguous, unequivocal and in terms of the offer. Equivocation, or an attempt to vary the terms of the offer, suggest that the offeree is uncertain or that negotiations are incomplete. A qualified acceptance is regarded as rejection of the offer, which thereby lapses, and the submission of a counter offer, which the other party is free to accept or reject. If the counter offer is rejected, the original offer, having lapsed, will not automatically revive: Watermeyer v Murray, 1911 AD 61. Communication of Acceptance The communication of an acceptance of the offer by offeree is generally required. It is essential for consensus and the establishment of animus contrahendi. The offeror may however dispense with the need to be informed of the acceptance of the offer. This may be the presumed intention of the offeror in the reward cases, in so far as embarking upon the challenge is concerned. Communication of the acceptance of the offer may also assist in the localisation of the contract. A contract may be deemed concluded at the time and the place where the acceptance is communicated. Communication of Acceptance through the Post The traditional method of communicating, through an exchange of posted letters, has given rise to difficult cases and special rules in both English law and South African law. The problems and rules can be appreciated from the Cape Explosives case. The central issue in two related cases was whether contracts were concluded in Cape Town, or somewhere else, so that the court in Cape Town could be seized of a contractual dispute that had arisen. The Cape Explosives Case cont. In the first case, a letter of offer was despatched from the Transvaal, and a letter of acceptance posted in Cape Town. In the second case the letter of offer was despatched from Durban, and an acceptance again posted form Cape Town. The court held that the contracts in both cases were concluded in Cape Town, where letters of acceptance were posted. The Court surveyed several possibilities, before settling for the so called mailbox rule. Cape Explosives Conti. The first possibility canvassed is that a contract would come into existence as upon acceptance of an offer. The second possibility is that a contract comes into existence upon the posting of a letter of acceptance. The third possibility is that the contract would come into existence when the acceptance letter is received. The fourth possibility is that the contract comes into existence when the letter of acceptance is brought to the attention of the offeror. The Court held that the balance of practical convenience favoured the second theory. Cape Explosives Cont The AD confirmed the correctness of the Cape Explosives case in Kergeulen’s Case. The mail box rule is odd. It contradicts and ignores the requirement for consensus. It can only apply where the intention was clearly to use the post, and that the rule should apply. It also applies only where the postal system is functioning normally, and a correctly stamped and addressed letter was posted. The theory or rule to apply in most situations would be one that confirms or reinforces the importance of consensus. Telegrams This is a rather old mode of communicating. It involves using the post. In consequence, the mail box rule was regarded as applicable in Yates v Dalton. The facts and conclusion in this case expose another reason for restricting application of the mail box rule. It was not possible in this case to effectively withdraw an acceptance by a quicker means of communicating, after an acceptance had been posted. Telephone In Woolmer v Rees the Court held by way of obiter that where communication is by telephone the contract would be concluded where an acceptance is uttered. In Tel Peda Ltd v Van Zyl, the court disagreed with Woolmer v Rees, and held, as in Entores Ltd v Miles Far East Corporation, that a contract should be concluded where an acceptance is heard. Other Means of communicating In the Entores Ltd case, Lord Denning held that telephone and telex were instantaneous means of communication. There was no good reason for departing from the normal rule that an acceptance must be heard. The Entores Ltd case was applied by the House of Lords in Brinkbon v Stahag to communication by telex. The English cases probably suggest how we should assess modern means of communicating.