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publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 1


Chapter 10

Management Control
in Decentralized Organizations

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Chapter 10 Learning Objectives

1. Define decentralization and identify its expected


benefits and costs.

2. Distinguish between responsibility centers and


decentralization.

3. Explain how the linking of rewards to responsibility-


center performance metrics affects incentives and risk.

4. Compute return on investment (ROI), economic profit,


and economic value added (EVA).

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Chapter 10 Learning Objectives

5. Compare the incentives created by income, ROI, and


economic profit (or EVA) performance measures.

6. Define transfer prices and identify their purpose.

7. State the general rule for transfer pricing and use it to


assess transfer prices based on total costs, variable costs,
and market prices.

8. Identify the factors affecting multinational transfer


prices.

9. Explain how controllability and management by


objectives (MBO) aid the implementation of management
control systems.

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Learning
Objective 1 Decentralization

The delegation of freedom to make


decisions is called decentralization.

The delegation of decision making authority


to lower levels of the organization.
The lower in the organization that authority
is delegated, the greater the decentralization.

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Learning
Objective 1 Centralization

The process by which decision making is


concentrated within a particular location
or group is called centralization.

Concentration of decision making authority only at the


highest levels of an organization is called Centralization

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Costs and Benefits

Benefits of decentralization:

Lower-level managers have the best


information concerning local conditions.

It promotes management skills which,


in turn, helps ensure leadership continuity.

Managers enjoy higher status from being


independent and thus are better motivated.

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Costs and Benefits

Costs of decentralization:

Managers may make decisions that are


not in the organization’s best interests.

Managers also tend to duplicate services


that might be less expensive if centralized.

Costs of accumulating and processing


information frequently rise.

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Middle Ground

Many companies find that decentralization


works best in part of the company, while
centralization works better in other parts.

Decentralization is most successful


when an organization’s segments are
relatively independent of one another.

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Segment Autonomy

If management has decided in favor of heavy


decentralization, segment autonomy, the
delegation of decision-making power to managers
of segments of an organization, is also crucial.

For decentralization to work, autonomy must be


real, not just “lip service.” Top managers must
be willing to abide (comply)by decisions made by
segment managers in most circumstances.

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Learning Responsibility Centers
Objective 2
and Decentralization

Design of a management control system should


consider two separate dimensions of control:

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Responsibility Centers
and Decentralization

Profit centers Cost Centers

Will a profit center or a cost center better


solve the problems of goal congruence and
management effort?

In designing accounting control systems, top


managers must consider the system’s impact
on behavior desired by the organization.

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Responsibility Centers
and Decentralization

The management control system should


be designed to achieve the best possible
alignment between local manager decisions
and the actions central management seeks.

For example, a plant may seem to be a


“natural” cost center because the plant manager
has no influence over decisions
concerning the marketing of its products.

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Learning Performance Metrics and
Objective 3
Management Controls

Linking rewards to responsibility-


center performance metrics affects
incentives and risk.

Incentives are the rewards, both


implicit and explicit, for managerial
effort and actions.

A performance metric is a specific


measure of management
accomplishment.

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Motivation, Performance, and Rewards

Incentives. . .

Performance-based rewards that


enhance managerial effort toward
organizational goals.

Motivational Rewards
Criteria
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Motivation, Performance, and Rewards

You get what you measure!

Therefore, accounting measures,


which provide relatively objective
evaluations of performance,
are important.

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Performance Metrics and
Management Controls

The design of a management control system


affects the actions of managers. It specifies
how outcomes translate into unit performance
metrics and into both explicit and implicit
rewards.
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Performance Metrics and
Management Controls

Agency theory provides a model to analyze


relationships where one party (the principal)
delegates decision-making authority to another
party (the agent).

Agency theory is useful to analyze situations


where there is imperfect alignment between
the principal’s and agent’s
1)Information and
2)Objectives.

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Agency Theory, Performance,
Rewards, and Risks

Agency theory deals with contracting between


an organization and the managers that it hires
to make decisions on its behalf.

Cost of measuring
Incentive Risk
performance

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Learning
Objective 4 Measures of Profitability

Measures of income are readily available from


the financial reporting system at any level of
the organization for which a company can
identify revenues and expenses.

Accountants can easily customize income


measures such as income before interest and
taxes (EBIT) or earnings before interest,
taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA).

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Return on Investment

A more comprehensive measure of profitability


that takes into account the investment required
to generate income is the return on investment
(ROI).

ROI is the product of two items:


Return on Capital
sales AND turnover

ROI

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Valuation of Assets

Should values be based on gross book value


(original cost) or net book value (original
cost less accumulated depreciation).

Practice is overwhelmingly in favor of using


net book value based on historical cost.

Most companies use net book value in


calculating their investment base.

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Valuation of Assets

Asset values: beginning, ending, or average

If investment does not change throughout


the year, it will not matter whether assets
are measured at the beginning, the end,
or average for the year.

If investment changes throughout the year,


we should measure invested capital
as an average for the period.

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Valuation of Assets

Because income is a flow of resources over


a period of time, and a company should
measure the effect of the flow on the
average amount invested.

The most accurate measures of average


investment take into account the amount
invested month-by-month, or even
day-by-day.
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Economic Profit (Residual Income)

RI is defined as after-tax net operating


income less a capital charge.

Capital charge is the cost of capital


multiplied by the amount of investment.

RI tells you how much a company’s


after-tax operating income exceeds
what it is paying for capital.

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Economic Value Added

Net operating profit after-tax (NOPAT)


is income before interest expense but
after tax.

Economic value added (EVA) =


adjusted NOPAT – (weighted average cost of
capital × adjusted average invested capital)

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Learning Incentives from Income,
Objective 5
ROI, or Economic Profit

Why do some companies prefer


economic profit (or EVA) to ROI?

ROI can motivate segment managers to make


investment decisions that are not in the best
interests of the company as a whole.

Economic profit (or EVA) motivate managers to


invest only in projects earning more than the
cost of capital because only those projects
increase the division’s economic profit.

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Invested Capital

To apply either ROI or residual income,


both income and invested capital
must be measured and defined.

 Total assets
 Total assets employed
 Total assets less current liabilities
 Stockholders’ equity

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Learning
Objective 6 Transfer Prices

The price that one segment charges another


segment of the same organization for a
product or service is a transfer price.

When one segment of a company produces


and sells an item to another segment,
a transfer price is required.

The transfer price is revenue to the producing


company and cost to the acquiring segment.

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Purpose of Transfer Pricing

A company wants profitability metrics that


reward the segment manager for decisions
that increase both a segment’s profitability
and the profitability of the entire company.

Transfer prices should guide managers


to make the best possible decisions
regarding whether to buy or sell products
inside or outside of the company.

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Learning
Objective 7 General Rule

Transfer price = Outlay cost + Opportunity cost

Outlay costs require a cash disbursement.


They are essentially the additional amount the
producing segment must pay to produce the
product or service.

Opportunity cost is the contribution to profit


that the producing segment forgoes by
transferring the item internally.

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Transfer-Pricing Systems

Transfer-pricing systems have multiple


goals. The general rule provides a good
benchmark by which to judge transfer
pricing systems.

Popular transfer-pricing systems:


1. Market-based transfer prices
2. Cost-based transfer prices
a. Variable cost
b. Full cost (possibly plus profit)
3. Negotiated transfer prices
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Market-Based Transfer Prices

If a market price exists, use it.

If there is a competitive market for the product


or service being transferred internally, using
the market price as a transfer price will
generally lead to goal congruence . . .

. . . because the market price equals the


variable cost plus opportunity cost.

Sometimes market prices are not always


available for items transferred internally.

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Market-Based Transfer Prices -
Drawbacks

When market prices don’t exist, companies


resort to cost-based transfer prices.

Cost-based transfer prices are


easy to understand and use.

Cost-based transfer prices lead to


dysfunctional decisions - decisions in
conflict with the company’s goals.

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Full-Cost Pricing

This transfer pricing system includes not only


variable cost but also an allocation of fixed
costs (and, if included, the profit mark-up.)
It is implicitly assumed that the allocation
is a good approximation of the opportunity cost.

Dysfunctional decisions arise with full-cost


transfer prices when the selling segment has
opportunity costs that differ significantly from
the allocation of fixed costs and profit.

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Variable-Cost Pricing

This transfer pricing system is


most appropriate when the
selling division forgoes no
opportunity when it transfers
the item internally.

Variable-cost transfer prices cause


dysfunctional decisions when the
selling segment has significant
opportunity costs.

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Negotiated Transfer Prices

Companies heavily committed to segment


autonomy often allow managers
to negotiate transfer prices.

Open negotiation allows the managers to


make optimal decisions.

Critics of negotiated prices focus on the


time and effort spent negotiating, an activity
that adds nothing directly to the profits
of the company.
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Learning
Objective 8 Multinational Transfer Pricing

Multinational companies use transfer


pricing to minimize their worldwide
taxes, duties, and tariffs.

Divisions in a high-income-tax-rate country


produce components for another division in a
low-income-tax-rate country. A low transfer
price would allow the company to recognize
most of the profit in the low-income-tax-rate
country, thereby minimizing taxes.
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Multinational Transfer Pricing Example

Tax authorities also recognize the incentive


to set transfer prices to minimize taxes and
import duties. Therefore, most countries
have restrictions on allowable transfer prices.

U.S. multinationals must follow an Internal


Revenue Code rule specifying that transfers
be priced at “arm’s-length” market values,
or at the price one division would pay another
if they were independent companies.

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Multinational Transfer Pricing Example

A high-end running shoe produced by an Irish


Nike division with a 12% income tax rate.

It is transferred to a division in
Germany with a 40% income tax rate.

An import duty equal to 20% of the


price of the item is imposed by Germany.

Full unit cost is $100, and variable cost is


$60 (either transfer price could be chosen).

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Multinational Transfer Pricing Example

Income of the Irish division is $40 higher:


12% × $40 = ($4.80) higher taxes

Income of the German division is $40 lower:


40% × $40 = $16 lower taxes

Import duty paid by German division:


20% × $40 = ($8)

Net savings = $3.20


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Learning
Objective 9 Management by Objectives

MBO describes the joint formulation by


a manager and his or her superior of a
set of goals and plans for achieving
the goals for a forthcoming period.

The manager’s performance is then


evaluated in relation to these
agreed-upon budgeted objectives.

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Budgets, Performance Targets, and Ethics

Many of the troublesome motivational


effects of performance evaluation
systems can be minimized by
the astute use of budgets.

The desirability of tailoring a budget


to particular managers cannot
be overemphasized.

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Budgets, Performance Targets, and Ethics

Using budgets as performance


targets also has its danger.

Companies that make meeting


a budget too important can
motivate unethical behavior.

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of the publisher. Printed in the United States of
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