Lesson 1: The Instruments of

Canada’s Foreign Policy: Liberal (or

Pearsonian) Internationalism
The ‘Golden Age’ of Canadian diplomacy
(1941-48, 1948-1956)
Lester (‘Mike’) Pearson was the Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs (USSEA or Deputy Minister) between
1946-1948
-Pearson became the Leader of Opposition 1956-1966
-He was Prime Minister (PM) 1963-68
The ‘Golden Age’ of Canadian diplomacy
(1941-48, 1948-1956)
Very famous Canadian diplomats included Escott Reid, John
Holmes, George Ignatieff, Norman Robertson, Arnold Heeney,
O.D. Skelton, Hume Wrong and Basil Robinson.
Why did the Golden Age end?
-rise of other middle powers like
Australia, Brazil, India, Mexico, etc.
-rebuilding of Europe including the
Marshall Plan including hard work and
an educated workforce in France and
Germany
-rise of regional blocs → less reliance
on international institutions like the UN
-superpower rivalry and the Cold War
Why did the Golden Age
end? George Ignatieff
was another famous
Canadian diplomat.
What were the main accomplishments of
Canadian diplomats during the Golden Age?
-establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) with the Canadian Article II
-establishment of UN Peacekeeping Forces
The Suez Crisis happened at the same time as the
USSR invaded Hungary in 1956
Suez Canal controls flow of oil from the
Middle East to Europe and the United
States.
Egypt’s plan was to build the Aswan Dam
but US and United Kingdom withdrew
financing of the Dam.
The Suez Crisis happened at the
same time as the USSR invaded
Hungary in 1956
 The Suez Crisis at the same time as the USSR
invaded Hungary in 1956 – what happened
UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold led
negotiations at United Nations
Meanwhile UK, France & Israel were secretly
meeting to discuss detailed military timetables
without telling the NATO allies
Israeli forces crossed canal to attack Egypt on
October 29, 1956
US President Dwight Eisenhower and U.S.
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in the
State Dept. were taken by surprise...
US officials and Canadian diplomats recognized
that the Israeli attack could:
-turn ‘Arab world’ against the West
aid the USSR
-divide NATO
-undermine UN

Moreover, UK, France and Israel

had lied about their intentions....
Pearson recognized that:
1. cooperation among UK and FR (Canada’s
‘mother countries’) and US (close neighbour
& superpower) was threatened!
2. NATO could fall apart!
3. UN authority was being undermined!
4. Commonwealth could be divided!
5. USSR attack on Hungary was problem!
In 1956, it looked as if the West was going
to allow the use of force to settle disputes.
Pearson was more idealistic – he was a
liberal internationalist
Pearson received the 1957 Nobel Peace Prize
Because he helped establish the United Nations Emergency
Force (UNEF)
A Canadian General E.L.M. Burns also worked with UN Sec-
Gen Dag Hammerskjold to establish UNEF
The US State Department was involved
According to the accounts by Pearson and the US Ambassador to UN Henry
Cabot Lodge:

Lodge had draft; saw Pearson; said US would be very gratified if Canada
would sponsor resolution; Pearson speedily read it; he quickly made up his
mind; he saw the hidden meanings & hooks; he sponsored it in UN General
Assembly... “I have never seen a man in a forum pick up and comprehend a
complicated thing of far-reaching implications and then get
recognized and get the floor and propose it immediately”.
-Henry Cabot Lodge

• Lesson: Pearson deserved a prize for putting in

place an idea whose time had come.
Vietnam War: Further lessons from the 1960s
Canada was involved with IndoChina (now Vietnam) since
1954 and the Geneva Conference. But the International Truce
Commissions didn’t work.
Canadian opposition to the war began to rise in 1965 due to
US bombing of Viet Cong and North Vietnam
Pearson’s famous speech at Temple University in
Philadelphia on April 2, 1965 departed from his usual policy of
“Quiet Diplomacy”.
 Vietnam War: Pearson’s speech in the US
Prime Minister Pearson urged a pause
in the bombing in the interests of peace
& negotiation, a cease-fire...and he did
so in the President’s own ‘backyard’.
PM Pearson and Canada’s
Ambassador to the US Charles Ritchie
were summoned to an angry meeting
with US President Lyndon Johnson and
advisor McGeorge Bundy at Camp
David
Vietnam War: Meeting at Camp David
US Pres. Johnson bellowed at Pearson on the porch
Charles Ritchie engaged in a spat with McGeorge Bundy
Back at the cottage, Richie saw Johnson grab Pearson by the shirt. They flew
back together to Ottawa. Ritchie phoned him that night and congratulated him
for having the courage of his convictions and then suggested it would be wrong
to sit back and absorb the treatment Johnson had doled it.
On the surface Pearson sounded calm but Ritchie
got the feeling he was quite shaken”.
Vietnam War
Pearson chose to defuse the matter with a conciliatory
letter to the President:
“I assure you that my proposal, carefully guarded, was meant to be
helpful; neither constructive nor obstructive....I want you to know that I
appreciate, as much as any person could, the crushing nature of the
problem, domestic and international, that you are facing with such courage
and wisdom...But Canada is a political democracy too, with an active and
often divided public opinion, sensitive that its leaders do not appear to be
mere echoes of the United States but anxious, I believe, to back up their
neighbour when required to do so, as an independent friend should.”
-Pearson’s letter to Johnson
Theoretical Framework: Liberal
Internationalism

Main Principles
Tenets/Themes
Canada as a Middle Power
(versus small/satellite power or principal power)

Canadian diplomats can act as middle men for superpowers; they can
sponsor compromise resolutions; lobby; reduce tensions

Canada could be an intermediary; its population size, geographic location

and ideology could hep

Canada’s vast geography, its normative view and its humane

internationalism could help
Functionalism
(versus sovereign equality and equal
representation)

restrict membership to those who are interested, can

contribute resources

thus avert great power hegemony (control)

conflicted with middlepowermanship

Mediatory Role
(versus US puppet, lackey, or apologist)
strive to obtain compromises and
solutions

mediate a gradual improvement in

world order

bring about gradual change through

mediation and compromise
Participatory Internationalism
(versus isolationism or unilateralism)
undertake national action to
maintain and strengthen world peace

don’t be afraid of commitments but

active in accepting international
responsibilities

contribute ideas and resources to

international organizations
Collective Security
(versus collective defence i.e. a pact among countries to
defend together the group against an outsider)
create and maintain organizations to preserve peace
among members (e.g. UN, NATO?)
Flexibility & Quiet Diplomacy
(versus principles, priorities, and ‘megaphone’
diplomacy)

be flexible and react to world events

avoid dogmatic principles and priorities

rely on behind-the-scenes techniques of persuasion

refrain from publicly criticizing countries and leaders

Guidelines for Canadian Foreign Policy-
Making:
1. Canada should play a role as a middle-power on the international
stage

2. Canada should seek every opportunity to mediate conflict so as to

secure international peace

3. Canada should support international institutions and consistently act

so as to promote participatory internationalism and collective security

4. Canada should employ techniques of flexibility and quiet diplomacy

when interacting with other nations
Principles of Liberal Ideology and their
Relation to the Guidelines:
1. Believe that equality, freedom, and tolerance among individuals, and nations,
are important.

2. Have faith in humankind’s power to solve our problems, especially through

mediation and compromise.

3. Believe in progress, the perfectability of humankind, and the gradual reform

of international institutions.

4. Appeal to human rationality and enlightened self-interest so as to obtain

harmony of interest, instead of war.
Questions to Discuss:

Are these principles useful and

valid today?
Why or why not?
What alternative guidelines
would you recommend?